


**WORKING  
PAPER**



**№ 74 / 2023**

# Voting Practices of Sub-Saharan States of Africa at the UN General Assembly: Latest Trends and Underlying Strategies

**RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL**

**MOSCOW 2023**

## **Russian International Affairs Council**

### **Author:**

**Nikita Panin**

### **Reviewer:**

**Andrey Urnov**, D.Sc. in History

### **Editing board:**

**Elena Karpinskaya** (Lead editor); **Tatiana Bogdasarova**, PhD in Political Science; **Katerina Trotskaya**; **Svetlana Gavrilova**, PhD in History (Copy editor)

### **Panin, Nikita**

**Voting Practices of Sub-Saharan States of Africa at the UN General Assembly: Latest Trends and Underlying Strategies** : Working Paper No. 74 / 2023 / [N. Panin; E. Karpinskaya, T. Bogdasarova, K. Trotskaya, S. Gavrilova, eds.]; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Moscow: RIAC NP, 2023. – 80 p. – Authors and editors listed on the reverse of the front page.

ISBN 978-5-6048843-1-7

The working paper seeks to analyze constitutive voting patterns of Sub-Saharan states of Africa at the UN General Assembly. The methodology proposed in this paper offers an opportunity to explore this issue topic-wise as well as in a broader sense. The paper considers a number of indicators that help assess the involvement of the continent's different countries in the voting processes, builds on the various types of strategic behavior in the UNGA, evaluates consistencies of issue-related stances adopted by African member states. Finally, the research provides a measure of voting coincidence between African nations and the UN's P5 on different items on the UNGA agenda.

The opinions set forth in the working paper reflect solely the personal opinions and research stances of the author and may be different from those of the Russian International Affairs Council Non-Commercial Partnership.

The full text of the working paper is published on RIAC's web page. You are welcome to download it and leave feedback directly at [russiancouncil.ru/paper74](http://russiancouncil.ru/paper74)

# Table of Contents

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Research Purposes, Design, and Methodology</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Interpretation of Data: Regional Dimension</b>	<b>16</b>
Assessing Voting Engagement of Sub-Saharan States of Africa at the UNGA	16
Identifying Issue Areas Prioritized by African Nations at the UNGA	19
A Broad Analysis of the Voting Coincidence Index	27
<b>Interpretation of Data: Sub-Regional Dimension &amp; Country Groupings</b>	<b>31</b>
Issue-Driven Analysis of the Voting Coincidence Index	31
Africa’s Voting Strategies for Politicized Issues	38
Evaluation of Voting Consistency of the Sub-Saharan States of Africa at the UNGA	44
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Appendices</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>About the Author</b>	<b>77</b>

# Introduction

On a conceptual level, foreign policies of most nations share the approach to the United Nations as an institution endowed with the central coordinating role in maintaining the existing architecture of world politics, while recognizing the UN's contribution to effecting collective governance of international relations in its different manifestations. Indeed, since its founding in October 1945, the UN has remained the only international organization with a uniquely conferred legitimacy stemming from virtually universal membership of states (193 members as of today). Besides, the UN's activities span the entire range of issues on the international agenda of the day, with the organization exhibiting certain flexibility by engaging not only member states per se, but also various NGOs, the expert community, organizations of the youth, associations of civil society, the private sector, and trade unions.

For the nations of Africa, the UN has become a manifestation of their rightful full-fledged integration into the international community, since they could make essential decisions on a par with the former colonial powers as equally sovereign states.

For this reason, researchers have almost immediately zoomed in on the strategies that nations may employ in the United Nations. Their voting at the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council certainly constitutes a unique source of factual evidence helping to identify, even if with certain limitations, foreign policy preferences of states covering a wide range of issues, while tracking their changes over time or linking them to the broader context of global events.

Under the UN Charter, resolutions of the UN General Assembly are not binding. Even though Article 11 of the UN Charter's Chapter IV states that "the General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security," these discussions may only produce "recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council." On the most urgent and controversial international issues, non-binding resolutions can only be adopted by a simple majority in a roll-call vote<sup>1</sup> rather than by consensus, which is the case when such decisions of the UN General Assembly demonstrate the range of opinions on a specific issue as well as, possibly, rally public opinion in support of principles contained in the resolutions adopted. Therefore, the UN Charter's legal wording suggests that the General Assembly carry the power of the opinion rather than the power of the law.

In a way, this limits the usefulness of research into the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. Particularly, Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General,

<sup>1</sup> "Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council ... the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions" (UN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 18).

admitted in his “In Larger Freedom” report<sup>2</sup> that UNGA resolutions do not fully reflect “a genuine unity of purpose among Member States in responding to global challenges” (when resolutions are adopted by consensus without being put to vote), nor are they an effective mechanism for reconciling their interests (in a roll-call vote). Kofi Annan opined that the established procedures “prompt the [General] Assembly to retreat to generalities, abandoning any serious effort to take action.” Instead of the heart of the matter, states tend to focus on the procedure, which results in many decisions simply “reflect[ing] the lowest common denominator of widely different opinions.” Such a limited room for maneuver for the UN General Assembly helped produce research papers that treated vote results as a consequence of external pressure, bloc solidarity or even “vote buying” rather than manifestations of actual preferences.

Certainly, this situation is not endemic, and there are instances when the UN General Assembly’s non-binding resolutions have had a major effect on the issues at hand. Gabriella Rosner Lande of Princeton University has identified four dimensions of this influence: being an agent of change in national behavior of Member states in favor of alternative solutions; setting standards of state behavior as part of the new international legitimacy; affecting a state’s global standing by putting pressure on its international environment, primarily its allies and sympathizers; setting precedents.<sup>3</sup>

Each of the described components of influence, pertaining to the final effectiveness of a resolution, stems from a combination of factors. G. Lande describes six variables in her article:<sup>4</sup>

- a particular point in history (political circumstances);
- the fundamental issues lying at the root of a resolution;
- the roll-call vote taken on it;
- the language of the resolution;
- the methods and procedures recommended in the resolution to facilitate its purposes;
- expectations of Member States in regard to the resolution.

This paper primarily focuses on the third suggested variable since it allows for a rather broad range of research problems, as is evidenced by existing academic publications. In a pioneering article on the subject, Margaret Ball, for instance, dealt with patterns of “bloc voting”<sup>5</sup> concluding that the Commonwealth of Nations was failing to reach a coordinated stance to vote as a united front; this was, however, the case with the League of Arab States where Egypt set the tone.

<sup>2</sup> Annan K. In larger freedom: toward development, security and human rights for all // Report of the Secretary-General. Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. 26 May 2005.  
URL: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/A.59.2005.Add.3.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Lande G. R. “The Changing Effectiveness of General Assembly Resolutions.” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting. 1964. 58. Pp. 162-70.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ball M. Bloc Voting in the General Assembly. International Organization. 1951. 5. Pp. 3–31.

Her analysis of voting practices on different resolutions also led M. Ball to speculate that Western and Eastern Europe manifested drastically different levels of voting solidarity which meant, at the time when the article was written, that the Western bloc was rather loose and diverse rather than united and consolidated. Other authors analyzed (1) votes on UNGA resolutions to identify “shifts” in foreign policy priorities of states,<sup>6</sup> (2) the effect that a change in leadership or regime type may have on the stance of a particular nation,<sup>7</sup> (3) the interrelation between democratic regimes and support for the U.S. stance at the UN,<sup>8</sup> (4) joint BRICS resolution sponsorship with a view to determining the bloc’s political cohesion.<sup>9</sup> Notably, such analysis may be strictly practical. For instance, the U.S. Department of State prepares annual reports for Congress since 1983, highlighting some of the UNGA resolutions. The emphasis is placed on voting alignment with the U.S. (considered both by particular states and by region), with utmost attention paid to the votes Washington deems important,<sup>10</sup> i.e. the votes that the U.S. has massively lobbied. Tellingly, there is a practice of bringing these reports to the attention of some foreign governments.

<sup>6</sup> Bailey M. A., Strezhnev A., Voeten E. Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 2017. 61(2). Pp. 430–456.

<sup>7</sup> Dreher A., Jensen N. M. Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting. *European Journal of Political Economy*. 2013. 29. Pp. 183–196.

<sup>8</sup> Carter D. B., Stone R. W. "Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly." *International Organization* 69. 2015. No. 1. Pp. 1–33.

<sup>9</sup> Dijkhuizen F, Onderco M. Sponsorship behaviour of the BRICS in the United Nations General Assembly, *Third World Quarterly*. 2019.

<sup>10</sup> By way of an example, I will note that out of 100 resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2020 through roll call vote and included in the report, 36 were deemed “important” for the US.

# Research Purposes, Design, and Methodology

This study has two main purposes. First, to offer an estimate for the extent of coincidence between the different nations of Sub-Saharan Africa and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This will make it somewhat easier to define the framework for Russia's strategy in Africa since coincidence estimates a) "highlight" states that are the most and the least "sympathetic" toward Russia; b) demonstrate which subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa will be more likely to extend support to Russia at the UN; c) reveal voting consistency of African nations in sticking to their guns on a certain issue. The three aspects combined may prove useful for defining directions that merit greater diplomatic efforts and for offering a subregional perspective on Russia's African policy.

The second major purpose is to identify the underlying strategies behind the voting practices of Sub-Saharan states of Africa. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the sovereign equality of UN member states, which is primarily expressed in the "one state, one vote" principle, some nations are particularly noticeable for taking a passive stance on certain resolutions, thereby ignoring their right to influence a final decision.

In such instances, they either abstain (instead of voting "yes" or "no") or are absent from the sitting when a resolution is adopted. Certainly, many factors may weigh with the effort states apply to contribute to the UN General Assembly's sessions—however, it is still possible to identify certain analytical patterns.

On the one hand, information may be gleaned from the comments representatives of member states make before or after the vote to explain their stance on a resolution. However, such comments are not always available, particularly with regard to states of the African Continent. Consequently, this paper does not rely on this source. On the other hand, certain conclusions may be drawn by analyzing the domestic situation in a given country. In particular, some studies have already confirmed the hypothesis that the more a state is faced with sociopolitical challenges, the fewer capabilities the state will have in exercising the rights and privileges of its UN membership, notably when voting on the UN General Assembly's resolutions.<sup>11</sup> This study, drawing on the voting data from resolutions adopted throughout 2021–2022, identifies other possibilities, as will be shown in the relevant section.

In practical terms, materials selected for analysis were prepared in several stages. First, contested resolutions (i.e. those adopted by a roll-call vote instead of consensus) were selected from the total number of resolutions that the UN General Assembly adopted at its 76<sup>th</sup> and 77<sup>th</sup> Sessions and the 11<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session (on the situation in Ukraine). Those resolutions totaled 87. 80 of them were adopted at the 76<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly,<sup>12</sup> five were

<sup>11</sup> Panke D. Absenteeism in the General Assembly of the United Nations: Why some member states rarely vote. *Int. Polit.* 2014. 51. Pp. 729–749.

<sup>12</sup> 77 of them were adopted in December 2021, the other three in June and July 2022.




**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

adopted at different times at the 11<sup>th</sup> ESS of the UN General Assembly, and the two remaining resolutions were adopted at the 77<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly. The analysis, including all the calculations, is two-pronged, with the 80 resolutions of the 76<sup>th</sup> session on the UN General Assembly on the one hand and all the 87 resolutions adopted in 2021–2022 on the other.<sup>13</sup> A comparison of the two selections showed the degree to which Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine influenced the stances of Sub-Saharan states of Africa at the UN General Assembly.

The next step involved a categorization of selected resolutions into thematic blocks: the nuclear dimension of international security; other aspects of international security; human rights; the development agenda; decolonization; issues of trade, finance and the economy; situation in the Middle East; situation in Ukraine. Some resolutions (for instance, on procedural matters) did not come under any of these categories. This stage provided the option of assessing the areas where the UN’s activities are prioritized by African nations (both in a broad sense and by individual country) and where Africans are the most and least close to Russia.

**Chart 1. Resolutions of the UN General Assembly Considered in the Study, Broken Down by Issue Areas**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>1</sup>

Stage three involved a quantitative interpretation of engagement and disengagement of members when voting on the resolutions selected, determining the extremes among the 49 states of Sub-Saharan Africa. The engagement indicator was considered as the total number of votes “in favor” and “against” divided by the total of resolutions put to vote (80 or 87 respectively, depending on the selection). The disengagement indicator was measured as the total of votes when member states were absent divided by the total of resolutions put to vote (80 or 87 respectively).

<sup>13</sup> Subsequently, this study terms these two groups Selection 1 (S-1, 80 resolutions) and Selection 2 (S-2, 87 resolutions).

<sup>14</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

**Figure 1. Calculation Methodology for (Dis)Engagement Indicators of Voting Practices at the UN General Assembly:**

- 1) Engagement (votes “yes” or “no”), for each state:  $\frac{\text{●} + \text{■}}{80}$  or  $\frac{\text{●} + \text{■}}{87}$  ;
- 2) Disengagement (absences), for each state:  $\frac{\text{◆}}{80}$  or  $\frac{\text{◆}}{87}$ .
- – “in favor” ■ – “against” ◆ – absent.


Stage four introduces the Voting Coincidence Index (VCI), scored for votes of each Sub-Saharan African nation as against the stances of the UN Security Council’s P5 (Russia, China, the U.S., France, and the UK). By doing so, five VCI scores have been calculated for each of the 49 states of Sub-Saharan Africa.

With allowances made for existing practices in the academic literature as well as for the methodology employed by the U.S. Department of State, this paper proposes an original approach to the Voting Coincidence Index. The calculation methodology is radically different in that it accounts for the “weight” of instances when a state did not vote, although the comparison-state (most likely, a P5 country) somehow expressed its stance (“in favor,” “against,” or “abstained”). This decision is premised on one of the study’s hypotheses—namely, on the assumption that states choose not to vote on a particular issue not only because of capability constraints (staffing or financial) or domestic tensions, but also as a strategy of deflecting external pressure. Essentially, this strategy can be epitomized as “we are on neither side,” and it is typical for states that strive to maintain relations both with the West and with China/Russia. Consequently, these nations attempt to “smooth out the differences”, particularly with regard to highly politicized issues that tend to have no principal bearing on foreign policies of African states. An elaboration on this claim will be provided further.

As a result, the VCI is scored as follows: for each resolution in Selections 1 or 2, there is a quantitative evaluation of coincidence; then, the respective figures are summated to be divided by the total of resolutions in the Selections (80 or 87 respectively). If the stance of state “A” and, for instance, that of Russia are aligned (i.e. both have voted “in favor,” or “against,” or abstained), the resulting coincidence scores 1 point. When stances are partially aligned, the grade is 0.5 point. Here are sample cases: while state “A” votes “in favor”, the other abstains (or vice versa); or when state “A” votes “against”, the other abstains (and vice versa). If state “A” has not clearly expressed its stance on an issue, meaning it is not contrary to the stance of a comparison-state (as state “A” was absent from voting), the resulting coincidence score is 0.25.<sup>15</sup> If the two states’ stances are opposite (one votes “in favor” while the other votes “against” and vice versa), then mathematical grade is 0. Such gradation in comparing stances appears optimal and it fully accounts for the results of previous studies.

<sup>15</sup> This coefficient was selected because states, in resorting to a strategy of deflecting external pressure, apparently demonstrate that they support neither the party “in favor” nor the party “against” (unlike the practice of abstaining, when circumstantial evidence indicates the party that the abstained state sympathizes). Therefore, “equidistancing” weighs twice less than indirect support (abstention). Besides, to reduce the coefficient (for instance, to 0.1) does not result in any analytical difference to calculating the Voting Coincidence Index.

**Figure 2. Calculation Methodology for the Voting Coincidence Index at the UN General Assembly (for each pair of nations)**



It follows that the higher the VCI is, the more aligned are the stances of the two nations in comparison. Full coincidence will result in the VCI scoring 100%. The VCI may be interpreted in several ways. First, we could identify the countries that tend to support Russia, China, or the Western bloc (the U.S., the UK, and France). Second, upon a classification of Sub-Saharan states of Africa by subregion, the Index could help, for instance, reveal the subregion whose countries form the backbone of Russia’s support at the UN. Since our study revolves around the United Nations, we resort to the UN’s classification of African states by subregion.<sup>16</sup> Finally, we may interpret VCI scores with reference to thematic groups of resolutions.

Stage five of the study consisted in a targeted selection of the resolutions that prompted most of the disputes between the states that voted on them. This stage helps reflect the shifts in policy preferences of African nations amid a much stronger external pressure, since both the countries sponsoring these resolutions and those in opposition would like to get as many countries as possible on their side when it comes to each case under analysis.

This stage added the Resolution Contestation Index (RCI). Any index is an integrated indicator—in this instance, each of the 80 resolutions in Selection 1 was ranked by a number of criteria that attest to the broad disagreement of a significant portion of UN Member States with the proposals put to vote. As such, the RCI includes three sets of indicators (criteria): active contestation (resolutions selected for the highest number of votes cast “against” as well as the lowest number of votes cast “in favor”); passive contestation (resolutions selected for the highest number of abstainers, for the highest number of absentees, as well as for the highest level of voting passivity<sup>17</sup>); contested by legitimacy (as the highest number of counterstances<sup>18</sup>). The RCI has been compiled on the basis of voting


<sup>16</sup> The UN identifies four subregions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Southern Africa includes Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa. Eastern Africa includes Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Western Africa includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. Finally, the UN includes Angola, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe in the subregion of Central Africa.

<sup>17</sup> Passivity is considered as the minimal score for active engagement (that is, sum of votes cast “in favor” and “against” divided by 193, a total of member states), with top-5 lowest values taken into account.

<sup>18</sup> Counterstance entails any stance different from voting “in favor.” The indicator is calculated as the share of votes cast “in favor” subtracted from 100%, with the highest values taken into account.

data for all 193 member states rather than only accounting for the 49 states of Sub-Saharan Africa, since an inclusive and accurate analytical picture would be impossible without such an approach. For each of the criteria, five resolutions have been selected (see Table 1).

**Figure 3. Resolution Contestation Index (RCI) and Its Components**



To calculate the RCI, all the selected resolutions were quantitatively graded for each criterion. First rank by each criterion produced 5 points, while the 5<sup>th</sup> place equaled 1 point, with absence from a criterion list resulted in 0 points. For instance, A/RES/76/11 “The Syrian Golan” ranks fourth both by the highest number of abstainers as well as the highest passivity. Since it is absent from other criterion lists, the resolution’s final measure of contestation (RCI) totals 4 points. Topmost measure of the RCI calculated under this methodology could potentially be 30 points. Importantly, this study pioneers the calculation and application of the Resolution Contestation Index (RCI).

