Turkey’s Policy in Central Asia: Are Ambitions Well-Founded?

Recently, the attention of the international community has been focused on Central Asia. This is largely due to events that are directly or indirectly linked to Central Asia, such as the Taliban coming to power, the situation in Kazakhstan, the CSTO ramping up its activities, etc. Turkey has become particularly active amid these developments, positioning itself as the leader of the “Turkic world” and attempting to become just as involved in the events as the principal non-regional actors, such as Russia and China.

Today, Turkey is positioning itself as a leader in several regions at once, including the “Turkic world,” emphasizing the country’s global importance as an ascending power centre in the multipolar international system and making its policies in Central Asia critically important. One should not forget that, despite its activity and ambitions, this policy has several limiting factors. Despite the often drawn parallel between Turkey’s current actions in Central Asia and Russia’s Middle Eastern “comeback” in 2015, Turkey remains a secondary non-regional actor in Central Asia, just like in the 1990s. This much is confirmed by how little room for manoeuvre the country has in the security sphere and its inability to become directly involved in tackling crises, which is primarily Russian competence.

Despite Turkey stepping up its political activities in Central Asia, the country’s ambitious plans in the region and the scope for increasing its influence in the region, these plans appear to be largely far-fetched and implausible in the long term. This, however, does not negate the growing importance of Turkey for Central Asia in terms of building strategies for third parties (Russia, China, etc.). We believe that the main condition for events to take a favourable turn for Turkey is the strengthening of its economic cooperation with other countries in the region, which would not only complement Turkey’s cultural and humanitarian activities but would also serve as the foundation of the country’s influence in the region.

Recently, the attention of the international community has been focused on Central Asia. This is largely due to events that are directly or indirectly linked to Central Asia, such as the Taliban coming to power, the situation in Kazakhstan, the CSTO ramping up its activities, etc. Turkey has become particularly active amid these developments, positioning itself as the leader of the “Turkic world” and attempting to become just as involved in the events as the principal non-regional actors, such as Russia and China.

However, the start of this activity coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which weakened the importance of Turkey as the outpost of the Western bloc and brought to the fore the issue of extending Turkey’s influence into newly established Central Asian states. The Turkish model of development was seen as the key instrument in this context, combining a secular democratic political system, respect for Islamic values, socially oriented state policies, and market economy. The factor of ethnic and denominational closeness of states was of additional importance and was used as an argument in favour of Turkey developing its status of an international representative of Turkic countries. However, regional states were unwilling to continue their development under the leadership of another “ruler,” and Turkey was forced to confine itself to economic, cultural and humanitarian interactions with these states.

Turkey’s Principal Areas of Cooperation with Central Asian States

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Economic Cooperation

Today Turkey’s attempts to enhance its regional standing hinge on deepening economic cooperation with Central Asian states. Ankara views Central Asia primarily as a promising area of investment in transportation infrastructure. Creating new highways and transport routes is instrumental in overcoming the infrastructural dependence of post-Soviet republics on Russia, which is why the countries in the region are offering so many projects. Attendees at the December 2018 Turkic Council commodities expo noted that Turkish investment in Central Asia exceed USD 85 bn. Turkey has recently invested in several large-scale projects, such as building an international port in Ashgabat and rebuilding Turkmenbashi International Seaport. Moreover, in 2020, Turkey’s TAV Airports Holding acquired one hundred per cent of the shares in the airport in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city. Further plans are also ambitious: together with China, Turkey intends to implement a trans-Caspian transportation route, a transportation artery that will connect the Turkic world. By building this corridor, Turkey will ensure direct access to Central Asia, which in turn will allow it to increase industrial exports and raw materials imports. The region is also of interest to Ankara in terms of diversifying energy supplies to Turkey. Ankara seeks to increase deliveries of Kazakhstan’s oil via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and Turkmenistan’s gas deliveries via the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, part of the Southern Gas Corridor project. Such plans illustrate Ankara’s intention to become a Eurasian “energy hub,” transporting gas to Europe from Russia, Central Asia, Azerbaijan and the Eastern Mediterranean.

It should be noted that Ankara has considerable resources for achieving its goals: the countries in Central Asian and Turkey have radically different economic structures, therefore, Turkey is capable of meeting the demand for the commodities these countries do not produce themselves. However, exports are limited owing to the absence of a well-developed infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2020, trade turnover between Turkey and Central Asian states increased from USD 5.5 bn to USD 6.3 bn. This figure accounts for just over 1.5 per cent of Ankara’s total foreign trade turnover, which shows that there is significant potential for growth in the area. Turkey mostly trades with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Its trade turnover with each of these states exceeds USD 2 bn, yet Turkey is not even in the top three largest trade partners of either country. It is hard for Turkey to compete with Russia and China, and Ankara’s successes in building up its economic presence in Central Asia pale in comparison with what these more prominent actors have achieved.

