To BRICS or Not to BRICS: the Group’s Future After Expansion

The year 2024 has already made BRICS history with the admission of new members. In the run-up to the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22–24, much of the conversation is often centered on the intrigue of which national leaders will attend the October summit and who will be next in line to join this elite club. Against this backdrop, the key question of what documents will be adopted and what decisions will be made during the gathering has been pushed to the sidelines. It is not entirely clear what the scale of BRICS enlargement will be after 2024. There is no doubt that the grouping will welcome new members in the next three to five years. However, it is not clear whether admissions will be selective or occur in groups of five, as was done under the Russian presidency. Some of these questions may be answered after the summit in Kazan, where the new status of a “BRICS partner” is expected to be conceptualized. More than 40 countries have already expressed interest in joining BRICS. The admission of so many states is no longer a wave but a tsunami of expansion, which cannot but affect the bloc’s dynamics, as well as its members’ ability to coordinate efforts and reach consensus on a wide range of issues.

BRICS is about to face the first stress test in this new format, if Iran and Saudi Arabia join its ranks. Despite the historic restoration of diplomatic relations, the two nations still have a long way to go before fully normalizing their dialogue. The potential accession of Vietnam, which will participate in the Kazan summit in the BRICS Plus/Outreach format, should be viewed in the same light. Hanoi’s strained relations with Beijing may slow down discussions on certain issues, especially in areas most sensitive to both.

The flexibility and informal status of BRICS, often dismissed as weaknesses, are in many ways one of the main drivers behind the growing interest in the bloc and the eagerness of countries to join. Potential members are fully aware that they will not have to undergo a strict “vetting procedure” to enter the club, as is the case with some regional organizations, nor will they need to assume any legal obligations. Candidates also understand that joining BRICS is a hassle-free process, without any additional costs or sacrifices such as losing economic resources or giving up national sovereignty. However, it would be naïve to think that potential candidates view BRICS membership as nothing more than a symbolic gesture, aimed solely at improving their image. Each country is guided by pragmatic considerations and sees BRICS as a tool to enhance its economic resilience.

However, it seems that the criteria and expected performance indicators used to evaluate the activities of integration blocs—such as direct economic benefits for businesses and citizens or the removal of various trade barriers—are completely inapplicable to BRICS. On that score, attempts to blindly copy the experience or imitate the integration and bureaucratic practices of the EU or EAEU will not deliver the expected results for BRICS. For this reason, it is rational to continue viewing BRICS in the future as a testing ground for shaping joint agendas, creating and “testing” new frameworks, joint initiatives and formats of interaction.

One major area of focus is the development of an alternative monetary and financial system, a topic that has been frequently raised at BRICS summits. In this context, one of the key challenges that Russia, China and India, the most active players in the bloc, will soon have to address is how to seamlessly integrate new participants into the promotion of existing initiatives and projects. Among these proposed projects is BRICS Bridge, a platform for cross-border payments, which will allow transactions in digital financial assets.

Another promising area of BRICS activity is the development of a framework for an emerging non-Western food security system. BRICS nations have the potential to increase agricultural production and exports. Moreover, many new and potential members of the grouping are still struggling to ensure their own food security. The establishment of a BRICS grain exchange, which could happen as early as this year, could be a major step in addressing this strategic issue.

At the same time, if BRICS continues to expand without any meaningful substance in the form of ready-made platform solutions or the implementation of new financial, environmental, technological and other initiatives and projects, it will reinforce the perception among many observers that BRICS is a dysfunctional political club, similar to the Group of 77, a comparison that, by definition, does not favor BRICS.

The year 2024 has already made BRICS history with the admission of new members. It seems that further expansion is only a matter of time. This change in membership numbers has effectively overshadowed the substantive agenda of Russia’s presidency at the media and socio-political levels.

Interestingly, in the run-up to the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22–24, much of the conversation is often centered on the intrigue of which national leaders will attend the October summit and who will be next in line to join this elite club. Against this backdrop, the key question of what documents will be adopted and what decisions will be made during the gathering has been pushed to the sidelines.

Striking a balance between quantitative expansion and qualitative deepening is the key challenge for BRICS in the coming years. So the efficiency and positioning of the expanded BRICS will depend on how well the bloc solves this equation.