Reconciliation of the criteria into a common index score indicate that the list of most contested resolutions include: two resolutions on the situation in Ukraine (A/RES/76/70 and A/RES/76/179, ranked first and second with 19 and 17 points), two resolutions on human rights with regard to specific states, namely, Iran and Palestine (A/RES/76/178 and A/RES/76/80 ranked 3 and 4 with 9 and 8 points), and one resolution on international security (A/RES/76/234 with 6 points).

Analysis of the resulting RCI reveals a gap between the resolutions on Ukraine and the rest bulk of the resolutions as they are, in fact, twice as contested as the

other controversial resolutions (on Iran and Palestine). For this particular reason, the RCI has not been calculated for resolutions in Selection 2 since it differs from Selection 1 precisely in that it accounts for the resolutions the UN General Assembly adopted on Ukraine following the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. These are *a priori* among the most contested resolutions in the period under consideration.

**Figure 4. Top-5 Most Contested Resolutions of the UN General Assembly Ranked by Descending RCI**



*Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.*<sup>19</sup>

Therefore, the analysis conducted within the framework of this paper accentuates the stances that the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa took on these specific resolutions. Where possible, voting record on a “same” resolution was traced: such was the case of the resolution on the militarization of Crimea and Sevastopol that has been put to vote at the UN General Assembly on an annual basis since 2018. By doing so, policy consistency of a country can be identified when voting on a similar issue.

Since a single study cannot span all 49 states of Sub-Saharan Africa, research design implied a selection of several levels of analysis as the final stage.

The regional level spanning all 49 nations was adopted to identify the distinctive voting patterns of Sub-Saharan states of Africa on different thematic blocks of resolutions, such as human rights or development. The analysis conducted at this level intended to find out which of the four voting options (“in favor,” “against,” abstained, or absent) informed the approach of the region’s nations when taken both together and individually. Among other things, the analysis allowed for identifying priority areas for African states at the UNGA.

The subregional level of analysis was applied to identify divergent approaches of states representing different subregions, accounting for their tendencies to lean toward the stances of one or more members of the P5 at the UN Security Council.

<sup>19</sup> VotingData//UNDigitalLibrary. URL: <https://digitalibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

**Table 1. Components of the Resolution Contestation Index: UNGA Resolutions Ranked by Criteria**

Rank	Active contestation		Passive contestation			Contested by Legitimacy
	MAX "Against"	MIN "In Favor"	MAX Abstained	MAX Absent	MAX Passivity	
1	Human rights and cultural diversity (A/RES/76/162)	Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (A/RES/76/70)	Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (A/RES/76/179)	Oceans and the law of the sea (A/RES/76/72)	Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (A/RES/76/70)	
2	Human rights and unilateral coercive measures (A/RES/76/161)	Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (A/RES/76/179)	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/RES/76/80)	Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (A/RES/76/70)	Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (A/RES/76/179)	
3	Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order (A/RES/76/165)	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/RES/76/178)	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (A/RES/76/290)	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/RES/76/80)	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/RES/76/178)	
4	Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security (A/RES/76/234)		The Syrian Golan (A/RES/76/11)	Promotion of interreligious and intercultural dialogue, understanding and cooperation for peace (A/RES/76/69)	The Syrian Golan (A/RES/76/11)	Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security (A/RES/76/234)

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

Rank	Active contestation		Passive contestation			Contested by Legitimacy
	MAX “Against”	MIN “In Favor”	MAX Abstained	MAX Absent	MAX Passivity	
5	Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination (A/RES/76/151)	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/RES/76/80)	Report of the Human Rights Council (A/RES/76/145)	Questions relating to the proposed program budget for 2022 (A/RES/76/245)	Report of the Human Rights Council (A/RES/76/145)	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/RES/76/80)

Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>21</sup>

To examine voting consistency of African countries on specific policy issues, the country level was brought forward, with certain states grouped together for further comparisons. To gauge the approaches of the region’s different states to issues put to vote at the UN General Assembly, seven nations were selected to be split into three analytical groupings: most active voters (Ethiopia, Namibia, and Senegal),<sup>21</sup> countries with extreme VCI scores in relation to Russia (Zimbabwe with the highest and Liberia with the lowest support for Russia’s UN stances), and regional powerhouses (Nigeria and South Africa).

**Figure 5. Country Groupings Used for Analysis in the Study**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, to test the hypothesis that African nations display different strategic behavior when voting at the UN General Assembly, individual cases with regard

<sup>20</sup> VotingData//UNDigitalLibrary.URL:https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data

<sup>21</sup> As for the study’s design, an additional advantage is that all three countries represent different subregions.

<sup>22</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data

to specific countries were cited, with selections based on certain similarities (for instance, proceeding from the same share of missed votes).

To recapitulate, the methodology suggested in this study led up to the analysis through six stages, with the study designed in such a way that different levels of aggregating the resulting data (from the regional level down to country-specific level) has made for the fullest and most accurate answers to the research questions.




## Interpretation of Data: Regional Dimension

This section seeks to answer three questions. The first step is to identify which Sub-Saharan states of Africa are the most active in their voting engagement at the UN General Assembly and which are the most disengaged (passive). The next step is to explore the thematic blocks that African nations tend to prioritize, putting this into the context of the recent developments on the continent. The final step consists in a comparison of the VCI across the region's different states to see which lean toward the Western and which lean toward China or Russia.

### Assessing Voting Engagement of Sub-Saharan States of Africa at the UNGA

Proceeding from Selection 1, i.e. the resolutions adopted at the 76th UNGA session, nations with the highest level of voting engagement, broken down by subregion, include:<sup>23</sup> Namibia (93.75%) in Southern Africa, Ethiopia (93.75%) in Eastern Africa, Senegal (93.75%) in Western Africa and Angola (92.50%) in Central Africa.<sup>24</sup> In addition to Angola, the same rate of voting engagement has been identified for Djibouti, Mauritius, the Gambia, and Mali.

**Figure 6. States of Sub-Saharan Africa Demonstrating Highest Rates of Voting Engagement at the UN General Assembly (based on Selection 1)**



*Source: Compiled by the author from open sources and own calculations.<sup>25</sup>*

Overall, Southern Africa is the most active subregion (83.00%), followed by Western Africa (79.78%) and Eastern Africa (79.74%). Then, the disengaged subregion is Central Africa (63.19%), which is due to the difficulties that the subregional nations face in terms of their national development. With that said, a switch to the subregional classification of African nations used in Russia<sup>26</sup> attests

<sup>23</sup> This means taking an actively engaged stance on a resolution put to vote: "in favor" or "against."


<sup>24</sup> Here and elsewhere: compiled by the author from open sources. Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

<sup>25</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

<sup>26</sup> Here, we are using the classification proposed by A.L. Emelyanov in: Emelyanov, A.L. *Post-Colonial History of Sub-Saharan Africa* (in Russian). Moscow: MGIMO-University Press, 2012. 492 p.

to more pronounced differences: Southern Africa (82.88%),<sup>27</sup> East and North-East Africa (79.58%),<sup>28</sup> West Africa (78.34%),<sup>29</sup> and Central Africa (57.08%).<sup>30</sup>


**Figure 7. Subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa Ranked by Voting Engagement at the UN General Assembly (based on Selection 1)**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>31</sup>

An analysis of Selection 2, which is generally more politicized as it incorporates the resolutions on the situation in Ukraine, confirms the hypothesis that greater politicization—accompanied by a higher contestation of resolutions—leads countries to avoid having to make a univocal choice, especially on issues that are beyond their immediate interests.

**Figure 8. States of Sub-Saharan Africa Demonstrating Highest Rates of Voting Engagement at the UN General Assembly (based on Selection 2)**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations<sup>32</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

<sup>28</sup> Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, the Comoros, the Seychelles, Uganda, South Sudan.

<sup>29</sup> Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Togo.

<sup>30</sup> Chad, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, The Central African Republic, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Republic of the Congo.

<sup>31</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>


<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

Selection 2 demonstrates lower voting engagement for countries as compared to Selection 1. If taken by subregions, the most engaged countries include: Namibia in Southern Africa (87.36%, down 6.39%); Mauritius in Eastern Africa (91.95%, down 0.55%, while Ethiopia, leader in Selection 1, is 4.09% less engaged, at 89.66%); Senegal in Western Africa (90.8%, down 2.95%); and Chad in Central Africa (90.8%, down 2.30%, emerging ahead of Angola, leader in Selection 1, which was 3.99% less engaged, at 88.51%).

An overall drop-off in engagement can also be observed. The UN classification suggests that Southern Africa appears to be just as active as Western Africa (78.39% and 78.38%, respectively). The two subregions are followed by Eastern Africa (77.07%) and Central Africa (59.51%). With a switch to the Russian classification, a somewhat different picture emerges: Southern Africa leads with 79.54%, closely followed by East and North-Est Africa (76.88%) and West Africa (76.63%), finally followed by Central Africa (52.87%).

**Figure 9. Subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa Ranked by Voting Engagement at the UN General Assembly (based on Selection 2)**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>33</sup>

Still, it should be noted that some African nations have become more active voters at the proceedings of the UN General Assembly since five new resolutions on Ukraine were adopted. These include Malawi, the Seychelles, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, Liberia, Mauritania, and Niger. As will be shown later, these are the countries most susceptible to the influence of the Western bloc, which can rally their support when voting on critical (for the West) issues.

As for the most disengaged (passive) states in terms of voting at the UN General Assembly, these are Eswatini in Southern Africa (35.00% and 34.48% of votes missed for Selection 1 and Selection 2, respectively), the Seychelles in Eastern Africa (41.25% and 39.08%), Benin in Western Africa (63.75% and 60.92%), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Central Africa (100% and 94.25%).

<sup>33</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>



**Table 2. Aggregate Indicators of Interest Displayed by States of Sub-Saharan Africa Toward Thematic Areas of Resolutions of the UNGA**

Indicator	Engagement	Disengagement	100% Engagement	100% Disengagement
	Percent	Percent	Number of states	Number of states
Nuclear security	88.51	9.02	20	2
Other aspects of international security	81.48	14.76	14	2
Human rights	84.18	14.97	16	1
Development	83.67	14.87	31	2
Decolonization	83.67	14.69	39	7
Issues of trade, finance and the economy	78.23	19.73	34	8
Situation in the Middle East	65.12	23.38	16	1
Situation in Ukraine (only the 76 <sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly)	14.29	40.91	4	6
Situation in Ukraine (all resolutions)	37.32	21.28	0	1
Other (only the 76 <sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly)	48.98	33.16	1	1
Other (all resolutions)	50.61	34.29	0	0
Top-5 most contested resolutions	31.43	31.02	1	2

Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>35</sup>


The table suggests that African nations, in fact, place top priority on the nuclear dimension of international security. This is an area where the highest levels of active engagement can be observed, coupled with the lowest levels of disengagement (passivity). The second most important group of issues, as is reflected by the indicator of active engagement, is human rights. While the level of passivity for this thematic block is lower than the average of 22.67%, the number of countries that voted on all of these issues is significantly lower than is the case for a number of other areas. With all the four indicators taken together, however, decolonialization emerges as the second most important group of issues, followed by development (an area with similar figures).

Notably, the region's nations tend to indicate less interest for resolutions on specific countries. With few exceptions, these are not directly related to the agenda pursued by foreign policies of these countries, which means that a coordinated position of the African Union could hardly be expected here. Rather, it has more to do with each state defining a behavior strategy for each specific case—align-

<sup>35</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

ing with one of the sides of the vote (sponsor or opponent), remaining neutral (abstaining) or choosing to deflect the vote because of external pressure, which may be interpreted as an attempt to keep a balance between the political blocs at the UN (West and non-West), avoiding external pressure.

**Figure 11. Issue Areas Prioritized by Sub-Saharan Africa at the UNGA**



*Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>36</sup>*

In a broad sense, certain trends can be observed in the voting practices of African countries on different thematic blocks. An analysis of the 19 resolutions on the nuclear dimension of international security reveals that, unlike the countries of the West, Russia and China take a more restrained stance, abstaining far more frequently. Therefore, these countries tend to show less engagement on issues in this area (73.68%) than the United States, the United Kingdom and France, as well as the vast majority of the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa. Only Somalia, the Central African Republic and Cameroon are equally or less engaged than Russia and China. In the case of the first two countries listed, domestic concerns prevent them from taking full advantage of the privileges of their UN membership. Meanwhile, Cameroon, demonstrating an engagement of 73.68%, is still far more active in this thematic block as compared to its overall engagement for Selection 2 (65.52%). As such, Cameroon’s relatively low level is still in line with the shared priority that the countries of the African Continent attach to nuclear safety.

In nine of the 19 cases, Russia and China adopted identical stances, while they took opposing positions in one case. Whenever Russia and China voted in favor of a resolution, the vast majority of African states did the same. However, the single case where both Russia and China abstained (on A/RES/76/27 “Reducing Nuclear Danger”), only three African states followed suit: Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. A further four countries, including Liberia, were absent in the vote. When Russia, China and all the other P5 members of the UN Security Council voted “against” A/RES/76/34 “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” none of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa voted the same way. The only country to abstain was Djibouti, while another six (including Cameroon) were absent. A similar situation was the case with regard to A/RES/76/49 “Toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World”, when the P5 voted “against”, while most African countries voted

<sup>36</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

“in favor” of the resolution. The only African country to abstain was Burundi, while another three countries were absent. A/RES/76/51 “Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices” proved to be the least contested, as both the P5 and all African countries voted “in favor” of it (with three absentees). A/RES/76/53 “Follow-Up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” is an interesting case as Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and France all opposed it, while China voted “in favor.” Here, states of Sub-Saharan Africa (save for the two absent) took the same stance as China.

As for “other aspects of international security”, Russia abstained from voting more frequently than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council (four times out of 13 votes). The only countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to abstain a similar number of times are Zimbabwe and Uganda (three times), although there was no case when the three countries abstained on the same resolution at the same time. Both Russia and Zimbabwe abstained on A/RES/76/26 “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” and A/RES/76/42 “Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Subregional Levels,” while Uganda abstained on A/RES/76/50 “The Arms Trade Treaty.”

Two resolutions stand out. First is A/RES/76/29 “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,” where the West voted “in favor” and Russia and China voted “against.” The position of Russia and China was supported by Zimbabwe only, while eight countries abstained (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea and Mali). Not a single country in Southern or Central Africa deflected the vote, let alone voted the same way as Russia and China. That said, the countries listed are contingently those whose votes could be mobilized by China and, to a lesser extent, Russia when voting on resolutions important to the two countries. Second is A/RES/76/47 “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” which China, the United Kingdom and France all officially supported, while Russia voted “against” and the U.S. abstained. This is the only resolution of the 13 in this block where Russia and China adopted opposite stances. No African country voted “against” here, although Djibouti, Zambia and Uganda abstained. Nor were there any countries that preferred to deflect the vote. In this case, the three countries that abstained is likely an indicator of which countries may vote in line with the U.S. or Russia on sensitive, although not critical issues. Then, a cursory analysis of foreign policies suggests that Djibouti and Zambia tend to gravitate toward the United States, while Uganda tends to vote in the same manner as Russia.

The “Decolonization” block of resolutions (priority 2) demonstrates the general cohesion among the states of Sub-Saharan Africa, with the sweeping majority supporting all resolutions in this area. Exceptions include Liberia, which voted against two of the five<sup>37</sup> resolutions and was absent on one; Botswana, the Sey-

<sup>37</sup> A/RES/76/104 “Dissemination of Information on Decolonization” and A/RES/76/105 “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.”

chelles, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Benin and Niger, which did not vote on any of the five resolutions; Togo, which did not vote on three;<sup>38</sup> and Rwanda, which was absent on one.<sup>39</sup> Seemingly, these exceptions are yet another manifestation of a strategy of deflecting external pressure employed by these countries, which strive to strike a balance between the regional stance and their orientation toward Western countries.

As was noted earlier, “development” is the third most important area for the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Russia and China supported all seven resolutions in this block, as did the majority of the countries in the region. The only countries that buck the trend are South Africa, Djibouti, Zimbabwe, the Comoros and Sudan, all of which abstained on A/RES/76/200 “Agricultural Technology for Sustainable Development.” Worthy of note, however, is the number of votes that the delegations from Gabon (71.43%), Liberia (57.14%) and Guinea (42.86%) did not turn up to. The lowest “turnout” in this respect was the case for A/RES/76/190 “International Trade and Development,” A/RES/76/191 “Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries,” and A/RES/76/192 “International Financial System and Development.” It would appear that the three resolutions (at least, with respect to Gabon and Liberia) showcase attempts to “balance” between the stance of the African Union and the orientation toward Western nations (primarily, the U.S.), which voted against all of these resolutions.

“Issues of trade, finance and the economy” clearly attest to the position of the United States running counter to that of the other P5 nations as well as most African countries. This block is particularly illuminating in that the countries that abstained or were absent seem more likely to be swayed by the U.S. The following countries abstained: Cameroon, Rwanda and South Sudan (on one resolution), while Burundi, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia and Niger were absent for all voting sessions.

As for “human rights,” Russia and China voted identically on all 12 resolutions. Meanwhile, the West voted “against” five of the resolutions,<sup>40</sup> although, notably, not a single African nation endorsed them on any of those issues. The countries that abstained the most were Ethiopia (twice on 12 resolutions), Eritrea, Guinea and Liberia (once each). While in the case of Liberia there may have been an attempt to strike a “balance” between the shared priority of the African bloc and the country’s traditional orientation toward the West,<sup>41</sup> the

<sup>38</sup> A/RES/76/87 “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and the International Institutions Associated with the United Nations” and preceding resolutions (footnote 37).

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> These include A/RES/76/151 “Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination,” A/RES/76/160 “Promotion of Equitable Geographical Distribution in the Membership of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies,” A/RES/76/161 “Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures,” and A/RES/76/162 “Human Rights and Cultural Diversity”, in which cases the United States, the United Kingdom and France voted “against.”

