Russia and the United States beyond the Ukrainian Crisis

At this moment, the main driver of the emerging positive dynamics of the Russian-American dialogue is the personal desire of President Donald Trump to become the main peacemaker in resolving the conflict between Moscow and Kiev. Everything else, including the movement towards normalization of bilateral diplomatic ties, the surprising solidarity vote in the UN General Assembly, signals from Washington about possible easing of anti-Russian sanctions, etc., is in one way or another subordinated to just one task. Trump desperately wants to achieve at least a truce on the ground on terms that would allow the Republican Administration to declare its political victory and to claim its superiority over the Democratic predecessors.

This hierarchy of US priorities was more than evident in the recent telephone conversation between the US and Russian Presidents and in the bilateral consultations that been launched in Saudi Arabia. However, let us assume for a second that the acute European crisis is already behind us. How significant are the areas of coinciding strategic interests of Russia and the United States, and how substantial is the potential for long-term cooperation between the two nations?

Many tactical interests of Moscow and Washington today largely coincide. Both parties are fighting against what they believe to be an international hegemony of globalists, against the dominance of cosmopolitan political and economic elites, for the restoration of the traditionalist national sovereignty and for a return to conservative values. The leaders of the two countries—Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump—understand each other well, their views on the processes taking place in the world are not identical, but appear to be close to each other. At the same time, their views and values are very different from, for example, the views and values shared by leaders of most European countries or by many senior officials in the European Union.

However, behind this situational commonality, there are obvious divergences in long-term interests, aspirations and goals. For example, for politicians in Moscow, the further strengthening of BRICS or SCO is one of the central foreign policy priorities, and for their peers in Washington, it is a serious foreign policy challenge. For the Kremlin, the decline in the role of the dollar as the world's main reserve currency is a natural and desirable process, and for the White House, it is a direct threat to American fundamental financial and even security interests. For Russia, China is and will continue to be the most important strategic partner, and for the United States, it is and will continue to be the main strategic rival. In Moscow, they try to conceptualize a new model of the global governance, while in Washington they prefer to look for specific “deals” that could bring specific political and economic returns to the United States here and now.

None of the above means that Moscow and Washington are doomed to eternal confrontation with each other and that after the next “thaw” in relations we will inevitably encounter the frost of a new Cold War. It is important for both sides to use any, even the most limited, opportunities for Russian-American dialogue because constructive relations between Moscow and Washington are a necessary, even if far from being the only condition, for stabilizing the situation in the world. Still, one should not have any illusions: the ongoing spectacular U-turn in the bilateral relationship became possible only thanks to the personal position of the 47th President of the United States. The changes remain fragile and reversible. Both sides should start thinking about a new, more stable and more reliable foundation for their future relations.

At this moment, the main driver of the emerging positive dynamics of the Russian-American dialogue is the personal desire of President Donald Trump to become the main peacemaker in resolving the conflict between Moscow and Kiev. Everything else, including the movement towards normalization of bilateral diplomatic ties, the surprising solidarity vote in the UN General Assembly, signals from Washington about possible easing of anti-Russian sanctions, etc., is in one way or another subordinated to just one task. Trump desperately wants to achieve at least a truce on the ground on terms that would allow the Republican Administration to declare its political victory and to claim its superiority over the Democratic predecessors.

This hierarchy of US priorities was more than evident in the recent telephone conversation between the US and Russian Presidents and in the bilateral consultations that been launched in Saudi Arabia. However, let us assume for a second that the acute European crisis is already behind us. How significant are the areas of coinciding strategic interests of Russia and the United States, and how substantial is the potential for long-term cooperation between the two nations?

Arms Control

Andrey Kortunov:
Trump: What Can We Expect?

Conventional wisdom suggests that neither Moscow nor Washington should be interested in an uncontrolled arms race. Such a race would be very expensive and very dangerous fir both sides, no matter what hawks in any of the two capitals might claim. It is no completely accidental that Donald Trump proposed to cut the military spending of the United States, Russia and China in half, and Vladimir Putin readily supported this idea. For Trump, spending too much on mostly useless military hardware is a waste of the US taxpayer money. Russia and the United States should also share a commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Both should have concerns about futuristic military developments that threaten to militarize outer space and cyberspace, to apply artificial intelligence for military purposes, to deploy of a road variety of autonomous lethal systems, and might have other intendent consequences that are not yet entirely predictable, but clearly unpleasant for both sides.

