Unraveling the Enigma: Western Expert Community Seeks to Explain Russian Policy

In their current assessments of the Ukrainian conflict, the decision-makers and commentators in Washington and other Western capitals also to a large extent rely on prevailing narratives. More often than not, this is not about understanding the logic of developments in Ukraine (Kiev’s behaviour is seen rather as a version of a general history of a young emerging democracy). Far more important is the interpretation of Russia’s foreign policy that prevails among scholars and experts.

“Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”
Winston Churchill

The Importance of Differences in Expert Community

The foreign policy of states in historical literature is often portrayed as a logical and consistent course oriented towards achieving understandable, sometimes too obvious, goals. Such orderliness is the advantage of looking from the future into the past. By contrast, current international politics presents itself to an unbiased observer, rather like a jumble of random facts, decisions and actions. Few strategies of international players contain no contradictions and ambiguities.

The uncertainty of the international environment prompts attempts to understand it, to reduce the complexity by putting it within the framework of logical and comprehensible stories that keep one afloat in the chaos of the infinite sea of information. The need for such “useful simplifications” increases at times of crisis, when risks grow and mistakes become more likely.

The ability of the narratives thus formed to explain the true motives of actors’ behaviour and especially the relevance of extrapolating them to the future has frequently been questioned.[1] Nevertheless, they remain influential instruments of orientating political leaders in complex political situations. They enable the leaders to draw on past experience and thus absolve themselves of part of responsibility for the future.

Competing Logics of Interpretation

In their current assessments of the Ukrainian conflict, the decision-makers and commentators in Washington and other Western capitals also to a large extent rely on prevailing narratives. More often than not, this is not about understanding the logic of developments in Ukraine (Kiev’s behaviour is seen rather as a version of a general history of a young emerging democracy). Far more important is the interpretation of Russia’s foreign policy that prevails among scholars and experts.

The wide variety of pronouncements on this topic nevertheless has three discernible “Russia stories” that shape the intellectual background against which the United States and its European allies make decisions. To use scientific terminology, these can be determined as constructivist, liberal and realistic. Selecting one of these explanations as a prism for interpreting current events implies different expectations concerning Russia’s next moves and different political recipes for the Western countries.

Reuters
Honour guards open the doors for Russia's President
Vladimir Putin, Crimea's Prime Minister Sergei
Aksyonov, parliamentary speaker Vladimir
Konstantinov and Sevastopol Mayor Alexei Chaliy
before a signing ceremony at the Kremlin
in Moscow March 18, 2014

The constructivist narrative that currently predominates in scholarly works and expert publications alike attempts to explain Russia’s behaviour by interpreting the country’s self-perception. It assumes that foreign policy reflects the process during which the state shapes and acquires sustainable images with regard to the international environment and its own place and role in the world.

The advocates of this approach see Moscow as a player that above all seeks to gain recognition of its special position in the global system, its belonging to the club of great powers. In the context of exacerbated contradictions between Russia and the West, applying the constructivist prism to assessing Moscow’s behaviour often sees that behaviour as stemming from resentment towards the West for neglecting its opinion, and Moscow’s desire to reaffirm its status ambitions is interpreted as a whim that addresses national psychological complexes.[2]

A continuation of that logic is the Russian leadership being accused of hegemonistic aspirations and the post-imperial syndrome. In scientific circles, “Russian expansionism” is traced back to the medieval experience of fiefdoms and the early state of Muscovy. A wide range of publications more often refers to the Soviet strategy of creating spheres of influence and maintaining bloc discipline.

In Search of an Intellectual Alternative

The prevalence of constructivist approaches to explaining Russian policy goes hand-in-hand – in foreign studies and journalism in particular – with an alternative liberal interpretation. In this case, the concept of “liberal” is used in its scientific-theoretical, and not ideological, meaning. It implies a view of the international behaviour of a state as the continuation of its domestic policy.

In that respect, Russia’s policy with regard to the United States, the European Union and the Ukrainian crisis is attributed to the predominance in Moscow of an anti-Western authoritarian coalition. Indeed, some analysts consider the current course as a means of mobilizing public support and discrediting political opposition in the country in order to shore up the position of the current leadership.[3]

Some directly accuse the Russian government of deliberately aggravating relations with the Euro-Atlantic countries to protect itself against the growing social discontent caused by the emergence of the liberal middle class and the crisis of the former economic growth model.[4]

Finally, the third prism that is present in current Western discourse on Russia is represented by realism. Realists consider Moscow’s policy to be a reaction to what it perceives as challenges to its security. They note that the expansion of Euro-Atlantic structures and Western penetration into the post-Soviet space did not take into account growing Russian fears concerning the original motives of its policy.