<sup>41</sup> The fact that Liberia did not vote on the resolutions (five cases) is further evidence of this. A similar but less pronounced strategy of deflection can be observed in the behavior of Malawi, the Seychelles, and Gabon.



stance a by Ethiopia and Eritrea appears more nuanced. Ethiopia abstained on A/RES/76/145 “Report of the Human Rights Council” and A/RES/76/300 “The Human Right to a Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment,” while Eritrea abstained on A/RES/76/143 “Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.” Obviously, both approaches are closely related to the internal processes in these countries.<sup>42</sup>

Resolutions on the situation in the Middle East (11 in total) are, in general, less important for Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, however, we must be mindful of the fact that some of the region’s countries (for example, South Africa) are unwavering in their support for Palestine. This explains that, while engagement in this bloc is lower than for the priorities outlined before, 16 states of Sub-Saharan Africa voted “in favor” of all the resolutions. With that said, the more West-oriented countries tend to be more passive in voting. Botswana, in particular, stands out, playing truant on votes for six of the eleven resolutions.<sup>43</sup> Following closely behind are Malawi, Tanzania, the Republic of the Congo, and São Tomé and Príncipe, all of which did not vote on five resolutions. Interestingly, these countries, being absent, never aligned with Botswana’s absences, and the four nations concurrently missed votes on three of the five resolutions.<sup>44</sup> This is perhaps a reaction to the country or countries that sponsored the resolutions in question,<sup>45</sup> as well as to the language used in them.

Table 2 shows that, in terms of their engagement, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are least interested in the resolutions on the situation in Ukraine. Tellingly, this is also true when comparing engagement for this block both within Selection 1 (two resolutions) and Selection 2 (seven resolutions, five of which were adopted after Russia launched its special military operation in Ukraine) as active engagement remains among the lowest among all thematic blocks, while disengagement (passivity) is among the highest rates. An analysis of Selection 1 reveals that Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Mali fully support Russia’s stance, while Burundi, the Comoros and Sudan support it only in particular instances. Nations that abstained on both resolutions include Nigeria, Namibia, Djibouti, Madagascar, Somalia, Angola, Chad and Guinea. Evidently, Mauritius and Burkina Faso have resorted to the strategy of deflecting external pres-

<sup>42</sup> For more detail, see: Ivan Loshkaryov, *Conflict in North Ethiopia: Tigray People’s Liberation Front Will Emerge Victorious?* RIAC. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/konflikt-na-severe-efiopii-voyane-na-kone/>


<sup>43</sup> A/RES/76/77 “Assistance to Palestine Refugees,” A/RES/76/78 “Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,” A/RES/76/79 “Palestine Refugees’ Properties and Their Revenues,” A/RES/76/80 “Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories” (one of the five most disputed resolutions), A/RES/76/81 “The Occupied Syrian Golan,” and A/RES/76/82 “Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan.”

<sup>44</sup> A/RES/76/10 “Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine,” A/RES/76/11 “The Syrian Golan,” and A/RES/76/12 “Jerusalem.”

<sup>45</sup> In the case of Malawi, Tanzania, the Republic of the Congo, and São Tomé and Príncipe, these were: Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, North Korea, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela and Yemen. In the case of Botswana (on A/RES/76/80), these were: Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Namibia, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Senegal, Tunisia and Venezuela, as well as Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brunei, Djibouti, the Gambia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

sure, being absent for either voting session. Clearly, prior to 2022, positioning the Ukrainian issue as one of human rights, rather than one of militarization, attracted greater attention (there were seven absences on human rights resolutions as compared to 32 on militarization). As for the subregional dimension, we see that the countries of Eastern Africa were engaged most actively (23.68%), those of Southern Africa were the least active (10%), while Central Africa was not active at all. An analysis of Selection 2 reveals that the situation has changed dramatically, as the West has clearly managed to “mobilize” the votes of nations of Western (an engagement of 43.75%), Eastern (41.35%) and Central Africa (30.16%).

**Fig. 12. States of Sub-Saharan Africa that Do Not Support Russia on Ukraine**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>46</sup>

Apparently, Southern Africa proved more resistant to external pressure when it comes to politicized issues (with a level of engagement of 14.29%). The countries that voted “in favor” most often (when Russia voted “against”) were: Liberia (six times out of seven); Malawi, the Seychelles, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire (five times); and Zambia, Kenya, Mauritius, the DRC, Benin, Ghana, Cape Verde, Niger and Sierra Leone.

To wrap up this discussion, the dynamics of the votes “in favor” will be evaluated for the resolutions adopted at the 11<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session. A comparison of all voting types is presented in Table 3.

With the growing number of countries that chose to abstain and the dwindling sponsorship of the resolutions, Table 3 suggests that African countries are slowly “tiring” of the Ukrainian issue, although the total number of countries, whose votes were “mobilized” by the West, remains rather stable. One resolution, in

<sup>46</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

**Table 3. Voting Distribution of Sub-Saharan States of Africa for Resolutions on Ukraine in Response to Russia’s Special Military Operation**

Resolution	“In Favor”	“Against”	Abstentions	Absent
“Aggression against Ukraine” <sup>47</sup>	25	1	16	7
“Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine” <sup>48</sup>	24	1	19	5
“Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council” <sup>49</sup>	9	8	22	10
“Territorial integrity of Ukraine” <sup>50</sup>	26	0	18	5
“Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine” <sup>51</sup>	15	5	23	6

Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>52</sup>

particular, stands out against the rest, as it calls for specific measures to be taken: “Suspension of the Rights of Membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council.” The decision endorsed through the resolution was still divisive, as 32 countries deflected having to take an active stance on the issue, while the number of votes “in favor” and “against” was roughly equal, at nine and eight, respectively.

It would be incorrect to make generalizations on the resolutions belonging to the “Other” block since they span a wide variety of issues. Nonetheless, what they have in common is that African nations, with few exceptions, exhibit very limited interest in these resolutions. For instance, there were 28 non-voting states for A/RES/76/72 “Oceans and the Law of the Sea,” although there were no counter-stances on this resolution (all states with the exception of Turkey voted “in favor” while Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela and Nigeria abstained). Resolutions pertaining to the situation in specific states generally prompt very reserved reaction from Sub-Saharan states of Africa: for instance, only four countries voted “in favor” for A/RES/76/178 “Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” two voted “against,” others assumed a passive stance. The response to A/RES/76/228 “Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic” was quite similar: nine states voted “in favor” and four “against.” This was also the case for A/RES/76/267 “Status of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia”, when nine states voted “in favor” and two voted “against” (Tanzania and Burundi), while none of

<sup>47</sup> African nations that were among the countries sponsoring the resolution: Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, the DRC, Liberia, Malawi, Niger.

<sup>48</sup> African nations that were among the countries sponsoring the resolution: none.

<sup>49</sup> African nations that were among the countries sponsoring the resolution: Liberia.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> African nations that were among the countries sponsoring the resolution: none.

<sup>52</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

the countries of Southern and Central Africa manifested any engaged stance (“in favor” or “against”).

The latest example (available as for the time of writing) is A/RES/77/10 on the situation in Afghanistan. Nine African countries (Mauritius, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Angola, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo) endorsed the West, voting “in favor” of the resolution. Not a single nation opposed it, while the vast majority, like China and Russia, abstained. Another noteworthy point is that not a single country in Southern Africa—an exception to the general trend for the subregion’s active engagement—took part in the vote.

There are two exceptions in this block. The first is the Russia-sponsored resolution “Combating Glorification of Nazism, Neo-Nazism and Other Practices that Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance” (A/RES/76/149), which all countries unanimously voted “in favor” of, although five countries (Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Liberia) were absent. The second is A/RES/76/165 “Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order,” where Liberia abstained amid a vast majority of votes “in favor,” although another four countries were absent for the vote (Eswatini, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, and São Tomé and Príncipe).

## **A Broad Analysis of the Voting Coincidence Index**

In the third part of the section, the indicators of the Voting Coincidence Index (VCI) for Sub-Saharan states of Africa will be interpreted. The subregional dimension reveals that the level of support for the P5 among the African countries is as follows (in descending order): Russia and China secure most votes in Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, Western Africa and Central Africa; France and the United Kingdom do so in Western Africa, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa and Central Africa; the United States draws on Western Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa and Eastern Africa (i.e., the opposite of Russia and China).

At the same time, VCI scores of African countries significantly differ in relation to the P5. To the utmost, African states tend to agree with China’s voting pattern as compared to any other P5 country: for example, Namibia shows the highest VCI score (83.05%) toward China in Southern Africa, Zimbabwe in Eastern Africa (89.08%), Mali in Western Africa (86.21%), and Angola in Central Africa (83.62%). With the countries of Africa, not a single Western country has a VCI score above 80.00%, while Russia has a VCI score topping 80.00% with Zimbabwe only (80.46%).

However, even those countries whose voting patterns align least with those of Russia demonstrate higher VCI scores than for any country in the West. In Southern Africa, for instance, Botswana’s VCI with Russia is 58.62%, as compared to 54.31% with France, 51.15% with the UK, and 33.91% with the U.S. (America’s highest VCI score in the subregion).

Another conclusion is that the stances of African nations tend to align better with European countries than with the United States. There has been no case when a state of Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates a VCI score with the U.S. greater than with France or the UK.

Returning to the analysis of Africa's VCI with Russia, the highest level of coincidence is observed for: South Africa in Southern Africa (71.55%), Zimbabwe in Eastern Africa (80.46%), Mali in Western Africa (72.99%), and Angola in Central Africa (70.40%). A separate category are the countries whose VCI scores with Russia and the West are comparable. These are: Mauritius (66.95% with Russia and 60.06% with France), Malawi (56.90% with Russia and 52.30% with France), the Seychelles (45.98% with Russia and 42.82% with France), São Tomé and Príncipe (40.80% with Russia and 39.66% with France), Benin (47.99% with Russia and 44.54% with France),<sup>53</sup> Cote d'Ivoire (64.37% with Russia and 62.07% with France), and Niger (47.99% with Russia and 47.13% with France).


Last but not least, the paper identifies the states of Sub-Saharan Africa that stand closest to Washington. The undisputed leader on the entire continent is Liberia (with a VCI of 46.55% with the U.S.). First, Liberia is the only country that supports the U.S. and China almost equally (its VCI with China is 46.84%), and the only country whose VCI with the U.S. is greater than its VCI with Russia (at 36.49%, the lowest for Moscow in the entire region). Second, it is the only country in terms of VCI that is closer to the UK (51.44%) than to France (49.14%). In the remaining subregions, maximum VCI scores with the U.S. seriously lag behind other countries. In Eastern Africa, for example, Madagascar's VCI with the U.S. is 34.48%, as compared to 74.71% with China (2.1 times higher) and 63.79% with Russia (1.85 times higher). A similar situation is the case for Central Africa, where Cameroon, at 37.36%, is closest to the U.S., which still compares poorly with China (72.13%, or 1.9 times higher) and Russia (62.93%, or 1.7 times higher).

Figure 13 illustrates the region's ten selected countries whose VCI scores indicate most and least coincidence with the stances of Russia and the United States.

Therefore, countries of Sub-Saharan Africa—in terms of their assessments of the global situation—are much closer to China and Russia (to a somewhat lesser extent), and they are farthest away from the United States. The discrepancies in the VCI scores of the region's states with Moscow are Beijing have primarily to do with the fact that the resolutions of the UN General Assembly rarely concern issues that are “toxic” for Beijing's foreign policy (unlike what the resolutions on Ukraine are for Moscow) rather than on account of significant differences in the African policies of Russia and China. Chart 2 illustrates this conclusion.

<sup>53</sup> One of two countries whose VCI values with Russia and China are comparable, at 47.99% and 49.71%, respectively. The second country is Somalia, although the difference is somewhat larger: 65.23% and 70.40%, respectively.

**Fig. 13. Africa's Top VCI Scores with Russia and the U.S.**  
(Calculated for Resolutions Adopted by the 76th Session of the UNGA)




Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

**Chart 2. A Comparison of Africa's VCI Scores With Regard to the UN Security Council's P5 (Calculated for All Resolutions Adopted in 2021-2022)**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

# Interpretation of Data: Sub-Regional Dimension & Country Groupings

In this section, emphasis is placed on the voting patterns of African nations at the UN General Assembly, with an analysis at a more granular level, focusing on the four subregions and seven selected countries of the region split into three analytical groupings.<sup>56</sup> Here, the paper dwells on three questions.

First, a comparison of the VCI scores aggregated by subregion and groupings, calculated for specific thematic blocks of the resolutions will reveal whether there are any significant differences between African countries, on the one hand, and China and Russia, on the other, especially amid the close similarity of approaches established in Chart 2. It is also important to identify thematic areas where there are no significant differences in the approaches of Sub-Saharan states of African either toward Russia or toward the West. Particularly, the analysis first explores resolutions on Russia's priority areas at the UN.

Second, this section of the paper centers on the strategies underlying decisions of African to vote one way or another on the most contested issues. The main hypothesis is that most states of Sub-Saharan Africa ideally prefer to take a remote a position as possible, since these issues are beyond the immediate scope of their foreign policies. That said, these countries still face external pressure, having to choose between two options: to be more actively engaged in a vote (voting either "in favor" or "against," thus "aligning" with the sponsor or the opposition), or skip the voting session ("deflecting" having to make a categorical choice that could bring undesired consequences for the country's political relations with either or both of the sides).

Third, we need to consider how consistent nations of Africa are in voting on the same (mostly similar) issues. To this end, an additional 34 resolutions were analyzed, ones that the UNGA adopted at earlier sessions and that were (a) directly related to the most contested topics of resolutions (such as militarization of Crimea and Sevastopol or the activities of the Special Committee on Israeli practices in Palestine affecting human rights) or (b) pertaining to issues that are of significant interest to Russian foreign policy (such as the resolutions on combating the glorification of Nazism). This leads us to the hypothesis that (non-)participation in a vote and voting record of individual countries most likely depend on the degree of politicization of a given issue and, consequently, on the level of pressure exerted on countries by the sponsor or/and the opposition.

## Issue-Driven Analysis of the Voting Coincidence Index

The observations presented in this part rely on VCI scores calculated for individual countries of Sub-Saharan Africa relative to the P5 of the UN Security Council.

<sup>56</sup> These country groupings included: 1) the most active voters at UN General Assembly (Ethiopia, Namibia and Senegal), with the three also representing different subregions; 2) the countries with extreme VCI score relative to Russia's position at the UN General Assembly (Zimbabwe and Liberia); and 3) two regional powerhouses (South Africa and Nigeria). This will allow a balanced assessment of the potential differences in the approaches of African nations to the UN General Assembly.



cil. However, before this part, we compared 80 resolutions in Selection 1 and 87 resolutions in Selection 2, whereas now the analysis compares VCI scores within the selected thematic blocks of resolutions. Notably, in addition to the eight thematic blocks we identified earlier, VCI calculations were performed for two additional “sets” of resolutions on the situation in Ukraine (the two adopted at the 76<sup>th</sup> Session of the UNGA, and all seven adopted to the date of writing) as well as for the two groups of resolutions under the heading “Other” (comprising the 76<sup>th</sup> Session only and comprising all “other” resolutions of the 76<sup>th</sup> and 77<sup>th</sup> Sessions). Further, VCI scores were calculated for the five most contested resolutions (which we elaborated on earlier). All the VCI calculations are summarized in the Appendices.


An analysis of the VCI by thematic blocks reveals that the stances of Sub-Saharan Africa and Russia coincide most on resolutions on development agenda. To illustrate, the VCI score (aggregated for the subregion) is 96.43% for Southern Africa, 94.55% for Eastern Africa, and 91.96% for Western Africa. Central Africa is an outlier here, with “decolonialization” turning out to be the area where the interests of these countries and Russia coincided the most (75.56%). Notably, the VCI scores for this subregion indicate that “development” (63.10%), despite the trend, is not in second place either. That position belongs to “human rights” (68.29%), which is also an exception to the general sentiment, as this block is third in Southern Africa (93.33%) after “issues of trade, finance and the economy” (95.00%). The same applies to Eastern Africa (89.14% and 90.35%, respectively) and Western Africa (88.54% and 89.06%, respectively). Returning to Central Africa, “issues of trade, finance and the economy” is in 6<sup>th</sup> place here in terms of coincidences with Russia, behind resolutions on the situation in the Middle East and resolutions from the category of “Other.”

The positions of Russia and states of Sub-Saharan Africa coincide the least on the nuclear dimension of international security (the lowest VCI scores, among subregions, are recorded in Eastern Africa and Central Africa, at 34.49% and 33.19%), as well as on Ukraine, particularly in Southern Africa (35.00%), which demonstrates the lowest indicators on the two “Ukrainian” resolutions of the 76<sup>th</sup> UNGA Session, i.e. adopted before Russia’s special military operation, and in Western Africa (26.12%), where the positions coincided the lowest when calculated for all the resolutions on Ukraine (including those adopted during Russia’s special military operation).

On the whole, these two themes are relevant for all the subregions in terms of their minimal coincidence with Russia’s policy choices: for example, the countries of Southern Africa and Western Africa score second lowest each on the VCI with Russia on nuclear security (35.53% and 32.89%, respectively), while VCI scores for resolutions on Ukraine are second lowest in Eastern Africa (38.53%, all resolutions counted) and Central Africa (33.33%, all resolutions counted). Interestingly, Southern Africa is the only subregion that shows greater agreement, in terms of the VCI, for the full set of resolutions on the situation in Ukraine than for the short set comprising the two resolutions adopted before Russia’s military operation (39.29%, compared to 35.00%).


Given the above, let's see which states of the region are more aligned with Russia within these two least convergent areas. As far as nuclear security is concerned, the states showing highest rates of coincidence with Russia are South Africa (42.11%) in Southern Africa, Zimbabwe (44.74%) in Eastern Africa, Gabon (38.16%) in Central Africa, and Nigeria (36.84%) in Western Africa. The following countries demonstrate VCI values lower than their subregion's average: Botswana, Namibia, Eswatini (3 out of 5 countries in Southern Africa); Burundi, Zambia, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan (13 countries out of 19 in Eastern Africa); the DRC and the Central African Republic (2 countries out of 9 in Central Africa); Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Togo (4 states out of 16 in Western Africa). The lowest scores of all were recorded for Eswatini (30.26%), South Sudan (26.32%), the DRC (25.00%), and Benin (25.00%).

