What Lies Ahead for Syria: A Russian Perspective

The first two months of the new authorities in Damascus could hardly provide us with a clear vision of Syria’s future. Meanwhile, the Transitional President of Syria and former Emir of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, is trying to preserve his grip on power, maintain control over all armed groups within HTS, conduct (or at least declare) a non-sectarian policy and protect all minorities in the country. He needs to convince Western states of his pragmatism and non-radicalism to eventually lift sanctions from Syria and attract investments. So far, it has not brought immediate results.

The Syrian crisis remains highly internationalized, with foreign actors playing a crucial role. This is why Syria today is not just a problem for Syrians. It is an international issue, and regional and global powers have a responsibility to eventually help Syria achieve long-lasting peace and stability.

As of now, it can be safely argued that at least the dominant public narrative is that Syria must remain united. It resonates with the approaches of both regional countries and external actors. However, there is still a big risk that Syria will remain unstable, if not descend into another cycle of violence. Several factors could well contribute to it.

First, the sectarian character of the Syrian state and society. Present-day and future pain points of this country are largely related to mutual historical animosities which have existed for centuries between the Sunni majority and religious minorities, including the adherents of ghulat sects (Alawites and Ismailis), Druze, Christians of different confessions, and Shiite Twelvers.

Second, de facto authorities in Damascus do not have full control over the country. The new administration has not yet reached any agreement with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which occupies around 25–27% of Syria’s territory, nor with the SNA, which controls areas in northern Syria. Damascus desperately needs to restore control over northeastern Syria, which holds the main oil and gas depots and has historically been the country’s “breadbasket,” producing over 50% of wheat and cotton.

The new authorities do not have permanent access to the national borders, which hinders their ability to fill the state budget. Here, the future support of the authorities in Damascus by the sheikhs of influential Shammar and Al-Shaitat Sunni Arab Bedouin tribes, who mainly inhabit the eastern Deir ez-Zor province, depends on whether the caretaker government agrees to turn a blind eye to their dividends from the “grey” trans-border trade with Iraq.

Third, the new Syrian authorities must set up a new solid functioning state and power structures, which is a challenging task.

In this context, although the recent decision to dissolve the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) as well as security and intelligence services can hardly cause an immediate escalation, it can make the transition to new military and security structures a bumpy road. The Syrian army, excluding generals and the Republican Guard, belonged neither to the sub-elite nor to the wealthy class.

However, the decision to disband the special services (mukhabarat) carries a higher risk of triggering a new cycle of violence, as their ranks formed a privileged part of society, while the commanders were not only part of the sub-elite but often belonged to the elite itself.

The new authorities must also reach some sort of a compromise with other armed groups (the SNA, the Kurds, factions within HTS), who may have differing views and agendas, and ensure their incorporation into the new system.

Fourth, the radical nature of the current authorities. Many scholars emphasize that despite public rebranding and declarative de-radicalization of al-Joulani’s views, his political stances and approaches remain authoritarian, if not still radical.

Fifth, the fate of Syria largely depends on foreign powers. For now, the legitimacy of the new authorities in Damascus stems from their international recognition. They still need to organize elections that will eventually give them genuine legitimacy coming from the Syrian people.

Overall, external powers are not interested in a fragmented and volatile Syria, and it appears to be a key unifying factor. It seems for now that regional and global players have more common interests in Syria rather than differences, including Russia. They are interested in Syria’s stabilization, unity and de-radicalization, as well as economic and humanitarian stability. In addition, any escalation in and around Syria would worsen the current humanitarian situation, most likely causing another wave of refugees.

Russia’s current position on Syria can be described as uncertain, much like the overall situation in the country and its future. Although HTS is still on Moscow’s terrorist list, and Russian air forces have been bombing armed groups, including HTS, for years, Moscow has immediately set up contacts with the new authorities, who chose not to exclude Russia from their engagement list. Moreover, Moscow is ready to assist the new authorities and the Syrian people.

That said, the new Syrian authorities cannot simply cut ties with Moscow. They know well that Russia can be helpful in many pragmatic ways, including counterbalancing other actors, e.g. Turkey, the U.S. and the Gulf states. The mere fact that they have not expelled the Russian military bases right away indicates their pragmatism.

