Moving Towards a Conservative International?

As the expert and academic communities were closely watching the saga of Donald Trump's impeachment and the fledgeling days of the United Kingdom post-Brexit unfold, one event that says volumes about the trends of modern Western politics somehow slipped under the radar. We are talking about the “God, Honour, Country: President Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II and the Freedom of Nations – A National Conservatism Conference” held in Rome on February 3–4, 2020. The long-winded and clearly anti-communist title aside, the event boasted an interesting list of speakers and highly respected organisers, as well as an ambitious agenda aimed at rethinking the role and content of conservatism in our changing world.

The stellar pool of speakers included former Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban and the French politician Marion Marechal, who just so happens to be the niece of Marine Le Pen. The organisers varied in terms of both geographical location and their particular form of conservatism, ranging from the Edmund Burke Foundation in the United States to the Herzl Institute in Israel.

An article run by The New York Times commented ironically on the conference that “European and American nationalists [...] warned of left-wing ‘totalitarianism’ and waxed nostalgic about St. John Paul II’s papacy and the ‘glorious revolution’ that brought down communism.” The organisers and participants all stated that they were trying to answer the question of whether the “national conservatism” of politicians such as Orban and Salvini was not only a threat to the post-war liberal order, as touted by traditional political elites, but also as a virtue, “a continuation of the best political traditions of the last century”. This is all part of a more fundamental question: Is the growing nationalist trend an indication that conservatism is being replaced gradually on the political stage? Or has nationalism always been an inherent feature of conservatism?

The substantive part of the conference provided some food for thought as to the creation of ideological and organisational foundations for a pan-European or, perhaps, a pan-Western union of right-wing political forces – a conservative International of sorts. On the other hand, the conference demonstrated that this International would not be led by traditional centre-right forces (such as Christian democrats or conservatives), but rather by newly emerged right-wing forces that described themselves during the event as national conservatives. Orban, Salvini and their ilk would certainly not mind becoming a centre of attraction for conservative audiences, although their names are normally associated with nationalistic, Eurosceptic, right-wing populist forces (choose your own flavour, there are plenty), rather than with purely conservative politics. In this sense, it would be interesting to look at what is hidden behind the “national conservatism” facade and to identify the objectives and possible consequences of the idea to form a political union of conservative and nationalist forces, with necessary reference to Russia.

The conference itself indicates that attempts are being made to legitimise and mainstream anti-systemic forces in the European political domain by using the “conservative” brand and trans-nationalising their political ties. For conservatism, these parasitic relations bring nothing but the loss of its voter base, the broadening of the divide between the liberal and traditionalist wings of the conservative movement, and the downgrading of its values. On the other hand, the objective to resist a rapprochement with the nationalists and populists is quite difficult for the conservatives, given the multiple internal and external factors in European politics that broaden the appeal of Orban, Salvini and Le Pen in the eyes of conservative audiences.

As the expert and academic communities were closely watching the saga of Donald Trump's impeachment and the fledgeling days of the United Kingdom post-Brexit unfold, one event that says volumes about the trends of modern Western politics somehow slipped under the radar. We are talking about the “God, Honour, Country: President Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II and the Freedom of Nations – A National Conservatism Conference” held in Rome on February 3–4, 2020. The long-winded and clearly anti-communist title aside, the event boasted an interesting list of speakers and highly respected organisers, as well as an ambitious agenda aimed at rethinking the role and content of conservatism in our changing world.

The stellar pool of speakers included former Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban and the French politician Marion Marechal, who just so happens to be the niece of Marine Le Pen. The organisers varied in terms of both geographical location and their particular form of conservatism, ranging from the Edmund Burke Foundation in the United States to the Herzl Institute in Israel.

An article run by The New York Times commented ironically on the conference that “European and American nationalists [...] warned of left-wing ‘totalitarianism’ and waxed nostalgic about St. John Paul II’s papacy and the ‘glorious revolution’ that brought down communism.” The organisers and participants all stated that they were trying to answer the question of whether the “national conservatism” of politicians such as Orban and Salvini was not only a threat to the post-war liberal order, as touted by traditional political elites, but also “a virtue, a continuation of the best political traditions inherited from last century.” This is all part of a more fundamental question: Is the growing nationalist trend an indication that conservatism is being replaced gradually on the political stage? Or has nationalism always been an inherent feature of conservatism?

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The substantive part of the conference provided some food for thought as to the creation of ideological and organisational foundations for a pan-European or, perhaps, a pan-Western union of right-wing political forces – a conservative International of sorts. On the other hand, the conference demonstrated that this International would not be led by traditional centre-right forces (such as Christian democrats or conservatives), but rather by newly emerged right-wing forces that described themselves during the event as national conservatives. Orban, Salvini and their ilk would certainly not mind becoming a centre of attraction for conservative audiences, although their names are normally associated with nationalistic, Eurosceptic, right-wing populist forces (choose your own flavour, there are plenty), rather than with purely conservative politics. In this sense, it would be interesting to look at what is hidden behind the "national conservatism" facade and to identify the objectives and possible consequences of the idea to form a political union of conservative and nationalist forces, with necessary reference to Russia.