**Fig. 14. Thematic Blocks of UNGA Resolutions where Sub-Saharan Africa Demonstrates Highest and Lowest Voting Coincidence with Russia**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>57</sup>

**Fig. 15. States of Sub-Saharan Africa Whose Positions on Nuclear Security are Closest to Those of Russia**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>58</sup>


After the launch of Russia's special military operation, the following countries show most coincidence with Russia on the Ukrainian issue: Namibia (50.00%)

<sup>57</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

and South Africa (46.43%) in Southern Africa; Eritrea (92.86%), Zimbabwe (78.57%) and Ethiopia (75.00%) in Eastern Africa; the Central African Republic (60.71%) and the Republic of the Congo (50.00%) in Central Africa; Mali (78.57%) and Guinea (39.29%) in Western Africa. On the other end, the following countries indicate a stance particularly distanced from Russia's: Botswana (28.57%), Malawi and the Seychelles (10.71%), the DRC (10.71%) and Liberia (3.57%). This list features either nations that adhere to a consistently pro-Western stance or states that particularly depend on aid and face more development concerns, which, in the end, makes them more susceptible to external pressure.

**Fig. 16. States of Sub-Saharan Africa Whose Positions on the Situation in Ukraine Coincide the Most with Russia**



*Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>59</sup>*


Interestingly, some countries showed a higher VCI score for the seven “Ukrainian” resolutions than the figure calculated for the two (i.e. a greater coincidence with Russia even after the special military operation in Ukraine began). These include: Botswana (+3.57%), Eswatini (+14.29%), South Africa (+8.93%), Mozambique (+8.93%), Tanzania (+5.36%), Uganda (+8.93%), South Sudan (+1.79%), the Republic of the Congo (+25.00%), the Central African Republic (+23.21%), Equatorial Guinea (+10.71%), Guinea Bissau (+7.14%). Thus, there are three such states (out of five) in Southern Africa, four (out of 19) in Eastern Africa, three (out of nine) in Central Africa, and one (out of 16) in Western Africa.

To determine whether this results from a bolstered support on the part of these countries for Russia’s position or, rather, whether this can be put down to the specifics of the VCI, there will be an additional assessment by calculating the VCI for these countries only on resolutions adopted by the 11<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session after February 24, 2022. A comparison of the VCI scores for “the Ukrainian seven” (all resolutions) versus “the Ukrainian five” (11<sup>th</sup> ESS resolutions) reveals that Southern Africa is the only subregion where the broad level of support for Russia actually increased (+1.71%), which is due to the increased VCI scores for Botswana (+1.43%), Eswatini (+5.71%) and South Africa (+3.57%), as well as no change in Namibia. The same situation is not observed in the other subregions, although VCI scores for the five post-February 2022 resolutions did increase for Mozambique and Uganda (+3.57%), Tanzania (+2.14%), the Repub-

<sup>59</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

lic of Congo (+10%), Equatorial Guinea (+4.29%) and Guinea-Bissau (+2.86%). This, however, does not necessarily mean that these countries tend to endorse Russia's position on Ukraine as the average VCI score with Russia for these nine states is a mere 45.00% (compared to an average VCI of 61.27% for all 87 resolutions), with extreme points of 70.00% (the Central African Republic) and 30.00% (Botswana) among the selected countries. In general terms, the highest VCI score for "the Ukrainian five" is the case for Eritrea (90.00%), while the lowest scores are the case for Malawi, the Seychelles, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, and Liberia (0.00%), for Zambia, the Comoros, the DRC and Benin (5.00%), as well as Djibouti, Kenya, Mauritius, Somalia, Ghana, Cape Verde, Niger and Sierra Leone (10.00%). Apparently, this list confirms the hypothesis put forward two paragraphs earlier.

**Fig. 17. States of Sub-Saharan Africa Whose Positions on the Situation in Ukraine Coincide the Least with Russia**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>60</sup>

Summing up the provisional results, an observation can be made that, in terms of the VCI, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Angola, Chad, Mali, Senegal and Nigeria turned out to be on average closer in their positions on the situation in Ukraine to that of Russia. At the same time, there is a significant gap in support for Russia when comparing Southern and Eastern Africa, on the one hand, and Western and Central Africa, on the other. The DRC, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Seychelles and Niger showed the lowest coincidence with Russia, which again confirms the hypothesis about support for Russia being distributed among Africa's particular subregions, as well as the hypothesis about the countries that typically don't endorse Russia's views at the UN General Assembly.

Recall that the approaches of the Sub-Saharan states of Africa to the issues discussed at the UN General Assembly were, on the whole, close to those of China and Russia, while, on average, the African nations voted coincidentally with China

<sup>60</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

18% more frequently than with Russia. Arguably, there is a similarity in African approaches to the positions of Moscow and Beijing.

In terms of specific thematic blocks, the VCI scores of the Sub-Saharan states of Africa relative to Russia and China are identical in such areas as: development (88.12%); issues of trade, finance and the economy (84.18%); human rights (85.54%); the two “Other” lists of resolutions (60.33% for resolutions adopted at the 76<sup>th</sup> UNGA session and 61.53% for resolutions of both the 76<sup>th</sup> and 77<sup>th</sup> sessions); and the situation in Ukraine based on the resolutions adopted at the 76<sup>th</sup> UNGA session (43.88%). In addition, their positions largely coincide on such issues as: the Middle East (74.95% with Russia and 76.35% with China); on the five most contested resolutions (51.63% with Russia and 54.69% with China).

There are, however, cases when such solidarity is missing. The biggest differences in VCI scores—and this correlates with the previous analysis—have to do with the situation in Ukraine (given the five 11<sup>th</sup> ESS resolutions of the UN General Assembly), with the gap of 1.87 times. Another such area is the nuclear dimension of international security, with the gap of 1.83 times. Considering that Beijing tends to take a more passive position on these two blocks of issues, often abstaining (unlike Russia, with the country’s more active stance), these differences can be considered par for the course as they do not point to serious differences in the approaches that the states of Sub-Saharan Africa take with respect to Russia and China.

Furthermore, as far as nuclear security is concerned, African countries remain notably closer to China and Russia than to the West: here, the VCI score is 31.20% with the United Kingdom, 26.85% with the United States, and 26.32% with France. The same can be said regarding their position on the two “Ukrainian” resolutions adopted at the 76<sup>th</sup> UNGA Session as the position of Sub-Saharan Africa aligns with that of Russia and China by a score of 43.88%, as compared to 35.71% for the West.


However, the situation changed after Russia started the special military operation in Ukraine. When the five 11<sup>th</sup> ESS resolutions on Ukraine are taken into account, it then appears that Sub-Saharan Africa sided more frequently with the West than with Russia (63.78%, as compared to 29.49%) and still slightly more with the West than with China (63.78%, as compared to 55.20%). Therefore, the West currently has more real “capabilities” to mobilize the votes of UN member states, Sub-Saharan Africa included, in support of resolutions that are critically important to their (Western) agenda.

Areas where the stances of Sub-Saharan states of Africa and China coincide the least include: the situation in Ukraine; nuclear security; and issues listed under “Other.” The five most contested resolutions also fall into this category. As it turns out, the distribution of VCI scores by topic generally coincides with what we saw in relation to Russia. As was the case of Russia, it is the countries of Eastern and Southern Africa that demonstrate the highest coincidence with China, and the list of states that tend to vote the same way as China includes the same countries as the list compiled for Russia.

An analysis of the VCI scores for Sub-Saharan Africa in relation to the U.S., the UK and France reveals that the region's countries tend to display a better voting coincidence with France, and France's greatest support can be found in Southern Africa and Western Africa. However, the broad level of support for France among the countries of Southern Africa is still 23% lower than it is for China and 14% lower than it is for Russia, while support stemming from Western Africa is 22% and 13% lower for France than for China and Russia. The difference becomes even more pronounced for Eastern Africa, where the VCI scores with France are on average 31% and 24% lower for France than for China and Russia.

France's voting pattern coincides the most with Botswana in Southern Africa, Djibouti in Eastern Africa, Angola in Central Africa, and Cote d'Ivoire in Western Africa. The issues where France and the African countries agree the most include: (1) trade, finance and the economy (95.00% in Southern Africa, 90.35% in Eastern Africa, 56.48% in Central Africa, and 89.06% in Western Africa); (2) the situation in the Middle East (71.36% in Southern Africa, 75.60% in Eastern Africa, 58.00% in Central Africa, and 79.97% in Western Africa); and (3) other (non-nuclear) aspects of international security (65.00% in Southern Africa, 58.20% in Eastern Africa, 57.69% in Central Africa, and 62.02% in Western Africa), although the situation in Ukraine ranks third with regard to the countries of Eastern and Western Africa (building on the five 11<sup>th</sup> ESS resolutions), at 62.37% and 71.56%, respectively.

**Fig. 18. States of Sub-Saharan Africa Whose UNGA Voting Patterns are Closest to Those of France**



Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>61</sup>

The thematic block, where France and Africa demonstrate minimal agreement, with a yawning gap in comparison to other areas, include: the nuclear dimension of international security (27.11% in Southern Africa, 26.18% in Eastern Africa, 26.90% in Central Africa, and 25.90% in Western Africa).


As for the UK and the U.S., note that the United Kingdom is only slightly behind France in its VCI scores, while the United States lags significantly behind. Notably, Washington's main source of support lies in Western Africa (29.28%), closely followed by Southern and Central Africa (28.44%). The countries with the highest VCI score in relation to the U.S. are: Botswana in Southern Africa, Madagascar in Eastern Africa, Cameroon in Central Africa, and Liberia in Western Africa. The

<sup>61</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

area where the VCI scores with the U.S. were the highest is the five 11<sup>th</sup> ESS resolutions on the situation in Ukraine (57.00% in Southern Africa, 62.37% in Eastern Africa, 56.67% in Central Africa, and 71.56% in Western Africa), which again attests to Washington’s ability to “mobilize” votes among the African nations, especially those in Western Africa, in support for resolutions that are fundamentally important for the goals of U.S. foreign policy.

The second highest VCI scores for the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa are recorded for the block “Other Aspects of International Security,” which includes some resolutions on which the U.S. lobbied. However, since not all of the 13 resolutions (in the block) are considered “important” for Washington, the VCI scores are predictably lower: 45.77% for Southern Africa, 42.41% for Eastern Africa, 41.03% for Central Africa, and 43.99% for Western Africa. The areas where the positions of the U.S. and African countries diverge the most—quite notably—include actual priorities for the states of Sub-Saharan African: decolonialization (5.31%) and issues of trade, finance and the economy (5.95%).

**Fig. 19. States of Sub-Saharan Africa Whose UNGA Voting Patterns are Closest to Those of the United States**



*Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>62</sup>*

The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. Russia/China and the West receive support from different subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa, although the VCI scores for the U.S., the UK and France are in all cases significantly lower than those for Russia and China. Russia and the African nations tend to show similar voting patterns on issues that are, first of all, important for Africa. At the same time, the West enjoys more opportunities to “mobilize” Africa’s voting support when it comes to the most politicized and thus contested resolutions, which are, in fact, critical for Russia’s foreign policy (this is especially so for the resolutions on the situation in Ukraine).

**Africa’s Voting Strategies for Politicized Issues**

As was noted earlier, the passivity of states when voting on a particular issue may indirectly indicate where they stand in terms of their foreign policy as well as where specific issues are positioned within foreign policy priorities of states. Seemingly, strategies of the Sub-Saharan states of Africa are most clearly dis-

<sup>62</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

played when votes are held on contested issues due to their underlying complexities as well as their “remoteness” from the policy focus of African nations.

What happens most often in such contested cases is that the countries that sponsor a resolution, as much as those that oppose it, seek to attract as many states as possible to their side, which results in pressure put on other member states. Therefore, most Sub-Saharan states of Africa are faced with three choices: to “side” with one of the parties, remain conventionally neutral, or “deflect” having to make any definite choice altogether. In the first case, countries are forced to make their position known by voting either “in favor” or “against.” In the third case, non-participation in the session of the UN General Assembly seems an optimal measure. Abstaining is mostly a compromise option, whereby the country occupies an intermediate position between the “either-or” strategy and the strategy of deflecting external pressure. The point here is that the decision of a country that belongs to a regional bloc—in this case, the UN’s African Group or the African Union—to abstain from voting, assuming that the members of that bloc vote almost identically, will be seen as an apparent refusal to demonstrate solidarity with the common position, although without “stepping over” any lines. Thus, to abstain essentially means an indirect (passive) demonstration of support for the common position, which is a big giveaway as to which side the country actually agrees with more.

There is an important limitation when it comes to assessing which countries typically resort to the strategy of deflection. Obviously, there are cases where an absence for a vote has little to do with the desire to choose the most fitting and rational course of action—rather, with the fact that the country has few real options to make its vote count. As many experts have pointed out, “absenteeism” largely occurs on account of domestic concerns and issues of economic development, as well as because of capability constraints.<sup>63</sup> That said, voting records help, if with certain reservations, to “separate” categories of states from one other. For example, the delegations of Burundi, Somalia, the DRC, Niger and Benin more likely constitute a group of states that have limited opportunities for participation. What is more, small and island nations such as Eswatini, the Seychelles and São Tomé and Príncipe, typically occupy an intermediate position, prioritizing certain issues over others.

Turnout among the Sub-Saharan states of Africa was poorest on the following resolutions from Selection 2: “Situation in Afghanistan” (36 absentees),<sup>64</sup> “Problem of the Militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov” (32 absentees),<sup>65</sup> “Oceans and Law of the Sea” (28 absentees),<sup>66</sup> “Promotion of Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, Understanding and Cooperation for

<sup>63</sup> Panke, D. “Absenteeism in the General Assembly of the United Nations: Why Some Member States Rarely Vote,” *Int Polit*, 51 (2014), 729–749.

<sup>64</sup> A/RES/77/10, adopted on November 14, 2022.

<sup>65</sup> A/RES/76/70, adopted on December 9, 2021.

<sup>66</sup> A/RES/76/72, adopted on December 20, 2021.



peace” (25 absentees),<sup>67</sup> “Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon” (24 absentees),<sup>68</sup> “Status of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia” (23 absentees),<sup>69</sup> and “Questions Relating to the Proposed Program Budget for 2022” (21 absentees).<sup>70</sup> Passivity (disengagement) for these resolutions was 2.6–4 times higher than the average for Selection 2.

Passivity is above average for three of the five most contested resolutions: the resolution on the militarization of Crimea and Sevastopol mentioned in the previous paragraph; “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security” (16 absentees),<sup>71</sup> and “Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories” (12 absentees).<sup>72</sup> The remaining resolutions – “Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine”<sup>73</sup> and “Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”<sup>74</sup> (eight absentees each) – received greater support and lower-than-average passivity. This difference can be explained by the fact that issues raised as a human rights concern typically attract more engagement than other thematic blocks.<sup>75</sup>

We will group these eleven resolutions into Selection 3. Table 4 (below) lists the states in Sub-Saharan Africa that were absent for votes on these issues. As can be seen, the table confirms the hypothesis that more states tend to vote when it comes to human rights: this is especially true of the situation in Crimea and Iran, and, to a lesser extent, violations of human rights committed by Israel against the people of Palestine.

Upon correlating the countries presented in Table 4 with the list of states that were absent on most of the occasions (indicated by an asterisk in the table, calculations based on Selection 2), the following comes up: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (absent for 82 of 87 votes), Benin (absent for 53 votes), São Tomé and Príncipe (absent for 42 votes), the Central African Republic (absent for 36 votes), Liberia (absent for 35 votes), the Seychelles (absent for 34 votes), Niger (absent for 31 votes), Eswatini, Equatorial Guinea (absent for 30 votes each). Consequently, only several of the states listed in the table missed a small number of votes (i.e., for these nations, absences were not a common voting practice), most

<sup>67</sup> A/RES/76/69, adopted on December 16, 2021.

<sup>68</sup> A/RES/76/290, adopted on July 7, 2022.

<sup>69</sup> A/RES/76/267, adopted on June 14, 2022.

<sup>70</sup> A/RES/76/245, adopted on January 6, 2022.

<sup>71</sup> A/RES/76/234, adopted on December 30, 2021.

<sup>72</sup> A/RES/76/80, adopted on December 15, 2021.

<sup>73</sup> A/RES/76/179, adopted on January 10, 2022.

<sup>74</sup> A/RES/76/178, adopted on January 10, 2022.

<sup>75</sup> On average, three to four sub-Saharan states are absent from such votes, although there are exceptions. For instance, the above-mentioned “Promotion of Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, Understanding and Cooperation for Peace”, “A Global Call for Concrete Action for the Elimination of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action”, and “The Human Right to a Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment.”

**Table 4. Votes of Least Engaged Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa on Resolutions Contested by Passivity**

State	Number of Missed Votes for Sel. 3	Resolutions of Sel. 3 with a Vote Cast	Number of Missed Votes, total for Sel. 2
The DRC	11	—	83/87*
Benin	9	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran	53/87*
The Seychelles	9	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran	34/87*
Burkina Faso	9	Promotion of interreligious dialogue, promotion of cooperation for peaceful uses	17/87
Cape Verde	8	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, Israel's actions violating human rights	16/87
Niger	8	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, Israel's actions violating human rights	31/87*
Rwanda	8	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, Israel's actions violating human rights	15/87
The Central African Republic	8	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, promotion of cooperation for peaceful uses	36/87*
South Sudan	8	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	26/87
Equatorial Guinea	8	Promotion of cooperation for peaceful uses, financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, program budget for 2022	30/87*
The Comoros	7	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, promotion of cooperation for peaceful uses, Israel's actions violating human rights	13/87
Gabon	7	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, Israel's actions violating human rights, oceans and law of the sea	26/87
Tanzania	7	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, program budget for 2022, promotion of cooperation for peaceful uses	14/87
São Tomé and Príncipe	7	Israel's actions violating human rights, oceans and law of the sea, militarization of Crimea, promotion of interreligious dialogue	42/87*
Lesotho	6	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, promotion of interreligious dialogue, promotion of cooperation for peaceful uses, financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	6/87
Liberia	6	Human rights in Crimea, Human rights in Iran, program budget for 2022, Israel's actions violating human rights, internally displaced persons from Abkhazia and Ossetia	35/87*
The Republic of the Congo	6	Promotion of cooperation for peaceful uses, Israel's actions violating human rights, program budget for 2022, internally displaced persons from Abkhazia and Ossetia, financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	27/87*
Sierra Leone	6	Human rights in Crimea, Israel's actions violating human rights, program budget for 2022, internally displaced persons from Abkhazia and Ossetia, financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	12/87

Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library, URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

of which featured contested resolutions. These states include: Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, the Comoros, Rwanda and Cape Verde—arguably, these are the countries that, alongside Liberia (which will be discussed later), did not partake in voting as part of their strategy of deflection. As for the other African countries listed in the table, their absences may well be resulting from internal constraints.