In the framework of that narrative, the Russian leadership is seen as a rational player confronted with growing uncertainty and its own limited potential in the context of an unfavourable external environment. Not all realists consider Moscow’s policy to be proportional to the character of the emerging challenges. Respected American expert Stephen Walt criticizes Russia for exaggerating the danger of regime change in Ukraine, unreasonably raising the stakes and being excessively cruel with regard to Kiev.[5]

Moreover, realist analysis often takes a pessimistic view of Russia’s future, the prospects for the development of its economy and maintenance of social and political stability.[6] At the same time, the majority of realists agree that Russian strategy is essentially defensive and its claims are limited by objective conditions.[7]

From Interpretation to Action Strategy

The adoption of the constructivist or liberal narrative to explain Moscow’s behaviour carries different implications for the policies of Western countries. In the former case, “Russian expansionism” has a psychological nature and is rooted in national mythology. The response can only be a firm and consistent policy of containment. Attempts at a compromise and concessions on the part of the West would in that case merely confirm the validity of Russian claims in public consciousness and fuel national ambitions.[8]

Liberal logic, on the contrary, separates the interests of the ruling elites and the aspirations of the majority of the population. It sees a solution to the existing contradictions between Russia and the West in a change of the internal political configuration in Moscow. The soft version of this policy implies an attempt to influence the assessment by the Russian ruling circles of the costs and benefits of their current course.[9] In the most radical version, it implies a change of the country’s leadership.[10] This logic dictates not so much containment as it does intimidation of the Russian elite.

Predictably, the recommendations of realists differ both from constructivist and liberal advice. In their opinion, attempts to punish, intimidate, or even replace the Russian leadership would merely strengthen existing fears in Moscow. At the same time, the policy of containment cannot be without alternatives, it has to be complemented by putting forward compromise proposals. The realistic narrative envisages convincing Russia that its fears regarding both the Ukrainian crisis and the overall trend in the development of its relations with the West are exaggerated. The implementation of this strategy does not rule out possible concessions on the part of the United States and its European partners.

With the constructivist and liberal narratives of interpreting the current crisis in relations between Russia and the West obviously prevailing in scientific, expert and political circles, the advocates of the realistic view today have less influence on the decisions being taken in Washington, Brussels and other European capitals. This is not to say that their voice is not heard at all. A recent article by John Mearshiemer in Foreign Affairs has attracted close attention and triggered a lively discussion both in the United States and in Europe.[11] However, the political recipes he and other realists propose have yet to translate themselves into attempts to find a mutually acceptable compromise, not on the part of the American leadership in any case.

Where the Imbalance of Narratives Came from

Before assessing the consequences for Russian politics of the current alignment of forces in the American expert discourse it is worth considering the causes of the perceived prevalence of the constructivist narrative, the influence of the liberal approaches and the relative sidelining of the realistic view of the situation. As opposed to the set of the more obvious and unprovable explanations that invoke Cold War stereotypes and the journalistic pursuit of eye-catching pictures in the era of round-the-clock television, two more complicated interpretations must be taken into account.

Mearshiemer J.
Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

The first is psychological in nature and is connected to the asymmetry of human perception. Scientific studies show that people tend to identify their behaviour in conflict situations with a reaction to external restrictions and threats. At the same time, the hostile actions of others are attributed to their inherent aggressiveness.[12] That is why realistic attempts to put oneself in the place of the Russian leadership often meet with a sceptical reaction. On the contrary, linking Russia’s behaviour with the foreign policy perceptions of a whole society, or of the ruling elite only, is much more in line with existing psychological expectations.

The second explanation of the prevalence of the constructivist and liberal narratives is historical and sociological in nature. It is associated with the development of Soviet Studies as a discipline in the post-war period. These studies were based on the perception of the USSR as an enigmatic and unusual structure, whose behaviour is determined by its own internal laws that defy assessment by the traditional tools of social sciences.[13] This school of thought has naturally influenced the mentality of the following generations of experts on Russia who have assimilated the established logic of culture-centric explanations.

At the same time, in the post-bipolar period specialists in the field of strategic studies, who tend to be more realistic in interpreting policy as a reaction to external threats, shifted their interest from Russia to the study of other issues.[14] Today, their unquestioned priority is for China.

The Policy of Optimizing Communication

The need to expand dialogue and establish contacts between experts and the public in different countries is often regarded as the main instrument for promoting mutual understanding and establishing constructive relations. There is no denying the fact that such links and keeping communication channels open serve a useful purpose.

At the same time, the structure of the dialogue formats and the selection of participants involved may greatly influence the effectiveness of interaction and its chances of resulting in a convergence of positions at the state level. The existence of three different interpretations of Russian foreign policy in Western discourse presupposes a diversified approach to discussing the problems connected with the Ukrainian conflict, and to the broader context of the relations between Russia and the West.

Obviously, a dialogue between the proponents of the realist understanding of the current confrontation holds out the biggest promise of a substantive discussion of existing contradictions. These adherents of the realistic approach are not inclined to think in terms of the Manichean concepts of the “community of democracies”, the “re-Sovietization of Ukraine” and the building of a “Russian world”.

