The 2018 Midterm Elections

U.S. history can be divided into periods of strong and weak presidency, guided by the balance of power between the president and Congress. Donald Trump's term in office has thus far been characterized by a weakening of presidential power in the country, and this is due primarily to the personality of the U.S. leader. The American elite have not accepted Trump as their president. Trump, in turn, does not accept the peculiarities of the U.S. political system, attempting to impose his own rules of the game and adjust the system to suit himself, which will simply not work. Another factor that gets under the skin of the American establishment is the "Russian train" chugging along behind the president. Even when the Republicans dominated both the House of Representatives and the Senate up until November 2018, the Republican President and Congress could not come to any kind of mutual understanding or coherence in their work. There were numerous examples in 2018 of the executive branch reigning in the legislative branch, which demonstrates just how deeply the United States Congress distrusts the incumbent President. Many of these examples concern decisions made with regard to relations with Russia.

The midterm elections held on November 6, 2018 were the biggest domestic political event for the United States last year. Trump hailed the election results as a "tremendous success," even though his party was only able to win a majority in one of the chambers, namely the Senate, with the Democrats winning a majority in the House of Representatives.

We do not know how long Donald Trump will remain president, or whether or not he will be able to secure relative independence from Congress. Nor do we know who his successor will be, or indeed when they will take over. Events could unfold in one of three ways:

1. The incumbent president is impeached and removed from power before 2020 (the Democrats could potentially launch the impeachment process). Much will depend on the findings of the investigation into "Russian interference" in the U.S. presidential elections, which are due to be presented in 2019. However, in order for the impeachment process to begin, two thirds of the Senate have to approve it. It is unlikely that the Republicans will allow the president to be impeached, although the process may very well drag on and end up costing a sizeable amount.

2. A new president is elected in 2020.

3. Trump is re-elected president for a second term in 2020, although this is unlikely.

Key Foreign Policy Events of 2018 and their Possible Consequences

1. Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and Arms Control

In May 2018, Donald Trump announced his country's withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran (JCPOA), an agreement that was the result of many years of multilateral diplomatic negotiations. This step has economic and political consequences and carries security risks for Iran, the Middle East, the individual parties to the agreement and the global community as a whole. One consequence is the negative impact that this will have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The undermining of the JCPOA weakens the ability of the global community to counter the threat of nuclear weapons being used in the region, or indeed in the world as a whole.

In October 2018, the Trump administration announced its intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), an integral part of the arms control regime. It is hard to say right now whether or not the United States will actually pull out of the INF Treaty. As a rule, updated agreements are preceded by consultations and negotiations. No such negotiations are currently taking place. It is possible that we could see a scenario similar to the one involving the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 2001, when the United States announced its unilateral withdrawal from the agreement, making true on its promise the following year.

The arms control regime is in crisis. This is largely due to the fact that the configuration of powers has changed dramatically since its formation; new types of weapons have appeared, not all of which fall under existing treaties. The likely withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty complicates the situation. The fate of another treaty that is also part of the arms control – the New START, which expires in 2021 – is also in question. If we allow this agreement to expire in 2021, then, for the first time since 1972, there will be no restrictions on nuclear arsenals, and a vacuum in the arms control regime will appear. And there is no way of telling how long it will last. The existing regime needs to be adapted to the new conditions, but probably not by destroying it completely.

Nuclear risks have grown steadily over the past few years. This is a paradox of the 21^st century. In the 20^th century, a certain system and culture of dialogue in nuclear sphere existed, despite all the difficulties in bilateral relations. At a certain point, the situation changed dramatically, due both to the increasing complexity of the political situation and to the change in the general attitude towards nuclear weapons, which have come to be seen as something abstract, incapable of causing harm, as they will never be used – not on purpose at any rate. The risks arise not only and not so much because of quantitative indicators, but rather because the system of nuclear arms control is idle and there is a lack of transparency and trust among states and their leaders, a lack of dialogue on nuclear security at all levels.