Another BRICK in the Wall: Motivation of New Members

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The flexibility and informal status of BRICS, often dismissed as weaknesses, are in many ways one of the main drivers behind the growing interest in the bloc and the eagerness of countries to join. Potential members are fully aware that they will not have to undergo a strict “vetting procedure” to enter the club, as is the case with some regional organizations, nor will they need to assume any legal obligations. Candidates also understand that joining BRICS is a hassle-free process, without any additional costs or sacrifices such as losing economic resources or giving up national sovereignty.

The second reason, and at the same time a common thread among all new BRICS participants, is their positioning as non-Western centers of power and dissatisfaction with the existing status quo in the world. Leaders of Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, the UAE, Malaysia and many other new or potential BRICS members have repeatedly criticized the United States for its hegemony and Cold War mentality in foreign policy—either openly or implicitly. Many of them regularly speak about “institutional discrimination” and the flaws in the UN system, particularly the lack of permanent representation of regional powers on the Security Council.

In this regard, non-Western nations perceive BRICS as a platform for projecting a vision of the future world order that is alternative to that of the U.S. and its transatlantic allies. Simply put, the countries want to be heard in the international arena and to set their own rules of the game (to be rule-makers), rather than to play by others’ rules (as rule-takers), which they find inherently unacceptable. This sentiment is echoed by Ethiopian Ambassador to South Africa Muktar Kedir, who said that Addis Ababa’s participation in BRICS is aimed at building an inclusive and more equitable world order by deepening cooperation within the Global South.

The third reason, which logically stems from the second one, is that BRICS is not just an established brand but also a convenient platform for small and medium-sized powers to increase their agency, enhance their political capital in the world arena and strengthen their negotiating positions with larger partners.

Finally, it would be naïve to think that potential candidates view BRICS membership as nothing more than a symbolic gesture, aimed solely at improving their image. Each country is guided by pragmatic considerations and sees BRICS as a tool to enhance its economic resilience. For Egypt, the world’s largest wheat importer, joining the bloc is inextricably linked to the issue of food and energy security, a concern voiced by the country’s leaders. Ethiopia seeks to strengthen trade and economic ties within BRICS and attract investments from its members, primarily Russia, to establish economic zones and industrial parks in the country.

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A telling example is the visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who is often accused of having a pro-Western tilt, including by critics at home, to Vladivostok for the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2024. His in-person attendance at the international economic forum in Russia, largely in defiance of intense pressure from the West, cannot be explained solely by reputational concerns.

In his speech at the EEF plenary session, Ibrahim highlighted Malaysia’s role as a regional economic hub and noted Kuala Lumpur’s interest in strengthening cooperation in Islamic finance and developing high-tech solutions in energy efficiency with Russia and BRICS as a whole.

BRICS: the Widening vs. Deepening Dilemma

If we turn to traditional organizational formats (whether economic, like the EAEU, or political, like the SCO), there is a classic trade-off between widening and deepening. In other words, it is an assessment of the extent to which existing organizations are ready for quantitative enlargement in terms of institutional structure, and how adding new members will affect the dynamics of integration, as well as the economic and political processes within them. The case of the SCO shows how expansion—particularly the inclusion of Pakistan and India, which hold irreconcilable views on certain issues—led to the degradation of one of the key SCO institutions, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.

Such considerations are equally relevant for BRICS. As regional powers become more interested in BRICS activities, the grouping will increasingly often face this dilemma and the need to find an internal balance. BRICS has no fixed membership criteria, and it is likely that none will ever be set. Official statements, such as those by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, say that to join BRICS, a country must “pursue a sovereign course, play a significant role in international and regional affairs, build good-neighborly relations with BRICS nations and not to join sanctions against other association members.” On the one hand, the absence of clear membership criteria is a logical and justified step given the informal status of BRICS. Excessive bureaucratic formalities might lead to an unnecessary increase in politicization and discourage potential participants.

