The Capture of Palmyra: Victory in Battle, but Not a Turning Point
Forces loyal to Syria's President Bashar
al-Assad flash victory signs and carry a Syrian
national flag on the edge of the historic city of
Palmyra in Homs Governorate
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Analyst on Russia and its Middle East policy, MPhil International Relations, University of Cambridge
As soon as the victory sentiments calm down in Damascus, Moscow and Tehran, the allies will have to decide how they will move further into IS-controlled territory. The primary task is to split the Islamic State into two parts along the Euphrates valley, the Iraqi part and the Syrian part. This will not be possible without coordination with the U.S.-led international coalition, which is pursuing an anti-IS campaign in Iraq.
The Syrian army finally regained control over Palmyra, one of the key strategic cities in central Syria, after four days’ intensive fighting. IS captured Tadmur (the local name of city) in May 2015, having travelled hundreds of kilometres unimpeded through the desert, from north to south, facing practically no resistance from government forces. The militants took advantage of Assad’s troops, which moved from Palmyra to Idlib to join in a tough battle against the rebels. This made it possible for IS to capture the city.
Palmyra is an architectural monument of universal significance and a vital Syrian transport hub. The one and only route that passes through the city links the government-controlled city of Homs and the capital Damascus with oilfields in north-eastern Syria, which are controlled by IS fighters. By recapturing Palmyra, Assad’s troops practically unblocked the route to the IS capital, Raqqa. The victory at Palmyra is deeply symbolic for Bashar al-Assad, as the brutal destruction of historical sites by the IS militants in 2015 was perceived as an attack on the heritage of humanity. It is now the Syrian president who has gained the laurels as the saviour of the world’s heritage, although this will hardly make up for his deeds in the eyes of the western political establishment.
One might say that the Tadmur victory was “expected”, if only because it was not the strongest position of IS. The fact that the jihadists fled, having saved a larger part of their army, testifies to their readiness to retreat from Palmyra.
It is precisely these airstrikes that made it evident the Syrian government would soon dare to push towards Palmyra.
This historic area is somewhat isolated, being located far away from the major Islamic State-controlled territories along the Euphrates. With many sources of IS funding being cut off, it is more important for the militant group to spare strength for major territories than keep a large contingent in peripheral areas.
Moscow and Damascus are already being reproached for not starting the Palmyra offensive earlier. But this is where some of the Syrian army’s weaknesses lie. Assad’s army has proven weak and incapable of fighting on several fronts. The Palmyra offensive became possible only after fighting had stopped in eastern Syria following the ceasefire of February 27, 2016. The government used the quiet in Latakia, Aleppo and Damascus and its suburbs to send extra forces to east Homs and launch a military operation in Palmyra.
Russia’s role in this offensive was crucial. Until spring 2016, only a few Russian airstrikes had hit Palmyra. As late as March, Russia sharply increased their intensity, hitting 146 IS targets in three days – March 22 to 24, 2016. It is precisely these airstrikes that made it evident the Syrian government would soon dare to push towards Palmyra.
As of today, the crucial problem for Moscow is how to take advantage of the Palmyra victory at the Syria talks.
At the same time, it is highly likely that Russia was also intensively involved in land operation. Images featuring Smerch rocket launchers and Buratino flamethrowers near Palmyra were posted on social media on the days that the offensive took place. Some Russian media outlets also reported the possible involvement of hundreds of private military contractors. IS online resources, in turn, reported several Russian military dead. This information was later partially confirmed by the Kremlin.
As of today, the crucial problem for Moscow is how to take advantage of the Palmyra victory at the Syria talks. It is the continued fight against IS that will become a stumbling block to the negotiation process and a trading tool in Russia’s hands.
Apart from the overall geopolitical benefit, Moscow urgently seeks to legitimize Assad in the eyes of western political community. Therefore, Moscow will try and give impetus to its idea of an antiterrorist coalition. In fact, this coalition is a union of two alliances led by the United States and Russia. The anti-Assad coalition will hardly agree to that, but Moscow has a new ace up its sleeve. Together with Damascus, it may hold off the Deir ez-Zor offensive, which will put extra pressure on Washington.
President Assad is evidently encouraged by his success and is set to make use of his victory in Palmyra. He has repeatedly made Moscow feel uncomfortable, at first, by doubting the Syrian truce, and then, by promising to regain control over his country with military force. After Palmyra’s liberation, Bashar al-Assad said that this victory confirms that the Syrian army had chosen the right strategy for fighting terrorism. This strategy, in turn, is far from being straightforward, as Assad failed to avoid mass killings of civilians, while destroying terrorists and, most often, opposition fighters.
As soon as the victory sentiments calm down in Damascus, Moscow and Tehran, the allies will have to decide how they will move further into IS-controlled territory.
With the liberation of Palmyra being truly a great victory for the Syrians, it will not be easy to keep the city under governmental control. The IS troops marched out of the city, but retained their composition, and, while staying dangerously close to Palmyra, are very likely to make another attempt at recapturing the city, not for Palmyra’s sake, but to reassert their power. If the conflict in western Syria accelerates and President Assad has to send troops from east Homs, Palmyra may once again follow the May 2015 scenario.
As soon as the victory sentiments calm down in Damascus, Moscow and Tehran, the allies will have to decide how they will move further into IS-controlled territory. The primary task is to split the Islamic State into two parts along the Euphrates valley, the Iraqi part and the Syrian part. This will not be possible without coordination with the U.S.-led international coalition, which is pursuing an anti-IS campaign in Iraq. Moscow’s long-time idea of an antiterrorist coalition seems to strike a chord in Washington, which has already recognized the futility of uncoordinated military actions. However, the coalition and the associated concessions expected from the parties are not supported by Tehran, Riyadh and Damascus.
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