Military Cooperation

In addition to stepping up economic cooperation, Turkey also wishes to bolster its military relations with Central Asian states. We are talking here primarily about bilateral contacts with the countries in the region, contacts that have recently reached a new level. Today, the idea of establishing a Turan Army—a military bloc involving Turkic states—is being extensively discussed. Back in 2013, the first steps in this direction were taken following the founding of the Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status (TAKM), which includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. Kazakhstan has also expressed a desire to accede to the TAKM. The purpose of the organization is to develop cooperation between the military law enforcement agencies of its member states. The organization aims to combat organized crime, terrorism and smuggling in the Caucasus and Central Asia. That said, the TAKM has not achieved any considerable success, although it was the first attempt at creating a prototype military organization that had the potential to become a platform for communication between all the law enforcement, military and security agencies in the region with Ankara at the helm of it.

Talks on strengthening military cooperation between Turkey and Central Asian countries started after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was resumed in 2020. In October 2020, at the height of military hostilities, Minister of National Defence of Turkey Hulusi Akar visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During his visit, Turkey and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on military and military-technical cooperation, and a Turkey–Kazakhstan strategic partnership was also under discussion. Experts treated this small tour as the start of a project to build a unified Turkic army. Talks about the “Turan Army” gathered steam once again after Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mevlüt Çavuşoglu visited Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in March 2021. Creating an Ankara-led military and political bloc may boost Turkey’s standing in the race for regional leadership. However, there are a number of factors that may derail Turkey’s plans, despite the ambitious nature of the project. First, other influential forces in Central Asia (Russia, China and Iran) may view the creation of a Turan Army as a threat to their security. Second, one needs to keep in mind that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the CSTO, while Turkey is a member of NATO. Should these countries accede to a new bloc, the inevitable question will arise—what their status will be in their traditional alliances and if they will retain any status at all. Finally, before creating a Turan Army, Turkey needs to achieve greater progress in other areas of cooperation with Central Asian states. In addition, the lack of an appropriate level of resources—in the broad sense—is a major hindrance to military integration.

Soft Power

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Back in the 1990s, Turkey relied on both economic levers and the use of a broad range of soft power instruments in Central Asia. For instance, Turkey’s regional policy was largely founded on several principal areas that included promoting the Turkish language, culture and history, and, more broadly, the Turkish education system. Within the framework of Turkish soft power policy, there are a number of core priority goals, such as developing (under Turkey’s leadership) a “new Turkic identity” based primarily on the idea of cultural and religious commonality that produces a single complex of values underlying the worldview of peoples in Turkic-speaking countries. This will prospectively serve as a foundation for effective economic and political interactions [1]. Another important vector is maintaining ties with ethnic Turks capable of lobbying Turkey’s interests beyond its borders and creating favourable conditions for developing the country’s international activities. This is achieved by preserving and increasing the knowledge and awareness of the history, culture and language of Turkey and Turkic peoples through establishing programmes for bilingual children, holding educational events dedicated to the country’s history and culture, implementing educational programmes, etc.

The task of creating and upholding the “new image” of the country—which has been undergoing major changes since the 2010s—is equally important for Turkey. While initially the “Turkish model” was showcased as an effective synthesis of Islamic values, democratic social customs and a prospering market economy, in the early 2010s—owing to a number of foreign (the Arab Spring) and domestic (the transformation in the politics of the ruling Justice and Development Party) political developments—Turkey started to emphasize its image as a “defender of Muslims and Turks” throughout the world. To achieve these goals, Turkey also actively disseminates the products of its popular culture, primarily Turkish cinema and the entertainment sector as a whole. Thus, images connected with Turkey’s cultural, historical and religious status—the ones Turkey needs to bolster—are being instilled in the public mind in the countries of the region. This is closely associated with an intensification of humanitarian aid activities, which include infrastructure and logistics projects in the areas outlined above, rather than direct financial payments and debt relief.

The Institutional Foundations of Turkey’s Central Asian Policy

The institutional component of Turkey’s Central Asian policy is one of its most controversial elements. On the one hand, there is a highly visible and ramified network of institutions that Turkey has been actively using since the 1990s as its regional conduit. On the other hand, the main weaknesses of these institutions—the fragmented, largely perfunctory nature and low efficiency—are undeniable. It is therefore important that, while studying Turkey’s regional policies and standing, we consider this aspect and identify several blocs in the existing network of institutions within the framework of Turkey’s regional policies.