People today have a fundamentally different understanding of the scale of the danger posed by nuclear weapons compared to those who lived during the Cold War era. There is a potential risk that the next generation of leaders will devote less attention to issues of nuclear arms control, having only an abstract view of what nuclear weapons actually are. This is one of the many reasons why it is so important to prevent a complete collapse of the arms control regime and the irreversible breakdown of nuclear relations, as well as to increase public awareness about nuclear weapons and the dangers they present.

2. A Long-Awaited Summit

One long-awaited foreign political event last year was the presidential summit between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump that took place on July 16, 2018.

A mechanism of official summits has been used as a platform for high-level U.S.–Russia relations since Cold War times. However, this mechanism failed to produce such a meeting following Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential elections. This can be put down to the domestic political situation in the United States, the complex international situation and the deep crisis in relations between Washington and Moscow. But it is precisely in times of crisis that meetings between heads of state are especially important. The political will of the two countries' leaders has been seen as a way to resolve a number of issues. Holding a summit could potentially open up a path towards the normalization of relations. But this never happened. Donald Trump has taken a number of steps to build stable channels of interaction with Moscow, but they have been blocked in Washington by those who are driven to continue and even intensify the destructive approach to relations with Russia.

For example, as early as August 2018, the U.S. administration announced a new package of sanctions against Russia, and in October it announced its possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Thus, the summit was followed exclusively by steps to aggravate the situation in U.S.–Russia relations. Based on this experience, little could be expected from possible upcoming meetings between the two presidents in 2019.

3. New Anti-Russian Sanctions

The anti-Russian sanctions announced by the U.S. administration in August 2018 were imposed because of Moscow's alleged use of a chemical weapon in Salisbury. Washington is currently preparing a second package of sanctions, the contents of which should be announced in 2019. In September, the President of the United States signed a decree that provides for sanctions to be imposed against foreign countries or organizations that interfere in U.S. election processes. [1] The decree creates a legal basis for such steps to be taken if the U.S. intelligence community concludes that the election process has been compromised as the result of a cyberattack or by any other means.

The United States has thus laid the foundation for the sanctions policy to continue, including with respect to Russia, provoking the further deterioration of bilateral relations. Washington realizes that coordinated actions on the part of its allies are required if it expects to increase the effectiveness of the sanctions regime, and the European Union is one of these allies.

4. Transatlantic Solidarity

President Trump has repeatedly criticized the other NATO countries for not contributing sufficient funds to maintain collective security and defence, demanding that all member states increase funding to 2 per cent of their respective GDPs. During his speech at the NATO Summit held on July 11–12, 2018, Trump proposed that member countries increase spending to 4 per cent.

Washington's attitude to its international obligations is changing. The United States positions itself as the global leader. In the past, the country was prepared to bear the bulk of military spending within NATO, as it saw itself as the guarantor of its allies' security. The arrival of Trump, however, has led to security being treated as a service for which the allies must pay. [2]

Despite the consensus mechanism, all major decisions within NATO are taken by the United States. Trump is trying to fine tune the organization's activities so that they serve the interests of Washington. And he is doing so with little regard for the interests of his NATO allies, thus strengthening the imbalance within the organization. NATO is experiencing an internal crisis, and the future of transatlantic solidarity is in question. European countries make a lot of decisions under pressure from the United States and, what is more, the positions and interests of European countries do not always coincide.

The Brussels Summit Declaration noted that Russia's behaviour undermined international order. [3] However, not all European countries agree that NATO's activities must be transformed in order to deal with the Russian threat. NATO's prospects during and after Trump's presidency will depend on the goals and strategies it chooses to adopt. The first question is whether it will focus on countering the threats that are allegedly emanating from the east, or rather on building a dialogue with Russian through the NATO–Russia Council (NRC). Second, will NATO expand its toolkit for tackling the new threats of the 21^st century (terrorism, migration, cyberattacks, etc.)?

An important event for relations between Russia and NATO in 2018 was the NATO–Russia Council meeting that took place on May 31, the first of its kind since the activities of the Council were frozen in 2014. Only time will tell whether or not this will turn out to be an effective communication channel. A regular communication mechanism is especially necessary during times of crisis in order to prevent an unintentional or accidental escalation; however, it was precisely during one a period of increased tensions that the work of the Council was frozen.