The Manifesto of “National Conservatism”

One of the conference organisers, former President of the American Enterprise Institute Christopher DeMuth, received resounding applause at the World Economic Forum in Davos, when he noted that the global threat of authoritarianism did not come from the right, but rather from the “globalist” media and the political and university establishments on the left. He expanded on this line of thinking at the conference in Rome: “We are called primitives, xenophobes, paranoids, racists. We are even called populists.” He then said that today’s conservative nationalists are the “direct descendants and rightful heirs of the glorious revolution of the 1980s” that brought down the Iron Curtain.

One striking example of these “direct descendants” is Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban, formerly a member of the anti-communist movement. An extensive interview he gave on the sidelines of the conference can almost be read as a national conservative manifesto.

Importantly, in addition to the hackneyed slogans of “building Europe from the bottom up” and “a Europe of sovereign states,” Orban’s self-identification as a “national conservative” is based on distancing himself from the European centre-right forces. Orban was eventually expelled from the respectable centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), where he had served as Deputy Chairman since 2002, for his persistent troublemaking. Orban commented: “We are the ‘black sheep’ of the community – the EPP would like to be part of the power structure of the European Union by any means. And if the price of that is to give up certain values to make a compromise with the left, they do so. And then we are losing our identity step by step. We [the EPP – author] became a centrist and then liberal and leftist-oriented political family.”

According to Orban, the problem is not just about the refusal of modern conservatives to rely on values in their policies, but also about the institutional structure within which they operate. Liberal democracy reproduces the conditions for “bad governance,” one that is unable to meet the interests of people, as is in the case of migration policies. Orban commented: “Liberal democracy in that sense is over. We need something new. We can call it illiberal; we can call it post-liberal; you can call it Christian democratic, whatever. But we need something new because on that basis we cannot provide good governance for the people.”

According to Orban, the so-called national conservatism of the Central European ruling parties appears to be an effective solution. Orban is known for his conceptually blurred understanding of conservatism: “Everywhere in this region [Central Europe – author] the governments are based on national sovereignty. They’re all national conservatives, whatever party family they belong to in Brussels, […] if you analyse the principal basis of their policy, they are all national conservative governments. And that is related to their success.” On the other hand, Orban mentions that Christian democracy is “the best foundation to conceptualise” what his party is doing, as it “appreciates” and “accepts” national sovereignty.

If we take Orban’s interview as the quintessence of the Rome conference, we may arrive at several interesting conclusions.

Is National Conservatism Really that Conservative?

It is important to understand that Orban, Salvini and the Le Pen dynasty can relate to the conservatives at the level of specific political programmes that manifest national sovereignty and the fight against migration and abortion, but ideologically they are very far from the legacy of conservatism’s founding fathers.

The fact that conservatism cultivates traditions automatically turns it into the custodian of the political foundations of European life. Edmund Burke’s image of a conservative gardener pruning away in order to ensure sustained social development is rarely found in real life, but it still is an example of political behaviour for conservative politicians. Liberal democracy, this intellectual product of the Enlightenment whose rationalism was historically opposed by conservatism, gradually became “woven” into the general tradition in the course of European history. This made it a foundation of European civilisation that conservatism is called upon to protect. In this sense, the Polish and Hungarian “national conservative” governments currently dismantling the established division-of-powers system seems to be absolutely anti-conservative. In the United Kingdom, however, the demand that parliament’s sovereignty be restored post-Brexit did not prevent Nigel Farage, a national conservative, from welcoming the forced suspension of the government.

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Moreover, the elitist nature of conservatism, which is based on the recognition of inequality as an integral part of our lives, clashes with the populism of Orban and Salvini, the latter being expressed through the excessive and deliberate simplification of political processes as a confrontation between good (the “pure people”) and evil (the “corrupt elites”).

Finally, as the political scientist Michael Freeden notes, “One common thread running through all conservative argument is anxiety about change and the urge to distinguish between unnatural and natural change.” Meanwhile, Orban and his ilk have it much simpler: promoting national sovereignty automatically makes a politician conservative, even if all their actions are aimed not at preserving the existing political model, but at destroying it. Furthermore, Orban effectively equates economic success to conservatism, arguing that the former proved the only way of survival for the “national conservatives” and Christian democrats.

Despite all the differences at the level of ideas and political philosophy, as well as the anti-systemic rhetoric, Orban and others like him are trying to sell themselves as conservatives. In this sense, the “national conservatism” brand makes it possible to resolve a number of pressing issues.

