Twelve Years into Syrian Conflict

For the past year or two, the situation in Syria has retreated into the shadow of global crises, all exacerbated by the standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine. The recent tragedy that befell Turkey and the five provinces in the neighboring Syria has once again drawn the attention of the international community not only to the loss of thousands of lives and colossal destruction but also to the extent to which these natural disasters may affect the prospects of national reconciliation in Syria and rapprochement between these two nations with a complex history of relations. While being “distracted” on the Western front, Russia still looks at Syria as an important strategic ally and at Turkey as a valuable partner, so attaining sustainable political settlement in this pivotal part of the Middle East aligns with Russia’s long-term interests.

Certainly, it is too early to make any assessments, even in regard to the short term. The political fallout from February’s natural disasters can make adjustments in one direction or another. Reconciliation between the two nations, which are burdened by the heavy legacy of the past and the very recent present, cannot be rapid anyway. At this stage, we are talking about gradual steps toward rapprochement and confidence-building to ensure the sustainability of this process. The “long game” has begun, which may determine not only the modalities of the Syrian settlement, but also the place of this explosive region in global affairs. The initial results of the work in the trilateral format, which has, importantly, the support of Iran, and the world’s reaction to this turn of events enable us, nevertheless, to draw some preliminary conclusions.

First. The rapid changes in the global and regional domains have led the leaders of Syria and Turkey to realization that continued brinkmanship entails dangerous economic, sociopolitical and humanitarian consequences for both countries. On this ground, there has been a convergence of interests, allowing for mutual benefits.

Second. In this environment, Russia acts, if not as a mediator, as a connecting link that ensures gradual movement forward. As the experience of world diplomacy showcases, such missions require the “moderator” to be not just flexible and unbiased in understanding concerns of the parties, their vision of the root causes of the conflict, but also to have an own vision of what to do in the actual situation.

Third. The Biden administration’s response to the triple-format talks between Syria, Turkey, and Russia was quite revealing. In this particular situation, the U.S. has openly shown itself to be a “spoiler” of multilateral efforts to unblock a Syrian settlement.

Fourth. The time has come when Syria and Turkey have matured enough to understand the need of seeking compromises on the basis of their common vision of the future in the new geopolitical environment. Be that as it may, the Syrian settlement, like it or not, remains part of the confrontational agenda on a global scale. In fact, with the inclusion of Syria, two “foursomes” were formed – the “Astana format” and the “Western format.” Turkey is an important link in this arrangement. Its position could become a turning point in the development of the situation in the entire region towards stabilization or a new round of military escalation.

For the past year or two, the situation in Syria has retreated into the shadow of global crises, all exacerbated by the standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine. The recent tragedy that befell Turkey and the five provinces in the neighboring Syria has once again drawn the attention of the international community not only to the loss of thousands of lives and colossal destruction but also to the extent to which these natural disasters may affect the prospects of national reconciliation in Syria and rapprochement between these two nations with a complex history of relations. While being “distracted” on the Western front, Russia still looks at Syria as an important strategic ally and at Turkey as a valuable partner, so attaining sustainable political settlement in this pivotal part of the Middle East aligns with Russia’s long-term interests.

An outside observer might get the impression that the armed opposition has been defeated and pacified with the end of the civil war, or that the conflict has entered some frozen stage. Government institutions, centrally and locally, are functioning normally in accordance with the 2012 constitution (presidential, parliamentary and local elections have been held over the past three years). In contrast, by the way, to the neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, where occasional mass protests flare up and the political system often fails. By Middle East standards, Syria can hardly be considered a “failed state” in this sense, and the autocratic methods of governance there are not much different from those used in most other Arab states. Many experts even speak of the “new authoritarianism” as a new phenomenon in the Middle East, after the series of upheavals in 2011.

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Yet, despite the cessation of large-scale hostilities, the Syrians are still far from sharing a common vision of their country’s future between themselves. The situation in Syria can be compared to “smoldering embers,” where any wind rush might rekindle the fire. A prolonged state of “no war, no peace” is fraught with the risks of unintended clashes and provocations, with four states still keeping military contingents on close lines of contact. A multitude of non-state actors and militias operating outside major urban centers makes the military geography even more chaotic.