The first bloc comprises the Turkic Council (renamed the Organization of Turkic States in 2021) and a complex of organizations operating under its auspices. This is the organization that Turkey currently sets as the central venue for integration and interaction among Turkic states. Turkey’s intention to make this institution wield more weight is evidenced by the Organization’s involvement in settling the latest events in Kazakhstan. Today, the organization includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, and it has such branches as the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY), the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries, the International Turkic Academy and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation. These organizations are focused on spreading and strengthening cultural ties, bolstering political dialogue, developing research into the Turkic world, and preserving and protecting the cultural heritage of Turkic countries. As for the global purpose of this institutional bloc, it is intended to develop effective integration between members of the Turkic world based on strengthening cultural, educational, social, political and economic ties. All of this is based on Turkey's concept of the existence of a unified Turkic world, hence, a Turkic identity.

The second institutional bloc is linked to the educational and, more broadly, social and cultural vector of Turkey’s activities, serving as the foundation of the country’s Central Asian policy. In this regard, mention should be made of the Yunus Emre Foundation and its Yunus Emre Institute, which has offices throughout the world under the name of Yunus Emre Cultural Centers. Although the Centers do not currently have offices in Central Asia, the Foundation runs projects and holds events tailored for the Central Asian population. As of late, the Maarif Foundation has taken on an important function: it is engaged in promoting Turkish education and developing Turkey’s international connections in this area, supervising the functioning of Turkish educational institutions abroad and being partly involved in offering foreigners preferential terms for pursuing education in Turkey. It is important that the Foundation has stepped up its activities in re-orienting the extensive network of FETO-connected educational institutions. FETO is the organization that, according to some reports, was directly involved in arranging the failed military coup in Turkey in 2016.

Another important organization is the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities that, in addition to working with compatriots and running the state scholarship programme “Turkish Scholarships,” is promoting Turkish education and the study of the Turkish language, history and culture abroad, primarily in Central Asia, as the organization’s institutions are mostly geared towards these countries. Organizations such as the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) also carry out auxiliary social and cultural functions. Diyanet operates in over 140 countries, promoting religious education and introducing the population to cultural values through a network of schools, universities, educational courses, etc.

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The third is the humanitarian organization bloc that implements the humanitarian policy proposed by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu back in the early 2000s—a person-centered policy intended to improve people’s lives in a global context. In this regard, special mention should be made of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), which was originally conceived specifically for Central Asian states. TİKA is the principal institution engaged in providing official development aid (ODA) offered by Turkey as a member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Agency has expanded its activities far beyond Central Asia, as it runs projects in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, etc. Turkey is an increasingly active humanitarian aid donor today, and one of the leaders in this area in terms of the GDP percentage allocated for the purpose. The principal recipients of Turkish humanitarian aid have changed significantly over the last decade, with a shift to Middle Eastern and African countries, although Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are still in the Top 10. Additionally, there are several auxiliary organizations such as Kızılay, AFAD, etc. that are important for Turkey’s overall humanitarian policy. However, they are not as focused on Central Asia.

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Today, Turkey is positioning itself as a leader in several regions at once, including the “Turkic world,” thereby emphasizing the country’s global importance as an ascending power centre in the multipolar international system and making its policies in Central Asia critically important. One should not forget that, despite its activity and ambitions, this policy has several limiting factors. Despite the often drawn parallel between Turkey’s current actions in Central Asia and Russia’s Middle Eastern “comeback” in 2015, Turkey remains a secondary non-regional actor in Central Asia, just like in the 1990s. This much is confirmed by how little room for manoeuvre the country has in the security sphere and its inability to become directly involved in tackling crises, which is primarily Russian competence.

This is precisely why, despite its buoyant military cooperation rhetoric, Turkey emphasizes the areas where the influence of other actors is limited. These are, for instance, culture, education, economy, and the humanitarian component. However, given the specific nature of non-traditional elements manifesting in foreign policy, this orientation is not in itself evidence of success and effectiveness. Moreover, the lack of result in “bringing” the region under the Turkish “leadership” and the dominance of bilateral interactions based primarily on the pan-Turkism ideology also appears to limit Turkey’s actions. The actual effectiveness of the current institutional foundation for interactions remains low. Finally, perhaps one of the main points is that, compared to other non-regional actors in Central Asia (primarily Russia and China), Turkey objectively does not have enough resources (financial, military, technological, etc.). At the same time, Turkey still exhibits, although much less noticeably, a multilateral approach in foreign policy.

These developments demonstrate that, despite Turkey stepping up its political activities in Central Asia, the country’s ambitious plans in the region and the scope for increasing its influence in the region, these plans appear to be largely far-fetched and implausible in the long term. This, however, does not negate the growing importance of Turkey for Central Asia in terms of building strategies for third parties (Russia, China, etc.). We believe that the main condition for events to take a favourable turn for Turkey is the strengthening of its economic cooperation with other countries in the region, which would not only complement Turkey’s cultural and humanitarian activities but would also serve as the foundation of the country’s influence in the region.

1. Sarimsokov, Z. “The Turkic Factor in Turkey’s Soft Power Policy in its Relations with Central Asian States.” Postsovetskye issledovaniya, 7 (2020): 613.