On August 31, 2022, Dostoevsky library hosted a RIAC Urban Breakfast on the topic: "Nuclear War — a Hypothetical Scenario or a Real Threat?". The event was attended by military observer Aleksandr Ermakov, Ph.D., Senior Researcher at IMEMO RAS Center for International Security; Konstantin Bogdanov, Research Fellow, IMEMO RAS Center for International Security; and Dmitry Stefanovich, Vatfor Project Co-Founder. Yulia Melnikova, RIAC Program Coordinator, moderated the discussion.
The experts discussed issues related to the current system of control and limitation of nuclear weapons. The participants assessed theoretical and practical approaches to considering the likelihood of a nuclear war. Other issues included most pressing challenges between Russia, the United States, and China in the field of nuclear arms limitation and control.
On August 31, 2022, Dostoevsky library hosted a RIAC Urban Breakfast on the topic: "Nuclear War — a Hypothetical Scenario or a Real Threat?". The event was attended by military observer Aleksandr Ermakov, Ph.D., Senior Researcher at IMEMO RAS Center for International Security; Konstantin Bogdanov, Research Fellow, IMEMO RAS Center for International Security; and Dmitry Stefanovich, Vatfor Project Co-Founder. Yulia Melnikova, RIAC Program Coordinator, moderated the discussion.
The experts discussed issues related to the current system of control and limitation of nuclear weapons. The participants assessed theoretical and practical approaches to considering the likelihood of a nuclear war. Other issues included most pressing challenges between Russia, the United States, and China in the field of nuclear arms limitation and control.
Key talking points:
Aleksandr Ermakov
The aggravation of the current military and political situation in the world over the past few years notwithstanding, the issue of nuclear weapons would still be on the agenda. This is due to the fact that the U.S. has long planned to modernize its nuclear triad. This process has been postponed for a long time, but in connection with the exacerbating tensions with China and its decision to achieve strategic parity with the United States, the U.S. response should soon be expected.
The element of confrontation between the U.S. and China, the decision made by the UK to increase the number of deployed nuclear weapons of its own, as well as the aggravation of relations between Russia and the United States, together with the dialogue on strategic stability put on hold, usher in a new stage in the nuclear arms race in the world. Perhaps, this stressful situation will lead to a new multilateral arms control system.
At the doctrinal level, the United States has already indicated a transition to deterring its two adversaries "simultaneously but independently". The U.S. is presently challenged by how the nuclear arms control system can be organized. China's determination to achieve parity with the United States in the field of strategic weapons, as well as the existing parity with Russia, theoretically result in tripartite parity. However, the United States is unlikely to agree to such a model. Otherwise, the combined nuclear potential of Russia and China will be twice the potential of the United States.
Russia is not using START-3 to the full extent, because there are enough nuclear warheads to deter the U.S. For this reason, Russia is not chasing numbers. If a nuclear arms race between the United States and China begins, Washington, under the pretext of containing China and Russia, will develop not only the qualitative characteristics of their nuclear arsenal, but also increase the quantity of their weapons.
Konstantin Bogdanov
The new factor that complicates the situation around nuclear weapons control and deterrence is the development of non-nuclear military potentials: high-precision long-range weapons, anti-space potentials, information means of the situation coverage reducing the degree of concealing the retaliatory strikes, etc.
Since the 1990s, there have been doctrinal shifts in the field of nuclear weapons control. We now live in a gray zone, where the possibility of using nuclear weapons is not limited by anything other than the realization that this will be followed by an uncontrolled escalation. This prospect of an uncontrolled escalation is the only deterrent.
In order to stay in this "gray zone", it is necessary to revisit the approaches and methodology of arms control, as well as to draft agreements in this area.
Today, the world has reached a point where nuclear deterrence is simultaneously transforming and degrading. For the past 30 years, the world has been sold on the idea of an imminent nuclear disarmament. Now, the global political system has transformed from a bipolar to a multipolar mode. China is likely to achieve strategic parity with the U.S. on ICBMs in 10 years, which will lead to a new structure of the nuclear system, as it will get more complicated to control nuclear deterrence between Russia, the U.S. and China. China will agree to become a member of the nuclear arms control system only when their potential equals that of the United States. Such a structure will inevitably contribute to the nuclear arms race.
The current political situation is rather "bad" because it limits the possibility of dialogue on the topic of nuclear control and disarmament. On the other hand, a bad “bad” political situation allows resorting to methods and solutions that were rejected in the past, considering them “not good enough” and ineffective, because in the current situation any methods and solutions would be “good”.
Dmitry Stefanovich
In conditions of high conflict potential, there is always the possibility of a nuclear conflict. However, it is rather difficult to assess the probability due to the required amount of source data lacking.
The use of tactical nuclear weapons in modern conflicts seems inappropriate. Compared to 1970–1980, when there was a possibility of an open military clash between the armies of several countries (several hundred thousand people), now there is no need for its use. In addition, the consequences of using tactical nuclear weapons are completely unpredictable.
Now, it is necessary to revise the principles of nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation. It is necessary to identify the unit of measurement of the effectiveness of deterrence and strategic stability. Quantitative parities are not something to rely on today and beyond.
Nuclear weapons are politicized weapons. They often appear as a symbolic trump card. In all countries there are people involved in planning its combat use. It is very important, while demonstrating the possibility and ability to use nuclear weapons rather than cross the line of nuclear escalation.