In a nutshell, it is highly possible to predict a new radical escalation of the Syrian conflict in 2025, caused, for instance, by a fierce power struggle among different factions of the former opposition or within HTS itself. Thus, any further Russian stance toward Syria depends on the logic of the conflict evolution in the coming months. Such ambiguity could lead to another cycle of violence in the country if Ankara turns a blind eye to the U.S.’s and Israel’s hostile actions, and Iranian and Russian interests are ignored by the new Syrian authorities.

The first two months of the new authorities in Damascus could hardly provide us with a clear vision of Syria’s future. Meanwhile, the Transitional President of Syria and former Emir of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) [1], Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, is trying to preserve his grip on power, maintain control over all armed groups within HTS, conduct (or at least declare) a non-sectarian policy and protect all minorities in the country. At the same time, he positions himself as a moderate and pragmatic leader who is open to dialogue with everyone, making intensive contacts with foreign (including Western) delegates inside and outside the country. He needs to convince Western states of his pragmatism and non-radicalism to eventually lift sanctions from Syria and attract investments. So far, it has not brought immediate results, and the remaining shaky modus operandi by no means guarantees al-Joulani’s ability to preserve legitimacy and power, avoiding a fight among radical groups inside the former HTS and Syria’s eventual slide into deeper chaos and disintegration.

The Syrian crisis remains highly internationalized, with foreign actors playing a crucial role. This is why Syria today is not just a problem for Syrians. It is an international issue, and regional and global powers have a responsibility to eventually help Syria achieve long-lasting peace and stability.

Possible scenarios for Syria

Vitaly Naumkin, Vasily Kuznetsov:
Syria: The Crossroad of Middle Eastern Uncertainty

As of now, it can be safely argued that at least the dominant public narrative is that Syria must remain united. It resonates with the approaches of both regional countries and external actors. However, there is also a risk of potential fragmentation and division of Syria into several smaller (and most likely failed) states. Such a scenario could lead to further destabilization and will likely trigger revisionism in the Middle East, which will bring hard-to-predict negative consequences for the region. Although Syria’s partition into several entities looks quite unrealistic, it cannot be fully excluded. Potentially, it might happen if the current authorities fail to stay in power and keep control over other armed groups, or if infighting continues among different factions within HTS and other armed opposition groups (the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Kurds, Druze and others). In such a scenario, Russia could potentially take the lead in the coastal areas (“Alawite state” as it existed under the French mandate after World War I in 1922–1936), the Kurds could preserve their autonomy or gain some sort of independence, while the central state of Damascus and Aleppo could fall under the control of the former HTS factions.

Given that chances of such a scenario are quite low, there is still a big risk that Syria will remain unstable, if not descend into another cycle of violence. Several factors could well contribute to it.

Factors driving continuous instability

First, the sectarian character of the Syrian state and society. Modern Syria is a product of colonial design, which made it quite a colorful ethnic and religious entity. Present-day and future pain points of this country are largely related to mutual historical animosities which have existed for centuries between the Sunni majority and religious minorities, including the adherents of ghulat sects (Alawites and Ismailis), Druze, Christians of different confessions, and Shiite Twelvers. Syria’s population consists of an Arab Sunni majority (60–70%), an Arab Alawite minority (10–12%), Kurds (10–15%, mostly Sunni), Christians (2–4%), Druze (about 1%), Shiite and Turkoman (1% each). According to UN estimates, Syria's current population stands at 23.5 million.

The Alawite population is currently concentrated on the Syrian coast alongside other minorities and Sunnis, who still make up the majority in that area. The Sunni population there has grown significantly as many of them moved to the coast during the civil war, searching for a safer area. Many former regime military and security personnel, as well as Baath party members, have also found refuge in the coastal area. Moreover, the mountainous terrain of the Latakia countryside (Ras al-Bassit, Kessab, Al-Badrusiyah, etc.) makes it difficult for the new non-local Syrian authorities to put it under full control. In addition, the geographical proximity of the Tartus-Homs corridor to northern Lebanon gives Hezbollah a supply route for coastal resistance if it emerges one day. Therefore, all these factors made the Syrian coast a potential hotbed of separatism and future resistance if the current authorities in Damascus decide to change their non-sectarian approach.