On the other hand, the current list of “requirements,” aside from the sanctions factor, leaves much room for interpretation. In particular, the degree of “sovereignty” in foreign policy raises questions. Can Turkey, a NATO member, or Saudi Arabia, which has finalized much of its defense agreement with the U.S. that provides Riyadh with security guarantees, be considered as actors pursuing a fully sovereign foreign policy? Similar questions arise when assessing a country’s role in international and regional affairs. For example, how can we accurately evaluate the political weight of countries like Vietnam, Nigeria, Venezuela and Syria, drawing a clear line between the regional and global dimensions of various processes? All this creates confusion that will inevitably accompany the process of reviewing applications from new participants.

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Moreover, it is not entirely clear what the scale of BRICS enlargement will be after 2024. There is no doubt that the grouping will welcome new members in the next three to five years. However, it is not clear how controlled this process will be—whether admissions will be selective or occur in groups of five, as was done under the Russian presidency. Some of these questions may be answered after the summit in Kazan, where the new status of a “BRICS partner” is expected to be conceptualized. More than 40 countries have already expressed interest in joining BRICS. The admission of so many states is no longer a wave but a tsunami of expansion, which cannot but affect the bloc’s dynamics, as well as its members’ ability to coordinate efforts and reach consensus on a wide range of issues.

BRICS is about to face the first stress test in this new format, if Iran and Saudi Arabia join its ranks. Despite the historic restoration of diplomatic relations, the two nations still have a long way to go before fully normalizing their dialogue. The potential accession of Vietnam, which will participate in the Kazan summit in the BRICS Plus/Outreach format, should be viewed in the same light. Hanoi’s strained relations with Beijing may slow down discussions on certain issues, especially in areas most sensitive to both. Consistency in foreign policy among BRICS members and candidate countries is also crucial, as it can cause reputational damage to the grouping. A prime example is Argentina: after eccentric President Javier Milei took office in December 2023, he swiftly announced that Buenos Aires was rejecting the invitation to join BRICS, undoing the agreements reached by his predecessor.

It would be naïve to expect BRICS, especially in its new composition, to quickly turn into a conveyor belt for producing ready-made financial or other products. The initiatives that have been discussed over the past five to seven years regarding financial, technological and food sovereignty within BRICS, as well as the priorities of Russia’s presidency, are inherently ambitious and long-term. Their implementation is highly susceptible to the global economic environment and faces the problem of discrepancies in technical standards, regulatory differences, persistent information gaps about the specifics of doing business in BRICS markets and more. Since 2022, there has also been growing concern among some participants about the risk of secondary sanctions for maintaining business ties with Russia.

Despite the many difficulties and often divergent interests of its members, the institutional design of BRICS remains a strategic asset for the grouping. The absence of “heavy bureaucracy” gives BRICS greater creative freedom compared to other organizations, but at the same time it opens the door to speculation and misperception about the core purpose of the platform, which is often criticized for its low efficiency and a lack of clear targets.

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However, it seems that the criteria and expected performance indicators used to evaluate the activities of integration blocs—such as direct economic benefits for businesses and citizens or the removal of various trade barriers—are completely inapplicable to BRICS. On that score, attempts to blindly copy the experience or imitate the integration and bureaucratic practices of the EU or EAEU will not deliver the expected results for BRICS. For this reason, it is rational to continue viewing BRICS in the future as a testing ground for shaping joint agendas, creating and “testing” new frameworks, joint initiatives and formats of interaction. One major area of focus is the development of an alternative monetary and financial system, a topic that has been frequently raised at BRICS summits. In this context, one of the key challenges that Russia, China and India, the most active players in the bloc, will soon have to address is how to seamlessly integrate new participants into the promotion of existing initiatives and projects. Among these proposed projects is BRICS Bridge, a platform for cross-border payments, which will allow transactions in digital financial assets.

Another promising area of BRICS activity is the development of a framework for an emerging non-Western food security system. BRICS nations have the potential to increase agricultural production and exports. Moreover, many new and potential members of the grouping are still struggling to ensure their own food security. The establishment of a BRICS grain exchange, which could happen as early as this year, could be a major step in addressing this strategic issue.

At the same time, if BRICS continues to expand without any meaningful substance in the form of ready-made platform solutions or the implementation of new financial, environmental, technological and other initiatives and projects, it will reinforce the perception among many observers that BRICS is a dysfunctional political club, similar to the Group of 77, a comparison that, by definition, does not favor BRICS.