Since 1945, a combination of prudent leadership, military professionalism, good luck, and divine providence has enabled humanity to avoid using nuclear weapons. But the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine elevates such risks dramatically, the latest reminder of how a nuclear catastrophe can quickly rise to the surface in the “fog of war.”
Today, serving and former political and security leaders from across the Euro-Atlantic region, including Russia and the US, warn that more must be done to build on the principle “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. Nuclear-armed states must conduct “fail safe” reviews and strengthen safeguards to avoid potential unauthorised, inadvertent, or accidental nuclear weapon use. Without practical steps to reduce nuclear risks, conflict leading to nuclear catastrophe becomes an ever-higher possibility.
The need for urgent action is clear: Each nation with nuclear arms has a responsibility to reduce the risk of nuclear blunder, and nations must work together to eliminate nuclear risks and threats and avoid any military clash of nuclear powers.
Since 1945, a combination of prudent leadership, military professionalism, good luck, and divine providence has enabled humanity to avoid using nuclear weapons. But the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine elevates such risks dramatically, the latest reminder of how a nuclear catastrophe can quickly rise to the surface in the “fog of war.”
Today, serving and former political and security leaders from across the Euro-Atlantic region, including Russia and the US, warn that more must be done to build on the principle “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. Nuclear-armed states must conduct “fail safe” reviews and strengthen safeguards to avoid potential unauthorised, inadvertent, or accidental nuclear weapon use. Without practical steps to reduce nuclear risks, conflict leading to nuclear catastrophe becomes an ever-higher possibility.
The need for urgent action is clear: Each nation with nuclear arms has a responsibility to reduce the risk of nuclear blunder, and nations must work together to eliminate nuclear risks and threats and avoid any military clash of nuclear powers.
Reducing and eliminating nuclear risks—relating to both nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy— that could lead to catastrophic consequences is a common interest for all nations. It is an enduring responsibility of all nuclear-armed states, particularly as it relates to the obligations of the five Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nuclear-weapons states and the alliances of which they are members. In January 2022, the leaders of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States together affirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” This principle is fundamental to ensuring predictability and reducing the threat of nuclear war.
More must be done now to build on this principle. Without practical steps to reduce nuclear risks, conflict leading to nuclear catastrophe becomes an ever-higher possibility.
Nuclear “Fail-Safe”
In June 2021, the EASLG called on all nuclear-weapons states to commit to conduct internal reviews of their nuclear command-and-control systems, including “fail-safe” steps to strengthen safeguards against cyber threats and unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use of a nuclear weapon. The United States recently has begun to undertake such a review; other nuclear-weapons states should lead with their own internal fail-safe reviews. When completed, results from these internal reviews could be shared, for example, by the NPT nuclear-weapons states in the context of the NPT P5 Process.
In today’s international security environment unilateral steps to increase resilience against nuclear use are essential, yet risk reduction also demands cooperative measures. Hence, dialogue on these issues between nuclear-weapons states must be restored irrespective of current circumstances. This includes the bilateral strategic stability dialogue agreed to by the United States and Russia in June 2021, including their commitment to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.
In parallel with such dialogue, internal fail-safe reviews could lead to proposals for bilateral and multilateral cooperative risk reduction measures that could be taken by nuclear-weapons states, including steps to increase warning and decision times for leaders. This could include establishing cyber-nuclear “rules of the road” and red-line understandings precluding cyberattacks on nuclear facilities, nuclear command-and-control structures, or early warning systems.
For too long, the risk of an accident, mistake, or miscalculation leading to broader conflict, including nuclear use, has loomed over all of us. Nuclear-weapons states and their allies must give themselves every feasible tool to prevent a mistake or blunder from turning into a catastrophe beyond imagination.
Signatories
Co-Conveners
Des Browne
Vice Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Chair of the Board of Trustees and Directors of the European Leadership Network; and former Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom
Ambassador (Botschafter a.D.) Wolfgang Ischinger
President, Munich Security Conference Foundation Council, Germany
Igor Ivanov
President of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC); and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia
Ernest J. Moniz
Co-Chair and CEO, Nuclear Threat Initiative; and former U.S. Secretary of Energy, United States
Sam Nunn
Co-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative; and former U.S. Senator, United States
Participants
Ambassador Brooke D. Anderson (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff and Counselor, White House National Security Council, United States
Steve Andreasen
National Security Consultant, Nuclear Threat Initiative; and former Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, White House National Security Council, United States
Joel Bell
Chairman, Chumir Foundation for Ethics in Leadership, Canada
Philip Mark Breedlove
General (Ret.), United States Air Force; former Commander, U.S. European Command, and 17th Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, United States
Kathryne Bomberger
Director-General, International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), United States
Richard Burt
Managing Partner, McLarty Associates, United States
General (Ret.) Vincenzo Camporini
Scientific Adviser, Istituto Affari Internazionali; former Chief of Defence, Italy
Hikmet Çetin
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey
Richard A. Clarke
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs; and former Special Advisor to the President for Cybersecurity, White House National Security Council, United States
Ambassador (Ret.) James F. Collins
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United States
Ambassador (Ret.) Alper Coşkun
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Turkey
James Cowan
CEO, HALO Trust, United Kingdom
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
Former Chief of Defence; former Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee; former Minister of Defence, Italy
Ambassador Rolf Ekéus
Diplomat and Chairman Emeritus of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden
O. Faruk Loğoğlu
Former Ambassador to the United States; and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey
Sir Chris Harper KBE FRAeS
Air Marshal (Ret.); former Director General, NATO International Military Staff, United Kingdom
Alexander Hug
Head of Mission, Iraq Program, ICMP; former Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Switzerland
Roderich Kiesewetter
Member of the Bundestag, Germany
Andreas Kleiser
Director for Policy and Cooperation, ICMP, Germany
Bogdan Klich
Senator of the Polish Senate, Chairman of the Foreign and European Union Affairs Committee, Poland
Bert Koenders
Professor Peace and Security, University of Leiden; former under-secretary-general, United Nations; and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands
Mark Melamed
Deputy Vice President, Global Nuclear Policy Program, United States
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen
William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow, Nuclear Threat Initiative, United States
Mike Mullen
Admiral (Ret.), United States Navy; 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States
Ferdinando Nelli Feroci
President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
Bernard Norlain
General (Ret.), Vice-President, IDN (Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament), France
Joan Rohlfing
President and Chief Operating Officer, Nuclear Threat Initiative, United States
Matthew Rojansky
Expert on U.S. and Russian national security and nuclear-weapon policies, United States
Lynn Rusten
Vice President, Global Nuclear Policy Program, Nuclear Threat Initiative, United States
Sir John Scarlett
Former Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service; Vice Chairman, Royal United Services Institute, United Kingdom
Stefano Stefanini
Former Italian Permanent Representative to NATO; European Leadership Network Executive Board; Project Associates Brussels Director, Italy
Page Stoutland, Ph.D.
Consultant, Scientific and Technical Affairs, Nuclear Threat Initiative, United States
Sir Adam Thomson
Director, European Leadership Network, United Kingdom
Nathalie Tocci
Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali; and Special Advisor, HR/VP, Italy