At the same time, the Druze of southern Al-Suwayda province have been growing more Israel-oriented for a number of reasons: firstly, in 2018–2024, they felt offended by Bashar al-Assad, who neglected their claims for privileges; secondly, during that period, they got weary of the presence of pro-Israeli militants; thirdly, they have relatives among the Druze of the Israel-annexed Golan Heights, who are fully integrated into Israeli society and enjoy higher living standards. Hence, the Syrian Druze do not appear to support the new authorities in Damascus and keep playing their own game, if necessary, with Israel’s assistance.

Second, de facto authorities in Damascus do not have full control over the country. The new administration has not yet reached any agreement with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which occupies around 25–27% of Syria’s territory, nor with the SNA, which controls areas in northern Syria. At the same time, Turkey keeps pushing HTS and the SNA to bring the Kurds to heel while threatening to launch its own military operation against the Kurdish YPG militia in Syria. If the new rulers in Damascus fail to find a compromise with the Kurds (and the United States) that also suits Turkey, it will pose a serious risk to the country’s unity. Besides, Damascus desperately needs to restore control over northeastern Syria, which holds the main oil and gas depots and has historically been the country’s “breadbasket,” producing over 50% of wheat and cotton.

That said, the new authorities do not have permanent access to the national borders, which hinders their ability to fill the state budget. Here, the future support of the authorities in Damascus by the sheikhs of influential Shammar and Al-Shaitat Sunni Arab Bedouin tribes, who mainly inhabit the eastern Deir ez-Zor province, depends on whether the caretaker government agrees to turn a blind eye to their dividends from the “grey” trans-border trade with Iraq. A similar story applies to the long-standing illicit trans-border trade with Lebanon through the Homs corridor, which became a haven for smugglers during the rule of Hafez al-Assad, i.e. long before the outbreak of the present Syrian conflict.

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In addition to this, since December 8, 2024, Israel has occupied the demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights and more Syrian land in Quneitra, Al-Suwayda and Daraa provinces, capturing over 400 square kilometers, including Mount Hermon on the Syrian side. According to reports, the Israeli military has started constructing six new military outposts in the buffer zone and one inside Syrian territory. In addition to taking control over a strategic military area, Israel acquired a strong bargaining chip for possible future peace negotiations with Damascus based on the “land for peace” formula. Furthermore, the new Trump administration supports the deals that may achieve peace through pressure.

Moreover, the new authorities do not have a complete monopoly on violence, which is essential for maintaining internal stability. The country is flooded with weapons, and there are still armed groups unwilling to lay down arms and lose their right of the strongest. For example, Southern Operations Room headed by commander Ahmed al-Awda who previously led the Eighth Brigade, a group made of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime and reorganized themselves, still did not join the new defense ministry.

Third, the new Syrian authorities must set up a new solid functioning state and power structures, which is a challenging task. The new leadership must somehow incorporate former regime cadres (military, security, intelligence, bureaucracy and technocrats) and representatives of elites to ensure a smooth transition and succession process. Otherwise, it will lead to further destabilization.

In this context, although the recent decision to dissolve the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) as well as security and intelligence services can hardly cause an immediate escalation, it can make the transition to new military and security structures a bumpy road. The Syrian army, excluding generals and the Republican Guard, belonged neither to the sub-elite nor to the wealthy class. During the civil war, even though several special units were formed with material incentives in mind (such as Suheil al-Hassan’s “Tiger Force”), many officers and soldiers “fought their war” by inspecting people and cargo at checkpoints. Contrary to stereotypes, the Syrian army remained mostly Sunni, with only some elite units commanded by Alawites, which decreased the risk of an upheaval. At the same time, with no formal military structures to incorporate former regime soldiers and officers, it seems difficult to avoid tensions.

However, the decision to disband the special services (mukhabarat) carries a higher risk of triggering a new cycle of violence. Since Assad’s Syria was rightfully considered a “country of special services,” their ranks formed a privileged part of society, while the commanders were not only part of the sub-elite but often belonged to the elite itself (Generals Ali Duba, Ghazi Kanaan, Ali Mamlouk and many others), enjoying their own business assets and economic interests. The Assads considered the special services a major backbone of the regime. Hence, without ensuring some sort of integration or co-optation of Assad’s former special services into the new power structures, which is rather difficult, the new authorities risk provoking tensions, if not riots.