The country is divided into spheres of influence. The government controls 68% of the territory, including major cities in the central part and along the Mediterranean coast, with most of the population (14 million) concentrated there. The northern strip along the Syrian-Turkish border is divided into three semi-autonomous entities: four enclaves de facto tied to Turkey after Istanbul has conducted four military operations (Al-Bab in 2016, Afrin in 2018, Ra’s Al-Ain and Tell Abyad in 2019, provinces of Northern Aleppo and Southern Idlib in 2020), a Kurdish administration in the northeast (part of Hasaka province, Raqqa and Deir Az-Zor provinces), patronized by the Americans, and the province of Idlib in the northwest, controlled by Hay’a Tahrir al-Sham (listed in Russia and the UN as a terrorist organization). Several dormant cells of ISIS continue making forays from deep desert areas in the east (al-Badia).

Time after time, localized armed clashes, mysterious assassinations, exchanges of artillery and rocket attacks are frequent in different parts of the country, especially in the south (Deraa-Suweida-Quneitra triangle). Syria remains an arena for score-settling between Israel and Iran, Turkey and the Kurdish militias, as well as the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the United States. Chronic instability seems to have become the new Syrian norm. Getting used to this uncertain reality is perceived by many inside and outside Syria as something inevitable that will have to continue.

Whatever the security threats, the Syrian authorities, backed by Russia and Iran, are generally in control of the domestic political situation. Above all, real challenges to the regime’s foundations lie in the economy, which is sinking ever faster into a deep hole. The strangling effect of Western sanctions is on a rising trajectory. Preconditions for economic reconstruction and much-needed recovery projects are almost non-existent, while the changing global situation is limiting the ability of Syria’s allies to provide the financial and economic support Syria so badly needs.

The UN estimates that 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line and 70 percent need international humanitarian aid. With stalling economic growth and rising global military expenditures, one might not expect increased donor assistance from the UN and various NGOs. The UN Plan 2022 was funded only by 47%. The living standards and quality of life of the vast majority of the Syrian population is rapidly declining. Prices of basic foodstuffs have risen 30% in the last three months and fuel by 44%. The average monthly wage is $15, while the cost of living for a family of five is estimated at between $427 and $611. The population, including in Damascus, is struggling due to intermittent power cuts and fuel shortages, exacerbated after Iran cut its oil supply in half due to domestic problems.

The Syrian government, for its part, is doing its best to keep the economy afloat, mitigating the social and political consequences of the crisis through a combination of market methods and state regulation. However, with dwindling domestic resources, this is becoming much more difficult than even during the active phase of hostilities. Growing budget deficits and galloping inflation are forcing the authorities to reduce government subsidies and the range of their recipients, which previously allowed them to keep prices more or less acceptable. Youth unemployment has been steadily rising, officially surpassing 30 percent last year. The Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, Samer Al-Khalil, had to admit that the past year of 2022 was “the worst in fifty years”.

In addition to purely economic measures, power is consolidated through a system of patronage. Two levels of government have emerged – formal state institutions and a shadow network of socio-economic and sectarian relations, built vertically on the client-patron basis. Such a system constantly feeds the corrupt environment in the distribution of financial flows and natural rents. It is facilitated by the “laws” of war economy, which continue to operate in conditions of territorial fragmentation and lack of normal intra-economic ties. The centers of influence formed during the war and the business structures connected with them are not interested in any transition to peaceful development, while there has been a demand for reform in the Syrian society, among entrepreneurs from the real economy sectors and among some public officials (“Syria can no longer be what it was before the war”). Yet, in a climate of general fear, political apathy, and domination of the security services, this demand is not being voiced openly.

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UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen, in his briefings for the Security Council, has consistently urged the international community to keep Syria in the spotlight, warning of the persistent risks of an unresolved, some even say “forgotten,” conflict. In his estimation, the situation in Syria is in a “strategic stalemate”, and solution can only be found on the political track. The work of the Constitutional Committee, established with great difficulty in 2019, stands still. Since May 2022, it has virtually been paralyzed. Syrians themselves seem no longer capable of negotiating, still trapped in political delusions. The government feels like a winner and sees no worthy negotiating partners, while the disparate opposition does not give up its excessive demands and misplaced ambitions. The international backdrop also hampers multilateral efforts of groping for a tradeoff.

In the meantime, there are tangible signs in Syria and its surroundings that offer a less pessimistic outlook. The emerging trends have not yet become sustainable, but they fit quite well into the picture of a fickle Middle East, where countries prefer to seek solutions to their accumulated internal problems and to avoid American domination.