Indeed, Table 4 includes resolutions on issues that are well beyond the immediate priorities of African foreign policies and that are highly politicized at the same time. By skipping the votes on these issues, these countries maintained a balanced position, not jeopardizing relations with their main partners.

This strategy may still have another manifestation. To explore it, we need to identify the states whose non-participation is an exception rather than the norm. These include: Angola, Ethiopia (absent for one vote each); Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe (absent for two votes each); Djibouti, Eritrea, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa (absent for three votes each); Chad, Kenya, Mali, Uganda (absent for four votes each); Gambia, Sudan, Mauritius (absent for five votes each); and Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar and Togo (absent for six votes each). Representatives of these countries did not participate in (at most) 7% of the votes on resolutions from Selection 2. As a next step, we'll see votes on which resolutions most of these 22 nations chose to skip.

As Table 5 suggests, these were mostly resolutions on politically vexing issues that typically do not directly affect national interests of African countries. Meanwhile, they were adopted at a time when the international community's attention was not focused on these issues, which means that there was no external pressure exerted on countries to vote in a particular way.<sup>77</sup> This, as the author would argue, allows countries to pursue a strategy of deflection for other reasons, such as not spending efforts and resources on highly politicized issues, concentrating instead on problems important for their agenda. Besides, a resolution on procedural matters is listed in the table. Studies prove that these issues tend to attract less attention from states.<sup>78</sup>

Having considered the primary motives that underpin a nation's preference for a strategy of deflection at the UN General Assembly, the next step will be to identify countries that do this most often. For this, we suggest an overview of how states of Sub-Saharan Africa voted on resolutions where the stances of the UN Security Council's P5 were opposite—both openly, when some P5 members voted “in favor” while others voted “against,” and indirectly, when one of the sides to the vote preferred to abstain rather than express its views openly. Selection 2 contains 36 such resolutions.

Ignoring the countries that were most likely absent for votes because of their staffing or financial constraints of capability (Burkina Faso, South Sudan, Benin,

<sup>77</sup> The resolutions listed in the table cannot be grouped through placing the positions of the West in opposition to those of Russia and China. For example, France, the U.S. and the UK supported A/RES/77/10, while Russia and China abstained. Meanwhile, the positions of the P5 diverged on A/RES/76/70 (when Russia and China voted “against”), and A/RES/76/72 saw unanimity among the P5.

<sup>78</sup> Panke, D. “Absenteeism in the General Assembly of the United Nations: Why Some Member States Rarely Vote,” *Int Polit*, 51 (2014), 729–749.

**Table 5. Resolutions Contested by High Passivity on the Part of the 22 Most Engaged Nations of Sub-Saharan Africa**

Resolution	Number of Votes Missed
Situation in Afghanistan (A/RES/77/10)	13
Problem of the Militarization of Crimea and Sevastopol (A/RES/76/70)	10
Oceans and Law of the Sea (A/RES/76/72)	10
Promotion of Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, Understanding and Cooperation for Peace (A/RES/76/69)	6
Questions Relating to the Proposed Program Budget for 2022 (A/RES/76/245)	5
Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia (A/RES/76/267)	5

*Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>79</sup>*

the CAR, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini and Niger), the following African states were often absent when voting on the selected 36 resolutions: São Tomé and Príncipe (absent for 24 of 36 votes), the Republic of the Congo and the Seychelles (15 votes each), Liberia (13 votes) and Gabon (12 votes). There were two resolutions where all five of these African nations did not vote: “The Syrian Golan” and “The Situation in Afghanistan.” Note that Liberia was probably most successful in using the strategy of deflection to its benefit, specifically in cases where Russia and China voted “in favor” and France, the UK and the U.S. voted “against.” This happened on 12 occasions (92%). Perhaps, this strategy was helpful because Liberia enjoys close ties with the West, but the country could not openly go against the African Union, whose members voted overwhelmingly in the same way as Russia and China. The same reasoning may explain the voting record of the Republic of Congo, whose strategy of deflection facilitated a gravitation toward the West in 14 of the 15 votes (93%). The Seychelles followed a similar, though more nuanced, strategy, gravitating toward the West on 12 of 15 occasions (80%). The other three times (20%), the Seychelles deflected the vote, likely endorsing the side of China and Russia. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to the strategy of São Tomé and Príncipe, which deflected 21 votes (88%) in favor of the West and three times (12%) in favor of Russia and China. Gabon’s non-voting record is somewhat different: on 8 occasions (67%), the country arguably “deviated” toward the West, while the remaining four times (33%) it “deviated” toward the positions of Russia, China and most of the states of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Importantly, the author believes that deflection of a vote is a more serious attempt for a nation to keep balance with regard to the opposing sides on issues targeted by resolutions. Correlating voting record of countries helps establish which of the sides a particular state is closer to—however, this support (if it exists) is conditional and indirect. In the very least, it “counts” less than if the country abstained from voting.

<sup>79</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

## **Evaluation of Voting Consistency of the Sub-Saharan states of Africa at the UNGA**

In this section of the paper, analysis centers around the three analytical country groupings (see Fig. 5). This approach makes it possible to focus on foreign policy behavior of states with different “identities” and interests within the framework of a set of resolutions on the same matter. In fact, the UN General Assembly adopts many resolutions on an annual basis, typically with minimal changes. This enables a review of consistency for a particular country, in terms of its ability to stand ground at the UN General Assembly.

As a rule, these are the cases of the most contested resolutions (for instance, militarization of Crimea and Sevastopol or the activities of the Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people). The analysis also took note of resolutions that concern the issues bearing special importance for Russia’s foreign policy (for example, combating the glorification of Nazism). A further 34 resolutions were selected on these criteria. Country stances as of 2021 were taken as a point of reference. 11<sup>th</sup> ESS resolutions on Ukraine were added to the selection. A summary of stances on the eleven selected resolutions, which will be discussed in more detail later, is presented in Table 6.

As can be seen from Table 6, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia are closest to Russia in their stances on the resolutions. Meanwhile, Namibia and South Africa display a rather balanced position. For example, Windhoek and Pretoria did not lend support to any of the anti-Russian resolutions adopted at the 11<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the UNGA. Senegal and Nigeria never openly went “against” Russia before the special military operation in Ukraine. Liberia, in contrast, takes an openly pro-Western stance on most “burning” issues. Note that all these observations are consistent with the earlier conclusions drawing on the analysis of VCI scores.

The second resolution on Ukraine adopted at the 76<sup>th</sup> UNGA Session (i.e. before Russia’s special military operation) concerns the issue of human rights in Crimea and Sevastopol. Table 8 shows voting by country since 2016. Four countries maintain a consistent position on the issue: Namibia, Nigeria (both neutral), Zimbabwe (pro-Russian) and Liberia (pro-Western). In 2021, Ethiopia switched to a pro-Russian position, much like it did with the previous issue. This change was most likely due to the fact that the words “temporarily occupied” were added to the name of the resolution, which were not there before. South Africa continued to distance itself from the Russian view of the issue, abstaining from voting—rather than voting “against”—since the coming to power of President Cyril Ramaphosa. The revised title of the resolution did not affect the country’s position. Senegal can be considered the most passive country on this issue, as it was absent more often than any of the other countries.

Year 2021, as the table suggests, marked the first time when Ethiopia took a stance identical to Russia’s, while South Africa was absent for the vote, which is another first. The latter circumstance can be interpreted as an attempt to “deflect” voting on an increasingly “toxic” issue. The positions of Zimbabwe, Namibia and

**Table 6. Summary of Country Stances on Pivotal Resolutions in 2021 (Prior to Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine) & 11<sup>th</sup> ESS Resolutions on Ukraine**

	Ethiopia	Namibia	Senegal	Zimbabwe	Liberia	Nigeria	South Africa	Russia	China	USA
Militarization of Crimea	■	◆	◆	■	◐	◆	◐	■	■	●
Human rights in Crimea	■	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●
Human rights in Iran	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●
Human rights and Palestine	●	●	●	●	■	●	●	◆	●	■
Cooperation in peaceful uses	●	●	●	●	◐	●	●	●	●	■
Democratic and equitable order	●	●	●	●	◆	●	●	●	●	■
Combating the glorification of Nazism	●	●	●	●	◐	●	●	●	●	■
Aggression against Ukraine	◐	◆	◆	◆	●	●	◆	■	◆	●
Humanitarian consequences	◆	◆	●	◆	●	●	◆	■	◆	●
Russia’s suspension from UN’s HRC	■	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●
Territorial integrity of Ukraine	◆	◆	●	◆	●	●	◆	■	◆	●

"in favor"  
 "against"  
 abstained  
 absent

Source: Compiled by the author based on open sources.<sup>80</sup>

Nigeria did not see any change throughout the four-year period, with Windhoek and Abuja remaining neutral on the issue. In 2020, Senegal did not participate in the voting, most likely due to the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting state of emergency in the country. Every other year, Dakar also took a neutral stance on the issue. The shifts in Liberia’s position are particularly noteworthy, with Monrovia either openly siding with the West (the only country to do this) or deflecting the vote altogether (likely “maneuvering” between its pro-Western course and a common position of the African Union). This behavior exemplifies how a country can pursue the strategy of deflection at the UN General Assembly.

Further analysis utilizes a retrospective approach, focusing on the consistency in stances that countries were taking throughout the years when resolutions with a similar (or identical) language were adopted.

<sup>80</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

As for the Ukrainian issue, countries in all the three groupings maintained a moderate—if not pro-Russian—position until 2022, when Russia’s special military operation began. Table 7 shows how these countries voted on the “Problem of the Militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.”

**Table 7. Voting Consistency of Sub-Saharan Africa**

	Ethiopia	Namibia	Senegal	Zimbabwe	Liberia	Nigeria	South Africa	Russia	China	USA
Problem of militarization of the Automous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol										
2018	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	◆	●
2019	◆	◆	◆	■	◆	◆	◆	■	■	●
2020	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●
2021	■	◆	◆	■	◆	◆	◆	■	■	●
2022	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	◆	●

Source: Compiled by the author based on open sources.<sup>81</sup>

**Table 8. Voting Consistency of Sub-Saharan Africa**

	Ethiopia	Namibia	Senegal	Zimbabwe	Liberia	Nigeria	South Africa	Russia	China	USA
Situation of Human Rights in the (Temporarily Occupied) Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine										
2016	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	■	■	■	●
2017	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	■	■	■	●
2018	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	■	■	■	●
2019	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●
2020	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●
2021	■	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●
2022	■	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●

Source: Compiled by the author based on open sources.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

Table 8 shows how the active phase of the conflict in Ukraine affected the positions of Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>83</sup>

In 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted just one resolution on the topics discussed in the previous paragraphs, namely the resolution on human rights. As a matter of fact, voting patterns of all the seven states saw no change on this issue, which suggests that Russian diplomacy has been rather successful in this regard.

Moving forward with the analysis of resolutions on human rights, we will look at the evolution of voting patterns with regard to the situation in Iran. The issue has been put to the vote every year since 2000. Table 9 highlights trends in the countries' voting patterns in increments of four years.

**Table 9. Voting Consistency of Sub-Saharan Africa**

	Ethiopia	Namibia	Senegal	Zimbabwe	Liberia	Nigeria	South Africa	Russia	China	USA
Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran										
2000	◆	◆	■	■	◐	◆	◆	■	■	●
2004	◆	◆	■	■	◆	■	■	■	■	●
2008	◆	◆	■	■	●	◆	■	■	■	●
2012	◆	◆	●	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●
2016	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	■	■	■	●
2020	◆	◆	◐	■	◐	◆	◆	■	■	●
2021	◆	◆	◆	■	●	◆	◆	■	■	●

●  
"in favor"

■  
"against"

◆  
abstained

◐  
absent

Source: Compiled by the author from open sources based on his own calculations.<sup>84</sup>

Table 9 indicates that Ethiopia, Namibia and Zimbabwe have been totally consistent in their voting, with Harare's position matching that of Moscow and Beijing on all occasions. As usual, Liberia demonstrates a pro-Western stance, deviating only between 2003 and 2006, when the country was headed by Gyude Bryant, Chairman of the Transitional Government of Liberia (formed after years of civil war). Clearly, his government was preoccupied with other, more pressing tasks. Nigeria took a restrained neutral position, abstaining from voting on the issue. The only exception came in 2004 during the country's presidency of the African Union, when Abuja voted identically to Russia and China.

The voting records of South Africa and Senegal stand out as being the least consistent. Pretoria, for example, has flip-flopped throughout, either expressing

<sup>83</sup> The resolutions listed in the table are taken into account in this section of the study only, and they were not included in the VCI calculations (as they had not been adopted at the time).

<sup>84</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>



**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

open agreement with Russia and China or taking a more restrained and passive position. Notably, a “softening” of South Africa’s position occurred during the Jacob Zuma’s second term in office, contrary to the popular belief that his administration sought rapprochement with the non-Western world, including Iran. This course, in fact, culminated in 2016 when South Africa refused to support the resolution. With the arrival of Cyril Ramaphosa in power, who was actively “balancing” among different powerhouses in the emerging polycentric world, Pretoria returned to a passive stance. As for Senegal, the country’s delegation to the UN consistently voted “against” this resolution while Abdoulaye Wade was in power (from 2000 to 2012). Under his successor, former Prime Minister, Macky Sall, the country initially adopted a pro-Western stance (Senegal voted “in favor” of the resolution in 2012), before taking a more restrained stance on the issue (either abstaining or not participating in the vote).

The resolution exploring the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories deserves special mention. Table 10 shows that the vast majority of African countries have not changed their position on this issue: Senegal, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Namibia and South Africa have supported the resolution since 1995 (although Namibia and South Africa were each absent on one occasion). Ethiopia long maintained a neutral position, voting “in favor” for the first time ever in 2021, thus demonstrating a more active approach, which is quite in line with the common position of the African Union.

**Table 10. Voting Consistency of Sub-Saharan Africa**

	Ethiopia	Namibia	Senegal	Zimbabwe	Liberia	Nigeria	South Africa	Russia	China	USA
Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Right of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories										
1996	◆	◆	●	●	◆	●	●	◆	●	■
2000	◆	●	●	●	◆	●	●	◆	●	■
2004	◆	●	●	●	◆	●	●	◆	●	■
2008	◆	●	●	●	◆	●	◆	◆	●	■
2012	◆	●	●	●	◆	●	●	◆	●	■
2016	◆	●	●	●	◆	●	●	◆	●	■
2020	◆	●	●	●	■	●	●	◆	●	■
2021	●	●	●	●	■	●	●	◆	●	■

●  
"in favor"

■  
"against"

◆  
abstained

◆  
absent

Source: Compiled by the author based on open sources.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

Again, Liberia has proven to be the most “flexible” in terms of its position on this issue. The civil war in the country meant that Monrovia did not take part in the voting until 2004, after which it maintained a neutral stance. This endured until 2018, when George Weah came to power, and the country started to vote the same way as the United States.

Table 11 shows how the seven countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have voted on the resolution “Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order,” first adopted in 2000. Among the nations of the African Continent that sponsored the resolution were Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, the DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, the Republic of the Congo and Tanzania.

**Table 11. Voting Consistency of Sub-Saharan Africa**

	Ethiopia	Namibia	Senegal	Zimbabwe	Liberia	Nigeria	South Africa	Russia	China	USA
Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order										
2000	●	●	◆	●	◐	●	■	●	●	■
2004	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■
2008	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■
2012	●	●	●	●	●	●	◐	●	●	■
2016	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■
2020	●	●	●	●	◆	●	●	●	●	■
2021	●	●	●	●	◆	●	●	●	●	■

"in favor"    
  "against"    
  abstained    
  absent

Source: Compiled by the author based on open sources.<sup>86</sup>

The position that South Africa chose to take in 2000 is particularly interesting here, as Pretoria voted “against” the resolution when almost every other country voted “in favor”. Interestingly, even Liberia took a cautious position, which it changed from support to abstention under George Weah. Apart from that, no other African country voted “against” the resolution. Apparently, this is a paradox that has no easy explanation, as the South African delegation never commented on its position in official documents.

The final resolution of the analysis is “Combating the Glorification of Nazism,” first sponsored by Russia in 2014 and put to the vote on an annual basis since. As can be seen from Table 12, Sub-Saharan Africa unanimously support Russia’s view of the issue. The only exception is Liberia, which has refused to endorse this resolution since 2018 (when George Weah came to power), but has still

<sup>86</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

never voted “against” it, unlike the United States. This might be another victory of Russia’s diplomacy at the UN General Assembly. But how has the special military operation in Ukraine affected the situation?

**Table 12. Voting Consistency of Sub-Saharan Africa**

	Ethiopia	Namibia	Senegal	Zimbabwe	Liberia	Nigeria	South Africa	Russia	China	USA
Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fueling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance										
2014	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■
2015	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■
2016	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■
2017	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■
2018	●	●	●	●	◆	●	●	●	●	■
2019	●	●	●	●	◆	●	●	●	●	■
2020	●	●	●	●	◆	●	●	●	●	■
2021	●	●	●	●	◐	●	●	●	●	■
2022	●	●	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	■

●  
"in favor"

■  
"against"

◆  
abstained

◐  
absent

Source: Compiled by the author based on open sources.<sup>87</sup>

On the one hand, the total number of UN member states that supported the resolution in 2022 significantly decreased as compared to the previous year: 120 votes “in favor” and 50 “against” in 2022, with 130 votes “in favor” and just two “against” in 2021. On the other hand, as Table 12 indicates, Liberia remains the only country in our sample that changed its stance, lending open support to the West for the first time.

To summarize, most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, despite certain deviations, have been consistent in their voting, sticking to a specific position on each issue. The biggest fluctuations in voting records had to do with the situation of human rights in Iran, which is evident from the changes in the positions of the region’s leaders, South Africa and Nigeria. Liberia seems the only country that seeks to find a “balance” between its neighbors in the region and the West in almost every case. Clearly, this results in a specific dynamic in Monrovia’s positions, which can be explained either by the domestic situation (overcoming the consequences of civil war) or by a change in leadership.

<sup>87</sup> Voting Data // UN Digital Library. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data>

## Conclusion

For the nations of Africa, the UN has become a reflection of their rightful full-fledged integration into the international community, since they could make essential decisions on a par with the former colonial powers as equally sovereign states.

The methodology suggested in this study led up to the analysis through six stages, with the study designed in such a way that different levels of aggregating the resulting data (from the regional level down to country-specific level) has made for the fullest and most accurate answers to the research questions..

