In Retreat: French Influence in the Sahel Region

France was once home to a far-flung empire in Africa. After World War II, independence movements resulted in the empire’s breakup, followed by the establishment of new post-colonial states. Though France officially left the continent, it still maintained significant influence over its former African colonies, specifically those in the Sahel region, such as Mali, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. From economy and security, to investment and politics, France has long been at the centre of the political realm in the Sahel region. One of its priorities has always been to keep its influence in the Sahel region, as it has successfully done from the Cold War period to modern times. Moreover, France was worry-free in terms of other powerful influences competing in the region. Now, however, much has changed; France is witnessing a pushback from the region’s Francophones. From the nineteenth century, Africa was pvied up, with France obtaining one of the largest slices of the pie. Much of West Africa has been influenced by France in terms of its politics. This was especially visible when France became militarily involved in the region to stop growing jihadist movements.

 Source: RT

Historical Context

France maintains strong historical connections to what once were its African colonies. The Sahel region of Africa is a region filled with natural resources like oil, gold, salt, diamonds, copper, uranium, petroleum, fisheries, and other resources. During the nineteenth century’s “Scramble for Africa”, France was considered one of the most prominent colonisers alongside the British, Italians, Germans, and Spanish. However, French influence in the Sahel was present long before it officially became its colonizer. Since the early seventeenth century, French businesses traded gold, acacia gum, and infamously, slaves along a river in Senegal bay, in the region of Saint-Louis.

Records may point to a specific date where the Sahel region fell under French rule, but France had long participated in African affairs prior to its official takeover. Officially, France took over Gambia in 1889, Guinea in 1891, Mali in 1892, Burkina Faso in 1896, Niger in 1922, Chad in 1900, and Mauritania in 1904. In 1918, even Cameroon was pided between the French and British, taking it from defeated Germany. Since each African country holds strategic value, given the rich minerals and natural resources present there, colonies were dominated with the aim to increase colonizer political and cultural influence in the region. To suppress resistance and maintain control in the territory and surrounding colonies, France established military bases throughout the Sahel and other parts of Africa. One of France’s greatest motivations, known as the “White man’s burden”, was to “civilize” Africa, whom they viewed as an inferior race. These colonies remained in French control during World War I and World War II, with the African troops playing a major role in both wars, laying down their lives for their ruling state.

With the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, a desire for change had swept through the Sahel, and states demanded their independence from France. From 1960 onwards, the struggle for independence proved successful, and all French-controlled territories became independent states. However, France’s influence and leverage in the continent continued to stick around. France constantly meddled in the politics and social movements of the post-colonial Sahel states. This was visible when certain pro-French political leaders allowed France exploit state resources and minerals. To keep them under their sphere of influence, there are accusations that France backed various coups and power struggles.  As the world became entrenched in Cold War dilemmas, France, being part of the American camp, strived to seat pro-French leaders, not excluding dictators, that promised to uphold France’s influence and economic interests. Burkinabé leader Thomas Sankara stood against such appeasement. Sankara was a military officer who became president of Upper Volta (prior name of Burkina Faso) via a coup in 1983. He was a Marxist revolutionary who believed in Pan-Africanism and opposed imperialism, advocating for a simpler lifestyle in Burkina Faso from 1983 to 1987. Sankara openly critiqued French imperialism and its exploitation of Burkina Faso and the Sahel. Most notable of his critiques took place in November 1986, when French President François Mitterrand visited Burkina Faso. Sankara criticised France for providing aid and support to Pieter Botha, the Prime Minister of South Africa who had implemented and upheld apartheid policies, and Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In turn, French economic aid to Burkina Faso was reduced by 80% from 1983 to 1985. Guy Penne, French President François Mitterrand's advisor on African affairs, then initiated a smear campaign against Sankara, concocting stories of supposed atrocities led by Sankara in order to fuel hatred and contempt against him in France and Europe.

Sankara brought drastic changes domestically, particularly by making the agricultural sector of Burkina Faso more self-sufficient. This was done via land reforms, famine prevention mechanisms, literacy campaigns, vaccination programmes against major illnesses, combating corruption and political crimes, outlawing forced marriages, polygamy and female genital mutilation, and by combating desertification in the Sahel by planting ten million trees. To leave its colonial legacy behind, President Thomas Sankara changed the name of Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, meaning “land of honest men”. There were also many major foreign policy triumphs during Sankara’s time in power, as he lessened Burkina Faso’s dependence on foreign aid, particularly that of France. This is why Sankara was often seen as a threat to French interests in Burkina Faso. This inevitably resulted in his demise on October 15, 1987, when he was assassinated alongside 12 other officials in a coup organised by his once colleague and confidante Blaise Compaoré, who previously defended him in the 1983 French-backed coup.[1] France, an advocate of democracy, human rights, equality and liberalism was nestling autocrats in the Sahel region to have more control over its affairs. Aside from Blaise Compaoré, there was Lansana Conté of Guinea who was in power from 1984 to 2008. Although the country fell into the hands of an authoritarian government, its relations with the French did not subside, unlike his predecessor Ahmed Sékou. Similar can be said about Chad and its dictatorship, led by military ruler Idriss Deby from 1990 to 2021.

Another example includes Mauritania, a country straddling West Africa, drenched in militia warfare. Throughout its history, Mauritania has suffered attacks from terrorist groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, particularly from 2005 to 2010. Prior to the 2005 attacks, Mauritania pursued anti-Islamist policies by President Maaouya Ould Taya. This backfired as Mauritania attracted Jihadist elements, resulting in its downfall in 2005. Since then, the Mauritanian government has faced a series of terrorist attacks over its alignment with the West. There were archives located in Bin Laden’s house following a raid of his home that revealed a truce between Mauritania and Osama bin Laden, however the agreement was denied by the Mauritanian government at the time.[2] As for France, both had maintained cordial relations with each other since the 1980s, providing developmental assistance via French investments in Mauritania and by providing other social, cultural, technical, and financial assistance.

Imperial Influences

       France has a history of using foreign aid to maintain influence in the region, in addition to installing leaders and taking part in military interventions to change the political landscape. Many observers have tied French security policies in the Sahel to the economic interests and the corrupt private and public networks linking French and African elites in the postcolonial era. These networks continue to play a vital role in the Sahel region, as do the prolonged historical conflicts that have been taking place because of the lack of stable political governance. As these historical conflicts continue, they destabilize states, leaving them incredibly vulnerable to conflict, as is the case with Mali.

In Mali, ethnical conflicts between the Tuaregs and the Malians have continuously erupted, despite there being three agreements that should have prevented such. Niger faces a similar threat, with Tuareg rebellions taking place in the 1990s and 2007, regardless of there being a peace agreement in 1995, where demands for military reforms, economic development, decentralisation, and integration were acknowledged. In both places, the Tuaregs demanded social and political inclusion, in addition to economic development in the region. Niger and Mali have both faced Tuareg- related issues, however Niger undertook a far more conciliatory approach to the problem than Mali, who distrusted the Tuaregs. True, this may be due to the fact that the chances of a rebellion in Mali are far greater, given that the Tuaregs have clustered in Northern Mali, while in Niger, they are more spread out across the state, reducing chances of secessionism. Hence, the geographical concentration of the Tuaregs in Northern Mali complicates matters. Aiming to avoid future conflicts and become more inclusive, Nigerien President Mahamadou Issofou appointed prominent Tuareg politicians to important ministries such as Brigi Rafini. Mali adopted a peace treaty in 1992, but then seriously neglected it. In terms of regional power, America and China have been steadily expanding their influence in the region, as has France, fearing that it can lose its primary hold over Sahel.

