Wars of the Future
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PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor at World Politics Department, MGIMO University
The history of international relations is a history of wars. At the beginning of the 21st century, armed conflicts and wars continue to remain an important element of international interaction. Changing in character, they are unlikely to be consigned to history this century, as some researchers predicted at the sunset of bipolar confrontation. In this regard, it is important to understand the development trends and patterns of armed conflicts and wars, so as to be prepared for future, rather than past wars.
The history of international relations is a history of wars. At the beginning of the 21st century, armed conflicts and wars continue to remain an important element of international interaction. Changing in character, they are unlikely to be consigned to history this century, as some researchers predicted at the sunset of bipolar confrontation. In this regard, it is important to understand the development trends and patterns of armed conflicts and wars, so as to be prepared for future, rather than past wars.
Systemic Prerequisites for Armed Conflict and War: From National States to Semi-Anarchic Interaction
The future world order will see a further erosion of the Westphalian system, based on the interaction between nation-states.
Many states that enjoyed the peak of their development immediately after decolonization in the middle of the previous century are now far from flourishing. Growing internal pressures and the inability to perform basic functions will inevitably turn the weakest of them into failed states, and lead to their disappearance from the political map of the 21st century in an avalanche-like manner. These countries will then be replaced by self-governing territories controlled by conflicting clans and factions superseding each other. Areas of instability (“gray zones”) like this are sure to attract various bellicose non-state actors such as transnational terrorists and international criminal groups who will use them as training camps, staging posts, etc. outside any jurisdiction.
Pirates in Somalia
In the 21st century there is a clear need to build a comprehensive system for interaction with non-state actors on security issues, in view of the dramatic increase in the scope of their operations.
The appearance of a significant number of failed and collapsed states would spark the emergence of differentiated approaches in international relations. In dealing with each other, nation-states will follow international rules, principles and norms enshrined in international law, as well as other obligations. At the same time, these rules will not apply to non-state territories, and each state will establish its own approaches unilaterally.
The same is true for the rules of war. The rights of combatants and civilians in nation-states will, as before, be protected by various treaties and conventions, while the representatives of non-state territories will face arbitrary rules based on the prototype of the conditions under which Al-Qaeda and Taliban members are held at the U.S. military base Guantanamo, where almost no human rights are respected.
Countries have always taken a tough stance on security threats that exist outside the legitimacy of the system, such as piracy in the 19th century. But in those days it was dealt with in separate cases, while in the 21st century there is a clear need to build a comprehensive system for interaction with non-state actors on security issues, in view of the dramatic increase in the scope of their operations.
Basic Scenarios for Armed Conflict and War in the 21st Century
The asymmetric confrontation between the nation state on the one hand and different non-state actors on the other could form the pattern of conflict for the 21st century.
According to statistical data from the Center for Conflict Research at Uppsala University [1], the number of inter-state armed conflicts has been steadily declining in recent decades. In the period 2004-2007 there were no inter-state armed conflicts at all, and only two in the past two years. This suggests that the mechanisms for deterring state aggression, developed and tested in the second half of the 20th century, proved both effective and efficient.
However, this is not to say that conflicts between nation states will disappear in the 21st century. That would be impossible under a system of international relations predicated on the balance of power.
By the mid-21st century, the rapid growth of China and India is likely to give rise to a complete revision of the very foundations of the international system. To attain this goal, potential revisionists and conservatives alike could resort to coercive methods, including nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, most conflicts, including armed encounters, between separate states or groups of states are likely to derive from particular problems. The growth in the global population and continuing economic development will exacerbate the struggle for natural resources, water and energy.
Territorial disputes, which account for the major part of interstate conflicts today, will also remain an important element of instability in relations between countries. The number of disputed territories is not diminishing, and countries rarely make concessions on these issues. Thus, the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir could be the most explosive conflict fraught with the ever-present risk of nuclear war.
Countries will also clash more in the virtual world. Cyber-attacks on one country’s information infrastructure from the territory of another have become a reality, though they are not yet systemic. In extreme cases these attacks could provoke a substantial military response, if what is at stake is the survival of critical information infrastructure, such as the banking system.
The asymmetric confrontation between the nation state on the one hand and different non-state actors on the other could form the pattern of conflict for the 21st century.
First, as a rule, potentially failed states are rich in natural resources vital for the economies of developed nation states. The need to possess and retain such resources could entail conflicts with a variety of non-state groups. It is possible that the territories of those countries that are to vanish will become international economic enclaves, established expressly to develop these natural resources. Multinational corporations’ private military and security structures will play an important role in ensuring safety in these areas.
Second, under public pressure, nation states will conduct “humanitarian operations” to protect people in other regions against sweeping human rights violations. These operations are unlikely to be carried out on a mass scale, because of nation states’ reluctance to incur inevitable significant military casualties.
Third, new non-state actors will, through their actions in the real (piracy) and virtual (cyber-attack) worlds, provoke armed conflicts with nation states in an attempt to win attention. Their aim will be to draw nation states into long-term asymmetric conflicts, wear them down, and force them to deliver the desired concessions (for example, sharing profits derived from natural resource production in areas under their control).
