Ukraine appears to have the second largest army of the Black Sea region, but in the case of an open conflict with Russia in Eastern regions, the Ukrainian army would have to be dispatched near the Belorussian and the Russian borders on the one hand, and near Transdniestria on the other hand to face Moscow's 14^th Army dispatched in Transdniestria. Although the bulk of the Ukrainian army consisted in 2014 in paramilitary units, mainly belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (39,900) and to the Border Guard (45,000), the figures for 2015 remain unknown. Kiev formed in 2014 a new National Guard with 33,000 personnel. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian military is hampered by a set of structural challenges that Kiev has been unable to deal with efficiently. First, plans to end the conscription have failed. After having suspended conscription for a few months in 2014, it was reinstated in May 2014, and today Kiev's army consists in just over 50% of servicemen. Before its ousting, the Yanukovitch government targeted 2015 to transform the army and terminate the conscription (Defence reform plan to 2017). Despite efforts to rationalize the budget and a roughly constant military spending (with a 2,8% average of GDP), the Ukrainian army has been poorly supplied in new equipment and continue to operate aging Soviet-era hardware. Moreover, reforms planned by Kiev to downsize and modernize its army have suffered from inappropriate budgets. As pointed out by the White Paper 2012, two decades of underfinanced military reforms question the training and the combat readiness of Ukraine's military. The number of personnel serving in the Civil Defense Troops and the battalions remains unknown although the number of battalions has been assessed at 40, with foreign fighters enlisted (mainly Polish, Croatians, and Balts so-called volunteers).

The Ukrainian air force operates mainly Soviet-era aircrafts, and due to budget restrictions, pilots are supposed to perform a minimum of 40 flying hours a year, which is very low in comparison with their Turkish counterparts (180 hours), and more than twice less than the average flying time in Russian air force. The Ukrainian air force consist in 116 fighters (MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker), 34 Su-24 Fencer (fighter and ground attack aircrafts) and 29 Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircrafts. However, the serviceability and the combat readiness of these aircrafts can be questioned, and the total available combat fleet is probably much smaller. Ukraine is said to have lost nearly 20 units above Donbass in the conflict against separatists.

Before Russia's absorption of Crimea, Ukraine had the most serious maritime power potential in the Black Sea. Crimea provided Kiev with the best Black Sea port, Sevastopol, and with the longest coastline and the largest continental shelf in the region. However, Ukraine's naval power has been constrained by critical funding restrictions and structural challenges. Kiev's fleet comes from the spilt of the ex-Soviet Black Sea Fleet concluded with Moscow in 1997 and is characterized by a very low serviceability rate. Ukrainian navy has only 1 high sea capable vessel, the frigate Hetman Sagaidachny, and its only sub, a Soviet-era Foxtrot type submarine, is not fit for battle. Ukraine however planned to modernize its fleet through the implementation of a €1,5 billion corvette construction program approved by the Ukrainian government in March 2009. According to the initial program, 10 units of the codenamed Project 58250 corvette were ordered, but due to financial difficulties, Kiev cut the program down to 4 units in 2010. The lead ship unit, the Vladimir Veliky, is being built in Chernomorsky Shipyard (Nikolaiev) with the contribution of several western companies, including the German Rheinmetall. The delivery of the Vladimir Veliky was scheduled for 2015, with 3 other units initially planned to be commissioned by 2021. However, the ongoing crisis as well as the critical economic situation in Ukraine is likely to seriously hamper the completion of this program. Besides, the bulk of Ukraine's navy was based in Crimean naval facilities, and after its military operations in the peninsula, Russia seized 70 Ukrainian warships. Nevertheless, taking into account their poor global condition, Moscow started to return the vessels to Ukraine, and on April 11, 2014, the first batch of Ukrainian warships was tugged to Odessa. In July 2015, Russia stated it was ready to return the last 20 vessels to Ukraine out of the 70 seized in March 2014. Due to the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine's maritime potential and naval power is dramatically questioned. However, since Crimea is not likely to return to Ukraine in the near future, Kiev should resize its fleet by decommissioning old and now unnecessary units.