Importance of the Libyan Crisis for Russia After the Arab Spring

Before the Arab Spring, bilateral relations between Russia and Libya were neither close nor indifferent. Instead, the Russians saw Libya as a place to promote their energy interests, sell weapons and challenge Western dominance over the Mediterranean. During the civil war, Russia supported both opposition groups such as General Haftar and the legitimate government of Mr Seraj, who was considered the legitimate leader by the United Nations. The question is, what is the significance of Russia's presence in the Libyan crisis? It can be said that such presence has political and economic benefits. This article attempts to explain Russia's motives in Libya and its political-economic consequences.

From the early 1970s until the overthrow of Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011, Russia and Libya enjoyed close relations. During the Cold War, Libya played an essential role as a base for Soviet interests in the Mediterranean. Although Moscow and Tripoli never entered an official alliance, Soviet military trainers in Libya were frequent visitors, and Gaddafi supported Moscow's propaganda efforts to support colonial and anti-imperialist struggles at the regional and international level. Most importantly, both countries enjoyed significant economic cooperation. However, after the Russian government joined the international sanctions regime against Libya in 1992, relations became more complicated.

Unlike the West — especially the United States — Russia supported Libya for pragmatic reasons — it had oil and was willing to buy Russian weapons. In 2008, Vladimir Putin forgave Libyan debt, which was about $4.4 billion. Russian railways and Gaddafi's government also signed a $2.6 billion contract to build a 550km railway between "Sirte" and "Benghazi". Moscow also benefited from $3.5 billion in energy deals and $150 million in construction projects. Since that time, high-level calls between Moscow and Tripoli have been common. As a direct result of the Libyan uprising in 2011, Russia withdrew from this leading North African country and lost contracts about worth approximately $10 billion. Following US interventions around the world, Moscow has referred to the West and NATO as the primary source of unrest in Libya. Senior Russian officials, including Putin and Sergei Lavrov, accused Washington and its allies of toppling the legitimate Libyan government, which led to widespread bloodshed and the emergence of jihadist groups.

While Putin — unlike Italy and France — always supported the dictatorship of Libya, Moscow joined Western-led arms sanctions in 2011. However, a few months later, Moscow, seeking to return to Libya, established close relations with the civil war leader, General Haftar. Since early 2012 Moscow has sent military hardware equipment to the country unilaterally. Since 2018 there have been rumours in the media that Russia is trying to expand its military base in Libya, and Moscow had announced that Special Forces had been sent to support the country.

Unlike Syria, where certain restrictions meet Russia, Moscow is more active in Libya. General Haftar, commonly described as a figure like Vladimir Putin in Libya, is seen by Moscow as just one of the necessary elements for the solution to this crisis. Indeed, Russia's return to the Middle East and the goals pursued by Moscow in the region have intensified as it has begun to play an active role in resolving the Libyan crisis. Due to the focus that was previously only on Syria, Russia's foreign policy Program for the region seemed too secretive for observers. Specific focus on security issues has raised concerns that Russia may seek a military stance in the Middle East. In this regard, Russia's particular view of Libya, which began in 2016 and was accompanied by rumours of a weapons delivery to General Haftar, has been interpreted as a step towards strengthening its military presence in the region. In fact, it was mainly under the influence of the Libyan coup that Russian policy towards the Mena region was defined. Libya's recent foreign policy strategy clearly states that its instability directly affects Russia.

Before the Arab Spring, bilateral relations between Russia and Libya were neither close nor indifferent. Instead, the Russians saw Libya as a place to promote their energy interests, sell weapons and challenge Western dominance over the Mediterranean. During the civil war, Russia supported both opposition groups such as General Haftar and the legitimate government of Mr Seraj, who was considered the legitimate leader by the United Nations. The question is, what is the significance of Russia's presence in the Libyan crisis? It can be said that such presence has political and economic benefits. This article attempts to explain Russia's motives in Libya and its political-economic consequences.

