Why Pakistan’s Foreign Policy to Afghanistan Backfired

Pakistan got a major setback over its image of control on proxies like the Taliban. Even at that time, Pakistan proposed that all humanitarian aid and financial support to the Taliban should be given through Pakistan, but international players rejected this offer.

The situation took a dramatic turn: the Afghan Taliban, originally nurtured by Pakistan as a tool to counter the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), have since shifted allegiances. Today, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are at their worst as Pakistan accuses the Taliban of failing to curb various terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil. The Torkham border has recently turned into a battlefield, with both sides accusing each other of various violations.

A set critical questions arise: Why has Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban and Afghanistan backfired? What caused the Taliban factions, with whom Pakistan allegedly maintained close ties—including the Haqqani network, which now holds key positions in Afghanistan—to turn against Pakistan? Pakistan shared a long-standing association with these groups, yet in turn, there has been a reversal of its strategic intentions.

There are several reasons behind this backfire. As Pakistan engaged with various proxies since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, including the Taliban (then known as the Mujahideen), over time, these proxies became a liability. For Pakistan, getting rid of this liability became a major burden. As a result of this strategy, these proxies became tools for engaging in war for other forces. However, Pakistan consistently failed to encourage the proxies to join normal engagement processes to disarm them. Even though Pakistan introduced a strategy of “Good Talibans” and “Bad Talibans,” this approach also backfired.

Another factor that contributed to the failure of Pakistan’s policy was the reversal approach on the hardliner cleric chain. It is ironic that the jihadi doctrine Pakistan once championed has now been adopted by its adversaries. The reversal of the command structure Pakistan established during the Taliban’s creation has further complicated the situation.

Another major factor was that the offshoots of these proxies had started emerging over several decades. After the elimination of one proxy, several new proxies emerged under different names with a new Jihadi strategy, often even more lethal than the one before.

Furthermore, by leaving sophisticated weaponry in the hands of these offshoots during U.S. withdrawal, Pakistan’s security and defense positions became more vulnerable and fragile.

The current challenge Pakistan faces is dangerous and surrounded by concerns and risks. At this stage, Pakistan has to extend its dialogue and peace process with Afghanistan by engaging regional strategic partners who can lead toward long-lasting peace and a pause in the increasing militant attacks.

On the day of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief, General Faiz Hameed, was seen sipping coffee at the Serena Hotel in Kabul. A news channel reporter captured this moment on video and asked, “Will you be meeting with the senior leaders of the Taliban?” The then-Director General (DG) of ISI replied: “No, I am not sure,” pointing to then-Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan, Mansoor Ahmed Khan, saying “Maybe he will arrange it.” The journalist followed up, asking: “What do you hope will come out of this…?” adding, “What do you think is going to happen in Afghanistan now?” and “What are you hoping for?” General Faiz Hameed replied: “I’ve just landed.” Intervening, the Ambassador noted, “We are working for peace and stability in Afghanistan.” Faiz Hameed then responded: “Don’t worry, everything will be okay,” bursting in a laugh.

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The journalist’s encounter with the then-DG of ISI was something unusual as it happened at the time when the whole world had its eyes on Afghanistan. At that time, it gave two impressions to the world and the global powers. One is that everything is now in the hands of Pakistan, and the second was that this gesture was full of overconfidence, having some severe repercussions which Pakistan is facing today. Now, Faiz Hameed is in detention and faces a military trial.

This nod of sending Pakistan’s intelligence chief to Afghanistan at such a sensitive time came at a significant cost. Typically, such visits are meticulously planned and kept discreet, but in this instance, General Hameed openly engaged with the media. The video went viral, fueling a widespread perception around the world that Afghanistan was firmly under Pakistan’s control.

Initially, Pakistan tried to challenge this impression to regional and other players, arguing the Taliban* are their loyal, diehard followers but this impression was dismissed. Every country that was interested in Afghanistan directly talked with the Taliban. So, Pakistan got a major setback over its image of control on proxies like the Taliban. Even at that time, Pakistan proposed that all humanitarian aid and financial support to the Taliban should be given through Pakistan, but international players rejected this offer. So, this made a poor impression on Pakistan and the visit of the ISI’s chief a futile exercise.

However, the situation took a dramatic turn: the Afghan Taliban, originally nurtured by Pakistan as a tool to counter the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), have since shifted allegiances. Today, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are at their worst as Pakistan accuses the Taliban of failing to curb various terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil. The Torkham border has recently turned into a battlefield, with both sides accusing each other of various violations.

After this, Pakistan issued the eviction order for all Afghan nationals and refugees to leave the country by March 31. However, there are thousands of Afghan nationals who have received Pakistani citizenship through different, albeit unfair, means and channels.

Today’s Pakistan laments over the Taliban’s good relations with India. After the Taliban Afghanistan takeover, Pakistan faced a rise in terrorism; more recently, Pakistan ranks second among countries on the Global Terrorism Index. Inside Pakistan, increasing security issues and the rise of militancy are major concerns for Pakistan’s strategic and economic partners, who ask Pakistan to do more to combat these issues.

Pakistan’s armed forces are internally engaged with the increasing menace of terrorism, but the country’s economic vulnerability is directly linked with overall security and the rising threat of terrorism.

The recent handover of an ISIS-K* member—allegedly involved in the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan—once again raised hopes for Pakistan to become involved and cooperate in U.S. counterterrorism operations. However, as the U.S. is cutting down on its global aid, the chances to revive those cooperative days between Washington and Islamabad are practically gone.

A set critical questions arise: Why has Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban and Afghanistan backfired? What caused the Taliban factions, with whom Pakistan allegedly maintained close ties—including the Haqqani network, which now holds key positions in Afghanistan—to turn against Pakistan? Pakistan shared a long-standing association with these groups, yet in turn, there has been a reversal of its strategic intentions.

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There are several reasons behind this backfire. As Pakistan engaged with various proxies since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, including the Taliban (then known as the Mujahideen), over time, these proxies became a liability. For Pakistan, getting rid of this liability became a major burden. As a result of this strategy, these proxies became tools for engaging in war for other forces. However, Pakistan consistently failed to encourage the proxies to join normal engagement processes to disarm them. Even though Pakistan introduced a strategy of “Good Talibans” and “Bad Talibans,” this approach also backfired.

Another factor that contributed to the failure of Pakistan’s policy was the reversal approach on the hardliner cleric chain. It is ironic that the jihadi doctrine Pakistan once championed has now been adopted by its adversaries. The reversal of the command structure Pakistan established during the Taliban’s creation has further complicated the situation.

Another major factor was that the offshoots of these proxies had started emerging over several decades. After the elimination of one proxy, several new proxies emerged under different names with a new Jihadi strategy, often even more lethal than the one before.

Furthermore, by leaving sophisticated weaponry in the hands of these offshoots during U.S. withdrawal, Pakistan’s security and defense positions became more vulnerable and fragile.

The current challenge Pakistan faces is dangerous and surrounded by concerns and risks. At this stage, Pakistan has to extend its dialogue and peace process with Afghanistan by engaging regional strategic partners who can lead toward long-lasting peace and a pause in the increasing militant attacks.

* An organization recognized as terrorist and banned on Russian territory