5. The United States and Syria

There is no consensus within the U.S. administration with regard to the policy in Syria, and there is no coherent Middle Eastern strategy. In January 2018, then U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made a statement about the goals of the United States' presence in Syria, which did not fully match Trump's views on the issue. Tillerson talked about the three goals of the U.S. presence in the country: the fight against Islamic State, the containment of Iran and the creation of the necessary conditions for the removal of Bashar al-Assad as President of Syria. United States Special Representative for Syria Engagement James Jeffrey (who was appointed in August 2018) later reiterated this position. In early 2018, Trump stated that he intended to withdraw American troops from Syria by that November, that is, in time for the midterm elections – a move that would improve both his and the Republican Party's ratings. No specific deadlines were officially fixed, so we cannot talk about Trump failing to meet them. Trump has referred to the situation in Syria as the "terrible legacy of Obama" and has set conditions for the United States' withdrawal from the country – namely the liquidation of Islamic States and the participation of the United States' allies in the post-war restoration of Syria. Allies in the region fear that after the United States leaves Syria their countries, and the region as a whole, will be exposed to greater threats, primarily from Iran.

According to experts, the plan to wind up the American presence in Syria is an attempt on the part of Trump to formulate what he sees as a balanced formula for the "sufficient presence" of the United States in the Middle East, whereby a reduction of its allied obligations will not lead to a loss of influence in the region. [4]

The main issue of U.S. politics is still to contain Iran and limit its influence. In autumn 2018, the United States Department of State announced that Iran's presence in Syria was hindering the United States' chances of defeating Islamic State. It would be fair to say the United States will not pull out of the Syrian conflict any time soon, at least until the end of Trump's term in office. Speaking at the UN headquarters in September, Trump called for the global community to put pressure on Tehran to change its policies. It is likely that, in the short and medium term, the United States will step up the pressure on its partners so that they fall in line with the U.S. policy towards Iran.

Russian and American experts are pessimistic about the prospects of a relatively quick resolution to the Syrian situation and the achievement of long-term stability in the country. The expectation that Syria could become a kind of arena of cooperation between the United States and Russia never panned out. However, despite the lack of full-fledged cooperation and the very different opinions on the issue of Syrian settlement, the United States and Russia do have certain tasks that, if carried out, would serve interests of both sides. We are talking in particular here about the preventing the revival of Islamic State and avoiding a military conflict between Iran and Israel. [5] Russia and the United States have the opportunity to influence the various sides in the Syrian conflict, and from this point of view, working together would go a long way to resolving the Syrian crisis.

6. The New United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA)

On September 30, 2018, the United States, Canada and Mexico concluded negotiations on the signing of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). While Donald Trump described the USMCA as a "completely new agreement," it is in fact an updated version of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that leans more heavily towards the United States. Mexico was forced to make significant concessions, Canada less so. On the other hands, experts have states that the two countries managed to avoid the worst option – the unilateral exit of the United States from NAFTA and the imposition by the American side of a 25-per cent import duty from Canadian and Mexican cars and parts. [6]

With the signing of the USMCA, the United States succeeded in strengthening the North American integration bloc. A new provision found its way into the agreement, something that had never previously been found in a free trade agreement: any member state that intends to conclude a free trade agreement with "non-market" states is required to inform the other member states beforehand. The United States includes China, among other countries, as one of these states. [7] If the contents of the proposed agreement with the "non-market" state are not to the liking of the other USMCA members, they can pull out of the Agreement while maintaining a free trade regime with the remaining member. By including this provision, Washington eliminated the chances of China signing an agreement with Canada or Mexico to localize production in one of those countries in response to U.S. sanctions and to gain indirect access to its market.

Washington is planning on concluding trade agreements with the European Union and Japan in the coming years. It is clear that the United States will ensure a similar provision is included in these agreements. Experts believe that the United States will behave even more harshly in the future, pursuing its own trade interests in other parts of the world. With the signing of the USMCA, the United States is counting on the support of Canada and Mexico in a possible trade standoff with China. [8] Donald Trump is interested in creating an "economic front" to oppose China.