From the early 1970s until the overthrow of Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011, Russia and Libya enjoyed close relations. During the Cold War, Libya played an essential role as a base for Soviet interests in the Mediterranean. Although Moscow and Tripoli never entered an official alliance, Soviet military trainers in Libya were frequent visitors, and Gaddafi supported Moscow's propaganda efforts to support colonial and anti-imperialist struggles at the regional and international level. Most importantly, both countries enjoyed significant economic cooperation. However, after the Russian government joined the international sanctions regime against Libya in 1992, relations became more complicated.

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Unlike the West — especially the United States — Russia supported Libya for pragmatic reasons — it had oil and was willing to buy Russian weapons. In 2008, Vladimir Putin forgave Libyan debt, which was about $4.4 billion. Russian railways and Gaddafi's government also signed a $2.6 billion contract to build a 550km railway between "Sirte" and "Benghazi". Moscow also benefited from $3.5 billion in energy deals and $150 million in construction projects. Since that time, high-level calls between Moscow and Tripoli have been common. As a direct result of the Libyan uprising in 2011, Russia withdrew from this leading North African country and lost contracts about worth approximately $10 billion. Following US interventions around the world, Moscow has referred to the West and NATO as the primary source of unrest in Libya. Senior Russian officials, including Putin and Sergei Lavrov, accused Washington and its allies of toppling the legitimate Libyan government, which led to widespread bloodshed and the emergence of jihadist groups.

While Putin — unlike Italy and France — always supported the dictatorship of Libya, Moscow joined Western-led arms sanctions in 2011. However, a few months later, Moscow, seeking to return to Libya, established close relations with the civil war leader, General Haftar. Since early 2012 Moscow has sent military hardware equipment to the country unilaterally. Since 2018 there have been rumours in the media that Russia is trying to expand its military base in Libya, and Moscow had announced that Special Forces had been sent to support the country.

Unlike Syria, where certain restrictions meet Russia, Moscow is more active in Libya. General Haftar, commonly described as a figure like Vladimir Putin in Libya, is seen by Moscow as just one of the necessary elements for the solution to this crisis. Indeed, Russia's return to the Middle East and the goals pursued by Moscow in the region have intensified as it has begun to play an active role in resolving the Libyan crisis. Due to the focus that was previously only on Syria, Russia's foreign policy Program for the region seemed too secretive for observers. Specific focus on security issues has raised concerns that Russia may seek a military stance in the Middle East. In this regard, Russia's particular view of Libya, which began in 2016 and was accompanied by rumours of a weapons delivery to General Haftar, has been interpreted as a step towards strengthening its military presence in the region. In fact, it was mainly under the influence of the Libyan coup that Russian policy towards the Mena region was defined. Libya's recent foreign policy strategy clearly states that its instability directly affects Russia.

The Importance of the Libyan Issue for Russia

The emergence of the Islamic State in Libya, following the resumption of civil war in 2014, has again been the focus of attention and has raised concerns both in neighbouring countries and around the world. Libya has gained importance because of its geographical location, oil resources, ports and the presence of radical Islamic groups. Now and even in the future, Libya plays a crucial role in the Transit Route of Africa.

Since mid-2010, senior Russian officials, including defence and foreign ministers, have repeatedly met with Haftar, and they have implicitly recognised his position as a credible foreign leader. Significant arms deals between him and Russian officials were discussed, and for that reason, Haftar urged Moscow to support him politically, militarily and economically in the civil war — with the promise of providing Libyan assets in return.

In 2017, General Haftar clearly confirmed that he and Russian diplomats discussed the issue of military aid, stating, "I am sure Russia is our good friend and will not refuse to help." For this reason, Moscow has deployed a number of Russian technicians to the Libyan National Army to assist in the modernisation and recovery of weapons that have remained mostly unrecorded since the Soviet era. According to some sources, Russia currently has a military presence in Eastern Libya. It is said to have deployed S-300 air defense missile systems and caliber anti-ship missiles.