In terms of voting engagement, Southern Africa is the most active subregion (especially Namibia), followed by Western or Eastern Africa, which depends on the classification of the region's countries. The disengaged subregion is Central Africa, which can be put down to the developmental difficulties that the subregion's nations face.

The more contested and politicized resolutions are, the more countries in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to avoid a direct participation in such votes, especially on issues beyond their immediate interests and priorities on the UN agenda.

Nuclear dimension of international security is an area that the African countries attach most priority to. Second comes decolonialization, followed by development. The two blocs, as it appears, naturally fit into the real priorities of African foreign policies.

If a resolution concerns a situation in a specific country, African countries pay comparatively less interest to it. With few exceptions, these issues are beyond the scope of issues prioritized by foreign policies of African nations. This also means that the African Union does not have a consolidated position on such issues, allowing for a certain "flexibility" in voting records.

The resolutions on the situation in Ukraine are of least interest to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, with Russia's special military operation in Ukraine continuing, Africa is gradually "tiring" of the topic, despite the fact that the number of countries in the region whose votes have been "mobilized" by the West remains fairly high.

Most often, African countries tend to vote the same way as China. Slightly behind, in terms of the average coincidence of stances, is Russia. Even those Sub-Saharan states of Africa that display minimal voting coincidence with Russia still demonstrate higher scores of the Voting Coincidence Index than with any country in the West. At the same time, there has been no African country that has a higher VCI with the U.S. than with France or the UK.

Africa's maximal voting coincidence with Russia is the case for resolutions on development, with minimal coincidence recorded for resolutions with regard to the nuclear dimension of international security as well as Ukraine.

The following countries are closest to Russia's view of the situation in Ukraine: Namibia and South Africa in Southern Africa; Eritrea, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia in Eastern Africa; the Central African Republic and the Republic of the Congo in Central Africa; Mali and Guinea in Western Africa. The countries that display least coincidence with Russia's position are Botswana, Malawi and the Seychelles, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia.

Russia/China and the West blocks draw on the support of Africa's different sub-regions, although in all cases VCI scores with the U.S, the UK and France are significantly lower than they are with China and Russia. Russia and the African nations tend to show similar voting patterns on issues that are, first of all, important for Africa. At the same time, the West enjoys more opportunities to "mobilize" Africa's voting support when it comes to the most politicized and thus contested resolutions, which are, in fact, critical for Russia's foreign policy (this is especially so for the resolutions on the situation in Ukraine).

Several African countries resort to the strategy of deflection when voting on some resolutions, attempting to maintain a certain balance between the sides. This strategy may, in fact, pursue different goals: a) to minimize the impact of a vote on relations with main partners; and/or b) prioritize on essential issues on the agenda instead of spending resources on highly politicized issues that are not of particular importance to their national interests.

Importantly, the author believes that deflection of a vote is a more serious attempt for a nation to keep balance with regard to the opposing sides on issues targeted by resolutions. Correlating voting record of countries helps establish which of the sides a particular state is closer to—however, this support (if it exists) is conditional and indirect. In the very least, it "counts" less than if the country abstained from voting.

While African countries sometimes "deviate" from their "established" record on a given issue, most states are consistent in their positions. Liberia stands out in this respect, however, as this is the only country that constantly seeks to find a "balance" between its African neighbors and its partners in the West.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1. Voting Coincidence Index for Africa and the P5

Data by Sub-Region / Countries & Thematic Areas

	RUSSIA	CHINA	USA	FRANCE	UK
<b>VCI for 19 resolutions on nuclear security</b>					
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	33,83%	62,03%	26,85%	26,32%	31,20%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>35,53%</b>	<b>63,95%</b>	<b>27,63%</b>	<b>27,11%</b>	<b>32,37%</b>
Botswana	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Lesotho	36,84%	63,16%	28,95%	28,95%	34,21%
Namibia	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Eswatini	30,26%	61,84%	27,63%	25,00%	30,26%
South Africa	42,11%	63,16%	28,95%	28,95%	34,21%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>34,49%</b>	<b>63,71%</b>	<b>26,45%</b>	<b>26,18%</b>	<b>30,89%</b>
Burundi	34,21%	63,16%	23,68%	21,05%	26,32%
Djibouti	36,84%	68,42%	28,95%	28,95%	34,21%
Zambia	32,89%	64,47%	27,63%	25,00%	30,26%
Zimbabwe	44,74%	71,05%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Kenya	36,84%	68,42%	28,95%	28,95%	34,21%
The Comoros	38,16%	67,11%	25,00%	25,00%	30,26%
Mauritius	31,58%	63,16%	23,68%	26,32%	28,95%
Madagascar	32,89%	59,21%	27,63%	25,00%	30,26%
Malawi	36,84%	68,42%	28,95%	28,95%	34,21%
Mozambique	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Rwanda	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Seychelles	30,26%	61,84%	27,63%	25,00%	30,26%
Somalia	32,89%	40,79%	25,00%	26,32%	27,63%
From Sudan	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Tanzania	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Uganda	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Eritrea	35,53%	61,84%	27,63%	27,63%	32,89%
Ethiopia	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
South Sudan	26,32%	57,89%	23,68%	25,00%	26,32%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>33,19%</b>	<b>58,33%</b>	<b>28,22%</b>	<b>26,90%</b>	<b>31,73%</b>
Angola	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Gabon	38,16%	61,84%	30,26%	30,26%	35,53%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	23,68%	25,00%
Cameroon	35,53%	61,84%	38,16%	32,89%	38,16%
Republic of the Congo	35,53%	61,84%	27,63%	27,63%	32,89%
São Tomé and Príncipe	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Central African Republic	26,32%	50,00%	26,32%	21,05%	26,32%
Chad	35,53%	67,11%	27,63%	27,63%	32,89%
Equatorial Guinea	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>32,89%</b>	<b>61,51%</b>	<b>26,32%</b>	<b>25,90%</b>	<b>30,92%</b>
Benin	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	23,68%	25,00%
Burkina Faso	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Gambia	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Ghana	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Guinea	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Guinea-Bissau	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Cape Verde	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Ivory Coast	31,58%	63,16%	28,95%	28,95%	34,21%
Liberia	34,21%	57,89%	31,58%	31,58%	36,84%
Mauritania	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Mali	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Niger	28,95%	57,89%	23,68%	21,05%	26,32%
Nigeria	36,84%	68,42%	23,68%	23,68%	28,95%
Senegal	34,21%	65,79%	26,32%	26,32%	31,58%
Sierra Leone	32,89%	61,84%	27,63%	27,63%	32,89%
Togo	28,95%	57,89%	23,68%	21,05%	26,32%

**VCI for 13 resolutions on other aspects of international security**

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	57,06%	76,37%	43,01%	60,05%	56,44%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	57,31%	79,62%	45,77%	65,00%	61,15%
Botswana	55,77%	78,85%	48,08%	67,31%	63,46%
Lesotho	57,69%	80,77%	50,00%	69,23%	65,38%
Namibia	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Eswatini	50,00%	69,23%	38,46%	57,69%	53,85%
South Africa	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	59,41%	77,63%	42,41%	58,20%	54,55%
Burundi	59,62%	82,69%	44,23%	63,46%	59,62%
Djibouti	65,38%	88,46%	42,31%	61,54%	57,69%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Zambia	63,46%	71,15%	55,77%	59,62%	55,77%
Zimbabwe	76,92%	76,92%	38,46%	34,62%	30,77%
Kenya	65,38%	88,46%	42,31%	61,54%	57,69%
The Comoros	63,46%	86,54%	40,38%	59,62%	55,77%
Mauritius	55,77%	78,85%	48,08%	67,31%	63,46%
Madagascar	51,92%	75,00%	51,92%	71,15%	67,31%
Malawi	50,00%	69,23%	38,46%	57,69%	53,85%
Mozambique	55,77%	78,85%	48,08%	67,31%	63,46%
Rwanda	53,85%	73,08%	34,62%	53,85%	50,00%
Seychelles	46,15%	65,38%	34,62%	46,15%	42,31%
Somalia	44,23%	51,92%	36,54%	44,23%	44,23%
From Sudan	65,38%	88,46%	42,31%	61,54%	57,69%
Tanzania	55,77%	78,85%	48,08%	67,31%	63,46%
Uganda	73,08%	80,77%	42,31%	53,85%	50,00%
Eritrea	69,23%	84,62%	38,46%	57,69%	53,85%
Ethiopia	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
South Sudan	51,92%	71,15%	32,69%	51,92%	48,08%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>55,98%</b>	<b>73,08%</b>	<b>41,03%</b>	<b>57,69%</b>	<b>54,27%</b>
Angola	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Gabon	46,15%	65,38%	42,31%	61,54%	57,69%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Republic of the Congo	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
São Tomé and Príncipe	50,00%	69,23%	38,46%	57,69%	53,85%
Central African Republic	67,31%	82,69%	40,38%	55,77%	51,92%
Chad	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Equatorial Guinea	69,23%	76,92%	38,46%	57,69%	53,85%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>54,81%</b>	<b>75,72%</b>	<b>43,99%</b>	<b>62,02%</b>	<b>58,41%</b>
Benin	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Burkina Faso	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Gambia	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Ghana	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Guinea	63,46%	86,54%	40,38%	59,62%	55,77%
Guinea-Bissau	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Cape Verde	50,00%	69,23%	38,46%	57,69%	53,85%
Ivory Coast	53,85%	76,92%	53,85%	73,08%	69,23%
Liberia	44,23%	67,31%	51,92%	71,15%	67,31%



**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Mauritania	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Mali	65,38%	88,46%	42,31%	61,54%	57,69%
Niger	38,46%	57,69%	42,31%	61,54%	57,69%
Nigeria	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Senegal	61,54%	84,62%	46,15%	65,38%	61,54%
Sierra Leone	50,00%	69,23%	38,46%	57,69%	53,85%
Togo	55,77%	78,85%	48,08%	67,31%	63,46%

**VCI for 12 resolutions on human rights**

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	85,54%	85,54%	34,40%	48,81%	42,86%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	93,33%	93,33%	37,08%	53,33%	45,83%
Botswana	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Lesotho	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Namibia	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Eswatini	83,33%	83,33%	35,42%	50,00%	45,83%
South Africa	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	89,14%	89,14%	34,10%	48,79%	42,87%
Burundi	87,50%	87,50%	29,17%	41,67%	37,50%
Djibouti	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Zambia	89,58%	89,58%	35,42%	47,92%	43,75%
Zimbabwe	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Kenya	89,58%	89,58%	35,42%	47,92%	43,75%
The Comoros	87,50%	87,50%	29,17%	41,67%	37,50%
Mauritius	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Madagascar	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Malawi	81,25%	81,25%	29,17%	43,75%	39,58%
Mozambique	77,08%	77,08%	31,25%	47,92%	39,58%
Rwanda	83,33%	83,33%	35,42%	50,00%	45,83%
Seychelles	81,25%	81,25%	29,17%	43,75%	39,58%
Somalia	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
From Sudan	89,58%	89,58%	35,42%	47,92%	43,75%
Tanzania	87,50%	87,50%	29,17%	41,67%	37,50%
Uganda	89,58%	89,58%	35,42%	47,92%	43,75%
Eritrea	91,67%	91,67%	33,33%	50,00%	41,67%
Ethiopia	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
South Sudan	83,33%	83,33%	35,42%	50,00%	45,83%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>68,29%</b>	<b>68,29%</b>	<b>31,02%</b>	<b>42,36%</b>	<b>37,73%</b>
Angola	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Gabon	81,25%	81,25%	29,17%	43,75%	39,58%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	22,92%	25,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	89,58%	89,58%	37,50%	56,25%	47,92%
Republic of the Congo	31,25%	31,25%	22,92%	22,92%	22,92%
São Tomé and Príncipe	31,25%	31,25%	25,00%	31,25%	27,08%
Central African Republic	87,50%	87,50%	29,17%	41,67%	37,50%
Chad	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Equatorial Guinea	77,08%	77,08%	37,50%	52,08%	47,92%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>88,54%</b>	<b>88,54%</b>	<b>35,81%</b>	<b>51,04%</b>	<b>44,79%</b>
Benin	83,33%	83,33%	35,42%	50,00%	45,83%
Burkina Faso	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Gambia	89,58%	89,58%	35,42%	47,92%	43,75%
Ghana	83,33%	83,33%	35,42%	50,00%	45,83%
Guinea	89,58%	89,58%	35,42%	52,08%	43,75%
Guinea-Bissau	93,75%	93,75%	31,25%	47,92%	39,58%
Cape Verde	83,33%	83,33%	35,42%	50,00%	45,83%
Ivory Coast	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Liberia	60,42%	60,42%	45,83%	60,42%	56,25%
Mauritania	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Mali	93,75%	93,75%	31,25%	47,92%	39,58%
Niger	83,33%	83,33%	35,42%	50,00%	45,83%
Nigeria	89,58%	89,58%	35,42%	47,92%	43,75%
Senegal	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%
Sierra Leone	87,50%	87,50%	29,17%	41,67%	37,50%
Togo	95,83%	95,83%	37,50%	54,17%	45,83%

### VCI for 7 resolutions on development

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	<b>88,12%</b>	<b>88,12%</b>	<b>15,23%</b>	<b>57,22%</b>	<b>51,38%</b>
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>96,43%</b>	<b>96,43%</b>	<b>13,57%</b>	<b>63,57%</b>	<b>56,43%</b>
Botswana	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Lesotho	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Namibia	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Eswatini	89,29%	89,29%	17,86%	67,86%	60,71%
South Africa	92,86%	92,86%	7,14%	57,14%	50,00%

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>94,55%</b>	<b>94,55%</b>	<b>13,35%</b>	<b>59,96%</b>	<b>53,20%</b>
Burundi	35,71%	35,71%	21,43%	21,43%	21,43%
Djibouti	92,86%	92,86%	7,14%	57,14%	50,00%
Zambia	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Zimbabwe	92,86%	92,86%	7,14%	57,14%	50,00%
Kenya	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
The Comoros	92,86%	92,86%	7,14%	57,14%	50,00%
Mauritius	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Madagascar	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Malawi	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Mozambique	89,29%	89,29%	17,86%	53,57%	46,43%
Rwanda	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Seychelles	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Somalia	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
From Sudan	92,86%	92,86%	7,14%	57,14%	50,00%
Tanzania	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Uganda	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Eritrea	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Ethiopia	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
South Sudan	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>63,10%</b>	<b>63,10%</b>	<b>18,65%</b>	<b>44,05%</b>	<b>40,87%</b>
Angola	89,29%	89,29%	17,86%	67,86%	60,71%
Gabon	46,43%	46,43%	17,86%	32,14%	32,14%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Republic of the Congo	78,57%	78,57%	21,43%	57,14%	50,00%
São Tomé and Príncipe	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Central African Republic	57,14%	57,14%	14,29%	28,57%	28,57%
Chad	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Equatorial Guinea	46,43%	46,43%	17,86%	32,14%	32,14%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>91,96%</b>	<b>91,96%</b>	<b>16,07%</b>	<b>59,38%</b>	<b>53,57%</b>
Benin	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Burkina Faso	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Gambia	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Ghana	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Guinea	67,86%	67,86%	25,00%	39,29%	39,29%
Guinea-Bissau	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Cape Verde	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Ivory Coast	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Liberia	57,14%	57,14%	28,57%	42,86%	42,86%
Mauritania	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Mali	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Niger	46,43%	46,43%	17,86%	32,14%	32,14%
Nigeria	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Senegal	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Sierra Leone	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%
Togo	100,00%	100,00%	14,29%	64,29%	57,14%

### VCI for 11 resolutions on the Middle East

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	74,95%	76,35%	15,49%	73,38%	64,75%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	75,00%	76,82%	10,45%	71,36%	62,27%
Botswana	59,09%	59,09%	13,64%	54,55%	45,45%
Lesotho	93,18%	93,18%	6,82%	88,64%	79,55%
Namibia	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Eswatini	31,82%	31,82%	22,73%	31,82%	31,82%
South Africa	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	77,03%	77,75%	16,75%	75,60%	66,27%
Burundi	43,18%	43,18%	25,00%	47,73%	38,64%
Djibouti	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Zambia	77,27%	72,73%	31,82%	72,73%	59,09%
Zimbabwe	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Kenya	86,36%	90,91%	13,64%	90,91%	86,36%
The Comoros	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Mauritius	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Madagascar	56,82%	52,27%	34,09%	61,36%	56,82%
Malawi	56,82%	52,27%	29,55%	56,82%	52,27%
Mozambique	88,64%	93,18%	6,82%	84,09%	70,45%
Rwanda	52,27%	47,73%	52,27%	56,82%	52,27%
Seychelles	31,82%	31,82%	22,73%	31,82%	31,82%
Somalia	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
From Sudan	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Tanzania	65,91%	65,91%	15,91%	65,91%	65,91%
Uganda	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Eritrea	100,00%	95,45%	9,09%	95,45%	81,82%

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Ethiopia	100,00%	95,45%	9,09%	95,45%	81,82%
South Sudan	36,36%	36,36%	36,36%	40,91%	40,91%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>58,59%</b>	<b>59,60%</b>	<b>21,21%</b>	<b>58,08%</b>	<b>53,03%</b>
Angola	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Gabon	68,18%	72,73%	13,64%	68,18%	63,64%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	54,55%	50,00%	54,55%	59,09%	54,55%
Republic of the Congo	61,36%	65,91%	15,91%	61,36%	56,82%
São Tomé and Príncipe	56,82%	52,27%	29,55%	56,82%	52,27%
Central African Republic	38,64%	38,64%	20,45%	38,64%	38,64%
Chad	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Equatorial Guinea	31,82%	31,82%	22,73%	31,82%	31,82%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>81,68%</b>	<b>83,95%</b>	<b>12,36%</b>	<b>79,97%</b>	<b>70,31%</b>
Benin	59,09%	59,09%	13,64%	54,55%	45,45%
Burkina Faso	79,55%	79,55%	11,36%	79,55%	79,55%
Gambia	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Ghana	90,91%	95,45%	9,09%	95,45%	81,82%
Guinea	88,64%	93,18%	6,82%	84,09%	70,45%
Guinea-Bissau	75,00%	79,55%	11,36%	75,00%	70,45%
Cape Verde	75,00%	79,55%	11,36%	75,00%	70,45%
Ivory Coast	86,36%	81,82%	22,73%	90,91%	77,27%
Liberia	25,00%	20,45%	38,64%	25,00%	29,55%
Mauritania	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Mali	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Niger	88,64%	93,18%	6,82%	84,09%	70,45%
Nigeria	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Senegal	88,64%	93,18%	6,82%	84,09%	70,45%
Sierra Leone	95,45%	100,00%	4,55%	90,91%	77,27%
Togo	72,73%	68,18%	36,36%	77,27%	72,73%