7. The Ongoing Trade War with China

The trade war between the United States and China gained momentum throughout 2018. Trump has repeatedly made it clear in his statements that he intends to win this confrontation. The United States demands transparency from China, respect for the rule of law and the fundamental principles of global trade, and an end to the practice of violating intellectual property rights. Other demands relate to the political and military spheres and are not entirely acceptable to China, and this creates the prerequisites for a prolonged conflict.

It is likely that it will become the norm in the short and medium term for the United States and China to be locked in this conflict, although this does not mean that compromises on individual issues will not be made. China is willing to make certain concessions, but it is not prepared to abandon its development goals or going against its national values. The long-term goal of the United States is to block the ability of Beijing to increase its economic, political and technological superiority in the world.

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In the event that the United States gets a new president in 2020, or even before, there is no way to know now what his or her attitude towards Russia and the possibility of building relations with the country will be. Right now, the image of Russia in the United States is decidedly negative – it is perceived as a country that interferes in the electoral process of other states, carries out cyberattacks, flouts international law, annexes parts of other countries (in the case of Crimea) and uses chemical weapons (in Salisbury). Constructive interaction with Russia is unlikely as long as this image exists in the minds of the U.S. political elite, congresspeople and senators.

The United States will continue to act as the world leader on the international stage and will continue to steer a course towards global dominance regardless of who the president is after 2020. This is the long-term strategy.

In terms of economic development, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) occupies a middling place among the world's regions. We could, in fact, state that it is largely in the lower range of this median. At the same time, there is significant dispersion within the countries of this region. The distance separating the world's highly developed countries from the leading Latin American states is less than that separating the region's leaders from the rear guard. With this in mind, the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean is rather succinctly reflected in the expression "a unique community with multivariant development."

In terms of its linguistic, religious and sociocultural kinship (due to the Iberian influence) LAC does not seem to have a precedent among the world's macro-regions. At the same time, however, the development paths and models of the region's countries, not to mention their domestic political situations, diverge greatly in terms of the trajectory they are travelling. The trends that we have traced over a long historical period demonstrate intraregional differentiation and indicate that it will likely continue. [1] However, this does not mean the destruction of the main ties of regional community.

The dual nature of how identity manifests itself in the LAC countries speaks in favour of this. On the one hand, identity is associated with national-state affiliation and the idea of one's homeland – patria. On the other hand, the notion of a greater homeland – patria grande – has long been established in the mass consciousness of various countries in the region.

Today, it is not only people's worldviews that are formed on the basis of this Patria grande idea, as the logic of geopolitical behaviour, as well as strategic decisions are too. In other words, one way or another, these things are determined by regional solidarity.

The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, like other members of the international community, have entered an unprecedentedly difficult period of transition to a qualitatively different mode of rehabilitation of the global economy and the system of international relations. A key – and revolutionary – impulse in this situation is the replacement of the dominant technological paradigm, which, as we know, will be determined by the digitalization of the economic machine, the introduction of nano- and biotechnologies, additive technologies (3D printing) and the spread of robotics moving forward.

All these technological advances set the parameters for development in the long term, for decades to come. The key circumstance here is the ability of certain countries, economies and societies to assimilate the main fragments of the new technological paradigm or become a leader in terms of their development while adapting to the large-scale structural shifts that are to be expected during the period of transition with minimal costs and maximum benefits. Unlike the countries with advanced economies and the technological leaders, LAC countries are doomed to a double transition – the simultaneous establishment of a new way of life and the transformation of those sectors of the economy that are associated with the structures of traditional industrialism or the era that came before. The discussion will thus deal with harsher imperatives that have a limited space for manoeuvre, while at the same time overloading the tasks of adaptation with additional economic and social burdens. At the same time, it is clear that the situation will be particularly difficult for those countries in the region that are in second and third echelons in terms of their development. And this, of course, is fraught with serious social and, accordingly, political risks.