A number of important recent developments in the regional configuration are among the signs of easing of tensions. The normalization of Turkey’s relations with neighboring Arab states, including a cautious rapprochement with Syria, mitigation of most disagreements that have impeded the work of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the end to the boycott of Syria by some of them (UAE, Jordan, Bahrain), the establishment of normal interstate relations with Syria, the maintenance of hidden channels of communication between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the assistance of Arab partners, the growing role of the UAE, Egypt and Qatar as moderators of internal conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and much more. Syria is almost central to this process. There is no consensus yet on Syria’s return to the Arab League, but there is some movement in this direction. The next Arab summit is to be held in Riyadh, and a lot will hang on how much the position of Saudi Arabia will change, given the firm belief of Saudis that there should be a street with two-way traffic – “steps in exchange for steps.” The priority is given to resolving problems with the opposition on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

In Syria itself, one can also notice a slight change in the tone of the statements “from above.” President Bashar al-Assad, without going into detail, recently spoke about a “new foreign policy” and “pragmatism in the approach to international and regional transformations” at a meeting with journalists from his pool. Syria’s high-level political contacts and economic exchange with a number of Arab states, primarily neighboring Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, have intensified. Syrian authorities have lifted restrictions on trade with Saudi Arabia and toned down their anti-Saudi rhetoric. Tellingly, with a belated and politicized Western response, 74% of urgent humanitarian aid to Syria from February 6th to 13th was provided by Arab states. Assad, for his part, has opened two additional border crossings from Turkish territory (Bab al-Salameh and al-Rai) to the northwest of Syria that is not under his government’s control.

Russia’s efforts have played an important role in the warming of political climate around Syria in the Arab world, as it has shown a growing interest in finding a way out of the current stalemate. From the beginning, official Damascus has been suspicious of the three UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoys empowered under UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and of the Geneva format in general. Yet for fear of openly opposing the international community, Damascus cooperated with them, albeit with apparent reluctance. The global aggravation between Russia and the West after the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine was reflected in the approaches to the Syrian settlement. Switzerland was classified by Russia as an unfriendly state, which served as a reason to reflect on the situation in the light of new realities. The Russian side declared that it was looking for a new platform to continue inter-Syrian dialogue. The Syrian authorities proposed Damascus, but the opposition representatives in the Constitutional Committee could not agree to it for security reasons. As a result, the political process remains frozen, despite Mr. Pedersen’s international activity and his contacts with the Syrian parties. All this forced Russia to consider other options in order to move the peace process from the dead point.

By the middle of last year, closed channels of communication between Syrian and Turkish intelligence agencies had signaled the mutual willingness of both sides to continue negotiations at the military and political level as well as their interest in Russia’s assistance. In early October, Turkish President Recep Erdogan caused a political stir, when he announced a possible meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad “at an appropriate time”. Later, as he continued closed contacts with Russia’s participation, he announced that he had coordinated a mechanism of interaction on Syria through successive talks in three formats: intelligence, defense and foreign ministries. The final outcome of this series of meetings should be trilateral talks at the top level.

Certainly, it is too early to make any assessments, even in regard to the short term. The political fallout from February’s natural disasters can make adjustments in one direction or another. Reconciliation between the two nations, which are burdened by the heavy legacy of the past and the very recent present, cannot be rapid anyway. At this stage, we are talking about gradual steps toward rapprochement and confidence-building to ensure the sustainability of this process. The “long game” has begun, which may determine not only the modalities of the Syrian settlement, but also the place of this explosive region in global affairs. The initial results of the work in the trilateral format, which has, importantly, the support of Iran, and the world’s reaction to this turn of events enable us, nevertheless, to draw some preliminary conclusions.

First. The rapid changes in the global and regional domains have led the leaders of Syria and Turkey to realization that continued brinkmanship entails dangerous economic, sociopolitical and humanitarian consequences for both countries. On this ground, there has been a convergence of interests, allowing for mutual benefits.