**VCI for the situation in Ukraine (resolutions of 76th UNGA Session)**

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	43,88%	43,88%	35,71%	35,71%	35,71%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>35,00%</b>	<b>35,00%</b>	<b>45,00%</b>	<b>45,00%</b>	<b>45,00%</b>
Botswana	25,00%	25,00%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Lesotho	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Namibia	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Eswatini	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
South Africa	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>52,63%</b>	<b>52,63%</b>	<b>28,95%</b>	<b>28,95%</b>	<b>28,95%</b>
Burundi	62,50%	62,50%	12,50%	12,50%	12,50%
Djibouti	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Zambia	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Zimbabwe	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
Kenya	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
The Comoros	62,50%	62,50%	12,50%	12,50%	12,50%
Mauritius	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Madagascar	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Malawi	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Mozambique	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Rwanda	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Seychelles	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Somalia	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
From Sudan	62,50%	62,50%	12,50%	12,50%	12,50%
Tanzania	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Uganda	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Eritrea	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
Ethiopia	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
South Sudan	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>36,11%</b>	<b>36,11%</b>	<b>36,11%</b>	<b>36,11%</b>	<b>36,11%</b>
Angola	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Gabon	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Republic of the Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
São Tomé and Príncipe	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Central African Republic	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Chad	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Equatorial Guinea	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>40,63%</b>	<b>40,63%</b>	<b>40,63%</b>	<b>40,63%</b>	<b>40,63%</b>
Benin	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Burkina Faso	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Gambia	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Ghana	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Guinea	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Guinea-Bissau	25,00%	25,00%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Cape Verde	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Ivory Coast	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Liberia	12,50%	12,50%	62,50%	62,50%	62,50%
Mauritania	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Mali	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
Niger	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Nigeria	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Senegal	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Sierra Leone	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Togo	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%	37,50%

**VCI for the situation in Ukraine (all resolutions)**

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	<b>33,60%</b>	<b>51,97%</b>	<b>55,76%</b>	<b>55,76%</b>	<b>55,76%</b>
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>39,29%</b>	<b>59,29%</b>	<b>53,57%</b>	<b>53,57%</b>	<b>53,57%</b>
Botswana	28,57%	50,00%	71,43%	71,43%	71,43%
Lesotho	32,14%	53,57%	60,71%	60,71%	60,71%
Namibia	50,00%	71,43%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Eswatini	39,29%	53,57%	39,29%	39,29%	39,29%
South Africa	46,43%	67,86%	46,43%	46,43%	46,43%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>38,53%</b>	<b>56,95%</b>	<b>52,82%</b>	<b>52,82%</b>	<b>52,82%</b>
Burundi	60,71%	82,14%	32,14%	32,14%	32,14%
Djibouti	21,43%	35,71%	64,29%	64,29%	64,29%
Zambia	14,29%	35,71%	71,43%	71,43%	71,43%
Zimbabwe	78,57%	100,00%	21,43%	21,43%	21,43%
Kenya	17,86%	39,29%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
The Comoros	21,43%	35,71%	64,29%	64,29%	64,29%
Mauritius	14,29%	35,71%	71,43%	71,43%	71,43%
Madagascar	42,86%	64,29%	57,14%	57,14%	57,14%
Malawi	10,71%	32,14%	82,14%	82,14%	82,14%
Mozambique	46,43%	67,86%	46,43%	46,43%	46,43%
Rwanda	21,43%	42,86%	64,29%	64,29%	64,29%
Seychelles	10,71%	32,14%	82,14%	82,14%	82,14%
Somalia	21,43%	35,71%	64,29%	64,29%	64,29%
From Sudan	53,57%	75,00%	39,29%	39,29%	39,29%
Tanzania	42,86%	64,29%	42,86%	42,86%	42,86%
Uganda	46,43%	67,86%	46,43%	46,43%	46,43%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Eritrea	92,86%	85,71%	7,14%	7,14%	7,14%
Ethiopia	75,00%	89,29%	17,86%	17,86%	17,86%
South Sudan	39,29%	60,71%	53,57%	53,57%	53,57%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>33,33%</b>	<b>50,79%</b>	<b>50,79%</b>	<b>50,79%</b>	<b>50,79%</b>
Angola	42,86%	64,29%	57,14%	57,14%	57,14%
Gabon	32,14%	53,57%	60,71%	60,71%	60,71%
DR Congo	10,71%	32,14%	67,86%	67,86%	67,86%
Cameroon	32,14%	32,14%	32,14%	32,14%	32,14%
Republic of the Congo	50,00%	71,43%	35,71%	35,71%	35,71%
São Tomé and Príncipe	21,43%	35,71%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Central African Republic	60,71%	82,14%	32,14%	32,14%	32,14%
Chad	14,29%	35,71%	85,71%	85,71%	85,71%
Equatorial Guinea	35,71%	50,00%	35,71%	35,71%	35,71%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>26,12%</b>	<b>44,42%</b>	<b>62,72%</b>	<b>62,72%</b>	<b>62,72%</b>
Benin	14,29%	35,71%	71,43%	71,43%	71,43%
Burkina Faso	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Gambia	25,00%	46,43%	67,86%	67,86%	67,86%
Ghana	17,86%	39,29%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Guinea	39,29%	46,43%	39,29%	39,29%	39,29%
Guinea-Bissau	32,14%	46,43%	60,71%	60,71%	60,71%
Cape Verde	17,86%	39,29%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Ivory Coast	10,71%	32,14%	82,14%	82,14%	82,14%
Liberia	3,57%	25,00%	89,29%	89,29%	89,29%
Mauritania	21,43%	42,86%	64,29%	64,29%	64,29%
Mali	78,57%	100,00%	21,43%	21,43%	21,43%
Niger	17,86%	39,29%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Nigeria	28,57%	50,00%	71,43%	71,43%	71,43%
Senegal	32,14%	53,57%	60,71%	60,71%	60,71%
Sierra Leone	17,86%	39,29%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Togo	35,71%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%

### VCI for the situation in Ukraine (resolutions of 11<sup>th</sup> ESS)

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	<b>29,49%</b>	<b>55,20%</b>	<b>63,78%</b>	<b>63,78%</b>	<b>63,78%</b>
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>41,00%</b>	<b>69,00%</b>	<b>57,00%</b>	<b>57,00%</b>	<b>57,00%</b>
Botswana	30,00%	60,00%	70,00%	70,00%	70,00%
Lesotho	30,00%	60,00%	70,00%	70,00%	70,00%
Namibia	50,00%	80,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%



**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Eswatini	45,00%	65,00%	45,00%	45,00%	45,00%
South Africa	50,00%	80,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>32,89%</b>	<b>58,68%</b>	<b>62,37%</b>	<b>62,37%</b>	<b>62,37%</b>
Burundi	60,00%	90,00%	40,00%	40,00%	40,00%
Djibouti	10,00%	30,00%	70,00%	70,00%	70,00%
Zambia	5,00%	35,00%	85,00%	85,00%	85,00%
Zimbabwe	70,00%	100,00%	30,00%	30,00%	30,00%
Kenya	10,00%	40,00%	90,00%	90,00%	90,00%
The Comoros	5,00%	25,00%	85,00%	85,00%	85,00%
Mauritius	10,00%	40,00%	90,00%	90,00%	90,00%
Madagascar	40,00%	70,00%	60,00%	60,00%	60,00%
Malawi	0,00%	30,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Mozambique	50,00%	80,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Rwanda	15,00%	45,00%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Seychelles	0,00%	30,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Somalia	10,00%	30,00%	70,00%	70,00%	70,00%
From Sudan	50,00%	80,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Tanzania	45,00%	75,00%	45,00%	45,00%	45,00%
Uganda	50,00%	80,00%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Eritrea	90,00%	80,00%	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%
Ethiopia	65,00%	85,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
South Sudan	40,00%	70,00%	60,00%	60,00%	60,00%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>32,22%</b>	<b>56,67%</b>	<b>56,67%</b>	<b>56,67%</b>	<b>56,67%</b>
Angola	40,00%	70,00%	60,00%	60,00%	60,00%
Gabon	30,00%	60,00%	70,00%	70,00%	70,00%
DR Congo	5,00%	35,00%	85,00%	85,00%	85,00%
Cameroon	30,00%	30,00%	30,00%	30,00%	30,00%
Republic of the Congo	60,00%	90,00%	40,00%	40,00%	40,00%
São Tomé and Príncipe	15,00%	35,00%	55,00%	55,00%	55,00%
Central African Republic	70,00%	100,00%	30,00%	30,00%	30,00%
Chad	0,00%	30,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Equatorial Guinea	40,00%	60,00%	40,00%	40,00%	40,00%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>20,31%</b>	<b>45,94%</b>	<b>71,56%</b>	<b>71,56%</b>	<b>71,56%</b>
Benin	5,00%	35,00%	85,00%	85,00%	85,00%
Burkina Faso	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Gambia	20,00%	50,00%	80,00%	80,00%	80,00%
Ghana	10,00%	40,00%	90,00%	90,00%	90,00%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Guinea	35,00%	45,00%	35,00%	35,00%	35,00%
Guinea-Bissau	35,00%	55,00%	55,00%	55,00%	55,00%
Cape Verde	10,00%	40,00%	90,00%	90,00%	90,00%
Ivory Coast	0,00%	30,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Liberia	0,00%	30,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Mauritania	15,00%	45,00%	75,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Mali	70,00%	100,00%	30,00%	30,00%	30,00%
Niger	10,00%	40,00%	90,00%	90,00%	90,00%
Nigeria	20,00%	50,00%	80,00%	80,00%	80,00%
Senegal	25,00%	55,00%	65,00%	65,00%	65,00%
Sierra Leone	10,00%	40,00%	90,00%	90,00%	90,00%
Togo	35,00%	55,00%	55,00%	55,00%	55,00%

#### VCI for 5 resolutions on decolonization

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	79,59%	87,35%	5,31%	37,65%	30,82%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	77,00%	85,00%	5,00%	36,00%	29,00%
Botswana	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	20,00%	25,00%
Lesotho	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Namibia	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Eswatini	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
South Africa	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	83,68%	91,58%	3,16%	38,42%	30,00%
Burundi	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Djibouti	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Zambia	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Zimbabwe	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Kenya	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
The Comoros	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Mauritius	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Madagascar	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Malawi	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Mozambique	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Rwanda	100,00%	90,00%	10,00%	50,00%	40,00%
Seychelles	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	20,00%	25,00%
Somalia	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
From Sudan	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Tanzania	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Uganda	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Eritrea	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Ethiopia	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
South Sudan	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	20,00%	25,00%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>75,56%</b>	<b>83,33%</b>	<b>5,56%</b>	<b>35,56%</b>	<b>28,89%</b>
Angola	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Gabon	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	20,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Republic of the Congo	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
São Tomé and Príncipe	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Central African Republic	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	20,00%	25,00%
Chad	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Equatorial Guinea	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>77,81%</b>	<b>85,31%</b>	<b>7,81%</b>	<b>38,44%</b>	<b>33,44%</b>
Benin	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	20,00%	25,00%
Burkina Faso	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Gambia	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Ghana	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Guinea	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Guinea-Bissau	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Cape Verde	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Ivory Coast	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Liberia	35,00%	45,00%	45,00%	35,00%	65,00%
Mauritania	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Mali	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Niger	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	20,00%	25,00%
Nigeria	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Senegal	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Sierra Leone	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Togo	80,00%	70,00%	30,00%	60,00%	60,00%

**VCI for 3 resolutions on trade, finance and the economy**

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	<b>84,18%</b>	<b>84,18%</b>	<b>5,95%</b>	<b>84,18%</b>	<b>84,18%</b>
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>95,00%</b>	<b>95,00%</b>	<b>1,67%</b>	<b>95,00%</b>	<b>95,00%</b>
Botswana	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Lesotho	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Namibia	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Eswatini	75,00%	75,00%	8,33%	75,00%	75,00%
South Africa	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>90,35%</b>	<b>90,35%</b>	<b>4,39%</b>	<b>90,35%</b>	<b>90,35%</b>
Burundi	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Djibouti	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Zambia	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Zimbabwe	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Kenya	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
The Comoros	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Mauritius	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Madagascar	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Malawi	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Mozambique	75,00%	75,00%	8,33%	75,00%	75,00%
Rwanda	83,33%	83,33%	16,67%	83,33%	83,33%
Seychelles	50,00%	50,00%	16,67%	50,00%	50,00%
Somalia	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
From Sudan	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Tanzania	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Uganda	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Eritrea	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Ethiopia	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
South Sudan	83,33%	83,33%	16,67%	83,33%	83,33%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>56,48%</b>	<b>56,48%</b>	<b>15,74%</b>	<b>56,48%</b>	<b>56,48%</b>
Angola	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Gabon	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	83,33%	83,33%	16,67%	83,33%	83,33%
Republic of the Congo	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
São Tomé and Príncipe	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Central African Republic	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Chad	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Equatorial Guinea	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>89,06%</b>	<b>89,06%</b>	<b>3,65%</b>	<b>89,06%</b>	<b>89,06%</b>
Benin	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Burkina Faso	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Gambia	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Ghana	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Guinea	75,00%	75,00%	8,33%	75,00%	75,00%
Guinea-Bissau	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Cape Verde	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Ivory Coast	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Liberia	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Mauritania	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Mali	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Niger	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Nigeria	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Senegal	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Sierra Leone	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%
Togo	100,00%	100,00%	0,00%	100,00%	100,00%

**VCI for other resolutions of 76<sup>th</sup> UNGA Session**

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	60,33%	60,33%	35,33%	47,07%	47,07%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	57,50%	57,50%	35,00%	48,75%	48,75%
Botswana	59,38%	59,38%	59,38%	65,63%	65,63%
Lesotho	59,38%	59,38%	21,88%	40,63%	40,63%
Namibia	62,50%	62,50%	37,50%	56,25%	56,25%
Eswatini	34,38%	34,38%	21,88%	28,13%	28,13%
South Africa	71,88%	71,88%	34,38%	53,13%	53,13%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	66,28%	66,28%	34,70%	47,86%	47,86%
Burundi	68,75%	68,75%	31,25%	37,50%	37,50%
Djibouti	68,75%	68,75%	56,25%	75,00%	75,00%
Zambia	62,50%	62,50%	37,50%	56,25%	56,25%
Zimbabwe	100,00%	100,00%	25,00%	43,75%	43,75%
Kenya	65,63%	65,63%	40,63%	59,38%	59,38%
The Comoros	56,25%	56,25%	18,75%	25,00%	25,00%
Mauritius	75,00%	75,00%	50,00%	68,75%	68,75%
Madagascar	71,88%	71,88%	46,88%	53,13%	53,13%
Malawi	40,63%	40,63%	40,63%	46,88%	46,88%
Mozambique	62,50%	62,50%	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Rwanda	46,88%	46,88%	21,88%	28,13%	28,13%
Seychelles	40,63%	40,63%	28,13%	34,38%	34,38%
Somalia	78,13%	78,13%	40,63%	59,38%	59,38%
From Sudan	68,75%	68,75%	18,75%	37,50%	37,50%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Tanzania	53,13%	53,13%	40,63%	46,88%	46,88%
Uganda	71,88%	71,88%	34,38%	53,13%	53,13%
Eritrea	84,38%	84,38%	21,88%	40,63%	40,63%
Ethiopia	87,50%	87,50%	37,50%	56,25%	56,25%
South Sudan	56,25%	56,25%	18,75%	37,50%	37,50%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>55,21%</b>	<b>55,21%</b>	<b>34,38%</b>	<b>42,71%</b>	<b>42,71%</b>
Angola	81,25%	81,25%	43,75%	62,50%	62,50%
Gabon	56,25%	56,25%	31,25%	37,50%	37,50%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	71,88%	71,88%	46,88%	53,13%	53,13%
Republic of the Congo	46,88%	46,88%	34,38%	46,88%	46,88%
São Tomé and Príncipe	34,38%	34,38%	34,38%	34,38%	34,38%
Central African Republic	50,00%	50,00%	25,00%	31,25%	31,25%
Chad	68,75%	68,75%	43,75%	50,00%	50,00%
Equatorial Guinea	62,50%	62,50%	25,00%	43,75%	43,75%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>57,03%</b>	<b>57,03%</b>	<b>36,72%</b>	<b>48,05%</b>	<b>48,05%</b>
Benin	46,88%	46,88%	21,88%	28,13%	28,13%
Burkina Faso	43,75%	43,75%	18,75%	25,00%	25,00%
Gambia	50,00%	50,00%	50,00%	56,25%	56,25%
Ghana	53,13%	53,13%	28,13%	46,88%	46,88%
Guinea	68,75%	68,75%	43,75%	50,00%	50,00%
Guinea-Bissau	59,38%	59,38%	34,38%	40,63%	40,63%
Cape Verde	46,88%	46,88%	21,88%	28,13%	28,13%
Ivory Coast	68,75%	68,75%	56,25%	75,00%	75,00%
Liberia	28,13%	28,13%	65,63%	65,63%	65,63%
Mauritania	62,50%	62,50%	37,50%	43,75%	43,75%
Mali	68,75%	68,75%	31,25%	50,00%	50,00%
Niger	46,88%	46,88%	21,88%	28,13%	28,13%
Nigeria	62,50%	62,50%	25,00%	43,75%	43,75%
Senegal	75,00%	75,00%	50,00%	68,75%	68,75%
Sierra Leone	59,38%	59,38%	34,38%	53,13%	53,13%
Togo	71,88%	71,88%	46,88%	65,63%	65,63%

#### VCI for all other resolutions

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	<b>61,53%</b>	<b>61,53%</b>	<b>32,45%</b>	<b>51,43%</b>	<b>51,43%</b>
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>58,50%</b>	<b>58,50%</b>	<b>30,50%</b>	<b>51,50%</b>	<b>51,50%</b>
Botswana	60,00%	60,00%	50,00%	65,00%	65,00%

