Turkey: The Missing Link?

The events that took place on the border between Turkey and Syria in late July 2015 prompted Ankara to join the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Today, Turkey is reaping the fruits of its anti-Damascus, pro-Islamist policy. However, bombing ISIS positions will not weaken the organization, nor will opening U.S. air bases on Turkish territory. The only thing that will do this is closing the border between Turkey and Syria, which will deprive it of its main source of logistical, military and financial support.

The events that took place on the border between Turkey and Syria in late July 2015 prompted Ankara to join the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). What is the significance of the decision?

On July 20, 2015, a suicide bomber attacked the Kurdish Amara Culture Centre in the city of Suruc, killing 32 people and injuring another 100. Two days later, in Ceylanpinar, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activists killed two Turkish policemen whom they suspected of working with ISIS. The following day, on July 23, a skirmish between the Turkish army and jihadists on the border between Turkey and Syria resulted in the deaths of a Turkish soldier and an ISIS fighter, prompting an immediate and severe reaction from Ankara, which bombed ISIS positions from both ground and air. This marks the first time that the Turkish army has been involved in a direct cross-border confrontation with ISIS in Syria. All this came in the midst of the July 23 decision of the Turkish authorities to allow the United States to use two of its military air bases, including the NATO Incirlik Air Base in the south of the country – the culmination of several months of negotiations between Washington and Ankara on the use of Turkish territory in the fight against ISIS in Syria. What is more, on July 25, the Turkish Air Force attacked PKK positions in Northern Iraq. This was the first attack of its kind since 2011, when Turkey bombed the region for six consecutive days. The Turkish police ended up detaining hundreds of armed Kurds and Islamists.

The events of July 2015 exposed two interconnected security issues. The July 20 attack demonstrated that the military operations being carried out by Kurds and jihadists in Syria and Iraq have spread to Turkish territory. And, politically speaking, the killing of PKK members by the Turkish police on July 22 highlighted the internal security problems facing the country. The support provided by PKK members to Syrian Kurds from the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and their armed People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the fight against ISIS has helped them to strengthen their positions. The Turkish Kurds have increased their political weight as well thanks to the explosion in popularity of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) – a Kurdish Party – which received 13 per cent of the votes in the general election held on June 7, 2015. The events of July 22, therefore, were a reaction to the terrorist attack that happened two days earlier and aimed at the Turkish authorities: the PKK crossed the line in its relations with Ankara, which had in recent years adopted a passive stance towards jihadists (if not supporting them), counter to the interests of the Kurds.

REUTERS/Huseyin Aldemir
Pavel Shlykov:
Suruc Terrorist Attack in the Context of
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These attacks and retaliatory moves by the Turkish authorities put an end to the ceasefire between Ankara and the PKK, which had lasted for over two years. And the events occurred at a delicate time for Turkey: a government has still to be formed following the June 7 elections; the neo-Ottoman policies of President Erdoğan are not bearing fruit; and the Turkish economy is faltering (showing 2.9 per cent growth in 2014, compared with 9.2 per cent in 2010).

Turkey’s support of the U.S.-led coalition may seem to be significant: on the one hand, the Turkish army is modern and well equipped, and as a member of NATO, it enjoys interoperability with the U.S. Air Force. On the other hand, Turkey’s proximity to the areas where the armed conflicts are taking place means that the U.S. Air Force can be sent into Syria far more quickly. In any case, by entering the fight against IS, Ankara has become a target for terrorists, thousands of whom crossed the Turkish border in 2011 to fight against Bashar al-Assad’s army.

We should not overestimate the political consequences of Ankara’s decision to join in the fight against IS. For Turkey, the main security issue is still the Kurdish question, while IS continues to be viewed as an instrument for achieving the country’s main goal in Syria, which is to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. Furthermore, the Turkish army’s direct action against ISIS raises a number of questions about just how long Turkey will be able to hold its current position and how strong it is. In this context, Turkey’s primary goal would seem to be the creation of a “buffer zone” in northern Syria that could accommodate the more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees that are currently living in camps on Turkish territory.

Ankara’s involvement was the missing link in the coalition against ISIS. Thus, if Turkey does go to war with the jihadists, then its participation could be decisive in the resolution of the conflict. This seems unlikely, however, considering Turkey’s real aim is not to topple IS, but rather to weaken the PKK’s military potential and create the “buffer zone” that it demanded in Washington back in 2011. Today, Turkey is reaping the fruits of its anti-Damascus, pro-Islamist policy. However, bombing ISIS positions will not weaken the organization, nor will opening U.S. air bases on Turkish territory. The only thing that will do this is closing the border between Turkey and Syria, which will deprive it of its main source of logistical, military and financial support.