Erdogan is known for his unexpected U-turns, although the Syrian case fits well into Turkey’s recent policy of “de-escalation on many Middle Eastern fronts.” Strong calls from Russia and the U.S. to refrain from another operation against the Kurds (this time, the two powers acted in parallel, but with different objectives in mind) gave the Turkish leader a convenient pretext for leveraging this change of political course in his favor during the election campaign. Turkey’s economic and humanitarian costs of the Syrian conflict, its policy on the Kurdish issue and increased military spending were successfully used by the opposition as one of the trump cards in the amped struggle. Whatever adjustments are made to the timing of presidential and parliamentary elections, the Turkish president can now demonstrate his intention to repatriate 500,000 Syrian refugees and provide security through less expensive non-military means.

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Damascus also expects to benefit from a rapprochement with Turkey, as it has taken note of the official confirmation from the Turkish side of the latter’s commitment to the principles of territorial integrity and the fight against terrorism. In the context of Syria’s future statehood, an agreement with Turkey is tied to addressing one of the central problems, the Kurdish one, but given the different approaches of both sides to this set of relationships, they have yet to agree on who should be classified as terrorists and who are to be seen as separatists.

Reaching some compromises will help Turkey influence the behavior of the opposition represented in the Constitutional Committee while giving the Syrian government ample justification for the concessions it will have to make sooner or later in the overall negotiating package. If it is crucial for the Syrian leadership that Turkey ultimately disassociate itself from its support to the so-called interim government and the Syrian National Army under its control as well as define its attitude to the terrorist groups in Idlib, Erdogan prioritizes Syria’s relations with the political wing (Democratic Union) and the military structure (Syrian Democratic Forces) of the Kurdish autonomy in the north-east, which, as the Turkish side claims, are closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, classified as a terrorist organization.

The movement towards “détente” with Turkey should accelerate the return of Syria to the “Arab fold” and the legitimation of the “Assad regime” in the Western world, including the establishment of a communication channel with the United States. All this is of prime importance for Syria in economic terms. The strip of territory on the Syrian-Turkish border constitutes a single environment in terms of economy, trade exchanges, transit of people and security. Even administratively, Syrian territories in this northern part are governed through the efforts of governors in the neighboring Turkish provinces, with goods and food supplies smuggled. The restoration of territorial integrity by intensifying the international political process will bring this part of the country out of the shadow of mafia structures, allowing it to stake on the inflow of foreign investment.

Second. In this environment, Russia acts, if not as a mediator, as a connecting link that ensures gradual movement forward. As the experience of world diplomacy showcases, such missions require the “moderator” to be not just flexible and unbiased in understanding concerns of the parties, their vision of the root causes of the conflict, but also to have an own vision of what to do in the actual situation. The parties to the conflict must understand that it is impossible to reach a resolution on the political track without mutual concessions. The logic of “winners and losers” is unlikely to work here. This also applies to the Kurds, who gained their “administration” during the war, but are “doomed” by history and geography to live as part of the Syrian state. The U.S. patronage will come to an end sooner or later, and the future of the Kurdish people also depends on how they build their relations with Turkey. Apparently, the illusions of “Rojava” are gradually dissipating, including under the influence of the sad experience of the Iraqi Kurds with the referendum on independence in 2017. In this sense, Russia will have to work patiently with the Syrian leadership as well, which so far has tended to equate any autonomous status with separatism.

Third. The Biden administration’s response to the triple-format talks between Syria, Turkey, and Russia was quite revealing. In this particular situation, the U.S. has openly shown itself to be a “spoiler” of multilateral efforts to unblock a Syrian settlement. The State Department’s spokesman made it clear that the U.S. does not support the upgrading of relations with Syria or “rehabilitation of the brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad”. On the U.S. initiative, a statement of about the same content was jointly made with Britain, France and Germany. Meanwhile, the U.S. intensified its military and diplomatic efforts in northeastern Syria, encouraging separatist sentiments. The U.S. Special Representative for Syria has held a series of talks with various organizations in the Kurdish leadership, with Arab tribes and national minorities in order to expand the social and ethnic base of the “Kurdish autonomy” and to strengthen its position in the region.

Fourth. The time has come when Syria and Turkey have matured enough to understand the need of seeking compromises on the basis of their common vision of the future in the new geopolitical environment. Be that as it may, the Syrian settlement, like it or not, has been and remains part of the confrontational agenda on a global scale. In fact, with the inclusion of Syria, two “foursomes” were formed – the “Astana format” and the “Western format.” Turkey is an important link in this arrangement. Its position could become a turning point in the development of the situation in the entire region towards stabilization or a new round of military escalation.