Widening Technological Gap and Future Warfare
A.Savelyev «Nuclear Weapons and War in
100 Years»
In examining the means used in armed conflict, the role of WMD and conventional weapons must be considered.
Nuclear arms, or whatever takes their place as a “weapon of last resort,” will retain their importance in securing the sovereignty of those countries that possess them. However, significant achievements in missile defense will compel many countries to develop new delivery systems and invest heavily in their nuclear missile force. As a result, if the parties fail to agree “reasonable sufficiency” in defense and strategic nuclear forces, another round of the arms race is inevitable. The development of a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons, not yet subject to restrictive international treaties, is in any case already underway. Its widespread use in armed conflict will open a new page in nuclear arms control.
There is also an increasing likelihood that non-state actors will use nuclear weapons, although for the time being they appear not to have access to this technology. But technological “democratization” will, sooner or later, give them this opportunity. For non-state actors, nuclear weapons are unlikely to become a tactical tool to achieve their goals: they will use them in the last resort, when they face a threat to their survival. This may not apply to transnational terrorist groups, striving for establishment of their “ideal” world order, prepared to achieve this goal at the cost of enormous human losses.
The ban on production, stockpiling and use of biological and bacteriological weapons, set by international conventions for nation states in the second half of 20th century, will remain in force. Non-state actors will also seek to acquire such weapons. However, the issue at stake here is tactical use under the framework of an asymmetrical conflict strategy. Nation states’ armed forces will need to make additional preparations for this scenario.
Significant changes will take place in the use of conventional weapons. They will widen the gap between the global powers and the rest of the world, and the gulf between the capabilities of state and non-state actors will increase further.
The leading nation states will continue to improve precision weapons, electronic assets, drones and other forms of military technology in which the physical presence of the combatant force is not required.
Although a new round of revolution in military affairs is underway, it is too early to speak about the transition to a new generation of warfare. This will happen only with the spread of weapons based on new principles of physics, such as kinetic, ultrasonic, and geophysical forces. However, it is worth noting that the re-tooling and upgrading cycle for weapons remains a long one, and these new approaches to weaponry will only enter the leading armies’ arsenals by the mid 21st century at best.
The world’s leading armies will continue to outsource certain functions. The forces themselves will deal exclusively with planning and conducting military operations, while private military companies (PMCs) will guard sites and, probably, organize peace-building efforts.
The IT revolution will continue to have a significant impact on the military scene. Advanced information technologies made it possible to create a digital, virtual representation of the planet’s surface, significantly reducing the cost of precision guidance. These technologies opened up the opportunity to get real-time information from the battlefield from several sources, reducing the time it takes to identify targets (from several weeks during the 1991 Iraq war to 45 minutes in 2003). Planning efficiency and the ability to make adjustments makes it possible for operations to be more dynamic. But there are negative aspects too. Civilian leaders, lacking the required skills, can interfere with the direct control of operations, while orders based solely on information and on-screen images received can be short-sighted, and run contrary to combat strategy.
Great advances are also expected in combat medicine, dramatically reducing the death toll from wounds received in the conflict theater.
The world’s leading armies will continue to outsource certain functions. The forces themselves will deal exclusively with planning and conducting military operations, while private military companies (PMCs) will guard sites and, probably, organize peace-building efforts, something at which conventional forces have not proved particularly adept.
Consequently, 21st century combat should see record-low figures for troop fatalities among national armies. This will strengthen public support for possible military action and is likely to increase the advanced nations’ propensity for launching combat operations.
However, only limited air force operations can guarantee an absence of casualties among the forces, while ground operations will inevitably involve casualties. But the involvement of ground forces is usually based on a need to establish physical control over the territory, which remains rare. In all other situations, priority will be given to limited remote operations, such as air strikes against nuclear facilities to prevent production and therefore possession of nuclear weapons by a country. This scenario could play out with Iran.
Non-state actors, confronting nation states, will not have such sophisticated military capabilities. But they could employ asymmetrical tactics, neutralizing the benefits of advanced precision and information military systems. Indeed, all it takes to disable drones is jamming the control center’s commands. Other modern electronic devices can be put out of action by a powerful electromagnetic pulse. Naturally, the world’s leading armies are putting every effort into developing electronic warfare assets. But the more complex the military systems become, the more minor vulnerabilities they will have, that non-state actors could take advantage of.
Conflicts have always accompanied the development of mankind. Although forecasting is a thankless task, there is little doubt that conflict and warfare experts will soon see qualitative changes in the international conflict environment. But only time will tell how these play out in reality.
1. Themner L., Wallensteen P. Armed Conflicts, 1946–2011 // Journal of Peace Research. 2012. Vol. 49. № 4.
2. “Privatization” of World Politics: Local Action – Global Results / Ed. Lebedeva M.M. Moscow, Golden Bee, 2008.
3. Future Character of Conflict / United Kingdom Ministry of Defenсe Strategic Trends Programme. 2 February 2010.
4. Nye J., Welch D. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. 9th ed. New Jersey: Pearson, 2011.
5. Veselovsky S.S., Main Knots of International Conflicts and their Features // Global Challenges of Today / Eds. Baranowski V.G., Bogaturov A.D., Aspect Press, 2010: 170-187.
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