French Intervention in the Sahel Region

The Sahel region is drenched in complex security dilemmas, riddled with humanitarian crises and violent extremism. Economic decline, rising poverty, unemployment, illegitimate governance, external interference, and worsening climate conditions have all threatened the security of the region. The last decade has borne witness to the rise of conflict and violence spilling over to state boundaries, posing magnanimous challenges for all Sahel countries. Most impacted have been the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin sub-regions. Instability was inadvertently introduced by France and its NATO allies when it bombed Libya for proliferating weapons. As the conflict worsened, Tuareg fighters fled to Libya where NATO would later drop bombs targeting Muammar Gaddafi. Tuareg deaths from the bombing rekindled pro-rebellion sentiments, similar to those of 1916, 1963, 1990, and 2006, setting the stage for future conflicts.

Mali faced intense political upheaval with the Tuareg rebellion, which led under the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In 2012, ten-year President Amadou Toumani Touré's government was overthrown in a coup by a group of renegade soldiers because of the government’s handling of the northern insurgency, the result of which frustrated the army, especially with under-funded and under-equipped army to tackle the Tuareg rebels who were well-armed and experienced.[3] The coup was followed by international denunciations, and sanctions against Mali by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This made the unstable situation further imbalanced and strengthened MNLA’s cause. To diffuse tensions, Burkina Faso President Blaise Camporé, and ECOWAS, brokered a deal to transition the power and presidency to interim President Dioncounda Traoré.

The MNLA was made up by former insurgents and armed Tuaregs who fought in the Libyan Civil War. To strengthen their cause, they partnered with Islamist Salafi jihadist groups Movement for the Oneness, Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) or MUJWA (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),[4] and Ansar Dine, which was formed by veteran Tuareg rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali in early 2012.[5] With political instability back in Bamako, the army was in disarray. As troops fled, rebels continued to advance to the north. The Azawad ceased the northern part where they formed 60 per cent of the majority with the Arabs under fragile agreements.[6] In April 2012, the MNLA rebelled against Mali’s government, aided by Islamist MOJWA and Ansar Dine. After the collapse of the government, the MNLA declared unilateral independence and sovereignty of Azawad.

Azawad has not been formally recognized by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), African Union, European Union, Russia, Canada, and America. France took things a step further and offered assistance to ECOWAS to stabilize the situation in Mali. Yet Azawad’s control over the territory remained delicate as Tuaregs and Islamist militants often disputed. In June 2012, Azawad forces came into conflict with Islamist Salafi jihadist groups MOJWA and Ansar Dine, after they imposed strict Sharia law in Azawad and declared a caliphate. The MNLA and Ansar Dine threatened Mali’s secular stature; all the cities proved to be breeding grounds for religious extremism and drug trafficking, as MOJWA and Ansar Dine were achieving swift gains in Northern Mali. This alarmed the international community, specifically France, from whom the interim Mali government had requested military assistance. With the crisis unfolding, the United Nations passed Resolution 2085, on December 20, 2012, to restore order and the territorial integrity to Mali.[7] French President François Hollande’s authorized to take down Islamist militancy in Northern Mali by whatever means necessary. France feared that terrorism would spread to all other Sahel countries. Therefore, to prevent a domino effect, the stability in Niger, Mali, and Mauritania became a priority for French political, financial, and security interests. Moreover, keeping in mind France’s great power interests in the region, it considered important to act as a protector for the West African countries, who had started tilting towards America, and China, for aid. To preserve its sphere of influence in the region, France decided it must intervene.

Intervention by Invitation

       In January 2013, AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, rapidly pushed their forces southward, capturing Konna, located in Central Mali. On January 11, 2013, by the request of interim President Dioncounda Traoré, five thousand French military soldiers were sent to Mali for Operation Sevral, backed by Burkina Faso, Senegal, Chad, other Sahel countries, ECOWAS,[8] and international backup of US via Niger.[9] Eventually, French forces captured Gao, Timbuktu, and other strategic towns such as Markala, Kidal, and Konna. Successful airstrikes resulted in heavy casualties for the jihadists, but not without the coalition losing some of their own. On February 19, 2013, a French soldier and 20 rebels were killed at Adrar des Ifoghas.[10] Meanwhile on 25^th February, two Islamist commanders of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Abdel Hamid Abou Zeid, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar were also killed making an impact on the radical Islamism spurring.[11] There were also various suicide bombings: on March 30, 2013 Islamist militants against Mali blew up forces at a checkpoint; on April 12, 2013, soldiers from Chad were killed in Kidal’s market.[12] African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) also intervened in Mali in December 2012,[13] which was succeeded by MINUSMA.[14] Thus, Mali was a conflict that touched many other states; Chad had sent around one thousand eight hundred soldiers to fight, provided their familiarity in the Sahel terrain.[15] Unexpected rebel advancements resulted in Nigeria being the first to steadfastly deploy its air and ground forces in Mali in January 17, 2013.[16]

French, Mali and MINUSMA forces were no match for the Jihadist’s use of guerrilla war tactics. To charter more support for the war effort, international forces under United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) were created on April 25, 2013, to support political processes and carry out security measures.[17] Many were sceptical about MINUSMA, as they were seen as French pawns, simply taking orders from France rather than acting as a coalition. In the later stages of the conflict, AFISMA held diplomatic talks with the rebels and others. By July 2013, this duty was passed to MINUSMA. French intervention was widely praised and supported by the international community, Mali’s population. Some analysts go on to argue that without the French, the beleaguered transitional Mali government would have fallen. By April 2014, French, Malian and MINUSMA forces were all in Mali, but there was lack of coordination among the forces. There was also an unexpected act of defiance in Gao when young people gathered and protested the lack of security parameters around the city, as MINUSMA and French forces were not able to garner support for the Malian forces against the Islamist militants. They also accused the forces of disturbing the life of Gao by taking extra security measure for themselves, rather than the citizens.

MINUSMA’s role was significant in leading peace efforts after France lost credibility when it allowed ransom to be paid for hostages, and turning Kidal to the MNLA. Ansar Dine and AQIM’s fallout from Kidal made France handover the role to MNLA, until a peace deal was reached. France’s presence brought psychological benefits to the people of Mali and the Sahel states, but conflict and insecurity still loomed. In May 2013, Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara and his forces entered Kidal; after 50 casualties the Prime Minister was urged to resign. France allowed the MNLA to take control of Kidal which made Malians suspicious of the French, thinking they were concocting their own plans without Mali’s consent. A peace agreement was finally reached between Mali and Tuareg (MNLA) on June 18, 2013, but due to irreconcilable differences, the Tuareg pulled out on September 26, 2013. There was another round of peace talks in the fall of 2014, yet Malians believed that France favoured MNLA separatists over locals. Additionally, many became disgruntled with MINUSMA, despite their abundant equipment and resources. Another peace agreement was reached in 2015, however it excluded Islamist militants.

Operation Sevral

       On July 15, 2014, Operation Sevral came to a successful end, with the northern Mali territory retaken from the terrorists. Reminiscing President Bush’s words over the toppling of the Taliban, President Hollande said “key objectives of the mission have been accomplished.”[18] The intervention gave President Hollande a chance to boost his image back at home and a chance to augment his stature. He portrayed himself as a strong president with immense public support. In Hollandé speeches, the intervention in Mali was seen as a fight for French values of liberty and democracy, while in France, terrorism became the greatest security threat. Meanwhile, in Mali, the intervention paved way for the presidential elections in July and August 2013, and legislative elections in November 2013 for rebuilding stability and government legitimacy. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected as president in the July-August 2013 elections, reversing the 2012 military coup, championing France’s version of a democratic Africa. The new government was highly indebted to France for intervening, and its ability to stabilize the situation and prevent the collapse of Mali’s democracy. President Hollandé emphasised the importance of the operation in his speech at a military airbase in Chad: “If we let terrorist prosper in this part of the African continent, there will be consequences for Europe and France.”[19]  On February 2, 2013, the French President visited Mali, where popular support for the intervention was broadly expressed. President Hollandé denied that France had any ulterior motives in Mali, claiming that the intervention was for the protection of Mali and Malian state. During Operation Sevral, France was met with positivity and was not accused of neo-colonialism. The flow of uranium from Niger and the stability of Mali was important to many French policymakers and elite, who feared that the valuable resources could fall into terrorist hands. France asserted itself as global player in the world stage under President Hollandé. The media projected stories and images of grateful Northern Malians, but this was all part of a “carefully crafted communication strategy” under joint French military and Malian authorities to shape the public perception about the intervention. Local and international journalist access was forbidden to visit combat zones, that way the government can better control the narrative. As Mali had contributed greatly in the war effort in both the World War’s under French colonial rule, French intervention was seen “as a repayment of France’s historical debt towards Mali” by French and Malian authorities.

