Zurab Abashidze: Improving Relations is a Two-Way Street

On July 30, 2015, Georgia officially joined the EU sanctions against Russia, citing the European Commission’s declaration on adopting restrictive measures in view of the situation in Crimea and Sevastopol. Two weeks earlier, a meeting between the Personal Representative of the Prime Minister of Georgia for Russia Zurab Abashidze and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Grigory Karasin took place in Prague. Zurab Abashidze shared his view of the meeting in Prague, described the main obstacles preventing the resolution of the Russian–Georgian political crisis, common economic and security interests, and the impact that the Ukrainian issue has had on relations between Moscow and Tbilisi.

On July 30, 2015, Georgia officially joined the EU sanctions against Russia, citing the European Commission’s declaration on adopting restrictive measures in view of the situation in Crimea and Sevastopol. Two weeks earlier, a meeting between the Personal Representative of the Prime Minister of Georgia for Russia Zurab Abashidze and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Grigory Karasin took place in Prague.

Zurab Abashidze shared his view of the meeting in Prague, described the main obstacles preventing the resolution of the Russian–Georgian political crisis, common economic and security interests, and the impact that the Ukrainian issue has had on relations between Moscow and Tbilisi.

On July 15, 2015, you met with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Grigory Karasin once again. What are the impressions?

As you know, the Prague format of bilateral talks between Georgia and Russia was set up in 2012 to deal with practical issues regarding trade and economic relations, transport and certain humanitarian questions. Within this mandate, the Georgian and Russian sides have taken steps to restore trade links and air and road transportation – both passenger and freight. We also addressed the issue of Georgian citizens who have been accused of espionage and are serving time in Russian jails. So, as you can see, we are dealing with real issues at these meetings.

The meeting on July 15 was fraught with serious difficulties. This is because on July 10, the boundary fences of two Georgian villages near the occupation line in Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) were moved, causing outrage in Georgian society. A number of harsh comments have been made on the issue by governments and international organizations.

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Zurab Abashidze

Tbilisi sees the move as a gross violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, as well of its people’s basic human rights. Such provocation could have dire consequences for the region as a whole.

In such a region as the South Caucasus you should be extremely careful to avoid provoking uncontrollable processes, a thought that I expressed at the last meeting in Prague.

The issue of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) is a topic that should be discussed at international consultations in Geneva. However, I could not ignore the matter, and it was the most hotly discussed issue at the July 15 meeting.

The situation provided an extremely negative background for the meeting. There was much criticism from our opponents in the sense that it is not appropriate to hold discussions on trade, economic and transport matters when something like this happens so close to the Georgian capital. In Prague, I said that Georgia was utilizing all international channels and contacts to make sure the country’s partners, as well as international institutions, are aware of the situation. Georgia intends to make use of every diplomatic opportunity and has no plans to accept this situation.

The meeting also dealt with issues related to the primary agenda. After economic relations were restored in 2013–2014, trade between the two countries showed positive results, with both imports and exports benefiting. Last year, trade turnover reached $850 million, with Georgian exports to Russia amounting to around $275 million. The end of 2014 was marked by a drop in overall trade and trade relations as a result of Russia’s economic and financial difficulties. Georgian exports to Russia suffered significantly, especially exports of wine products, which fell by 48 per cent.

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Grigory Karasin

The situation in other areas, such as transport, motorway services and freight traffic is entirely different. The number of Russian tourists travelling to Georgia increased by 12–13 per cent compared to last year.

We also discussed the possibility of implementing the 2011 intergovernmental treaty on customs monitoring. An agreement on holding a tripartite meeting (between Georgia, Russia and Switzerland) was reached in August or September 2015 to discuss the implementation of the treaty.

We also touched upon organizational and technical matters: the relevant Georgian agencies are interested in having new products reach the Russian market. A number of Georgian companies are experiencing difficulties in obtaining licenses, visas and permits. This was discussed in Prague.

In turn, the Russian side confirmed that it was looking into the possibility of easing the visa regime for certain categories of Georgian nationals. In this respect, I would like to point out that Russian citizens do not need a visa to travel to Georgia.

In this respect, Georgia has a very liberal regime for nationals of neighbouring countries and other countries around the world.

This was the first time that the meeting in Prague was held in an expanded format, with the participation of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation and the Head of the Land Transport Agency of Georgia. Are there any plans to set up meetings between these two agencies in the future?

The Swiss side helps set up direct contact between different agencies. And the ministries of economy of the two countries do work together. Since the Prague meetings deal mainly with practical issues, it would seem appropriate and logical that experts in the various fields should be involved. After all, experts are more qualified to talk about specific issues, including those that relate to transportation.

Despite the fact that Russian–Georgian relations have not been fully restored, contacts between the two countries have not been broken off. What, in your opinion, are the most promising areas for the development of bilateral relations?

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Trade and economic relations are a huge area, with room for a great many ideas and suggestions. The number I cited earlier with regard to the trade volume between Russia and Georgia ($850 million) is encouraging, but in reality it is a rather modest figure. In 2015, Russia has gone from being Georgia’s third most important trade partner in terms of size to being its fifth most important trade partner.