The adherents of such views need not necessarily be on the periphery of political discourse in Washington and Brussels. The experience of the current U.S. administration indicates that it is sensitive to the realist interpretation of international politics. Contrary to the widespread opinion of Russian journalists, the current president has throughout his term been pursuing the line of countering the excesses of the messianism of American foreign policy rather than encouraging it. He has managed to maintain a course of relative strategic restraint in spite of the hard-line attitude of the establishment, including representatives of his own team.[15]

The Strategy of Persuasion and the Limits of Dialogue

EPA / SERGEI ILNITSKY / Vostock Photo
Ivan Timofeev:
From Russia with Concern:
A Letter to an American Friend

In the dialogue with the adherents of the liberal narrative, especially in its softer version, the question has to be raised as to whether the recommendations lobbied by these experts correspond to their own priorities. If the United States and the European Union seek to strengthen internationalist forces in Russia oriented towards cooperation with the West, the introduction of sectoral sanctions is clearly counterproductive. The sanctions make Russian business and society still more dependent on the government power that the West so fiercely seeks to isolate. What is more, the hardest hit by the overall worsening of the economic situation are the representatives of the middle class who, according to the liberal narrative, must be the main agents of change in the country.[16]

Oddly enough, the constructivist explanation of Russian policy is the most watertight of the three. Its adherents would consider nothing less than Moscow’s total capitulation in the Ukrainian conflict as proof that Russia has no imperial ambitions and does not seek to restore the Soviet Union. Since the Kremlin is unlikely to renounce support of the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, let alone its integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation, dialogue with them is unlikely to be productive.

At the same time, it is worth noting that some well-respected experts have come up with a more nuanced constructivist explanation that contains a substantial element of realism, at least in the tactical sense.[17] The negative impact of such interpretations of Russian policy in the longer perspective can only be weakened if the narrative itself loses legitimacy (at least in its current version) within the U.S. expert establishment. This is possible if real progress is made in working out compromise positions between Russia and its Western partners.

[1] Criticism of the limited capacity to interpret politics can be found in: Neustadt R.E., May E.R. Thinking in Time: the uses of History for Decision Makers. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1986; Kahneman D. Thanking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013

[2] One vivid example is the recent remarks by Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (see Brzezinski Z. America’s Strategic Dilemma: A Revisionist Russia in a Complex World. March 9, 2015. URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/150318_Brzezinski_Remarks.pdf)

[3] See Shevtsova L. Russia’s Political System: Imperialism and Decay // Journal of Democracy. 2015. No. 1.

[4] Aron L. Putin and Ukraine: Expect More Brutal Aggression from Russia’s Desperate Leader. January 15, 2015. URL: http://www.aei.org/publication/putin-ukraine-expect-brutal-aggression-russias-desperate-leader/; Graetz J. Putin’s Russia: Exploiting the Weaknesses of Liberal Europe. March 31, 2015. URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=189522

[5] Walt S. What Putin Learned from Reagan. February 17, 2015. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/17/what-putin-learned-from-reagan-ukraine-nicaragua/

[6] Kuchins A., Mankoff J. Russia, Ukraine, and U.S. Policy Options: A Briefing Memo. January 2015. URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/150129_Mankoff_RussiaUkraineUSOptions_Web.pdf

[7] Mearsheimer J. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault // Foreign Affairs. September/October 2014.

[8] For an example of such logic, see Brookes P. Time for ‘Reset’ of Russian Policy. February 5, 2015. URL: http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2015/2/time-for-reset-of-russian-policy. It is even more apparent in the remarks of Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institution in August 2014: “the single most important and obvious issue here with regard to what the effect will be on globalization of the right kind and global governance insofar as we are developing that as a concept is whether Putin prevails or not. I would think that it should be the determined goal of the United States Government and other like-minded governments that victory for Putin in Ukraine is just not an option.” (Tallbott St. Remarks at the Round Table “The Ukrainian Crisis and Russia’s Place in the International Order”. August 20, 2014. URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/08/20-ukraine-russia/20140820_russia_ukraine_transcript.pdf)

[9] See for example, Pifer S. We May Live in Different Worlds, but Sanctions on Russia Still Make Sense. March 12, 2015. URL: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/12-we-may-live-different-worlds-sanctions-russia-still-make-sense-pifer

[10] Motl A. Russia: It’s Time for Regime Change. January 30, 2015. URL: http://www.newsweek.com/russia-its-time-regime-change-303399

[11] Mearsheimer J. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault // Foreign Affairs. September/October 2014.

[12] Jervis R. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 343.

[13] See Engerman D.C. Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

[14] We can note the shift of interest of such distinguished scholars as John Mearshimer, Jack Snyder and William Wallfort.

[15] See a similar analysis of the dynamic of interactions within the current administration during Barrack Obama’s first term provided by American journalist James Mann (Mann J. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York : Viking, 2012)

[16] This viewpoint has already been expressed by some American experts. See Gaddy. Cl. One Year of Western Sanctions against Russia: We Still Live in Different Worlds. March 9, 2015. URL: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/09-one-year-western-sanctions-against-russia-gaddy

[17] Hill F. Toward a Strategy for Dealing with Russia. February 11, 2015. URL: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/11-strategy-for-dealing-with-russia-hill