Operation Barkhane

    Overall, Operation Sevral made room for the French to mask its regional aims via combating counterterrorism. Subsequently, on August 1, 2014, Operation Barkhane was announced, expanding French operations in the Sahel region, aiming to maintain stability and control over the territory. Operation Barkhane transformed the French military strategy on terrorism from a targeted to a regional one. It was one of the largest French overseas operations, aiming to neutralise jihadists and find their hideouts. France aimed to dismantle jihadist arms and ammunitions, with the support of regional forces. There was an expedition of 4,700 French forces in the Operation Barkhane. Soon, it became clear that France’s presence in Mali and the region was a long-term plan. Operation Barkhane established a French base in Gao with a thousand French troops stationed there. French operations were closely coordinated with Chad, as 3,000 strong French forces were deployed to take down the terrorists.[20] 300 security personnel were deployed in Niger for intelligence operations, and a special operations team in Burkina Faso. There were 20 helicopters, 6 fighter jets, 200 vehicles, 3 drones, and 10 transport planes.[21] President Hollande’s previous statements regarding reducing soldiers and a “mission accomplished” was a far cry from reality. Learning from the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, France understood that a complete exit from Sahel and Sahara is not viable for future stability, and it must remain active in the region. This only fuelled Islamist militants in perpetuating their desire to expel the French, seeing them “kafirs” or “infidels.” This is best exemplified when the MLF and Koufa called on its people to directly attack “les Blancs.”[22]

France’s intervention by invitation became evident when more military bases were set up in the region, all with the blessing of regional heads of state. The presence of those military bases strengthened the ties between those regional countries and France. As those regional leaders developed beneficial political and economic relations with France. Moreover, in 2015, in hopes of taking down Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, France expanded its mandate to coordinate with the Multinational Joint Task Force. As France exited Mali, MINUSMA and Malian forces were left there to provide security and peace. Rebels during this period continuously shifted their allegiances in hopes of gaining French military support. This was evident with rebel groups being constantly created and disbanded, aiming to have their positions met during negotiations. During the constant reshuffling of allegiances, former allies became enemies in an attempt to bargain for peace in the region.

The growing threat of various new nonstate actors endangered the stability of the region. Macina Liberation Front (MLF) is one of those examples. On January 2015, Amadou Koufa declared a jihad and implemented Sharia law across Mali. Amadou Koufa recruited young Fulani’s from region into his organisation, promising to re-establish the glory of Fulani Empire of Macina and declare a Fulani caliph. MLF was linked to several attacks, such as hotel attack on Sevaré, that aimed to weaken the Malian state and its democratic institutions.

MINUSMA

MINUSMA was one of the main actors that was managing the increasingly complex ground situation in Mali. Its primary responsibility was to uphold the “security” of Mali when French troops were scaled back. This made the northern armed groups of the MNLA negotiate for peace alongside the Arab Movement for Azawad (MAA) and the High Council for Unity of Azawad (HCUA). In Algiers, peace talks with the armed groups lead to a ceasefire. The Tuaregs shifted their strategic alliances, splitting into factions and Malian government continued to distrust them. This led to various clashes, like, for example on February 12, 2014, when 30 people were left dead at the Mali-Niger border including Tuareg villagers loyal to Malian government and MUJAO fighters, who were Fulani.[23]

The war against fanatic Islamist militants started to reach new highs. The Sahel region’s belt was ingrained with extremism, with even more religious extremist organisations emerged such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali became hotbeds for terrorism because violent Islamist extremist organisations spurred in Liptako-Gourma (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) and the surrounding area. On March 7, 2015, an assailant attacked La Terrasse bar, where five people were killed, from whom two were foreigners, and wounding two United Nations employees.[24] The Islamist Salafi-jihadist al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility. Mali’s desert north, which was already plagued by frequent attacks, started overseeing attacks in the capital. The sporadic attacks of Islamist militants became somewhat frequent in the Sahel with the Radisson Blu Hotel attack in Bamako Mali, in November 2015 where 21 people were killed.[25] Malian troops and MINUSMA forces were scrambling to reorganize and fight as they were ambushed multiple times, resulting in six peacekeepers killed, even after strucking peace deal with Tuareg-rebels which was less than two weeks.[26] The attacks increased, with the L’Etoule de Sud Hotel attack in Ivory Coast[27], and the Splendid Hotel shooting in Burkina Faso in 2016.[28] The attacks occurred in areas, previously considered calm and had not yet experienced such conflicts. In September 2016, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) attacked a border post near the vicinity of Markoye, Burkina Faso.[29] More attacks took place in Burkina Faso in 2016, with the founding of Imam Ibrahim Malam Dicko’s Ansarul Islam.[30] Meanwhile, in Niger, since 2016, attacks grew in the western region of the Tillabéri, as the Nigerian insurgency started to spill over into Niger.[31]

France and Mali

          France’s military intervention was celebrated by Mali, while America, Germany, and NATO, applauded and supported the French intervention. However, France had other undisclosed reasons for intervening. By 2011, 2.32 per cent of Malian goods were exported to France with an estimated 10.9 million dollars. The main products exported are insect resins (24.82 per cent), raw cotton (14.61 per cent), and tropical fruits (13.45 per cent). France was one of Mali’s main partners, after Senegal and Ivory Coast, making up 9.75 per cent of Mali’s imports.[32] France wanted to defend its economic interests in Mali, since Asia made up around 70.99 per cent of Mali’s exports.[33] French investments in the mining sector are undoubtedly high in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria. With regards to oil, and an Islamist takeover in Northern Mali would hamper French interests since Mali has the world’s third-largest gold reserves after South Africa and China. In 2010, Italian companies discovered petroleum, phosphate, and uranium in Northern Mali. Since Iran constantly threatens to close off the Strait of Hormuz, huge oil reserves from Mali would be beneficial for France and compensate for such a loss. Mali’s uranium, which is the world’s third largest reserve, would also benefit France because 75 per cent of France’s electricity is generated through nuclear energy.[34] Canadian company Denison already had started to explore the reserves, at times with French company AREVA in Niger, who provides nuclear energy to the energy stations in France. As for oil, there is the Taoudeni Basin, which is the largest basin in northwest Africa that extends beyond Algeria and Mauritania. Speaking of Mauritania, the French company Total operates in the Basin. Algerian oil giant Sonatrach also sought out an oil well, with the Chinese hydrocarbon company Sinopec very present in the Malian market. Downstream oil facilities are mostly operated by the French.

France decision it would be strategic to militarily intervene in the name of fighting terrorism, to play a more active role in Mali and Niger. To consolidate Frances relations with other African states, on February 16, 2014, it supported the creation of G5 Sahel. This group was made up by Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger in hopes to create an institutional framework to coordinate security and development, where all the states could correspond jointly. MINUSMA, France, ECOWAS, and others carried counter-offensive measures in the Sahel. French intervention in the Sahel, was done with the cooperation of the G5 Sahel. French intervention in Mali happened at a crucial time when the White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2013 was negotiated in France’s National Assembly. France found that it must act independently to protect its national security and to have the capacity to do what it must to protect its allies. As violent Salafi-jihadism had spread throughout the Middle East, in addition to the Malian crisis, which was plagued with extremists, drastic changes were made to Frances military spending.

