Returning to collective actions. For how long?
The ongoing deployment in Syria of the international observers’ mission gives hope for the resolution of this conflict within a framework of the international law. Both resolutions on the establishment of the monitoring mission - № 2042 of April 14 and № 2043 of April 21 – were adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council. Whether this last chance allowing to avoid a long civil war fraught with sending new shocks across the region will be used depends now on the Syrian authorities and the opposition.
The responsibility to protect or the right to change regimes?
The degree of the leadership’s responsibility for the current situation is, however, higher despite the desire to put an equal share of blame on the discordant opposition. “Each state must protect its population”- this is what the autumn 2005 UN Summit Declaration said. The Russian delegation to the Summit was headed by Vladimir Putin. But the principle of “protection responsibility” has never been made into a law albeit the international community as one of the stakeholders now and again invokes it in crisis situations.
But, is the international community prepared to be pro-active as it pledged in resolving crises when outside interference is needed? And is such an interference always associated with “military intervention”? And, finally, back in 2005 UN member-states’ leaders agreed that such kind of actions in case they are necessary must be collective and be based on the Security Council resolutions. The world learnt its lesson from the war of 2003 waged by the USA and its allies in Iraq without the UN Security Council authorization and on the far-fetched grounds of Iraq possessing WMD.
The situation in Syria is even more complicated. Russia and China twice, on October 4, 2011 and on February 4, 2012 vetoed the UN SC resolutions on Syria putting them under fire for unilateral condemnation of the Syrian government. The disagreement of Moscow and Beijing is explained by the suspicion that the principle of regime change through outside interference could be literally added to the armory of the major Western countries and their partners in the Middle East such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Israel and others.
The example of Libya demonstrated that to change the regime and catch or even execute without judicial safeguards the dictator in his rotten, clannish and nepotistic “kingdom” is much easier today than comply with the international rules among which are the non-interference into internal affairs of a state and respect for national sovereignty. It is even more difficult to live up to the criteria devised as a recommendation by the international experts for the justification of such kind of interference.
The cost of “decisive inaction”
It should be reminded that commonly five or six criteria are implied. The “consequence consideration” is one of them. It means that the consequences of interference shall not be graver than “inaction” or, as a Russian poet Fyodor Tyutchev put it, “decisive inaction”. The poet, who was also a diplomat, believed such an approach to be applied to complicated international collisions provided they did not pose an immediate threat to Russia. He indicated this in his letters to his correspondent in 1866, a century and a half ago. Today Russian diplomats when wanting to take neutral position on this or that problem often invoke this phrase.
Even today the consequences of the last year interference in Libya although endorsed by the UN Security Council seem controversial. All this as well as the intimidations of Tehran sounding from Washington and Tel-Aviv play in the hands of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Yesterday it was Libya; today it is Syria; tomorrow it will be Iran; who will be the next? For somebody it’s a matter of life and death.
The same could be attributed to the question whether those who initiated the interference an effected it can relieve themselves of the responsibility for the development of the situation in the country they took under their patronage or rather experimental country only because they are faced with other concerns, say, economic crisis, presidential elections, man-made catastrophe or natural disaster. On the other hand, if they continue to stay in the country with a view to forming local authoritative bodies and facilitating economic development, doesn’t it remind of a manifestation of neo-colonialism?
There are many disagreements to this regard but there are also some commonalities. There is, for example, an understanding that new rules of the game and new centers of power are emerging now. Maintaining the status quo will require more efforts. But fewer and fewer countries are prepared to take them. The majority opt for the changes.
On the other hand, it feels uncomfortable to act beyond the international law framework hence the issue of the current rules changing will be inevitably gaining relevance. The alternative to it at some stage is to efficiently employ the already existing capabilities. In both cases the “inaction” option seems irrelevant. With new rules being formulated, it’s necessary to be extremely pro-active.
