Why Bharat Matters

In December 2023, Indian Foreign Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, visited Moscow, where he met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. As part of the visit, at the request of the Indian side, a meeting was organised between Jaishankar and a group of leading Russian foreign affairs experts. This initiative was a new and non-standard step in Russia-India relations. Typically, ministerial visits are limited to official negotiations. The meeting itself also began with a seemingly mundane, but remarkable, detail. In the place where the minister was supposed to sit there was a large comfortable chair. The minister asked his Indian colleagues to replace it with a more modest one—the same as the other participants had. This request was voiced casually and in a whisper. Almost invisible to others.

The performance itself was conducted in a calm and even modest manner. The Indian minister had no desire to impose his point of view or give a lecture. He did not shy away from questions. Even the brief responses conveyed the main points. His speech corresponds to a deeper archetype of Indian culture, with its moderation, empathy, and the desire to hear the interlocutor.

The question posed in the title of the book may seem excessively modest to the Russian reader. Even those who are not involved in international relations understand that India is a major player in world politics. India has the largest population in the world, and a young one. Its economy is growing at a high rate, it is a nuclear power, and its cultural and civilizational foundations have preserved and attracted others for thousands of years. At the same time, India lives not only in the past, but also in the future. It has launched an unmanned mission to the moon, large-scale digitalisation of the economy and society, is working on a consistent solution to the problem of quality of life and has shown a way out of poverty for millions of people. The Indian diaspora abroad is enriching India with the knowledge of the whole world. Is there any point in answering a self-evident question?

There is. The cumulative effect of changes in India’s society, economy and domestic politics, combined with transformations in the world order and international relations, is giving rise to significant shifts in the country’s foreign policy. It is not simply a list of individual innovations, but a different quality that determines foreign policy identity. The change in identity can be seen symbolically in the very title of the book. Instead of India, which is familiar to the general reader, there is Bharat in the title. Here is a symbol of a new state that is rethinking itself on the international stage and at home. Here is a reference to deep historical and civilizational roots. Bharat is a modern kind of state-civilization, reconciling dozens of ethnic groups, languages and cultures in one political project, directed towards the future with the impetus of thousands of years of the past.

The idea of the civilization-state, reflected in Jaishankar’s book and in the broader context of the political theory of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, was developed almost simultaneously with the emergence of the concept of the civilization-state in Russian foreign policy doctrine.

Review of the Dr. S. Jaishankar’s book “Why Bharat Matters”

In December 2023, Indian Foreign Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, visited Moscow, where he met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. As part of the visit, at the request of the Indian side, a meeting was organised between Jaishankar and a group of leading Russian foreign affairs experts. This initiative was a new and non-standard step in Russia-India relations. Typically, ministerial visits are limited to official negotiations. The meeting itself also began with a seemingly mundane, but remarkable, detail. In the place where the minister was supposed to sit there was a large comfortable chair. The minister asked his Indian colleagues to replace it with a more modest one—the same as the other participants had. This request was voiced casually and in a whisper. Almost invisible to others.

Indian External Affairs Minister Subramanyam Jaishankar meets RIAC Members and Experts

The performance itself was conducted in a calm and even modest manner. The Indian minister had no desire to impose his point of view or give a lecture. He did not shy away from questions. Even the brief responses conveyed the main points. His speech corresponds to a deeper archetype of Indian culture, with its moderation, empathy, and the desire to hear the interlocutor.

The question posed in the title of the book may seem excessively modest to the Russian reader. Even those who are not involved in international relations understand that India is a major player in world politics. India has the largest population in the world, and a young one. Its economy is growing at a high rate, it is a nuclear power, and its cultural and civilizational foundations have preserved and attracted others for thousands of years. At the same time, India lives not only in the past, but also in the future. It has launched an unmanned mission to the moon, large-scale digitalisation of the economy and society, is working on a consistent solution to the problem of quality of life and has shown a way out of poverty for millions of people. The Indian diaspora abroad is enriching India with the knowledge of the whole world. Is there any point in answering a self-evident question?

There is. The cumulative effect of changes in India’s society, economy and domestic politics, combined with transformations in the world order and international relations, is giving rise to significant shifts in the country’s foreign policy. It is not simply a list of individual innovations, but a different quality that determines foreign policy identity. The change in identity can be seen symbolically in the very title of the book. Instead of India, which is familiar to the general reader, there is Bharat in the title. Here is a symbol of a new state that is rethinking itself on the international stage and at home. Here is a reference to deep historical and civilizational roots. Bharat is a modern kind of state-civilization, reconciling dozens of ethnic groups, languages and cultures in one political project, directed towards the future with the impetus of thousands of years of the past.