As it stands, Georgia has adopted the following approach: in 2014, the country signed a European Union Association Agreement and, as part of this, it signed an agreement on the establishment on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between Georgia and the European Union. At the same time, the Georgian side believes it is possible to maintain normal trade relations with its neighbours, as well as with other countries, and have a trade regime that is beneficial to all parties. The door is slightly open in this respect, in terms of relations between businesspeople and various organizations. Only time will tell if these opportunities are exploited to their fullest.

Representatives from both sides, as well as the expert community, say that developing economic ties between Russia and Georgia should be the priority. How likely is it that a business forum will be organized in Georgia for Russian investors along the same lines as the events that exist for foreign investors?

Russian companies feel quite comfortable on the Georgian market. There are around 200 Russian companies working in Georgia right now. Incidentally, a significant number of strategic assets in Georgia were purchased by Russian companies during the previous government, when the United National Movement was in power (from 2004 to 2012). The current government is also interested in having Russian investors operate in Russia.

Returning to the original topic, it should be noted that the absence of a favourable political climate would make it all the more difficult to develop ties in even one area. There are issues that can act as a serious hindrance to everything.

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When the Prague dialogue began, we said that we would move forward with baby steps and a constructive approach. The Georgian side has exerted great efforts to create a constructive spirit and search for solutions to many very difficult problems in Russian–Georgian relations. As for Russia’s actions, we do not understand the reasoning behind the decision to sign new integration agreements with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia). The Russian side insists that there is nothing new in these agreements. If this is the case, then it is not clear why they would want to spoil a good start. On the other hand, in reality we can see that these agreements contain much that is new. And this can change the situation in the region as a whole in a big way. Tbilisi views these agreements as a step towards the de facto annexation of Georgian regions.

A year ago, our Russian colleagues insisted that the process of “borderization” was complete[1] But the events of July 10 suggest that it has started up once again. All this creates additional problems for solving the already difficult relations between Georgia and Russia.

The Ukrainian crisis has significantly altered the makeup of Russia’s foreign policy contacts. But it hasn’t affected the process of political rapprochement between Russia and Georgia. In particular, the Karasin–Abashidze dialogue has acquired particular significance as a bilateral means of communication. What is the reasoning behind the generally favourable position taken by the Georgian authorities at a time of difficulty for Russia in its foreign policy?

The Georgian side tries to avoid terms like “settlement” and “benevolent approach”, as they do not reflect the current reality. In the absence of bilateral and diplomatic relations, there can be no talk of “settlement”. We are talking about trying to find a way out of a dead end. By “dead end”, I mean that by recognizing the independent status of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) in 2008, Russia created a vicious circle – a vicious circle in the legal sense. And no one knows how to get out of it. Russia will not go back on its decision, and Georgia will never accept the independent status of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. Right now, there is no way out of the situation. In this situation, there is no need to talk about re-establishing diplomatic relations. At the same time, we should remember that the Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories is in force.

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The Georgian side wants to gradually return the situation to normal. Unfortunately, we keep running into problems.

Russia and Georgia have restored relations to the bare minimum that must exist between states. It is difficult to name a single country with which Russia does not have some kind of communication, dialogue or cooperation, especially among its neighbours. Despite the obvious difficulties, Ukraine maintains trade and diplomatic relations with Russia, and there are regular flights between Kiev and Moscow. Georgia has allowed the same kind of relations to continue.

As for the situation in Ukraine, Georgia unequivocally supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and endeavours to provide the necessary aid to our close neighbours.

Has the Ukrainian crisis altered the perception of the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia?

Some people have changed their opinion, some have adopted even stronger stances. On the whole, the dramatic events that have unfolded in Ukraine are reminiscent of what happened in Georgia in 2008 and earlier in the 1990s.

In early summer 2015, the Georgian authorities detained a cousin of an ISIS leader as part of a special operation in the Pankisi Gorge. As you know, political Islam is a problem for both Russia and Georgia. Are the Russian and Georgian special forces planning to work together to combat this problem?

I think it is our duty under God to combine the efforts of the entire civilized world to fight the huge threat of international terrorism. In this respect, and as members of the United Nations, we have international obligations. Georgia actively participates in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and the Central African Republic under the auspices of the European Union. In other words, the Georgian military is well prepared. During the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Georgia adopted a number of measures to tighten security, including greater control on Georgian territory. My personal opinion is this: in order to establish cooperation of any kind in this area, there needs to be a certain level of trust. There also needs to be a history of working together to solve major issues.

How do you assess the role of public diplomacy in Russian–Georgian relations? Is there any point in strengthening and developing Russian–Georgian ties in the non-governmental sector?

There have always been ties in this area. Before I became a government official, I participated in various meetings. These days, such meetings are held on a regular basis. I attended two seminars only a few weeks ago. Experts from Georgia and Russia get together and organize events under the auspices of international funds.

We need experts and specialists to generate new ideas, eliminating excessive politicization. We need honest and professional cooperation in the non-governmental sector.

Can we expect Tbilisi to change its foreign policy course given that the normalization of bilateral relations with Russia has not brought the desired results?

Changing the country’s foreign policy with regard to Europe is out of the question, as it has been chosen by the Georgian people.

We have a clear understanding of what we need to do in terms of our foreign policy. At the same time, the Georgian Dream coalition has promised to break the deadlock with Russia should it emerge victorious in the next elections. And we are trying to do that too. But improving relations is a two-way street.

Interviewed by RIAC blogger Leila Machavariani.

[1] Setting up barriers (fences and barbed wire) on the “borders” between the Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) and Georgia.