A civil war in Syria will pose a risk for the whole region
The plan of Koffi Annan, UN former Secretary General, on Syria and the UN SC resolutions on deploying the observers’ mission is another option, i.e. an effort to effectively engage the existing instruments of international law. The difficult situation in the country with diverse religious faiths and unreliable neighbors contributed to it.
The risk of a full-scale civil war in Syria is high, besides it might spill over to the neighboring countries. The danger also lies in the possibility of it acquiring a religious character.
The population of Syria is almost 22 m people. 74% of them are Muslim Sunnites the majority of whom believe that they were not let have their fair share of power in the country. The Sunnite majority is weary of more-than-40 years-long dominance of the Assad clan.
The ruling Syrian Arab dynasty descends from the Alawis community. Back in history there were periods when neighbors did not consider this sect’s adepts Muslims because of their uncommon and eclectic religious views. That said, today the Alawis are usually percieved in the region as Muslim Shiites due to the close military and political ties established lately between the Syrian leadership and Shiite Iran allied with the Shiite organization Hisballah of Lebanon. The Alawis account for 10% of the Syrian population, or 2 m people.
Another 8 or 10% are Christians. A small in number but influential community of the Druze accounts for about 3% (less than a million) of the population. The Druze also call themselves Muslims but traditionally they try to keep neutrality in all the conflicts waiting for the moment when one of the sides takes an upper hand. Then they get ajusted to the requirements of the winner whoever it is. However, this policy doesn’t safeguard them against losses in case a conflict breaks out.
If the Muslim Sunnites enter the stand-off with the Mislim Shiites in Syria not only on socio-political but also religeous grounds it may trigger off a chain reaction of similar confrontations in neighboring countries such as Iraq and Lebanon. Their populations are also diverse in terms of national and religeous makeup, besides, they have had a sad experience of religeous conflicts. Moreover, the degree of hostilities between the Sunnites and the Shiites has been growing recently.
Foreign military intervention into one of these countries is the last resort measure with unpredictable results. At the same time, the reforms that Bashar Assad is trying to carry out do not lead to the settlement of the situation. The Syrian leader each time is overdue with the half-measures he takes but most importantly he inplements them against the backdrop of ongoing violence. During more than 18 months of the conflict, according to the UN, over 10 thousand people were killed in Syria. These are members of the opposition, the military, the regime supporters and people from the street.
Will 300 un-armed international observers deployed in Syria in compliance with Security Council resolutions adopted in April 2012 be able to put an end to this fratricide? Latest events show that in some parts of the country the UN observers’ mission has had positive effect, but it’s not true about the whole country. Three hundred inspectors is very few for Syria and their number should be increased. Perhaps, peacekeeping operation will also be required in the country.
Exit strategy for Assad
Tension will be growing again unless this measure is supported by other initiatives, and as soon as possible. The Annan six-point plan outlines some of them, eg. giving rights to citizens to peaceful demonstrations and release of political prisoners. Most important, however, is to establish a dialogue between the authorities and the opposition while realizing that very little what unites them is the demand of Bashar Assad’d resignation (he has been ruling the country since 2000).
The “Yemen scenario” is again looming large in Syria. According to it the former President of Yemen Abdallah Saleh with the help of international mediators was given guarantees against the prosecution, and on January 28, 2012 he left for the USA and later found refuge in one of the Arab countries.
The plan was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council resolution 2014 of October 21, 2011. It’s important to note that both the opposition and President Saleh himself agreed to this plan after long persuasion. In Syria only one side to the conflict, the opposition, has agreed to the plan so far. Nonetheless, this option is one of the best if the pursue the aim of avoiding the worst-case scenario: civil war in Syria, foreign military intervention in the country or other actions taken in violation of the UN Charter and in favor of unilateral measures of some groups of states. In reality there is a slim chance for establishing a dialogue for providing Assad with an exit strategy. There are, actually, two countries in the world which can persuade Assad and the people of his clan to go – Russia and Iran, with China not objecting strongly to it.