Russia's involvement in the Libyan civil war seems quite practical and relatively balanced. Since the beginning of the war, Moscow has tried to maintain balance in its relations with representatives of both camps. In fact, during the Civil War, Moscow maintained contacts with representatives of the Tripoli government. At several stages, Russia expressed its readiness to recognise the government of Fayez al-Sarraj as Libya's legal authority. As such, we can point out some of Russia's interests Because of the presence in Libya:

Economic Interests

Economic interests appear to be dominating Russia's agenda in Libya. In fact, according to several sources, Haftar has pledged to renew Qadhafi's key contracts with Russia, should Moscow back him. Renewal of important deals worth nine to ten billion dollars — or even more, given Libya's destruction after years of civil war — is strong motivation for Moscow's support. Moscow has likely discussed the same possibility with the Sarraj government. While Moscow's goal of expanding its military sales has become imperative to its Middle East agenda, indirect control over Libya's energy resources through a friendly and indebted government may increase Russia's role in Mediterranean politics and security.

The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC), which is aligned to the GNA in Tripoli, signed a significant cooperation and investment deal with Rosneft, the Russian oil giant, which will grant Rosneft access to investment in the Libyan oil sector and allow for the sale of Libyan crude oil for the first time. Geopolitically, Russia is aware of Libya's importance to the global energy market. Libya has the highest reserves of oil in Africa, and most of it has not yet been explored. Libya is also already supplying gas to Europe through a pipeline under the Mediterranean Sea which runs into Italy. Russia is a major supplier of gas to Europe, and by investing in the Libyan market, Russia will still maintain its dominant market share and leverage in supplying energy to Europe.

Given Russia's ambitions for more influence in the Middle East, it could potentially benefit from gaining a permanent naval facility on the Libyan coast in the strategic Mediterranean area, similar to the one it already has in Syria. Such a permanent facility could become a geopolitical bargaining card for Moscow against Europe and NATO. Russia will most likely continue to follow the long-term patient game of attempting to realise its pragmatic economic and geopolitical interests in Libya. It will probably maintain its anti-western and NATO rhetoric as well while doing so.

However, future trends in the Libyan energy industry will inevitably be shaped by political developments. Given closer ties with Egypt and widespread arms sales to Algeria, Russia may consider Libya's arms sales a way to strengthen its strong ties with three strategically important North African countries. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Moscow is only discussing the potential construction of military bases by Russia on arms sales.

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Political Interests

President Barack Obama once famously considered Libya the “worst mistake” of his presidency. The power vacuum that established itself following the Western withdrawal from Libya, months after the NATO bombing of the Qadhafi regime critically facilitated its toppling, has since been filled by Moscow in an effort to project its influence as an essential global player. In fact, given Russian elites' great‐power aspirations, a history of collaboration with Libya, and the ongoing conflict with the West, it would have been odd for Moscow not to utilise this unique opportunity. Establishing a presence in this key part of the Mediterranean is seen as a matter of prestige by Russian analysts. Apart from tangible economic interests, it may turn Russia into an important actor with a say in the issues of international immigration, conventional security, and energy policy, all in close proximity to the European continent. Nikolay Kozhanov observes in this regard that "having entered the Libyan conflict, Moscow shows to Europe and the USA that it will not limit itself to Syria and Ukraine and that its 'success' in Syria is not accidental." While Moscow is not interested in a direct confrontation with the West, it may use its relatively successful Libya endeavour to accrue status benefits in its negotiations with Western nations, trading certain aspects of its Libya presence off for other unrelated assets, as it has possibly done in the case of Syria. An important player in Libya, Russia is to be reckoned with by Western powers, in the North Africa region and globally[1]. Following Russia's isolation from the international community after its annexation of Crimea and its “hybrid war” in eastern Ukraine, this has been a salient objective of Russian diplomacy.

[1] Emil A. Souleimanov, “Mission Accomplished? Russia's Withdrawal from Syria,” Middle East Policy 23, no. 2 (2016): 108–18.