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Lesotho	60,00%	60,00%	20,00%	45,00%	45,00%
Namibia	62,50%	62,50%	32,50%	57,50%	57,50%
Eswatini	40,00%	40,00%	20,00%	35,00%	35,00%
South Africa	70,00%	70,00%	30,00%	55,00%	55,00%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>66,84%</b>	<b>66,84%</b>	<b>32,37%</b>	<b>52,37%</b>	<b>52,37%</b>
Burundi	75,00%	75,00%	30,00%	45,00%	45,00%
Djibouti	67,50%	67,50%	47,50%	72,50%	72,50%
Zambia	62,50%	62,50%	32,50%	57,50%	57,50%
Zimbabwe	100,00%	100,00%	25,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Kenya	65,00%	65,00%	35,00%	60,00%	60,00%
The Comoros	57,50%	57,50%	17,50%	32,50%	32,50%
Mauritius	75,00%	75,00%	50,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Madagascar	72,50%	72,50%	47,50%	62,50%	62,50%
Malawi	47,50%	47,50%	42,50%	57,50%	57,50%
Mozambique	65,00%	65,00%	50,00%	60,00%	60,00%
Rwanda	50,00%	50,00%	20,00%	35,00%	35,00%
Seychelles	45,00%	45,00%	25,00%	40,00%	40,00%
Somalia	67,50%	67,50%	37,50%	52,50%	52,50%
From Sudan	67,50%	67,50%	17,50%	42,50%	42,50%
Tanzania	55,00%	55,00%	35,00%	50,00%	50,00%
Uganda	70,00%	70,00%	30,00%	55,00%	55,00%
Eritrea	80,00%	80,00%	20,00%	45,00%	45,00%
Ethiopia	90,00%	90,00%	35,00%	60,00%	60,00%
South Sudan	57,50%	57,50%	17,50%	42,50%	42,50%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>56,94%</b>	<b>56,94%</b>	<b>30,83%</b>	<b>47,50%</b>	<b>47,50%</b>
Angola	80,00%	80,00%	45,00%	70,00%	70,00%
Gabon	57,50%	57,50%	27,50%	42,50%	42,50%
DR Congo	32,50%	32,50%	22,50%	32,50%	32,50%
Cameroon	70,00%	70,00%	40,00%	55,00%	55,00%
Republic of the Congo	50,00%	50,00%	30,00%	50,00%	50,00%
São Tomé and Príncipe	40,00%	40,00%	30,00%	40,00%	40,00%
Central African Republic	52,50%	52,50%	22,50%	37,50%	37,50%
Chad	67,50%	67,50%	37,50%	52,50%	52,50%
Equatorial Guinea	62,50%	62,50%	22,50%	47,50%	47,50%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>58,75%</b>	<b>58,75%</b>	<b>34,06%</b>	<b>52,50%</b>	<b>52,50%</b>
Benin	50,00%	50,00%	20,00%	35,00%	35,00%
Burkina Faso	47,50%	47,50%	17,50%	32,50%	32,50%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Gambia	52,50%	52,50%	42,50%	57,50%	57,50%
Ghana	57,50%	57,50%	32,50%	57,50%	57,50%
Guinea	75,00%	75,00%	40,00%	55,00%	55,00%
Guinea-Bissau	60,00%	60,00%	30,00%	45,00%	45,00%
Cape Verde	50,00%	50,00%	20,00%	35,00%	35,00%
Ivory Coast	67,50%	67,50%	47,50%	72,50%	72,50%
Liberia	27,50%	27,50%	57,50%	57,50%	57,50%
Mauritania	62,50%	62,50%	32,50%	47,50%	47,50%
Mali	67,50%	67,50%	27,50%	52,50%	52,50%
Niger	50,00%	50,00%	20,00%	35,00%	35,00%
Nigeria	65,00%	65,00%	30,00%	55,00%	55,00%
Senegal	75,00%	75,00%	50,00%	75,00%	75,00%
Sierra Leone	60,00%	60,00%	30,00%	55,00%	55,00%
Togo	72,50%	72,50%	47,50%	72,50%	72,50%

#### VCI for 5 most contested resolutions

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	51,63%	54,69%	29,80%	36,94%	29,80%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>40,00%</b>	<b>44,00%</b>	<b>36,00%</b>	<b>40,00%</b>	<b>36,00%</b>
Botswana	20,00%	20,00%	60,00%	60,00%	60,00%
Lesotho	40,00%	40,00%	40,00%	40,00%	40,00%
Namibia	60,00%	70,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Eswatini	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
South Africa	55,00%	65,00%	25,00%	35,00%	25,00%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>57,89%</b>	<b>59,47%</b>	<b>27,89%</b>	<b>35,79%</b>	<b>27,89%</b>
Burundi	60,00%	60,00%	20,00%	20,00%	20,00%
Djibouti	60,00%	70,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Zambia	65,00%	55,00%	35,00%	45,00%	35,00%
Zimbabwe	90,00%	100,00%	0,00%	10,00%	0,00%
Kenya	55,00%	65,00%	25,00%	35,00%	25,00%
The Comoros	65,00%	75,00%	15,00%	25,00%	15,00%
Mauritius	35,00%	45,00%	25,00%	35,00%	25,00%
Madagascar	60,00%	50,00%	50,00%	60,00%	50,00%
Malawi	40,00%	30,00%	50,00%	60,00%	50,00%
Mozambique	40,00%	50,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Rwanda	50,00%	40,00%	40,00%	50,00%	40,00%
Seychelles	25,00%	25,00%	45,00%	45,00%	45,00%
Somalia	60,00%	70,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%



**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
From Sudan	65,00%	75,00%	15,00%	25,00%	15,00%
Tanzania	50,00%	50,00%	30,00%	30,00%	30,00%
Uganda	55,00%	65,00%	25,00%	35,00%	25,00%
Eritrea	100,00%	90,00%	10,00%	20,00%	10,00%
Ethiopia	90,00%	80,00%	20,00%	30,00%	20,00%
South Sudan	35,00%	35,00%	35,00%	35,00%	35,00%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>47,78%</b>	<b>50,00%</b>	<b>27,78%</b>	<b>34,44%</b>	<b>27,78%</b>
Angola	60,00%	70,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Gabon	40,00%	50,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%	25,00%
Cameroon	65,00%	55,00%	35,00%	45,00%	35,00%
Republic of the Congo	45,00%	55,00%	15,00%	25,00%	15,00%
São Tomé and Príncipe	45,00%	35,00%	35,00%	45,00%	35,00%
Central African Republic	50,00%	50,00%	30,00%	30,00%	30,00%
Chad	60,00%	70,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Equatorial Guinea	40,00%	40,00%	20,00%	20,00%	20,00%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>50,00%</b>	<b>55,00%</b>	<b>31,25%</b>	<b>38,75%</b>	<b>31,25%</b>
Benin	35,00%	35,00%	35,00%	35,00%	35,00%
Burkina Faso	40,00%	40,00%	20,00%	20,00%	20,00%
Gambia	55,00%	65,00%	25,00%	35,00%	25,00%
Ghana	55,00%	65,00%	25,00%	35,00%	25,00%
Guinea	60,00%	70,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Guinea-Bissau	50,00%	60,00%	40,00%	50,00%	40,00%
Cape Verde	40,00%	50,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Ivory Coast	55,00%	45,00%	45,00%	55,00%	45,00%
Liberia	20,00%	10,00%	70,00%	60,00%	70,00%
Mauritania	55,00%	65,00%	25,00%	35,00%	25,00%
Mali	80,00%	90,00%	10,00%	20,00%	10,00%
Niger	40,00%	50,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Nigeria	60,00%	70,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Senegal	60,00%	70,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%
Sierra Leone	35,00%	45,00%	25,00%	35,00%	25,00%
Togo	60,00%	50,00%	30,00%	40,00%	30,00%

**VCI for Selection 1**

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	<b>63,94%</b>	<b>74,48%</b>	<b>27,22%</b>	<b>50,00%</b>	<b>47,20%</b>
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>65,50%</b>	<b>76,63%</b>	<b>27,44%</b>	<b>52,44%</b>	<b>49,38%</b>

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Botswana	60,31%	71,56%	32,19%	53,13%	49,69%
Lesotho	70,31%	80,94%	25,94%	55,31%	52,19%
Namibia	71,25%	83,75%	26,25%	56,25%	52,50%
Eswatini	52,50%	63,75%	27,19%	41,88%	40,63%
South Africa	73,13%	83,13%	25,63%	55,63%	51,88%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>67,04%</b>	<b>77,57%</b>	<b>26,32%</b>	<b>50,26%</b>	<b>47,14%</b>
Burundi	55,00%	66,25%	26,88%	37,50%	35,63%
Djibouti	72,50%	85,00%	27,50%	57,50%	53,75%
Zambia	67,50%	76,25%	31,25%	51,25%	48,13%
Zimbabwe	80,63%	88,13%	21,88%	48,13%	44,38%
Kenya	70,31%	82,81%	27,19%	55,31%	53,44%
The Comoros	70,31%	82,19%	20,31%	48,44%	45,31%
Mauritius	70,31%	82,81%	26,56%	57,19%	52,81%
Madagascar	65,00%	75,00%	32,50%	52,50%	50,00%
Malawi	60,00%	70,63%	29,06%	48,13%	46,25%
Mozambique	64,38%	76,88%	27,50%	51,88%	48,13%
Rwanda	60,31%	69,69%	31,25%	45,94%	44,06%
Seychelles	48,44%	59,06%	28,13%	38,75%	37,19%
Somalia	69,69%	74,06%	24,69%	54,38%	49,06%
From Sudan	71,25%	83,75%	21,88%	51,25%	48,13%
Tanzania	71,25%	83,75%	21,88%	51,25%	48,13%
Uganda	72,81%	82,81%	24,69%	52,81%	49,69%
Eritrea	76,25%	85,00%	22,50%	52,50%	48,75%
Ethiopia	75,63%	86,88%	25,63%	55,63%	51,88%
South Sudan	52,19%	62,81%	28,75%	44,69%	40,94%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>56,04%</b>	<b>65,56%</b>	<b>28,37%</b>	<b>44,76%</b>	<b>42,64%</b>
Angola	72,19%	84,69%	27,19%	57,19%	53,44%
Gabon	55,31%	65,31%	28,13%	44,06%	42,81%
DR Congo	25,00%	25,00%	25,94%	26,88%	25,00%
Cameroon	65,00%	75,00%	38,44%	52,50%	50,00%
Republic of the Congo	70,94%	83,44%	24,06%	53,44%	50,31%
São Tomé and Príncipe	41,88%	52,50%	29,06%	38,13%	36,88%
Central African Republic	49,06%	57,19%	27,19%	35,63%	34,69%
Chad	72,19%	84,69%	27,19%	55,94%	52,19%
Equatorial Guinea	52,81%	62,19%	28,13%	39,06%	38,44%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>64,20%</b>	<b>75,18%</b>	<b>27,58%</b>	<b>51,88%</b>	<b>49,16%</b>
Benin	50,31%	50,31%	24,38%	41,56%	37,19%

**VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES**

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Burkina Faso	66,56%	78,44%	24,69%	50,94%	49,06%
Gambia	68,75%	81,25%	26,88%	55,00%	51,88%
Ghana	67,50%	80,00%	26,56%	55,00%	51,88%
Guinea	66,56%	79,06%	27,19%	50,31%	47,19%
Guinea-Bissau	67,19%	79,69%	26,56%	52,19%	49,69%
Cape Verde	62,81%	74,69%	25,00%	49,06%	47,19%
Ivory Coast	68,44%	79,69%	32,19%	59,69%	55,94%
Liberia	39,06%	48,44%	43,75%	46,56%	49,06%
Mauritania	70,94%	83,44%	25,94%	54,69%	50,94%
Mali	73,44%	85,94%	22,81%	52,81%	49,06%
Niger	50,00%	60,63%	27,19%	44,06%	41,25%
Nigeria	70,94%	83,44%	24,06%	53,44%	50,31%
Senegal	71,56%	84,06%	27,81%	56,56%	52,81%
Sierra Leone	67,19%	78,44%	23,44%	52,81%	49,69%
Togo	65,94%	75,31%	32,81%	55,31%	53,44%

**VCI for Selection 2**

<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	61,54%	72,68%	29,30%	51,06%	48,55%
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	64,02%	75,86%	28,79%	52,93%	50,11%
Botswana	58,62%	70,69%	33,91%	54,31%	51,15%
Lesotho	67,82%	79,31%	28,16%	56,32%	53,45%
Namibia	69,83%	83,05%	27,30%	56,03%	52,59%
Eswatini	52,30%	63,79%	27,87%	42,53%	41,38%
South Africa	71,55%	82,47%	26,72%	55,46%	52,01%
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	64,76%	75,89%	28,55%	51,36%	48,58%
Burundi	56,32%	68,39%	27,59%	38,51%	36,78%
Djibouti	68,68%	81,32%	29,60%	58,33%	54,89%
Zambia	63,79%	73,56%	33,91%	53,45%	50,57%
Zimbabwe	80,46%	89,08%	22,41%	47,70%	44,25%
Kenya	66,67%	79,89%	30,46%	57,47%	55,75%
The Comoros	66,38%	78,45%	23,85%	50,86%	47,99%
Mauritius	66,95%	80,17%	30,75%	60,06%	56,03%
Madagascar	63,79%	74,71%	34,48%	54,02%	51,72%
Malawi	56,90%	68,39%	33,62%	52,30%	50,57%
Mozambique	63,79%	77,01%	29,31%	52,87%	49,43%
Rwanda	57,76%	68,10%	33,33%	47,99%	46,26%
Seychelles	45,98%	57,47%	31,90%	42,82%	41,38%

	<b>RUSSIA</b>	<b>CHINA</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>UK</b>
Somalia	65,23%	70,40%	27,30%	54,60%	49,71%
From Sudan	69,83%	83,05%	23,28%	51,44%	48,56%
Tanzania	62,64%	75,29%	27,59%	50,00%	48,85%
Uganda	71,26%	82,18%	25,86%	52,87%	50,00%
Eritrea	76,72%	84,20%	21,55%	50,29%	46,84%
Ethiopia	75,57%	87,07%	25,57%	54,31%	50,86%
South Sudan	51,72%	63,22%	30,17%	45,98%	42,53%
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>53,03%</b>	<b>63,06%</b>	<b>29,89%</b>	<b>45,15%</b>	<b>43,39%</b>
Angola	70,40%	83,62%	29,60%	58,33%	54,89%
Gabon	54,02%	64,94%	30,17%	45,98%	44,83%
DR Congo	24,71%	26,44%	29,02%	31,03%	29,31%
Cameroon	62,93%	72,13%	37,36%	51,44%	49,14%
Republic of the Congo	53,74%	65,80%	26,15%	45,69%	44,54%
São Tomé and Príncipe	40,80%	51,72%	30,17%	39,66%	38,51%
Central African Republic	50,57%	59,77%	27,01%	35,92%	35,06%
Chad	67,82%	81,03%	31,03%	58,62%	55,17%
Equatorial Guinea	52,30%	62,07%	28,45%	39,66%	39,08%
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>61,71%</b>	<b>73,28%</b>	<b>30,01%</b>	<b>53,43%</b>	<b>50,93%</b>
Benin	47,99%	49,71%	27,59%	44,54%	40,52%
Burkina Faso	64,08%	75,00%	24,43%	49,71%	47,99%
Gambia	65,80%	79,02%	29,60%	56,61%	53,74%
Ghana	64,37%	77,59%	30,75%	58,05%	55,17%
Guinea	65,52%	77,59%	27,59%	50,00%	47,13%
Guinea-Bissau	65,23%	77,87%	27,87%	52,59%	50,29%
Cape Verde	59,77%	72,41%	28,45%	51,72%	50,00%
Ivory Coast	64,37%	76,44%	35,63%	62,07%	58,62%
Liberia	36,49%	46,84%	46,55%	49,14%	51,44%
Mauritania	67,53%	80,75%	28,45%	56,03%	52,59%
Mali	72,99%	86,21%	22,99%	51,72%	48,28%
Niger	47,99%	59,48%	30,46%	47,13%	44,54%
Nigeria	68,10%	81,32%	27,87%	56,03%	53,16%
Senegal	68,97%	82,18%	30,46%	58,05%	54,60%
Sierra Leone	63,79%	75,86%	27,01%	55,17%	52,30%
Togo	64,37%	74,14%	34,48%	56,32%	54,60%

## **About the Author**

Nikita Panin is a Ph.D. student at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Program Coordinator at RIAC. He is a graduate of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. He has completed internship programs at the University of Southern Denmark and Princeton University (United States). He has published works on the foreign policy of South Africa, specifically its conceptual framework and participation in key international organizations. His research interests include foreign policy of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, political, social and economic developments in Southern Africa, the African Union, and Russia–Africa relations.

## Russian International Affairs Council

The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is a non-profit organization focused on conducting research in the field of international relations and developing practical recommendations on issues of foreign policy and international relations in the interests of the Russian government, business, and non-profit organizations. The Council was established by the decision of the founders in accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 2, 2010.

RIAC is one of the country's leading think tanks, conducting work in more than 20 research areas. RIAC's expertise is in demand by Russian government agencies, academic community, Russian and foreign businesses that conduct international activities.

Along with analytical work the RIAC is active in creating a sustainable community of young professionals in the field of foreign policy and diplomacy. The Council also acts as an active participant in expert diplomacy, partnering with foreign research centers, universities, and business associations.

The Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov is the chairman of the RIAC board of trustees. Igor Ivanov, RIAC president and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences served as Russian foreign minister from 1998 to 2004 and as secretary of the Russian Security Council from 2004 to 2007. The Council's director general is Ivan Timofeev. The academic director of the Council is Andrey Kortunov.

**Notes**

**Notes**



**Russian International Affairs Council**

VOTING PRACTICES OF SUB-SAHARAN STATES OF AFRICA  
AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY:  
LATEST TRENDS AND UNDERLYING STRATEGIES

Working Paper No. 74 / 2023

Cover photo credit:  
EPA-EFE / SPENCER PLATT / Vostock Photo

Layout—Olga Ustinkova

Format 70×100  $\frac{1}{16}$ . 200 copies.

Printed in Russia



Tel.: +7 (495) 225 6283  
Fax: +7 (495) 225 6284  
[welcome@russiancouncil.ru](mailto:welcome@russiancouncil.ru)

119049, Moscow,  
8, 4<sup>th</sup> Dobryninsky pereulok

[russiancouncil.ru](http://russiancouncil.ru)