As they try on the “conservative mask,” Orban and his cohorts legitimise themselves in the political arena, presenting their programmes not as something radical and marginal, but rather as something conservative and traditional for specific communities. In doing so, they distance themselves from their own radical right-wing past, as is the case with the National Rally (formerly known as the National Front) in France, or from their current radical right-wing colleagues, as is the case with the Alternative for Germany and the UK Independence Party.

Moreover, this cosying-up to conservative values and ideas appears to be an attempt to replenish their ideological arsenal. Hence the parasitic attitude towards the conservative ideology. Orban and his ilk cannot explain the entire system of political and social phenomena, so they seek to use the existing conceptual instruments of the comprehensive conservative ideology, which claims to be applicable in any historical and national context due to its stable ideology and values. In his attempts to mimic conservatism, Orban often resorts to concepts such as nation, sovereignty and tradition. That said, he cherry-picks whatever components he needs from the conservative ideology, hyperbolises them and populates them with new content.

What a Conservative International Will Mean for Conservatism

The content of the Rome conference highlighted the possibility of political cooperation among right-wing political forces. The basis for this cooperation would be the identification of a “common enemy.” Such an enemy could be a left-wing liberal, a communist, a bureaucrat from Brussels, a migrant from Africa or all of them together. However, such a conservative International, expressed at the ideological and organisational levels, could significantly reshape the very idea of Western conservatism.

It is clear that the “golden age” of Western conservatism is a thing of the past. Conservatism has become far more “social-democratic” in the economic realm and significantly more “liberalised” in terms of moral issues. The willingness to compromise that is characteristic of liberal conservatives such as Angela Merkel prompts the more traditional conservatives to side with Salvini and Orban, who discuss topics that resonate with any conservative: European integration and immigration, protecting traditional values and the importance of religion in society. It is no coincidence that the British commentator and journalist Tim Montgomerie, who was hired by the government to be as an adviser to Prime Minister Boris Johnson on social justice, says the United Kingdom will establish a “special relationship” with the Orban government after Brexit. All this goes to show that the conservative camp, heterogeneous as it is, is further polarising.

The above gives weight to the thesis put forward by the political scientist Jan-Werner Mueller that, given the “ideological disorientation” and “historical amnesia” of European centre-right parties, manifested in their inability to explain their positions and values, they risk to be supplanted with right-wing populists such as Orban, Le Pen and Salvini. This thesis is also supported by the political analysts Paul Webb and Tim Bale, according to whom elections can expose the vulnerability of centre-right parties to populist right-wing parties, given the narrowness of the ideological gap between their voters. “centre-right parties are vulnerable to populist right-wing radicals when it comes to elections since the ideological gap between their voters is extremely narrow.”

What does Russia Have to Do with All This?

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Despite the fact that Russian political actors have established contacts with extreme right forces on both sides of the Atlantic, and the distinct turn towards traditional values in Russia’s domestic policies, Moscow was not represented at the Rome conference. Perhaps this was because Russia has not been assigned a place in the future conservative International.

The pro-Russian sentiments expressed by Salvini, Orban and the Le Pen family (mostly concerning the lifting of the sanctions) seem to be a consequence of their anti-systemic attempts to distance themselves from traditional Western mainstream values and the Western vision of the global order. The fact that Russian actors use traditional values (family and religious values as part of the national identity) as an instrument to strengthen their positions domestically, in the context of the global haemorrhaging of values, creates the necessary conditions for broadcasting this "message" to external audiences. The latter, in turn, serve as the basis for contacts and cooperation with Le Pen and her colleagues, whose voters are also sensitive to this topic. Marine Le Pen’s statement that Russia is an outpost of Christianity in the modern world should be interpreted as the exploitation of the narrative of traditional values in domestics politics. Furthermore, the statement could also signify an attempt to position herself as a politician who supports values, in this particular case, religious values, but not as an intention to integrate Russia into the Western conservative nationalist camp.

Russia’s ability to play ball with Salvini and Le Pen and join ranks with them around traditional values seems unrealistic. The results of the vote in the European Parliament on the resolution on the equal guilt of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in unleashing the Second World War is proof enough of this. While the Identity and Democracy faction, which incorporates the parties of Salvini and Le Pen, supported the resolution, it was the least decisive compared to other groups, with 16 out the faction’s 73 members abstaining.

To conclude, the conference indicates that attempts are being made to legitimise and mainstream anti-systemic forces in the European political domain by using the “conservative” brand and trans-nationalising their political ties. For conservatism, these parasitic relations bring nothing but the loss of its voter base, the broadening of the divide between the liberal and traditionalist wings of the conservative movement, and the downgrading of its values. On the other hand, the objective to resist a rapprochement with the nationalists and populists is quite difficult for the conservatives, given the multiple internal and external factors in European politics that broaden the appeal of Orban, Salvini and Le Pen in the eyes of conservative audiences.