In the short term, LAC countries are unlikely to be able overcome the prolonged period of stagnation (pause) on the way to a model that could lead them from the impasse of the "new normality" that is associated with poor economic dynamics, the revival of protectionism on the main export markets, the aggravation of the consequences of the financialization of the economy and the ever increasing gap between the financial and real sectors of the economy, as well as the crisis of confidence in traditional (systemic) parties and movements and the impulsive reshaping of political systems.

It is difficult to imagine the region's aggregate GDP meeting even the global average (2.7–3.1 per cent) over the next two to three years. Let us remind ourselves of the fact that indicators for the region were down in 2015 and 2016; however, this was in large part due to the protracted crises in Venezuela and Brazil. [2] Positive dynamics returned, but they were not particularly high – at just 1.5–1.7 per cent in 2017–2018. At the same time, the indicators for Mexico, Central American countries and a number of small Caribbean states were higher than the regional average.

The short-term forecast (for the next two to three years) does not inspire a great deal of optimism. It will take a long time for the countries in the region to adapt to the "new normality." Certain hopes can be pinned on the medium term (the next five to seven years), when the results of this adaptation will be evident, including in the event that the expected cyclical drop as the 2010s move into the 2020s does not come to pass. I would like to believe that the next crisis will not be extraordinary like the one that took place in 2008–2009, but there are too few guarantees for this.

The economic factors mentioned above mean that the socioeconomic situation in the short term does not promise a peaceful life for the ruling elites. The risks of growing protest sentiments are quite high, objectively speaking. In addition, the "left–right" antithesis will not work in its current form. A large-scale survey conducted across the region by the renowned Latinobarómetro Corporation in the run up to the second round of the presidential elections in Brazil (on October 28, 2018) demonstrated a serious shift in the moods and preferences of the electorate. For the most part, the people are rejecting ideological tenets in favour of the charisma of party leaders, their apparent commitment (in words at least) to eradicating corruption and crime, reducing the tax burden and creating new jobs. Latinobarómetro draws the conclusion that people who are tired of "isms" are now reacting to simple solutions to life problems that are stated in a categorical tone.

As a region, Latin America remains the focus of attention of the global community in a "concentrated" form, as it were, even though individual countries have differences from those that set certain geopolitical trends. In Latin America, the "Romantic" era of the turn to the left engulfed almost the entire region in the late 1990s to the early 2000s and contested the hegemony of free market. [1] Given the commodities boom of the early 2000s to the mid-2010s, the era proclaimed a course for sovereignty, social justice, liberation from economic and technological dependence on the traditional centres of power. Today, it is being replaced with the era of right-wing pragmatism.

The political landscape of the region was changed overnight by a series of "soft overthrows," [2] such as those of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras (2009), Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2014) and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil (2016), and by right-wing leaders coming to power in several Latin American states, such as Mauricio Macri (in power since 2015) in Argentina, Jair Bolsonaro (he will be inaugurated in January 2019) in Brazil, Iván Duque in Colombia (2018) and Sebastián Piñera, who returned to the presidential office in Chile (2010–2014, and from 2018). These developments resulted in the current trend being dubbed Operation Condor light in reference to the events of the 1970s–1980s. [3]

While the Latin American left-wing turn, with its protectionism and statism, challenged the free market and globalization, today's right-wing establishment in the region, on the contrary, is committed to the policy of privatization, thereby letting go of (and disregarding) such state tasks as guaranteeing social justice, stimulating domestic sources of economic growth, redistributing revenues, consolidating the domestic market, etc. Bolivia under Evo Morales and Uruguay under Tabaré Vázquez can be classified as consistently left-wing states. Mexico is an exception to the ring-wing trend, as it demonstrates absolutely unique dynamics in the region, yet such has almost always been the case with Mexico. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who won the 2018 elections, is a left-wing politician; [4] however, his ability to conduct appropriate policies largely depends on whether he can overcome the hegemony of the current ruling class, i.e. Mexico's traditional parties such as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). There are fewer doubts about the prospects of the right-wing parties that have recently come to power determining the political situation in the region for a long time to come.