The new authorities must also reach some sort of a compromise with other armed groups (the SNA, the Kurds, factions within HTS, Southern Operations Room, etc.), who may have differing views and agendas, and ensure their incorporation into the new system. At the same time, Syria’s new leadership needs to carefully reform and adjust existing state structures, including the economic sector, military, security and intelligence services, diplomatic institutions, etc. Both processes are necessary for a successful transition.

Fourth, the radical nature of the current authorities. Many scholars emphasize that despite public rebranding and declarative de-radicalization of al-Joulani’s views, his political stances and approaches remain authoritarian, if not still radical. So, there is a huge risk of gradual but steady radicalization and islamization of Syria. Most likely, the reshaped HTS’s leadership will not tolerate any political opposition. Moreover, HTS remains on the terrorist lists of many countries, and sanctions have not been scrapped.

Fifth, the fate of Syria largely depends on foreign powers. For now, the legitimacy of the new authorities in Damascus stems from their international recognition. They still need to organize elections that will eventually give them genuine legitimacy coming from the Syrian people. That said, during this transitional period, the legitimacy of the new leadership depends on foreign powers (mainly the U.S. and EU) that recognize it. If they see that the new Syrian authorities are following a “wrong trajectory,” they can easily revoke their support and “legitimization.” It is even more important in the light of the sanctions regime and resources needed for Syria’s reconstruction. The U.S. and EU have strong leverage over Damascus through these sanctions.

Overall, external powers are not interested in a fragmented and volatile Syria, and it appears to be a key unifying factor. It seems for now that regional and global players have more common interests in Syria rather than differences, including Russia. They are interested in:

• Stabilization. None of the regional powers are interested in escalation or destabilization in Syria because no one is going to benefit from it. Iran is weakened and faces domestic issues which will not get settled if instability in the region increases. The Gulf states have already lost quite a lot in Syria and would like to recover their assets and invest more, something that requires a stable country.
• Unity. So far, all actors want Syria to remain united.
• Economic and humanitarian stability. This is needed for investments and business opportunities.
• De-radicalization. Everyone wants to see current people and groups in power remain moderate to prevent a return to an authoritarian scenario.

In addition, any escalation in and around Syria would worsen the current humanitarian situation, most likely causing another wave of refugees. This is why no one in the region and beyond wants such a scenario to materialize. Between late November and mid-December 2024, 1.1 million new internally displaced persons (IDPs) were recorded in Syria as a result of the anti-Assad ground military offensive. Therefore, any potential destabilization will almost certainly lead to another massive displacement.

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In such circumstances, the position of the U.S., which supports the Syrian Kurds, is crucial. Without oil, gas and food supplies from Kurdish-controlled areas, the authorities in Damascus will not be able to launch a full-scale sustainable reconstruction. Turkey alone cannot fill this gap, as its own economy is not able to provide Syria with the necessary assistance. Ankara can contribute if other actors (the Gulf states, Europe and the U.S.) pay for it. That said, international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts will be as crucial to the country as they were during the past decade. Therefore, it brings to the forefront another important issue—lifting Western sanctions on Syria, which would allow external funding and aid to flow into the country.

On January 6, 2025, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Syria General License No. 24, authorizing transactions with the Syrian state for six months in order to ensure the provision of essential governance services, including certain transactions related to energy and personal remittances. Partial U.S. sanctions relief will serve as a test until June to determine whether the HTS transitional government is able to prove its new moderate character.

Then, on January 27, the EU agreed to start gradually easing its Syria sanctions. It is going to be a step-by-step reversible approach, which will allow the EU to have leverage over the new authorities in Damascus if they deviate from an “acceptable” development trajectory. The first restrictions to be relaxed are in energy, transport and financial spheres—so vital for ordinary Syrians.

Russia’s prospects in Syria

Russia’s current position on Syria can be described as cautious and yet to be clarified, much like the overall situation in the country and its future. The Kremlin is trying to consider all possible scenarios in Syria and maintains relations with all armed groups and factions on the ground. Although HTS is still on Moscow’s terrorist list, and Russian air forces have been bombing armed groups, including HTS, for years, Moscow has immediately set up contacts with the new authorities, who chose not to exclude Russia from their engagement list. Moreover, Moscow is ready to assist the new authorities and the Syrian people. Facing such a complicated environment, Russia is likely to do its best to avoid the worst-case scenarios and chaos in Syria.