Niger: Benefits and Chaos

        Economically speaking, Niger has a vast amount of natural resources, including gas, oil, and natural resources like uranium. The company AREVA, has been operating in the country for the last fifty years, and has exclusive uranium extraction rights. Interestingly, France has stakes in the company, now owning 87 per cent.[35] Despite losing its mining rights in 2007, the company kept operating through its subsidiaries. In 2013, AREVA's global revenue was 9.3 billion dollars, with one-third coming from Niger’s uranium production.[36] This makes AREVA Niger’s biggest employer, and France makes up Niger’s 37 per cent of exports.[37] France protects AREVA from anything that can threaten its supplies or company interests.[38] When French troops entered Mali, Hollandé dispatched Special Security Forces to protect AREVA facilities in Niger.

In January 2013, Niger and the US wrote a security agreement over the deployment of US forces and aircraft at non-combatant services in order to facilitate and support French efforts. By February 2013, America intervened in Niger in leu of escalating jihadist attacks on the state. The US was already working with France in terms of creating a counterterrorist offensive against the Islamist groups. The US did not openly intervene in the conflict, as it had previously done with Afghanistan, Iraq, other countries. This is why French intervention was truly a collaboration of its own military influence and US financial assistance. America also helped Niger monitor routes and assist in certain counterterrorist operations in Niger and other areas. In 2013, President Barack Obama sent 500 American troops to suppress rebel groups, in addition to providing intelligence support to Niger.[39] In 2016, drone and surveillance headquarters in were constructed in Niger, that oversaw situations in Mali, Niger, Libya and beyond.

Nigeria

        Though Nigeria was not a former French colony, France heavily invested in the country, particularly in its security. Nigeria, following a series of attacks from Boko Haram, conducted a police raid in July 2009, and 700 people were killed in an attempt to stamp down Boko Haram alongside Muhammad Yusuf.[40] The remaining members of Boko Haram dispersed into Chad, northern Mali, Niger, Algeria, Somalia, and Afghanistan. By 2011, Boko Haram came back, this time using suicide bombings against security forces and UN compounds in Abuja, Nigeria. They gained notoriety in April 2014 when they abducted 276 girls from the town of Chibok.[41] France collaborated with Nigeria in major military armaments and economic support in an effort to fight Boko Haram.[42] France supported the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) through intelligence sharing via surveillance flights to monitor extremist movements and promote operational cooperation. President François Hollandé considered the fight against Islamic State, Boko Haram and other violent Islamist jihadists as part of the same offense, especially when Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Allegiances are used to link terrorist groups to their source of funding. Boko Haram was once allied with Al-Qaeda, but most of their funding was raised by looting villages, interfering in trade routes, and abducting locals for ransom money. In the past, Nigeria had fought against Boko Haram on its own, seeing the threat as an internal issue that can be dealt with on its own. Familiar to other the Sahel countries, there were times when Nigerian forces were outgunned and saw soldiers fleeing as extremists unleashed violence against citizens. More than 12,000 people were killed[43] and 2.1 million people were displaced in Nigeria since 2009.[44] Now, Nigeria works with France in the fight against terrorism, in addition to the US and UK. France interests in helping Nigeria lie beyond Operation Sevral and Operation Barkhane: Nigeria is home to oil fields in the Niger Delta, which had been a point of contention with Nigerians and terrorist groups.

MJTF, Boko Haram and ISWAP

In January 2015, the Multinational Joint Task Force initiated a yearlong offensive against Boko Haram and Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya in the Sambisa Forest. By March 2015, defeated Boko Haram retreated and tried to regroup with the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP). AbuBakar Shekau refused to terrorize women and children, despite ISIL commands to do so, thus he was soon replaced by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Eventually, ISWAP and Boko Haram clashed, benefiting Nigeria immensely. Despite these internal conflicts, Shekau never officially renounced his allegiance to Islamic State. In time, Abu Musab and Shekau reconciled, but ISWAP took charge, seeing as they had more fighters then Boko Haram. ISWAP targeted more Christian communities than other groups. The Multinational Joint Task Force worked together in the fight against ISWAP and Boko Haram. In the Chad Basin campaign, there were significant gains and losses by Nigeria, and ISWAP’s military strength prevailed. The attacks repulsed the Islamist militants but they could no longer contain the insurgency.

In 2017, several Al-Qaeda affiliates formed the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). The ISGS and JNIM formation led to heightened violence in the Sahel regions. The spill over effects became more evident when both ISGS and JNIM moved farther south into Liptako-Gourma. The JNIM acquired territorial control over northern and central Mali, while, ISGS gained territorial control over northern Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, Boko Haram was the dominant driving force of violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin, with Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon bearing the brunt of the damages. Boko Haram had always been a severe threat to Nigeria’s stability; in 2009, it had unsuccessfully proclaimed the Islamic State in Northern Nigeria.

As previously mentioned, Boko Haram’s split in August 2016, and with ISWAP coming as a main actor, France’s list of terrorist organisations increased. Operation Barkhane, the G5 Sahel forces, the Multinational Joint Task Forces, and other French-backed regional forces gained more responsibility to tackle terrorism. The task of containing the Islamist jihadist militants was moving away as radical jihadism was only grew as local civilians, NGO’s, and troops became more targeted.

European Quagmire  

Fighting expanded from Mali to the Sahel region, and jihadist organisations kept on flourishing, at times taking inspiration from each other’s ideologies. France, along with Germany, started training Malian troops, supporting the country any way they could. Other great powers also suffered the blow from terrorists in the region; the US and Germany also faced spill over effects as Salafi jihadist organisations spread to other territories. America covertly supported Niger and other states against the Islamist militants with tactical support, surveillance, and training. Germany, on the other hand, was working with the European Union states via the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali. These groups trained Malian troops to counter the jihadist organisations more effectively. The limited German intervention was only possible because of France. Although Germany supported France’s policies in the Sahel region, it did so in a limited scope because of disagreements between the two regarding the use of force, including the Takuba Task Force. The Takuba Task Force was a multinational task force consisting of Special Operation Forces (SOF), from both European to African forces merged together. The task force was to confront terrorists in the Liptako-Gourma region (Lake Chad Basin) and to tackle the Islamic State of Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM). The Takuba Task Force was set to be part of the Coalition of the Sahel and a key part in Operation Barkhane. Particularly, it was supposed to harmonize its actions with G5 Sahel states, MINUSMA, and EU missions like EUTM Mali, EUCP Niger and EUCP Mali. However, Germany believed that more military deployments would not result in a better outcome.

Soft Power: Germany’s Entry

          In 2017, a French-German initiative was put forward for the G5 Sahel. President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel were the brainchild of this initiative, hoping it would deliver faster, effective, and targeted assistance to the most vulnerable areas. The Sahel Alliance consisting of 26 members with prominent members being the African Development Bank, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, European Investment Bank, Canada and others. Aid worth around € 22 billion was provided for training, food security, rural development, youth employability, energy and climate, governance, decentralisation, providing basic services, and internal security. German engagements in the Sahel was visible via soft power rather than hard power, unlike France. Germany avoided combat roles and political risks. Berlin did not want to deal with any criticism from the Sahel or have overseas deployment burden the economy.

Pau Summit

            At the Pau Summit on January 13, 2020, G5 Sahel and France agreed for new central command structure, known as the “Coalition of the Sahel”, aiming for greater intelligence-sharing, joint military operations and swifter responses in border areas by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where insurgency was at its highest. The Islamic State of Greater Sahara (ISGS) was identified as main regional threat. To strengthen the rule of law the judicial system and penal code of the Sahel countries was reformed. Partnership for Peace and Stability in the Sahel (P3S) was one of the key pillars set by France and Germany to train and deploy staff in the civil administration, justice, and internal security. Additionally, with rising terrorist attacks, the African Union deployed 3000 troops into the region to work closely with the G5 Sahel forces and ECOWAS. The Pau Summit was one of many summits that showed support to the Sahel region, consolidating France’s position and influence in the region.