Yet, arms control in its traditional format is unlikely to become the main core of bilateral relations again, as it has been since the early 1970s. Donald Trump has never been an ardent supporter of arms control in any form, as the experience of his first administration clearly shows, when the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty and actually refused to negotiate extending START-3. Apparently, he believes that the United States is in a position to outspend and to outperform any military adversary, Russia including. In addition, any new full-fledged format of strategic arms control could no longer be bilateral, but has to become multilateral, taking into account the nuclear missile arsenals of third countries. It is crystal-clear that Trump is much more concerned about the fast-growing military capacities of China rather than these of Russia.

Regional Problems

In theory, Moscow and Washington could work fruitfully together on a wide range of regional issues, including the Middle East, Northeast Asia, Afghanistan, Africa, and even Latin America. The likely motivation of the Trump team is understandable—further aggravation of regional crises would require Washington's significant investment in the security of unstable regions, a military presence and even, possibly, direct US interventions in local conflicts, which Trump would like to avoid to the extent possible. If Moscow could assist Washington in domesticating Iran, North Korea or even Venezuela, in the White House they would definitely appreciate such assistance.

However, opportunities for practical cooperation between Moscow and Washington on most of ongoing regional problems appear to be rather modest at best. In the Middle East, especially after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, the United States clearly intends to present Russia with a fait accompli (as it was, for example, in the case of the recent US strikes the Houthis in Yemen). The unconditional Trump’s support for Israel makes it very difficult for Russia to help the United States with any Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Africa does not appear to be one of the strategic priorities of the current administration at all—the new Administration arguably outsourced African security problems to US European allies. With regard to the Korean Peninsula, Moscow and Washington take very different positions, and the Russian side is also bound by the obligations arising from the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the DPRK signed in June last year. The same applies to Iran, with which Russia signed a similar agreement in January this year. There are no reasons to believe that Moscow might sacrifice its long-term relations with either Pyongyang or Tehran just in order to please Washington.

Economic Interaction

Vladislav Belov:
US-EU Economic and Political Conflict in the Second Trump Era

If the Trump Administration decides to at least partially lift or ease the numerous US anti-Russian sanctions, such a policy shift may indeed open new opportunities for more economic cooperation between the two nations. The United States needs Russian titanium to produce Boeings, uranium to fuel US atomic power plants, and even Russian heavy oil to process at US refineries. The US manufacturing sector would not mind getting access to Russian rare earth elements and other mineral resources. In its turn, Russia could try to attract significant amounts of direct and portfolio investment from the United States, as well as increase imports more American made stuff, ranging from civilian aircraft to a variety consumer goods.

Still, one should not overestimate these opportunities. Historically, Moscow and Washington have never been each other's main trading or investment partners. Even at its peak at the turn of the first and second decades of this century, bilateral trade did not exceed USD 45 billion, and American exports to Russia amounted to only about USD 10 billion, which is an order of magnitude less than Russia's current imports from China. There are no reasons to believe that in the near future the United States will be able to take any significant part of the Russian consumer market away from China—like cars, machinery or consumer electronics. With the accumulated foreign direct investment, the situation is not much better - on the eve of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, the US accumulated FDI size (9.2 billion dollars) was inferior not only to such offshore jurisdictions as Cyprus, Bermuda or the Bahamas, but also to a number of European countries, including the UK, the Netherlands, France and Germany. Even assuming that some of the U.S. investments reached Russia indirectly through the aforementioned offshore jurisdictions or through European partners, the overall numbers do not look very impressive. At the same time, it is easy to predict that Washington and Moscow will remain trade competitors in many important global markets including such sectors as weapons, hydrocarbons, foodstuff, etc.

R&D Cooperation

Russia's significant R&D capacity in some areas could certainly be of interest to the United States. Moscow, in turn, could be interested in diversifying its international R&D partnerships in order to maintain what the call ‘technological sovereignty’. The experience of 1990s and 2000s suggests that Russia and the United States can successfully collaborate in bilateral and multilateral joint research projects of various types. If they worked together in the past, why could not they do it in the future? For example, Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, has already proposed sending a joint mission of Russia and the United States to Mars in 2029.