The idea of the civilization-state, reflected in Jaishankar’s book and in the broader context of the political theory of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, was developed almost simultaneously with the emergence of the concept of the civilization-state in Russian foreign policy doctrine. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation-2023 directly designates the country as a civilization-state. In the Russian reading, it is a combination of the historical tradition of a multi-structured and multinational organism married to the idea of a sovereign state as a political community. The Indian and Russian views are united in that they view their civilization-states as one among many civilizational projects. There is no ambition to consider themselves the standard for all to follow, no claim to authorship of the “end of history” embodied precisely in these civilizations.

However, behind extremely general terms such as civilization, history, state or culture lie very specific foreign policy strategies and interests. In the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, they are presented in the barren language of a doctrinal document. In Why Bharat Matters, they take the form of a series of essays written by a practitioner. By and large, the book can be considered an original foreign policy concept, presented in professional language, yet comprehensible to a wide range of readers. Each reader will be able to understand the main thesis of the book independently, highlighting those aspects which resonate personally.

As a starting point, Jaishankar postulates significant changes in the modern world order. The globalisation of the world economy continues, and along with it, the mechanisms of interdependence in many areas of life. But, he points out, under the influence of great power competition, interdependence is no longer what it was 10 or 20 years ago. There is a temptation to use it for political purposes. In turn, politicisation gives rise to mistrust and a natural desire to diversify international relations in a variety of areas.

This is a correct diagnosis, seen most vividly from Russia. For 30 years, Russia has been consistently integrated into globalisation and a variety of interdependent relationships. The European Union (EU) became Russia’s key partner in trade and humanitarian ties, and the U.S. became the partner in matters of strategic stability. But ultimately, political disagreements, and then a deep crisis against the backdrop of unresolved issues of European security, the nerve of which was the conflict in Ukraine, brought down these accumulated ties. The process of their erosion was slow. It wasn’t enough for economic interdependence and common interests in solving global problems to insure against sliding into a large-scale crisis.

Ivan Timofeev:
A State as Civilisation and Political Theory

Today, there is a total weaponisation of the interdependence developed over the years. Payments in dollars and euros, financial messaging systems, the close integration of Russia into supply chains, and much more have been used as weapons. Compared to Russia, India is in a less conflict-ridden environment. Its relations with its neighbours are far from cloudless, but at least the country is not currently experiencing an acute and long-lasting crisis in its relations with major centres of power. A completely rational strategy for New Delhi is to develop ties with the U.S., the EU and a wider range of countries and associations. India is certainly drawing conclusions from the lessons of their use of interdependence as a weapon,and is taking into account the difficult relations it has had with certain western countries in the past.

Jaishankar’s recommendation is pragmatic: to move towards the decentralisation of international relations. Such decentralisation provides an opportunity for de-risking and reducing the consequences of the weaponisation of interdependence. If selected partners abuse their established contacts, countries can always switch to others.

Here, a serious problem arises in the critical shortage of such alternative connections. Under otherwise equal conditions, Indian businesses are forced to use U.S. dollars in their transactions and take into account the risk of secondary sanctions and exclusion from dollar payments. Transactions in national currencies are still rather exotic, although their volume in relations with Russia has grown significantly over the past two years. An alternative mechanism for its effectiveness and an alternate universal mechanism for financial settlements simply does not exist yet, though cautious attempts are being made within the context of BRICS. However, there is still colossal work to be done, the success of which is not predetermined.

In other words, Jaishankar’s pragmatic and conceptually right approach requires enormous effort to move from the imperative format to the mode of practical implementation. It is obvious that the format of the book, which defines the strategic vectors of foreign policy, does not go into technical details. But the question itself of the existence of working mechanisms for the decentralisation of international relations, has been opened. And if the emergence of new mechanisms based on BRICS and other associations causes opposition from the West, what can be done? How can cooperation with western countries be reconciled with the idea of decentralised international relations, when the latter may reduce the influence of the U.S. and its allies, thereby prompting them to reject new projects?

A valuable dimension of Jaishankar’s book is his new model for positioning India in the world. It is built on the protection of national interests and state security on the one hand, and global responsibility on the other. In this model, India avoids building its relations with the external environment according to the principles of a zero-sum game. Contribution to solving global problems, including climate and environmental problems, digitalisation, poverty, economic imbalances and much more, is becoming an important priority for the country. India is becoming an active international donor and source of aid, a key change from very recently when it was considered by many to be a purely developing country. There is much to be done for India’s own development, but modernisation now goes hand in hand with helping others and contributing to solving common problems.