A State of Integration Processes

Integration processes in Latin America have most often encountered objective difficulties due to the unequal economic weight of states that are members of various blocs and to national interests being prioritized over collective ones. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s (globally, that was a period of geopolitical and commercial blocs being actively formed as a component of globalization) and particularly since the early 2000s, regional integration has truly become one of the key priorities in the region. The number of alliances multiplied: the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR, 1991), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the radical left-wing Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (2004) and then the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (2010).

Although the member states had more differences than similarities (primarily in the commercial aspect), political will determined the constant bolstering of integration rhetoric and the development of the integration blocs' legal framework. Integration objectives included, among other things: boosting self-sufficient intraregional trade as a factor to liberate the region from unequal exchanges with the traditional centres of power and weaken political dependence on those centres; attempting to establish aligned consolidation in the region and establish a Patria Grande of sorts as a counter to the neoliberal Free Trade Area of the Americas proposed by Washington (the initiative failed in 2005); striving to diversify foreign political and commercial ties via blocs and entering new markets, including those aligned along the South–South line; attempting to get away from the vicious "centre–periphery" circle in order to take a "break" and boost the bloc's negotiating capacities in its talks with, for instance, the European Union.

The right-wing Latin American governments of today do not hide their attitude to MERCOSUR. In 2017, Mauricio Macri called the bloc's protectionism and isolation the reason why the poverty of its member countries is exacerbating. [5] Within the framework of the alliance, Macri prioritizes signing an agreement with the European Union and establishing contacts with the neoliberal Pacific Alliance (Alianza del Pacífico, AP) that comprises Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico. Bolsonaro's followers in Brazil also point to the need to liberalize MERCOSUR, otherwise the South American giant does not rule out its withdrawal from the bloc. [6]

However, it would be unfair to claim that the region's integration blocs are going through hard times due to the whims of right-wing governments that have taken over the political space and now impose their policies on the alliances. MERCOSUR's "bloc" orientation and collective nature were undoubtedly a major obstacle for large actors (Brazil and Argentina) during the talks started in the 1990s on trade cooperation with the European Union. In addition, a series of local and global crises determined each bloc member's course for greater protectionism.

Today, both UNASUR and MERCOSUR are in deep crisis. [7] In April 2018, six countries, that is, half of UNASUR's total membership, announced their temporary withdrawal the Union: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru. [8] In the next few years, MERCOSUR will be influenced by neoliberal governments. We can thus expect either the liberalization of the bloc and the intensification of talks on free trade already initiated with the EU, Singapore, Canada and South Korea, or the loss of interest on the part of the bloc's key participants, Argentina and Brazil, in the project. [9] The latter is the more likely outcome.

Russia's Positions in Latin America

The "left-wing turn," with its intent on shaking off dependence and diversifying foreign ties, led to out-of-region countries, including Russia, seeing a window of opportunity to bolster cooperation with Latin America. However, given the war of sanctions and Moscow's confrontation with the West, the "right-wing turn" of Latin America will likely become a factor in a certain weakening of Russia's positions on the continent. As of 2016, Russia, Brazil's partner in BRICS, was outside the country's top five key export partners, which are: China (with $35.1 billion in turnover), the United States ($23.3 billion), Argentina ($13.4 billion), the Netherlands ($10.3 billion) and Germany ($4.8 billion). [10] In 2016, Russia's trade turnover with Brazil was $4.3 billion. [11] Since Bolsonaro proclaimed a rapprochement with the United States, [12] to the detriment of cooperation with China, Brazil's today chief trade partner, [13] there can be little doubt that the ideological factor will be crucial in the development of Brazil's foreign political strategy.

Still, in the last few years, a trade rapprochement between Russia and Latin America has been hampered by several endogenous factors, such as the inertia of Russian business with regard to South America (a fact that is even acknowledged at the governmental level), the underdeveloped system of state financial support for exports, the lack of universal cooperation mechanisms and insufficient attention to the capacities of "soft power." [14] Despite the prospects of mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation based on the steady (during the commodities boom) economic growth of Latin America, and despite several Latin American countries implementing major infrastructural projects, Russia should admit to being insufficiently active in the area over the last few years. [15]