In order to understand Russia’s opportunities in Syria, it is helpful to list its main assets in the republic prior to the HTS takeover. These were:

• Russian military bases. They give Moscow several advantages. If the situation in the country worsens and the minorities come under threat, Russia can act as their defender. The Russian leadership has already proposed using its air base for humanitarian aid deliveries to Syria once consensus is reached on this matter with Damascus. At the same time, the future of these bases is among key Russian concerns, and Damascus has more room for maneuver to discuss their fate. Much here will depend on the effectiveness of Western pressure on the new Syrian authorities—not solely from the U.S. but from the Europeans (Germany, France) as well, who now want to return to Syria and “be on the spot” after they “fell out” of the Syrian crisis in 2012–2024 due to the successful actions of Iran and Russia. The issue of Russian bases in Syria could be discussed at a Putin–Trump meeting, even though Syria is outside of Washington’s top priorities in the Middle East;
• Military-technical cooperation. Russia could help the new Syrian authorities diversify military-technical cooperation. Given that the SAA was built and trained according to Soviet standards and equipped with Soviet and Russian weapons, the new leadership will have to rebuild the army and somehow incorporate former lower- and middle-ranking officers and soldiers. Russia may be helpful here;
• Russia’s connections with local leaders and groups who went through Russia’s Reconciliation Center and with whom Russia maintained regular contact. If the new authorities decide to continue non-sectarian policies and reconcile with minorities, namely, the Kurds, Moscow could play a role;
• Agricultural cooperation and wheat supplies. Russia can provide Syria with wheat and grain until the Syrians themselves are able to satisfy their own domestic needs;
• Human resources. There are over 30,000 Soviet- and Russia-educated Syrians who constitute a valuable asset in economic and humanitarian cooperation. Most of them have degrees in technical and engineering fields, which will be especially useful during the reconstruction stage;
• Russia was among Syria’s top five economic partners in imports and is likely to remain so, at least in the foreseeable future. Regardless of future external orientations of Damascus, certain prospects for Russian–Syrian economic relations do exist, based on the Soviet and post-Soviet experiences, as well as Moscow’s political will. However, the economic activities of Russia in Syria have been neither large-scale nor profitable (except for infrastructure projects of the Soviet era). Even if the sanctions are lifted from Syria, and Russia is also allowed to be a player, it is going to be a very competitive environment. Perhaps, it is time for the Russian private sector to find more flexible multilateral forms of B2G or B2B cooperation, for instance, bringing decent business partners from Turkey or the UAE;
• Russia’s diplomacy. Moscow maintains relations with all Syria-related actors in the region and beyond. It could maintain a critical dialogue with Ankara on Syria while developing regular consultative mechanisms with China, Iran, the Arab League and the GCC states, as well as reviving contacts with the UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen, who has been trying to reanimate the Geneva platform for intra-Syrian talks.

That said, the new Syrian authorities cannot simply cut ties with Moscow. They know well that Russia can be helpful in many pragmatic ways, including counterbalancing other actors, e.g. Turkey, the U.S. and the Gulf states. In order to ensure their own survival, the new authorities in Syria should be interested in balanced relations with all regional and external powers, avoiding overreliance on one particular country. The new Syrian government can well build relations with Russia to diversify its diplomatic portfolio.

What matters most in this context is the current authorities’ readiness for dialogue with Moscow. The mere fact that they have not expelled the Russian military bases right away indicates their pragmatism. The recent visit of a Russian delegation to Damascus, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Putin-al-Sharaa phone call, also demonstrate that the two parties are engaged in dialogue and do not rush to make abrupt moves. After the meeting, the Russian side confirmed its readiness to provide Syria with the needed assistance in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

In a nutshell, there is quite a chance for a new radical escalation of the Syrian conflict in 2025, caused, for instance, by a fierce power struggle among different factions of the former opposition or within HTS itself. Thus, any further Russian stance toward Syria depends on the logic of the conflict evolution in the coming months. Such ambiguity could lead to another cycle of violence in the country if Ankara turns a blind eye to the U.S.’s and Israel’s hostile actions, and Iranian and Russian interests are ignored by the new Syrian authorities.

1. An organization recognized as terrorist and banned on Russian territory