The fundamental value of such a model is trust which gradually accumulates through the development of partnerships. But the focus of the model remains the citizens of India and the problems of specific people, solved by foreign policy directly or indirectly. The resolution of those problems begins with global issues like creating the political conditions for attracting investment and the modernisation of the country, and ends with specific operations such as evacuating Indian citizens from conflict zones and natural disasters.

However, this model of foreign policy will, sooner or later, face a fundamental problem. In the modern era, confrontational tendencies are rapidly growing. The world is again being divided into hostile camps. Such trends are especially clearly visible from Russia, which is engaged in an acute confrontation with the West. Rivalry between the U.S. and China is growing. In many areas, from space exploration to vaccine production, cooperation is giving way to competition. In the context of the growing imbalance in the world order, it will not be easy for India to stay away from the warring camps and rise above their rivalry. They will try to pull India in one direction or another, forcing it to radicalise its political standpoint.

India is a large player, not merely an ordinary participant, in new coalitions. Maintaining a balance between cooperating with individual coalitions and avoiding becoming embroiled in conflicts is a difficult task. Preserving its basic principles will require the highest degree of diplomatic skill.

Russia — India Relations in Broader Geopolitical Context. RIAC and Synergia Foundation Report

On China: Given the complex relations between India and China, it was natural for Jaishankar to pay special attention to the relations between these two powers. The style of the essay on China is noteworthy. There is no attempt to humiliate this neighbour, nor concentrate on the past; no attempt to rebuild China in India’s image. Rather, the essay takes the form of a medical history, with a sober and dispassionate listing of key relationship problems as evidenced by recent border incidents. While acknowledging that India-China ties are at a crossroads, Jaishankar leaves room for manoeuvre in normalising relations between the two countries. It is symptomatic of this view that the minister sees dialogue as the solution to problems with China, rather than in containment or coalition with China’s opponents. To some, this position may seem overly cautious. In reality, a conflict would cost both India and China dearly. Behind the external caution lies a sober and pragmatic calculation. Managing rivalry is a much more complex task than the rivalry itself.

Russia, for its part, has traditionally advocated dialogue between New Delhi and Beijing. Close partnerships with China should hardly be seen as a threat to India, and vice versa. China should not fear close Russia-India relations. The question of reconciling difficult India-China bilateral ties with the development of multilateral associations like BRICS, remains open. Obviously, reducing the competition in Indo-Chinese relations could contribute to more efficient work of multilateral formats. It is in Russia’s interest to reduce the severity of the contradictions between India and China, consistently build relations with both state-civilizations, and develop multilateral associations based on their cooperation.

Of course, Jaishankar’s assessment of relations between India and Russia is important for the Russian reader. It is presented in a balanced and realistic manner. The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine poses a serious challenge. However, it creates a number of opportunities for cooperation between Moscow and Delhi. The energy sector is especially important. The growth of Russian supplies coincides with the demands of Indian industrial modernisation. The key question is how the new format of relations can be sustained and maintained. It seems that the stability of those relations, among other things, will be determined by the objective long-term nature of the conflict between Russia and the collective West.

India is becoming a significant market for Russia, and, in the future, will be a source of imports of a wide range of goods. If in the past, political relations clearly dominated the economy, now the high level of political and economic relations between the two countries is adjusted. The stability of bilateral ties will be determined by the ability to build systems of financial transactions and trade relations independent of third countries. Settlements in national currencies between Russia and India have led to a number of tactical problems, one of which is a lopsided trade balance. Over the long term, the problem can be solved, or at least mitigated, by the growth of Indian exports to Russia and an increase of Russian investment in India.

Several other topics are addressed in the book. The issues of India’s cooperation with other countries, its approaches to multilateral cooperation and the relationship between foreign policy and economic development deserve a separate discussion. What is important is that Why Bharat Matters creates an environment for an open and equal dialogue, which must continue between Indian and Russian diplomats, experts, and representatives of business and public organisations. Foreign Minister Jaishankar is a visionary and an intellectual; his book can be considered an example of next-generation Indian soft power. In Russia—and around the world—it will find a wide range of readers and will help them better understand Indian foreign policy at the intersection of the challenges of the future and the legacy of the past.

First published in the Gateway House.