Burkina Faso

          President Blaise Compaoré was ousted from power in 2014 when he expressed an interest in running in re-elections by enacting constitutional amendments. Interestingly, France did not echo the sentiments of the people that called for Blaise Compaoré’s removal. After a series of intense protests, president Blaise Compaoré’s government dissolved and imposed a state of emergency. Compaoré fled the country to Ivory Coast with the support of French President Alassane Ouattara. France feared that it had lost a major ally in the battle against extremism, as president Blaise Compaoré was staunch French and US ally. After a military political struggle in Burkina Faso, General Honoré Nabéré Traoré was became interim president. Due to his unpopularity, Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida ended up taking his place. After an intervention from the African Union and opposition parties, a transitional government was set up; elections were held a year later. There was a coup attempt in 2015, when a controversial autonomous military unity Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP) founded by Blaise Compaoré, rebelled against the transitional government of President Michael Kafando and Prime Minister Yacouba Isaac Zida. However, RSP failed to garner support among the people so the attempt collapsed and members to the transitional government were reappointed. The RSP was dissolved altogether by the transitional government. During the mayhem, France remained cautious. Former RSP troops were reported to be cooperating with Ansar ul Islam.

Following the November 2015 elections, Roche Marc Christian Kaboré became President of Burkina Faso, lacking any military connections or support. In October 2016, there was another coup attempt which, led by Gaston Coulibaly, dissolved the Regiment of Presidential Security. The coup attempt was condemned by France which was conducting counter terrorism Operation Barkhane alongside the Burkina Faso forces at that time. The coups damaged France’s influence in the country, and hurt the fight against jihadists. In 2018, there was a fence agreement between France and Burkina Faso, that allowed 400 French troops to be stationed on the outskirts of capital, Ouagadougou.[45] This aimed to combat the deadly incidents of violent Islamist extremists and increase France’s influence in the region.

Cameroon

Cameroon joined Operation Barkhane in 2015. Even though Cameroon and Nigeria had territorial disputes in the past, Cameroon supported its fight against Boko Haram. France played an important role in making this cooperation possible. Cameroon was involved in different operations with French and Sahel countries, while also supporting and protecting its own interests. However, Cameroon was also caught up in an internal conflict: English-speaking Cameroonians announced independence from the French-speaking Cameroonians, resulting in a military clash. The Anglophone crisis began in 2016, when the English-speaking Cameroonians began peaceful demonstrations demanding linguistic reforms, which escalated into violent protests. Brutal police responses, and heavy-handed government policies against the Anglophone people only made matters worse. Although there were mediation efforts between Anglophone leaders and Cameroon’s government, the state’s denial of abuse further deteriorated relations.

Nigerian authorities opposed the Anglophone separatists. Both Nigeria and Cameroon cooperated in the name of suppressing terrorism, with the Cameroonian authorities even passing into Nigerian territory to capture separatist leaders. France, being an ally of Cameroon, condemned the attacks by separatists and supported dialogue between separatist and the Cameroonian government.  The separatist then accused French forces of being complicit in the discrimination and against Anglophone Cameroonians.

Gambia

France never controlled Gambia during the colonial era, however it did build close relations with UK’s former colony. Since 1994, Gambia’s president has been President Yahya Jammeh. He turned the country toward Islamism by revising Gambia’s constitution, turning it into an Islamic Republic in 2015. However, Yahya Jammeh used Islam for his own political benefit by politicising Gambia's Supreme Islamic Council, cultivating ties the nation’s youth, many of which who have studied in Saudi Arabia. In 2014, he criminalized homosexuality, and changed the state’s female dress code, which hurt the state’s relations with the West, withdrawing it from the Commonwealth of Nations. In some ways, these changes turned Gambia into a breeding ground for the Islamic State to produce Islamist militants, given growing unemployment and a rise in extreme poverty.

Unlike Senegal, Gambia has avoided the deadly array of attacks by Boko Haram, the Islamic state, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. However, it did prove vulnerable to terrorism, since it lacked the security defenses to deal with foreign threats. To ensure the security of Gambia, the state turned to Senegal, with whom it had tense relations with for a period. However, the two managed to reach a pragmatic approach in setting aside their differences, making relations practical between the two states. In March 2017 the two states wrote a security agreement, which aimed to avert the trafficking of illegal contraband. As Gambia started to leave its “Islamic Republic” name behind and align itself more the Senegal and the West, it became a potential target for regional Islamist terrorist organisations. In 2016, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attacked Grand-Bassam in Ivory Coast in retaliation to Gambia’s close ties to France and Senegal.

Mauritania

          The Islamic Republic of Mauritania, which straddles West Africa, proved an important state in countering violent extremism. Mauritania was already part of the US-led Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism partnership. The fight was against Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was carried out mainly by investigating, arresting and putting perpetrators in jail, while strategically collaborating with France in the Northern Mali. The government showcased its efforts by reforming their military, increasing ther security capabilities and anti-terrorism tactics. With its successful raids and arrests, Mauritania improved its intelligence services, acquiring a good name among its French and Western. Notably, Mauritania was not a terrorist hotspot; most terrorist-related incidents happened prior to the Operation Barkhane, which is why Mauritania did not intervene in Northern Mali in January 2013. Instead, it took a more neutral approach to the crisis by welcoming thousands of fleeing Tuareg refugees. Jihadist groups were far busier fighting France, Mali, Burkina Faso and other states than Mauritania, so it held little strategic value during that time, but remained committed to “Global War on Terror.”

On the June 12, 2021, the G7, led by the US, introduced the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative. The projects under the B3W aimed for a $40 trillion economic growth in the certain states, while strengthening security and stability, health security, climate, equality and gender equity by 2035.[46] On December 1, 2021, the European Union announced the Global Gateway Initiative, which planned infrastructure projects across the world worth between 2021 and 2027. These projects connected the digital, climate, energy, health, education, transport, and research sectors. France aimed to keep this initiative within the African continent. Mainly, France sought to curb the rising influence of China in Africa. Build Back Better World and Global Gateway initiatives competed with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which resulted in competition between African republics. Additionally, there was the Flintlock Programme, which bolstered the training of the African forces under African Command (AFRICOM). The Flintlock programme may an independent program, but indirectly hampered French military and political influence when it intervened in the continent.

Diminishing French Influence

France heavily invested its military resources, economic aid, financial support, and diplomatic resources to the francophone states in the Sahel region. Though it attempted to expand its influence in the continent during its intervention, it faced a decline in its influence. Reasons for such a decline are complex and long in the making. Although France has tried to aid its allies, the Sahel region itself continued to have weak governance, corruption, democratic backsliding, gross human rights violations, nepotism, military deficiencies and government legitimacy issues. The power in urban African centres contradicted the needed development in the rural areas. Many underdeveloped regions of Sahel states have fallen into despair and hopelessness, as violent extremist organisations like ISGS, JNIM, Boko Haram emerged, exploiting the situation. Democracy is fragile in the Sahel region, constantly facing coup and power transfers. Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso faced twenty-five military coups from 1960 to 2022. French has had successful interventions in the Sahel region, building its military bases in the region while aligning itself with different democratic leaders. Yet in doing so, France was also exploiting the situation in turbulent countries, placing civilians and soldiers under terrorist and clan fire.

