The Unknown Hero of Cuban Missile Crisis

While this year global attention is rightfully focused on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, that is no excuse to forget other comparably important historical events that have played a key role in preserving and developing modern society, including the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, which shattered the Soviet-American relationship. It is common knowledge that the situation was eventually resolved by the leaders of the two global superpowers, USSR and the U.S., but little is known about the activities of the KGB’s Washington station in those hours. RIAC met with Natalia Asatur-Feklisova, daughter of Alexander Feklisov who headed the station in 1962-1964, to find out why he also deserves to be remembered as part of this history.

While this year global attention is rightfully focused on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, that is no excuse to forget other comparably important historical events that have played a key role in preserving and developing modern society, including the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, which shattered the Soviet-American relationship. It is common knowledge that the situation was eventually resolved by the leaders of the two global superpowers, USSR and the U.S., but little is known about the activities of the KGB’s Washington station in those hours. RIAC met with Natalia Asatur-Feklisova, daughter of Alexander Feklisov who headed the station in 1962-1964, to find out why he also deserves to be remembered as part of this history.

The Cuban Missile Crisis is widely known to have been resolved by the personal will of Khrushchev and Kennedy. Why do some insist this is not strictly true?

Khrushchev and Kennedy, the two leaders, took the final decision on resolving the Cuban Crisis only on October 28, 1962, while the issue arose on October 14 when American reconnaissance aircraft detected missile launchers built in Cuba to threaten the United States. Americans believe that the crisis lasted 13 days, and the book Thirteen Days by Robert Kennedy, which was published six months later, was the first chronological account of those terrifying events.

The previous year, Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet Army General Staff decided to defend Cuba from any possible U.S. encroachment and launched the top-secret operation Anadyrto equip the island with nuclear missiles and a contingent to operate the launchers.

James Blunt presented the book to Alexander
Feklisov during the conference marking the 27th
anniversary of the settlement with
a commemorative inscription "To Alexander
Fomin, the man I have always longed to meet
and the person who played a key role in
a momentous event of our times."

In those days, official diplomatic channels between the USSR and the U.S. were nonexistent. The Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin and Ambassador to the United Nations Valerian Zorin knew nothing of these developments, still less the diplomatic missions to the United States. Hence, none were in a position to adequately respond to the alarmed inquiries emanating from the American side.

The hotline between Moscow and Washington established only several months after the crisis. In a situation like this, a great deal hinged on informal contacts between Soviet intelligence officer Alexander Feklisov and John Scali, a top reporter with ABC News, who was close to President Kennedy's family.

According to some historians, John Scali and Alexander Fomin, my father's alias for the U.S. mission, became the "soldiers in the battlefield," who prepared the groundwork for the eventual resolution. The two men met over a period of 18 months and exchanged official information.

The American side recognized the role of this Fomin-Scali channel, which was described in detail by James Blunt in his book On the Brink. The author presented the book to Alexander Feklisov during the conference marking the 27th anniversary of the settlement with a commemorative inscription "To Alexander Fomin, the man I have always longed to meet and the person who played a key role in a momentous event of our times."

One of those days my father also received a gift form John Scali – a book by McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor during the Cuban Scare, and in 2000 the film Thirteen Days with a character named Alexander Fomin was made based on the book by Robert Kennedy.

Regrettably, the Soviet side was extremely slow to recognize this informal channel. The first article to unveil the truth – Unknown Facts of the Cuban Settlement – appeared in 1990 in a military history magazine. In 1994, my father released his first book Beyond the Seas and on the Island in the series Firsthand Info on Intelligence and Espionage. In late 1999, Confessions of the Intelligence Officer, my father's main story, went out of print.

Alexander Feklisov

In 2002, the Americans held a massive celebration marking the 40-year anniversary of the Cuban Crisis resolution, and the Russian public was preparing to do the same. But the occasion was thwarted by the Nord-Ost terrorist attack in Moscow, and in the end just three minutes was given to the coverage of this planned event by TV Channel One.

Could you imagine the scenario without the KGB station’s involvement?

The world could have been exploded in an appalling nuclear disaster, and we may not have survived to see the 21st century. On October 26, 1962, John Scali and Alexander Fomin met twice – at 11 am and about 4.30 pm. John Scali presented the U.S. side’s settlement terms – decommissioning and withdrawal of Soviet missile launchers from Cuba under U.N. supervision, removal of the U.S. blockade on the island, and Washington's public guarantees of nonaggression against Cuba.

The same day Alexander Fomin cabled the conditions to Moscow. The Americans named October 27 Black Saturday, as Nikita Khrushchev was silent. By the morning of October 29, the missiles were to have been assembled and armed, and the same day President Kennedy promised his hawks would attack Cuba. Several hours before the attack, Alexander Feklisov and John Scali met again, and the Soviet station chief clearly suggested that if the Americans land in Cuba, Nikita Khrushchev might order the capture of West Berlin. Angered by the Americans, Alexander Feklisov was unauthorized to make any such statements, and understood perfectly that this could ruin his career and have even more dire consequences.

John Scali conveyed the message to the White House, which needed several hours to present the official crisis settlement scenario. Feklisov immediately informed Moscow, with the cable came before Khrushchev's eyes on October 27. Waiting for an answer, the administration delayed its Cuba operation. And on October 28 the Kremlin replied by confirming its readiness to negotiate.

Alexander Feklisov and his wife

In fact, it was a unique initiative launched by a Soviet intelligence officer rather than a meticulous KGB operation, with neither the KGB nor the Kremlin informed of Alexander Feklisov's unauthorized initiative.

The latter years of his life were rather miserable. Feklisov spent his final years trying to make the Russian authorities recognize the merits of German nuclear scientist Emil Klaus Fuchs, who participated in the U.S. A-bomb project and passed information to the Soviet intelligence because of his political convictions. My father wanted him to be posthumously awarded the Hero of Russia title, but in vain.

My parents never discussed politics in presence of us children, so I first learned about his feats in 1994 at the launch for his book Beyond the Seas and on the Island. And in 1996 my father and three of his comrades-in-arms were decorated with the Hero of Russia Gold Star.

What did your father do after the dust settled? Did he stay in Washington?

He continued his Washington mission until 1964, working on normalization of bilateral ties and the elimination of any lingering consequences of this crisis. And in November 1964 he witnessed the assassination of President Kennedy.

Interviewer: Maria Gurova, RIAC Website Editor