Time for a Reset in Russian-Saudi Relations

Almost immediately, the arrival of the 30-year-old His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud to Russia and his talks with President Putin made front-page news.

As a matter of fact, in claiming the role of the leader of the Persian Gulf and the Arab World, Saudi Arabia is in the midst of a very significant political transition coupled with a generational change in its national leadership.

Almost immediately, the arrival of the 30-year-old His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud to Russia and his talks with President Putin made front-page news.

As a matter of fact, in claiming the role of the leader of the Persian Gulf and the Arab World, Saudi Arabia is in the midst of a very significant political transition coupled with a generational change in its national leadership. Although the country’s domestic structure is quite fragile, the Saudis still have marked influence over regional processes, sometimes destructively from the viewpoint of Russia. For many years, disagreements between Riyadh and Moscow have been steadily increasing, the former generally unhappy about Russia's loyalty to Saudi opponents and enemies, while the latter is frustrated by Saudi support for radical Islam groups, including those involved in terrorist attacks on Russia's territory.

To this end, the meeting between President Putin and Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, who combines the posts of defense minister and deputy prime minister, the first leader with such titles in four years, appears to be a major development for the bilateral relationship. However, the statistics conceal much more important matters. Even the official list of issues covered by the two leaders is quite meaningful given the inclusion of investment and electric power (not incidentally at Pulkovo airport, His Highness was met by Energy Minister Alexander Novak and Director General of Russian Fund for Direct Investments Kirill Dmitriyv), peaceful nuclear projects, joint GLONASS-based projects and arms supplies to Saudi Arabia (the Iskander-E short-range ballistic missile system). The weapons part is especially noteworthy, since it gives Russia the opportunity to fill at least a small niche in the U.S.-dominated market.

As far as the visit of Prince bin Salman is concerned, the American factor appears quite important. First, the Saudis and the other monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula are frustrated with the regional moves of the Obama administration. Many local experts and military and political leaders regard them exclusively as part of an attempt to build the president's political legacy amid the loss of a strategic vision. The same refers to the U.S. concessions on the Iranian nuclear program and the haste to sign a full-fledged agreement with Tehran before Mr. Obama leaves the White House. Although the American presence on Saudi territory provides Riyadh with a sense of security, true faith in allied guarantees is gone. Moreover, since the greater part of the dialogue between Russia and the Gulf states has been focused on Syria with Moscow's stance coming across as the most principled, the Saudis tend to think (reasonably or not) that the solution to the Syria conundrum should be sought in Moscow rather than in Washington.

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Since the greater part of the dialogue between Russia and the Gulf states has been focused on Syria with Moscow's stance coming across as the most principled, the Saudis tend to think that the solution to the Syria conundrum should be sought in Moscow rather than in Washington.

Second, the Gulf countries are seriously worried by the prospects for the expansion of Russian-American confrontation in the region, since they acknowledge that Russia's national interests and foreign policy are being perceived through the prism of the "critical Western debate on Russia." They are sure that the U.S. factor could be minimized only through a direct dialogue with Moscow, which might bring more Russian flexibility on Syria and more cooperation on other regional matters. At the same time, a direct dialogue should help better understand Russian motives in the area. In other words, the Gulf countries need a new Russian policy in the region and also would also like to understand Moscow's true intentions. Hence, they are working hard to arrange negotiations along various tracks at the expert, diplomatic and top levels. This development is significant because the long-standing period of accusations may be followed by a window of opportunities, although even such a hypothetical probability seems temporary bearing in mind the extreme volatility of the Middle Eastern processes and their penchant for fast political transformations.

In this regard, Russia should carry out at least two important foreign policy tasks. The first relates to the timely and properly forecasting of regime change in Syria which will sooner or later take place. If this happens contrary to Moscow's efforts, the need for Russia will considerably subside, while the Russian Federation might lose its only outpost in the region and suffer major reputational damage as a state that has misplaced its bets and has been defeated after nonstop wrangling. If Moscow still views President Assad as the least of all evils, the relevant argumentation must be revised. As a matter of fact, current cooperation is reasonable with regards to the domestic audience but is hardly convincing elsewhere.

The Gulf countries need a new Russian policy in the region and also would also like to understand Moscow's true intentions.

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However, neither the Saudis nor their Gulf Cooperation Council partners have a constructive answer to Russia's potentially main question, i.e. the Syria situation after Assad and regional consequences.

One of Moscow's basic concerns that is being used as a guideline for its Middle East policy is related to the expansion of the Islamic State and overall Islamic radicalism threats to the vulnerable parts of Russia. However, this idea barely resonates with Gulf leaders. Some of them sincerely believe that a small group of Russians fighting on the side of IS cannot destabilize such a vast country and, consequently, this development cannot justify Moscow's current stance on Syria. Others recognize the Islamist threat but find it insufficient to "exchange the favors of the Arab world for the support of dictators."

The first approach reflects the inadequate and incomplete understanding of the essential threats to Russian domestic security. The second one suggests some trickery on the part of the Gulf countries which are trying to supplant the pan-Arab agenda with their own. However, this fact should not negate the need for regular and adequate communication of Russia’s basic motivations to the political and advisory establishments of the Arabian monarchies, complete with reasoning that matches their own visions.

However, neither the Saudis nor their Gulf Cooperation Council partners have a constructive answer to Russia's potentially main question, i.e. the Syria situation after Assad and regional consequences. These proposals are far from convincing enough to expect changes in Moscow's position. In other words, the Arabian monarchies appear to have enough food for reflection if they really want Moscow to change its course. As far as Russia is concerned, these contacts provide it with an extra opportunity to restore its regional status after the Arab Spring, at least the public perception of it. Even if no breakthrough happens at the highest level, the push towards dialogue could give Russian-Saudi contacts some regularity, bolstered by economic and especially energy cooperation, a definite success in the current environment.