For example, on February 6, 2014 there was a notable intercommunal clash, that was masked behind the threat of terrorism. Armed men from Fulani ethnic groups retaliated when a Fulani ethnic member was kidnapped in Tamkoutat, 80 kilometres north of Gao. France viewed the incident as a violent act by Islamist Salafi-jihadist militants, but the complex grassroots issue of the situation remained unaddressed. At the end of the day, problems related to desertification, shortage of grazing land, lack of harmony, and scarcity of irrigated land, are all major factors that contributed to the start of the Malian war, and subsequent French intervention. To assist Mali, America designated MUJAO as a terrorist organisation alongside Ansar Dine. The designation only casts shadows on the lack of determining the terrorist properly because of the complex communal relations in the region. On September 9, 2014, when a clash occurred between armed groups and herders, the blame was put on MNLA, HCUA, and MAA, yet there was no clear evidence of such. The attack and accusation clearly demonstrate that there was no proper investigation conducted in leu of the attack. Such accusations only increased mistrust and lack of confidence in building measures between African states and France. As Operation Barkhane carried on, there was a risk of destabilising the region further from widespread instability and violence. The threat of violence on the ethnic lines spurred from Northern Mali to the Sahel region, which saw the quick rise of new factions and organisations. These factions pursued their own interests when seeking resolutions for a crisis, making the overall fight against terrorism a rather shallow endeavour. The rebellion in the northern Mali created pisions within the involved groups, as well as made way for the emergence of more groups, making it insolvent. France and other actors were aware of this factionalism, thinking it may bring security and stability to the crisis. With the persistent violence following the peace accords, the formation of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s administration, and an unstable military strategy, the lack of progress in defending the local population and combating terrorism from the region became incredibly apparent. France pushed for military domination in taking down jihadists, in coordination with the G5 Sahel and the international partners. Though Malian troops were trained by the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), the forces remained rather weak.

France’s presence in the region should had altered consequences experienced in the conflict by reducing the number of armed groups and taming jihadism, yet that was not the case. United Nations West Africa and Sahel (UNOWAS) special envoy Mohamed Ibn Chambas addressed the United Nations Security Council where he emphasised the attacks intensified fivefold since 2016 in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso with more than 4,000 deaths in 2019.[47] In one attack, on March 17, 2019, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked two military camps at Mondoro and Boulkessy in central Mali, killing forty people.[48] On the border of Niger and Mali, there was another attack where 71 troops were killed by hundreds of jihadists who supported the Islamic State.[49] On December 24, 2019, seven soldiers and thirty-five civilians were killed by 200 heavily armed jihadists in the northern city of Arbinda in Burkina Faso.[50] On March 22, 2019, Boko Haram jihadist killed 23 Chadian soldiers at Dangdala.[51] To counter increasing violence, the G5 Sahel state group announced to strengthen its troop presence from 4,500 to 5,100 by February 2020.[52]

G5 Sahel Force Failures

Since the start of the G5 Sahel operations in 2017, G5 forces have suffered massive casualties by regional terrorist organisations, despite intense training by France and the US. G5 Sahel forces mainly faced difficulties in its efforts to contain jihadists. G5 Sahel forces learned from the Multinational Joint Task Force, where Chad veterans worked with Nigerian army capabilities and Cameroonian war experiences, but the situation there was different. Three countries (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) took most of the burden in Liptako-Gourma, revealing a great deal about their weaknesses. Burkina Faso’s army and intelligence services were restructured after the removal of President Blaise Compaoré in October 2014, the budget of Niger’s army faced deficit, and Mali’s slow and disorganized army existed more on paper than in the field after Captain Sanogo coup d’etat in 2012. However, Mauritania and Chad’s armies were far from obsolete. They maintained a solid reputation of being able to rapidly intervene their units and intelligence services, however Mauritania’s army did not often participate in the G5 Sahel task force. Chad, on the other hand, was tired of being on the frontline on every battlefront. No matter how much France was emboldening, training and supporting G5 Sahel forces and flaming the fire of battle in the forces, Mauritania and Chad kept a distance in Liptako-Gourma region.

Each G5 Sahel country hardly poured money into their national armies and was unable to fund such a big institution solely on French moral, political and military support. The envisioned budget was of 423 million euros in its first month of operations, with 230 million euros were poured into investment, 110 million euros were for cover up operations and 83 million francs were for troop payments.[53] Overall, the European Union contributed £50 million euros, France - £8 million euros, the G5 Sahel countries - £10 million euros, and Saudi Arabia - £84.8 million euros.[54] Overall, G5 Sahel forces were unsuccessful as they were faced with the dark reality in trying to counter terrorist organisations that were intertwined with fractions throughout the Sahel region, unlike the Multinational Joint Task Force who simply concentrated on Lake Chad Basin. G5 forces were not enough to tackle an entire region, which hampered their efforts.

 

The Sahel Region and France in Disarray

State development lagged behind since local institutions were either too weak to start reforms or corrupt. There was no proper legislation in the Sahel states against the violent and criminal acts done by the local or foreign forces. Regional heads of state benefitted from foreign aid and personal relations with President François Hollandé and President Emmanuel Macron, while the general population bared the brunt of the damages. France collaborated with dictators or authoritarian figures, often disregarding the voices of the common people. France intervened in postcolonial Africa multiple times with its peacekeeping missions. Francophone Africa was no exclusion with Cote d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, and Chad being the most important operations. Intervention, however, at times damaged France’s credibility when favouritism of certain leaders or groups became evident. This made Africans realise that French intervention involves strategic ambiguity, and an undisclosed French ambition. Thus, France’s intervention and backdoor diplomacy with rebels only damaged their reputation among the Sahel states. France’s denial to demilitarize the MNLA and lessen the presence of insurgency in the Kidal region, altered the attitudes of many Sahel region states towards French involvement. France leaned on the MNLA to combat other northern rebel groups, whereas, Mali blamed the MNLA for the uprising in the first place. French presence also contributed to more attacks on troops in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. From Sevral to Barkhane, France pushed their influenced in Sahel’s political issues, using the “War on Terror” as an excuse. France failed to understand the actual roots of revolts, and growing militarization did little to settle the underlying problems as violent extremists started their own “War against Infidels.” France was accused of neo-colonialism by far-left intellectuals with professor Issa N’Diaya and political Oumar Dicko severely criticising French intervention. France’s allies were targeted by violent extremists when they allowed military bases to be built across the Sahel. With hundreds of Sahel troops being targeted, those who once welcomed the French now started turning against them. Frustration over growing attacks at checkpoints and border were paired with growing shortages of basic necessities, as well as weapons and ammunition.

 Weak Institutions and Fallen Troops

In Mali, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was criticised for not creating an effective peace process in northern Mali. Some peacebuilding efforts were effective, such as the Estates General of Decentralisation and Assises nationales sur le nord. However, Gao did not participate in Assises, which dealt a significant blow to the effort. Peace activists in Timbuktu held regular intercommunal dialogues, but they were not supported by the government. This lack of support for ground-level negotiations further heightened tensions. The Bamako government also did not fully implement the Algiers Accords of June 2015, and were violating a ceasefire agreement. Tensions in the north became more drastic when Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA), aligned with Mali, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) the pro-independence movement, fought over the control of Anefis, a town in Kidal. The G5 Sahel may look organized, but within, members were going off script, especially when Chadian President Idriss Deby announced in March 2020 that he would not fight militants beyond Chad’s border. The announcement just came after few weeks ago when 92 Chadian soldiers were killed and 47 wounded on the island village of Boma, in the Lake Chad, where Nigeria, Chad and Niger were fighting against Islamist militants.[55] The loss of troops disturbed many, including President Idriss Deby, who felt that Chad been the sheer driving force against Boko Haram. Chad’s decision impacted the determination of other G5 Sahel states to fight because Chadian forces were well-respected, powerful, and had years of experience in fighting against terrorists. In January 2020, Nigerien President Issofou Mahamadou decided to remove Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ahmed Mohamed when the country suffered 174 casualties in just two months.[56] Similar to what had happened in the first attack, the 89 soldiers were killed, along with 77 jihadist attackers.[57] This raised questions over Niger’s ability to contain the rising violent extremist attacks on Mali and Burkina Faso’s western border. Changes that were made to the state’s military leadership failed to bring any permeant solutions to growing the security issue.

