Limitations of Indian Aircraft Carriers: A Critical Review

Aircraft carriers are physical manifestations of naval power projection. The prestige associated with carrier vessels symbolizes the status of any maritime nation as major naval power. The incorporation of air power at sea significantly augments the combat potential of any naval force. By nature, aircraft carriers are frontline combatants and are employed for sea-control missions during combat. In peace time, carriers are used as a coercive tool for naval diplomacy and provide a decisive psychological advantage through its visible and continuous presence at sea.

The Indian Navy (IN) has been operating aircraft carriers since 1961. Up to now, four carrier vessels have sailed under the Indian Navy flag. Currently two aircraft carriers, the INS Vikramaditya and the INS Vikrant, are part of the Indian naval fleet. With the exception of the recently commissioned and locally built INS Vikrant, all Indian aircraft carriers have been purchased from foreign sources as refurbished second-hand vessels.

Source: scmp.com

India’s first aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, was former HMS Hercules carrier of Royal Navy. It was purchased by India in 1961 from Great Britain and remained in service until January 31, 1997. In the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the INS Vikrant spent most of its time at harbor instead of taking an offensive position against Pakistan. In the 1971 war, the INS Vikrant sailed in open seas only after the sinking of PNS Ghazi submarine off the Visakhapatnam coast. The INS Viraat, the erstwhile HMS Hermes of the Royal Navy, was India’s second aircraft carrier. Commissioned on May 12, 1987, this 28,700 ton displacement vessel participated in numerous peacetime missions but did not see any remarkable combat action throughout its service. The only notable operation conducted by this carrier was to support counter insurgency operations in Sri Lanka. The INS Viraat was phased out on March 06, 2012.

The INS Vikramaditya, the third and largest naval vessel of Indian Navy, is not a purpose-built aircraft carrier per say. The Admiral Gorshkov missile cruiser of the Russian Navy was converted into the INS Vikramaditya after extensive modifications. The deal was inked in 2004 with an initial cost of USD 0.97 billion. But considering the scale of structural tailoring required the deal suffered from numerous delays and cost overrun. The price ballooned to USD 2.35 billion, and after a decade-long delay, the INS Vikramaditya was eventually delivered to India on November 16, 2013. This ill-fated flagship of the Indian Navy has suffered numerous accidents and operational mishaps in its brief operational history.

In 2012, during sea-trials in Russia, the INS Vikramaditya lost propulsion due to engine failure. On 10 June 2016, a leakage of toxic gases during vessel’s refitting killed two people onboard. Similarly, on April 16, 2019, when the carrier was entering harbor in Karwar, a fire broke out and killed an Indian naval officer. One more fire-related incident was reported in May 2022. Recently, on July 20, 2022, another fire-related accident took place during planned sea trial. Frequent safety issues and technical failures have undermined the operational capability of the INS Vikramaditya which has spent most of its time at the Karwar naval station instead of open seas.

The locally produced INS Vikrant is India’s second aircraft carrier that is currently operational in the Indian naval fleet. It was commissioned on September 02, 2023, and is the largest warship ever produced by India. The INS Vikrant shares similar design as the INS Vikramaditya. Both are mid-size conventionally powered carriers with an angled flight-deck, displacing roughly 42,000 tons. The logic of this carrier design has numerous operational limitations which significantly degrades its power projection potential.

The capability of the aircraft carrier is often gauged by the propulsion system, deck surface area, launch mechanism, and total ship displacement. Conventionally powered aircraft carriers are suitable for local sea-control and lack the range and endurance of nuclear powered aircraft carriers for blue water power projection. The United States Navy’s nuclear powered super carriers, equipped with CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off Barrier Arrested Recovery), can carry 90 aircrafts of varying type. Unlike the CATOBAR launch system, which uses steam or an electromagnetic catapult to launch aircrafts at high speed, STOBAR (Short Take-Off Barrier Arrested Recovery) carriers utilize a ski-jump or angled flight deck. Only high thrust aircrafts are capable of taking-off from STOBAR carriers using afterburners. As a result, aircrafts cannot fly with maximum load capacity and have to compromise between weapon load-out and fuel carriage. Both Indian aircraft carriers use STOBAR launch mechanisms, supporting a meager number of 36 aircrafts at their maximum capacity and rely on replenishment at sea (RAS) for conducting long range sustained operations. These limitations undermine the carrier’s ability to conduct sustained offensive operations, compelling the carrier to operate within engagement envelop of adversary subsequently threatening the survivability of the carrier.