Aleksey Arbatov:
Nuclear Doctrine and Strategic Stability

Nevertheless, if relations between the two nations in other areas remain primarily relations of competition rather than that of cooperation, then this overall environment will inevitably impose severe restrictions on the scale and depth of R&D cooperation between them as well. One could assume with a high degree of certainty that Washington will apply the same principle to Moscow that is applies today to Beijing—“a small yard, a high fence.” Unfortunately, as the existing experience of US-China relations suggests, Americans are not very good at keeping the “yard” small when building a high “fence”.

The Humanitarian Dimension

Even though in the Russian public consciousness the image of America as a “shining city on a hill” has faded somewhat in recent years, the overall attractiveness of the United States has not completely disappeared, especially against the backdrop of negatively changing attitudes of the Russian public towards Europe. Many experts argue that after all the current anti-US feelings are not that deep in the Russian society. Maybe, it is quite possible to count on a gradual revival of bilateral educational and cultural exchanges, on the expansion of contacts of the second track between experts and between civil society institutions—such as we observed in plenty some twenty years ago. It should not be forgotten that it is in the United States that the world's largest Russian (or rather, post-Soviet) diaspora is located, exceeding 3 million people. This diaspora could serve as a natural bridge between the two countries facilitating more intense social interaction.

Nonetheless, here again one should not expect any miracles to happen. The anti-Russian consensus is still very strong and very resilient in the United States, and it is unlikely to fade away anytime soon. This consensus might well outlive the Trump Administration and thrive under a new leadership in the White House. At the same time, Russia's admiration for America should not be over exaggerated either. In 2019, the last year before the pandemic, when about 57 thousand Russians entered foreign universities, the share of the United States was only slightly more than 10% of this number, significantly inferior to Germany, Italy and even South Korea. Approximately the same picture manifested itself in the cultural interaction of Russia with Western countries. As for such a large and politically fragmented post-Soviet diaspora, it remains unclear whether this diaspora can become an accelerator or, on the contrary, will turn into a brake on the development of Russian-American relations.

A New World Order

Rahul Pandey:
The U.S.-Led Global Disorder: Opportunities for India, China and Russia

Many tactical interests of Moscow and Washington today largely coincide. Both parties are fighting against what they believe to be an international hegemony of globalists, against the dominance of cosmopolitan political and economic elites, for the restoration of the traditionalist national sovereignty and for a return to conservative values. The leaders of the two countries—Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump—understand each other well, their views on the processes taking place in the world are not identical, but appear to be close to each other. At the same time, their views and values are very different from, for example, the views and values shared by leaders of most European countries or by many senior officials in the European Union.

However, behind this situational commonality, there are obvious divergences in long-term interests, aspirations and goals. For example, for politicians in Moscow, the further strengthening of BRICS or SCO is one of the central foreign policy priorities, and for their peers in Washington, it is a serious foreign policy challenge. For the Kremlin, the decline in the role of the dollar as the world's main reserve currency is a natural and desirable process, and for the White House, it is a direct threat to American fundamental financial and even security interests. For Russia, China is and will continue to be the most important strategic partner, and for the United States, it is and will continue to be the main strategic rival. In Moscow, they try to conceptualize a new model of the global governance, while in Washington they prefer to look for specific “deals” that could bring specific political and economic returns to the United States here and now.

Summing Up

None of the above means that Moscow and Washington are doomed to eternal confrontation with each other and that after the next “thaw” in relations we will inevitably encounter the frost of a new Cold War. It is important for both sides to use any, even the most limited, opportunities for Russian-American dialogue because constructive relations between Moscow and Washington are a necessary, even if far from being the only condition, for stabilizing the situation in the world. Still, one should not have any illusions: the ongoing spectacular U-turn in the bilateral relationship became possible only thanks to the personal position of the 47th President of the United States. The changes remain fragile and reversible. Both sides should start thinking about a new, more stable and more reliable foundation for their future relations.

First published in the Guancha.