Extremism spread across the Sahel region, but Burkina Faso and Mali were particularly in trouble. Huge areas of Burkina Faso and Mali fell under the militants and their raging fights against the military institutions. Increasing security crises continue to grow in Sahel countries, with French alignment often being an instigating reason for terrorist attacks. The stakes were so high that in late October 2022, the US and UK recalled their ambassador from Abuja, Nigeria, when a spur of terrorist incidents took place. Operation Flintlock and additional EU training cannot prepare the troops effectively. Unpopularity and growing tensions of the Sahel to France and President Emmanuel Macron has only spread, rather than dissipate.

Mali’s Coup and Russia

On August 18, 2020, Mali faced its first coup in ten years. The military overthrew the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cissé following an Islamist militant insurgency, growing government corruption, a crashing economy, and poor growth following the break out of the Coronavirus pandemic. President Keita was an ally of President Macron, who called for Mali’s administration to return and leaders in confinement to be released. The African Union and ECOWAS suspended Mali from the organizations, while the US stopped sending aid to Mali. Under pressure from the African Union and ECOWAS, new elections were agreed to be held within two years, and a new transitional government was appointed, led by transitional President Bah Ndaw and vice-president Assimi Goïta. The transition government was fragile and had a weak military.

French credibility came into question when in late March, United Nations investigators accused the French military of killing 19 Malians in Central Mali in an aerial strike.[58] On May 24, 2021, a cabinet reshuffle irked tensions between the military and civilian governments. By May 25, 2021, when there was another coup, where key civilian leaders and journalists were captured at the outskirts of the Bamako military base in Kati. Assimi Goïta, one of the main orchestrators of the 2020 coup, became president. He promised new elections in 2022. Meanwhile, French support among the public fell, while Russia became viewed as a more reliable ally. France condemned the coup strongly and objected the military takeover. This time, there were no sanctions in place on Mali or its by ECOWAS; it was only suspended by African Union. France influence took a major hit when Mali terminated their Defence Cooperation Treaty with France in addition to the Status of Force Agreement with France and other European Union operations. Mali also pulled out of the G5 Sahel force, as it lacked funding and did not reduce insurgencies, as the regional patterns indicated. On June 3, 2022, France ended its military cooperation with the Malian government. It announced for Operation Barkhane forces to be redrawn from Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

Mali, frustrated with France’s inability to curtail Islamist militants from the state, it turned to Russia for the help seeing the consistent military and economic assistance it sends to its ally, Syria, despite Western hostilities and funding against Bashar al-Assad. In September 2021, a deal was brokered between Mali and Russia’s Wagner Group to train Malian troops and provide protection to senior officials. In a diplomatic offensive, France attempted to reverse Mali’s decision by sending US diplomats to Bamako and Moscow. France feared that Operation Barkhane may face issues in the fight against Salafi jihadists. However, what France truly feared was its waning influence in the region. With weakened diplomatic channels between France and Mali, engagements between Mali and Russia significantly increased. Wagner's emergence in Mali came at a crucial point, as it increased Russia’s presence in Mali and increased efforts in counterterrorist operations against militants by training Malians.

Death of Idriss Deby

French counter-terrorism efforts were dealt a major blow when Chad’s President, Idriss Deby died on April 20, 2021, during the Northern Chad offensive. President Deby’s death was a crushing blow for France because he was an indispensable ally of France and the West in their fight against Islamist militants. Since he was a former rebel and a skilled pilot, he had managed to stay in power for 30 years, even with the prolonged conflicts and failed coup attempts. Seeing he was involved in nearly all anti-terrorist operations; his troops were battle-hardened and well-experienced in the battlefield. Following his death, his son, Mahamat Idriss Deby, leader of Chad’s Military Council, was the appointed to govern the country. However, a power vacuum opened up in the country, and the security apparatus of the region deteriorated because Chad’s forces started fighting rebels who sought to take power, rather than focus on extremists and other factions. Idriss Deby was one of the most pro-French and Pro-western allies in the Sahel region, thus his death created a security crisis in the country. Instead of fighting the violent Islamist jihadist externally, they had to fight themselves internally.

Guinea’s Coup

On September 5, 2021, Guinea faced a coup, where President Alpha Condé was replaced by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya. Police and military budgets were slashed, while funding for the office of President and National Office increased. Mass protests and discontent grew in Guinea, since France avoided backing Alpha Condé. This coup meant that other countries were also vulnerable to coups, given the rise of violent jihadist organisations in the so-called “coup belt.” However, Guinea’s coup did not destroy its relations with the French; it simply reduced the number of international forces present in the region.

The sixth Europe-Africa Summit, held on February 17-18, 2022, did not manage to obtain anything more than a £150 billion investment package for the states with deepening cooperation to curb migration.[59] The summit aimed to consolidate renewed partnerships between Europe and Africa via sustainable development, social development, and security cooperation to combat terrorism, illegal migration flows, and preventing conflict. However, the European Union previously failed to meet past financial support pledges, and lacked realistic action plans for Central and West Africa’s security.  Prior to the start of the summit, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that French and European troops would be redeployed from Mali to Niger, thereby marking the end of Operation Barkhane.

Burkina Faso’s Coup

Burkina Faso faced the same fate as Mali, with a coup led by young Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henry Sandaogo Damiba on January 24, 2022. Mass casualties suffered by Burkina Faso’s troops, as well as disappointment by the government’s mismanagement in tackling security issues, and poor governance were all factors contributing to the coup. The military was disgruntled and blamed France for the growing violence, as the country faced high casualties during battle operations. Recalling Thomas Sankara's assassination in 1987, where France was allegedly involved, contempt towards France grew throughout the public. Delegates from ECOWAS met with Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henry Sandaogo Damiba and set up a transitional government, that would then be followed by fresh new elections. Just after few months of this system in place, there was another coup on September 30, 2022 by Ibrahim Traoré who accused Paul-Henry Sandaogo Damiba's government as inept, following an increase in attacks taking place on civilians and troops, and the fact that the government had lost 40 per cent of its territory during this period.[60] The coup suspended various ongoing military operations in the most terrorist-ridden zones, including in the eastern, western, north-central, and tri-border regions of the state. As resources, attention and personnel moved from conflict areas to areas participating in the coup, over 1,500 violent events were observed with 3,800 fatalities in 2022, and 2 million displaced by the war.[61]

French – Burkina Faso relations hit a major blow on October 1, 2022, when the French embassy was attacked by the citizens when ousted leader Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henry Sandaogo Damiba was seen at the Kamboinsin French military base. In addition to the attack, French buildings was vandalised. This further strained the relations between Burkina Faso and France. There was speculation that Damiba and Traoré was tied to the US military via US training programs such as US Africa Command or AFRICOM, further hurting the credibility of both France and the US.

In February 2022, violent Islamist jihadist organisations became emboldened when the French - EU task force “Takuba” announced its intention to withdraw from Mali, bringing the decades long intervention to an end. The first six months of 2022 saw a dramatic 50 per cent increase in violence from last year in the Liptako-Gourma region, which spilled into West Africa, resulting in two thousand civilian casualties.[62] Locals suspected that France was simply stealing their resources when it promoted foreign aid projects, and purposefully allowed Mali troops to be targeted by terrorists, rather than French. France’s inability to supress the Islamist jihadist militant attacks permanently is seen as the greatest reason for all the unrest and distrust.

 

Total Downfall

        As relations plummeted, by Febuary 19, 2023 France and Burkina Faso announced the end of their French-led Sabré operations. This brought the relations of these two states to their lowest since the removal of Blaise Compaoré and Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. The announcement came in January 2023, when the junta demanded the full withdrawal of French forces within four weeks. The Wagner group replaced French forces in Burkina Faso, disregarding France’s warning that it would not help better the situation. A similar decision was made in Mali. By January 2023, Burkinabé Prime Minister Apollinaire Joachim Kyelem de Tembela urged Mali to join the Union of Sahel states, since both were struggling in the fight against jihadism, in addition to economic turmoil brought by ECOWAS and isolation. The once enthusiastic Operation Barkhane initiated by President Hollandé, was already over by 2022, though the region continued to face jihadist attacks. France’s exit from the Sahel region states marked the downfall of its influence in the region. To evoke nationalism and counter the growing dissent against the state, Burkina Faso’s military decided to root out the reason for Thomas Sankara’s death. The investigation revealed French involvement and the support France had provided to Blaise Compaoré’s 27-year rule only further led many to believe that it was he who was responsible of the death of Thomas Sankara. Compaoré played an active role as a mediator in regional issues, specifically that of the Ivory Coast, 2012 Mali coup, and other regional issues.

