When Persisting Delusions Vanish

The day of February 16, 2022 will come to be a remarkable moment for the history of contemporary international relations. Scrutinized by some Western politicians and proliferated in the media, the news that Russia will certainly attack Ukraine on this very day has not been confirmed, which is to say the least.

What happened then?

It should be noted that this whole campaign about allegedly forthcoming aggression began at exactly the time when a serious talk about security guarantees in the Euro-Atlantic, initiated by Russia, was beginning to take place, albeit not without difficulties. Moscow has made ambitious proposals with its vision of the problem. The proposals were formulated in a tough, but accessible-to-all way. Their essence was that Russia is not satisfied with the current state of European security and therefore it cannot be maintained.

If one steps back from the intricate diplomatic wording, it is very clear that the central component of the Russian proposals is the assurance of each side that the other party’s military capabilities will not pose a threat to its own security, which the Western countries are trying to avoid discussing. For this purpose, the relevant mechanisms of interaction between military and diplomats are jointly established, and control procedures, verification, etc. are agreed upon.

Washington and its allies have proven reluctant to such an open and fundamental conversation.

Against this backdrop, NATO strategists have decided to resort to the methods they repeatedly used to manipulate public opinion that were aimed at justifying their policies. That were the cases of NATO’s aggression in Yugoslavia, preparations, and then the Iraq War itself.

This time a similar scenario was used towards Ukraine.

It was hoped that right lessons will be drawn from this sad story. Long past the time when one could whistle past the graveyard with impunity, instigating international crises. Now it is time to sit at the negotiating table and begin serious substantive conversations about the whole complex set of Euro-Atlantic security problems that has accumulated over the past decades. Setting it aside until better times means multiplying risks of repeated acute political crises with no winners.

The day of February 16, 2022 will come to be a remarkable moment for the history of contemporary international relations. Scrutinized by some Western politicians and proliferated in the media, the news that Russia will certainly attack Ukraine on this very day has not been confirmed, which is to say the least.

What happened then? Was it another slip-up of the Western special services or was it the treachery of an unpredictable Moscow? There is more than ample room for every possible guesswork and speculation on this topic.

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However, professional diplomats, like any other people, can naturally make mistakes, but as a rule, they draw their conclusions based on a grasp of history, individual facts of the emerging situation, an in-depth analysis of the problem underlying the crisis and everything that surrounds it. That is, from the very beginning of this propaganda coup around Russia’s allegedly aggressive plans for Ukraine, IR experts realized that there won’t be a real war. Either way, there will be no war in its classic sense with the large-scale use of all types of weapons, decisive offensive operations, the seizure of enemy territories, etc. This was well known in Washington, Paris, London and other European capitals. Obviously, it was also known in Kiev.

Then why is Europe experiencing one of the worst crises in recent years? Why it is now, at the beginning of the 2022, that one started talking about the possibility of a new big war in Europe?

It should be noted that this whole campaign about allegedly forthcoming aggression began at exactly the time when a serious talk about security guarantees in the Euro-Atlantic, initiated by Russia, was beginning to take place, albeit not without difficulties. Moscow has made ambitious proposals with its vision of the problem. The proposals were formulated in a tough, but accessible-to-all way. Their essence was that Russia is not satisfied with the current state of European security and therefore it cannot be maintained.

The West could choose from two possible options. Either the Atlantic partners take into account Russian legitimate interests and all together fight against common security threats, as it was enshrined in many joint documents, or each party ensures its own security, without regard to the concerns of others. In that way, the future of Ukraine and its place in European structures is only one element of a more general issue of Euro-Atlantic security, albeit a very important one.

Washington and its allies have proven reluctant to such an open and fundamental conversation. This became evident from the official responses received from the US and NATO. Obviously, there are some positive elements in these answers, but there is still no willingness to talk about key security issues. If one steps back from the intricate diplomatic wording, it is very clear that the central component of the Russian proposals is the assurance of each side that the other party’s military capabilities will not pose a threat to its own security, which the Western countries are trying to avoid discussing. For this purpose, the relevant mechanisms of interaction between military and diplomats are jointly established, and control procedures, verification, etc. are agreed upon.

All these fundamental principles have been developed and enshrined in many joint documents, but have gradually become more blurred by Washington and its allies in an undisguised manner. As a result, we have witnessed the retreat from the noble idea of forming a "common security space in the Euro-Atlantic" to such security situation, which today looks much more alarming than even that of the Cold War.

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Against this backdrop, NATO strategists have decided to resort to the methods they repeatedly used to manipulate public opinion that were aimed at justifying their policies. That were the cases of NATO’s aggression in Yugoslavia, preparations, and then the Iraq War itself. There are many examples of such manipulations. The toolkit is changing, methods and forms are being improved, new faces are being involved, but the essence remains the same, which is to present their policies in the best possible light and to denigrate in every way those who do not agree with it or who are willing to suggest alternative options.

This time a similar scenario was used towards Ukraine. A substitution of concepts typical of the West has taken place, whereby Moscow’s mythical aggression against Ukraine became the center of the discussion, instead of Russian proposals for a new security architecture in Europe to be accepted. In the meantime, the long-term interests of Ukraine itself were, of course, not taken into account.

Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that times are changing. Today it is becoming increasingly difficult to mislead public opinion even with the use of massive and deliberate propaganda. First, the memory of the many "former merits" of most of these propagandists is still fresh. Let us recall, for example, the inability of many Western experts and many politicians to predict the developments in Afghanistan last summer and fall. Second, now one can use a variety of sources of information and form one’s own opinion instead of blindly keeping up with the popular schemes of biased propagandists.

It was hoped that right lessons will be drawn from this sad story. Long past the time when one could whistle past the graveyard with impunity, instigating international crises. Now it is time to sit at the negotiating table and begin serious substantive conversations about the whole complex set of Euro-Atlantic security problems that has accumulated over the past decades. Setting it aside until better times means multiplying risks of repeated acute political crises with no winners.

I happened to take part in such negotiations and edit the final documents. When I read them now, I have mixed feelings. On the one hand, I realize how much potential for common security these documents had. On the other, I see that eloquence can lose its meaning if it is not supplemented with the appropriate tools for implementation. I keenly hope that this time it would not be the same.