The MiG-29K is the sole carrier borne fighter aircraft at IN’s disposal. India acquired 45 MiG-29K aircrafts from Russia in two orders made in 2007 and 2010, and have been split into two squadrons, the White Tigers and the Black Panthers. In 2016, MiG-29K’s became known for issues related to airframe, their RD-33 turbofan engines, and fly-by-wire controls. At that time, the availability rate of the aircraft was very poor usually ranging from 15.93 percent to 37.63 percent. Measures have been taken by the IN to improve the serviceability of aircraft, but the aircraft is still notorious for technical snags and operational limitations. Moreover, despite being a comparatively new acquisition, the MiG-29Ks have high crash rates. Five MiG-29K aircrafts have crashed since 2018. With the current strength of a mere two squadrons, the MiG-29K fleet is inadequate to fulfill the operational requirements of the two carriers. With a limited number of aircrafts available, the carriers cannot undertake offensive and defensive operations simultaneously. With a questionable sustained sortie rate, Indian carriers cannot deliver a substantial punch against near-peer adversaries, particularly in high intensity and multi-front conflict zones.

Another major shortcoming of the STOBAR carriers is their inability to operate fixed wing carrier-capable Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircrafts. The fixed-wing AEW aircrafts, like US Navy E-2 Hawkeye, are heavier and cannot take-off from the carrier deck using aircraft’s engines power alone. These aircrafts utilize catapult for the carrier launch operations. When compared with rotary-wing AEW aircrafts, like the Indian Navy’s Ka-31 AEW helicopter, fixed-wing AEW aircrafts have greater speed, range and endurance, and can climb at a higher altitude. This not only significantly improves the response time and operational area coverage, but also remarkably enhances the radar horizon of AEW aircraft. Additionally, fixed-wing AEW aircrafts, due to their bigger payload capacity, carries more powerful radars, therefore providing superior capability to detect and track greater number of targets simultaneously at longer ranges. Indian aircraft carriers, with Ka-31 AEW helicopters fleet, have noticeably limited situational awareness in comparison with CATOBAR carriers operated by the US Navy and French Navy. It is noteworthy that India’s primary rival in Indian Ocean, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), is in the phase of raising similar capability using combination of CATOBAR system in the Fujian aircraft carrier and KJ-600 AEW aircraft.

To compensate for the deficiency of carrier-aircraft fleet, the Indian Navy is undertaking several measures, including the expansion and diversification of its aviation fleet. The deployment of MH-60 R Romeo ASW helicopters from its carriers will augment carrier anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defensive capabilities. The IN is in the process of testing carrier-based unmanned aerial system (UAV) which will significantly improve the operational flexibility of Indian carries. Additionally, India is aiming to acquire 26 Dassalt Rafale-M aircrafts from France. However, the deal is yet to be signed and deliveries of these aircrafts will take time to materialize. Although the naval version of LCA Tejas has successfully conducted test sorties from both carriers, but the limited range, restricted payload capacity and poor thrust to weight ratio has led IN to reject Tejas for carrier operations. Instead, the IN has shifted its focus on future potential options like the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) and a naval version of Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (N-AMCA) which will periodically replace the existing MiG-29K fleet.

In parallel, India is currently planning to domestically construct another aircraft carrier. Known as the INS Vishal, it will be second carrier built within India. Previously, it was planned that Indian Navy will eventually shift from mid-size carrier vessels to large flat-tops and the INS Vishal will ensure this transition. However, the carrier initially perceived to be in same category as Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth class carrier, is now planned to be sister ship of the INS Vikrant with a similar design albeit with advanced sensors and defensive systems. The timeline from its approval to its commissioning is yet to be known. With the current know-how of the already built INS Vikrant, it is anticipated that the INS Vishal will not take a decade to acquire commissioning in the IN. But, given the dismal history of delaying military projects due to bureaucratic hurdles, financial constraints, and technical complications, hindrance in the construction of INS Vishal cannot be completely ruled out. So, depending on its acquisition timeline, it will be decided that either the IN will employ the INS Vishal as third carrier or as replacement of the INS Vikramaditya.

The Indian Navy has traditionally regarded aircraft carriers as a vital asset for achieving psychological and physical dominance at sea. Indian aircraft carriers symbolize the New Delhi’s aspirations for greater maritime power, which is why India has plans to build five or six more carriers in the future. However, the structural and operational limitations faced by India’s carrier fleet can impede their combat efficiency in high-intensity conflicts. Considering the growing complexity of India’s threat perceptions in the maritime domain – particularly when power politics in Indo-Pacific is taken into account – there is growing need to overcome these limitations. Otherwise, with the inability to conduct offensive and defensive operations at a sustained rate in hostile waters, India’s carrier fleet will remain self-defeating in practice.