Burkina Faso and Mali on the Table

Mali and Burkina Faso both faced two military coups in a very short period of time. In Burkina Faso, however, one military man toppled the military – all while ignoring the criticism of ECOWAS and the African Union. The winners of military coups are not the French, Russians or Americans. Rather, they are the Islamic State and the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM). The “coup belt” in the region favours militants in perpetuating more attacks against the state by weakening the security structure of each state. Coup leaders are utilizing existent anti-French attitudes and failed past policies. France’s influence in both states are damaged significantly by attempting to formulate a new strategy to tackle the Islamist jihadist militants. Niger, despite remaining pro-French and pro-West, continues to be targeted ruthlessly by Islamist militants and its reliance on foreign forces are only increasing. Mauritania remains greatly damaged by the war that had already happened prior to French intervention in the Sahel. Mauritanian President Abdel Aziz resolved some issues by reforming the military and dealing with the AQIM, who waged a deadly war against the state from 2005 to 2010. Since then, Mauritania has been a French ally, but it does not significantly hold the strategic value that Mali and Burkina Faso do.

MINUSMA Withdrawal

United Nations forces have also faced after scrutiny 13,000 multinational MINUSMA soldiers were deployed, but only 300 forces were killed in ambushes. Former Chadian President Idriss Deby once accused MINUSMA of using Chadian soldiers as shields,[63] as many more Chadian troops were killed in the attacks. In early 2022, French forces decided to withdraw from MINUSMA with completing it in August 2022 and re-shifting its forces in neighbouring Niger in order to prevent jihadism in Niger and surveillance across the region.[64] A year later on June 30 2023, all 13,000 MINUSMA forces left Mali.[65] This was far from a victory for Mali, as it added more complexities and risks. Mali and the Sahel region have been facing increasing instability and growing humanitarian crises. Normally when United Nation forces withdraw from the region, there is peace and stability in the state, however that was far from the case with Mali.

Cameroon, which has been actively participating in the Multinational Joint Task Force, has celebrated various victories. Boko Haram became weaker in May 2021, following the death of its leader AbuBakar Shekau. Many of former Boko Haram Cameroonians left the group and have been coming back to the country with their families. Additionally, captured or surrendered Boko Haram militants were given the option for a better life if they adhered to state-sponsored de-radicalization and worked in government jobs. The constructed de-radicalization centres, however, are not fully capable of holding a large number of former rebels that still pose security challenges, especially with growing ostracization. Instead of pursuing and pressuring the government of Paul Biya to construct more rehabilitation centres and promote unity, France is more occupied on holding onto its waning influence in the region. As human rights abuses are being committed in the Anglophone Cameroon by Biya’s government, France remains silent. Cameroon, in turn sides with France in its “War on Terror” by joining Chad in the war against Boko Haram, though the conflict continues to this day.

In Comes Russia, Out Goes France

Areas in the Sahel have become overrun by terrorists, one notably being the Moura area, also known as “terrorist fiefdom.” Vast swathes of area are still held by a myriad of rebel groups and militiamen, while thousands of civilians and are killed and refugees swarm to other countries. MINUSMA reported in April 2022 that the situation is critical; rebels are determined to take down the state, increasingly using more and more violence. Insecurity in the Sahel will further grow with France’s withdrawal and the US more focused on Southeast Asia. Moreover, China’s growing influence via economic investments and Russia’s increase in security agreements and local training programs has changed the dynamics of the Sahel. Some Sahel states may rollback to earlier pro-France policies, as is the case with Gambia and Adama Barrow. Barrow has pursued a more open foreign policy strategy with the West, re-joining the Commonwealth of Nations, and opening dialogue with the Islamic countries in a pragmatic way.  Mali and Burkina Faso, however, have fallen into a military junta, while Chad has become politically unstable, limiting France’s influence. In both Niger and Mali, France didn’t intervene politically to resolve conflicts, learning from their mistake in Kidal.

In 2020, the Trump Administration announced to withdraw great bulwark of troops stationed in Niger to focus on threats from Russia and China in Middle East,[66] an excuse often used by Trump administration when withdraw itself had been complex. Following Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, France turned all its attention to its European neighbour, thus the Sahel region lost importance in French policies. There are only a few states left that remain strongly pro-French, including Senegal, Chad, Cameroon, Gambia, and Mauritania. Niger has also proved to be a strategic French ally in battling violent extremism but mounting deadly attacks on Niger has scrutinised French intentions in Niger.[67] As for Germany, it lost its military footing when in early 2023, it announced the withdrawal of all troops from Mali by May 2024,[68] instead opting to expand economic assistance and partnership programmes in the Sahel region. The withdrawal is followed after a hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Only in April 2023, Germany decided to send 60 troops to Niger, however it was with the aim of helping the country in logistics and infrastructure. [69]

 

Difficult Reality and Future

Russia is back in Africa, just like it was during the Cold War period. This is an emblematic change in the era of foreign interventionism, including the War on Terror, by introducing geopolitical competition in areas that were once French- dominated. In some ways, this period is a new “scramble for Africa.” Russia’s presence is highly debated among the French and expert community who questioned their presence multiple times. From economic to geopolitical, Russia’s main strategic objective is to challenge the French and Western influence in the region. France intervenes on the basis of foreign multilateralism; however, it is much more focused on its own great power status and post-colonial legacy, rather than tackling the realities former colonies face. With Mali and Burkina Faso turning towards Russia for assistance and France reserves and invests more of its resources and energy to Ukraine, France’s influence in the Sahel region will diminish. Russia’s growing presence in the region may also make it more vulnerable to rising Islamist insurgent attacks. As Ibrahim Traoré had replaced Paul-Henry Sandaogo Damiba in Mali, there can be more coups inspired by failed missions in combating “Islamist extremism” and combating “foreign intervention.”

As for Mali and Burkina Faso, security structure is crumbling, as deadly incidents rise, that can eventually plunge states into civil war and factionalism. If the situation worsens, France would be called to intervene, however Emmanuel Macron or any future leader must consider whether or not to send soldiers to the Sahel region. France may lose its economic grasp in the region as Mali and Burkina Faso coup leaders promote anti-French policies and sentiments. The Sudanese crisis will also make the security of the Sahel region more delicate, with growing influx of refugees flows and violence escalation. USA and France are already being challenged on economic hegemony in the African continent with $23 billion infrastructure projects under Chinese banks in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2007-2020, which have diminished French influence greatly.[70] Thus, France may monitor the Sahel region’s development and the growing terrorist incidents. It will also keep an eye on Russian activities in the Sahel yet do so without intervening, to mask its failure in maintaining influence the Sahel region.

 

 

 

 

 

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[5] Lebovich A. The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali // Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. June 2013. URL: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/

[6] Chauzal G., Damme V. T. The roots of Mali’s conflict – moving beyond the 2012 crisis // Clingendael Institute. March 2015. Pp. 4

[7] Resolution 2085 (Mali) S/RES/2085 // Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 20.12.2012. URL: https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/resolution-2085-mali-s-res-2085/#:~:text=Resolution%202085%20aut...

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[11] France confirms death of Islamist commander Abou Zeid // BBC News. 23.02.2013. URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21912281

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[40] Jerome A. Lessons from Colombia for Curtailing the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria // PRISM. 2015. Iss. 5. Vol. 2. Pp. 97

[41] Violent Extremism in the Sahel // Council on Foreign Relations. 01.08.2023. URL: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel

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