Sudan on the Brink of Civil War

The current armed escalation of Sudan’s internal political crisis has been triggered by a delay with the signing of a political agreement to form a civilian government and initiate a new transitional phase towards elections. The dual power of the military in Sudan as well as the actual division of the state into zones and spheres of influence between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo made it impossible for the Sudanese military and security forces to have a unified political representation. Thus, the fighting that erupted in Sudan’s capital Khartoum and elsewhere in the country was a direct result of a bitter power struggle within the military leadership.

The world media and various analytical resources are now actively circulating the opinion that one of the key reasons for escalation of the conflict in Sudan is external influence. However, we believe that the current events are the result of contradictions between the two military groups reaching a critical point, given that the latter have failed to rein in their political ambitions of achieving full power in the country. External forces, such as the U.S. and Russia, are now focused on addressing more pressing issues on the global and regional agenda.

Arguably, external forces will be involved in the conflict primarily in the context of its settlement, since neither global nor regional actors are interested in the escalation of the crisis in Sudan. Nevertheless, external mediation cannot guarantee the speedy resolution of disputes between the warring parties in Sudan.

Thus, the new power struggle in Sudan threatens to evolve into a protracted civil conflict that will mainly affect the civilian population, which has failed to achieve the transit of power from the military to democratically elected structures

The crisis of the political process in Sudan, which has persisted for more than a decade, has entered another phase of aggravation. This time, the contradictions between the parties vying for power have led to armed clashes between the army and the so-called Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The speed of escalation and scale of the fighting indicate that the country is now faced with a real prospect of civil war, which could indefinitely postpone the transit of power to the civilian government, turning Sudan into one of the hottest spots in the world for many years to come.

What caused the current conflict

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The current armed escalation of Sudan’s internal political crisis has been triggered by a delay with the signing of a political agreement to form a civilian government and initiate a new transitional phase towards elections. The process of transition to civilian structures kicked off after former President Omar Hassan al-Bashir was ousted in April 2019. Under the August 2019 agreement, the Sudanese army agreed to share power with officials appointed by civilian political groups in the run-up to the elections. But this agreement was abruptly broken as a result of the October 2021 military coup, sparking a series of mass civilian protests across Sudan.

It was the period from 2019 to 2021 that temporarily merged the interests of the Sudanese army led by Commander-in-Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Both generals, despite their obvious political ambitions, declared their commitment to the democratic transformation of Sudan and managed to agree on a framework agreement regarding general elections in 2023, as well as on a new status for the RSF (about 100,000 men under arms), which was to be integrated into the regular army. It was the new format of the RSF that played a decisive role in postponing the potential transit of power in the country. Because of the haste and voluntary nature of the decisions made on reforming the the security sector, the country entered a new phase of confrontation between the military and security forces.

The dual power of the military in Sudan as well as the actual division of the state into zones and spheres of influence between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo made it impossible for the Sudanese military and security forces to have a unified political representation. Thus, the fighting that erupted in Sudan’s capital Khartoum and elsewhere in the country was a direct result of a bitter power struggle within the military leadership. This point is also made by local leaders of civilian political forces. Al-Misbah Ahmed Muhammad, leader of the Umma Party, commented for Al-Alam TV that the disagreement was precisely at the level of the army leadership regarding security and the reform of the military.

The external factor in Sudanese developments

The world media and various analytical resources are now actively circulating the opinion that one of the key reasons for escalation of the conflict in Sudan is external influence. In particular, it is argued that various regional and global actors might stand behind the warring parties. Thus, a reference is made to Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s close ties with Russia and the UAE, which could be involved in the gold mining business in Sudan, controlled by the RSF. Also, the RSF commander is seen by many as Moscow’s main sympathizer in the issue of establishing a Russian naval base in Sudan. It should also be pointed out that in 2015 it was Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo— in agreement with the Sudanese army—who sent his men to fight in Yemen with the Saudi-led coalition, which allowed him to establish very close ties with many Gulf powers. The latter appear in various reports as one of the pillars for the head of the RSF in the current conflict.

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On the other hand, there is information about the possible support of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan by Egypt, which enjoys closer ties with none else but the regular army and similar positions regarding the problems of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In addition, the United States may also be involved in the process, as it tries to resist the consolidation of Russia’s positions in the region.

However, we believe that the current events are the result of contradictions between the two military groups reaching a critical point, given that the latter have failed to rein in their political ambitions of achieving full power in the country. External forces, such as the U.S. and Russia, are now focused on addressing more pressing issues on the global and regional agenda. Moscow is also reluctant to see a deterioration of its relations with Egypt, a country that, in its turn, will not clash with the Arabian monarchies over the Sudanese case.

Based on the said assumptions, we can conclude that external forces will be involved in the conflict primarily in the context of its settlement, since neither global nor regional actors are interested in the escalation of the crisis in Sudan. Nevertheless, external mediation cannot guarantee the speedy resolution of disputes between the warring parties in Sudan.

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Thus, the new power struggle in Sudan threatens to evolve into a protracted civil conflict that will mainly affect the civilian population, which has failed to achieve the transit of power from the military to democratically elected structures. The early phase of the current crisis allows for an optimistic forecast, but only if there is an early start of the negotiation process between the army and the RSF as well as a cease-fire, and if various regional and world powers act quickly. A delay in this matter would mean complete uncertainty about the timing and scope of the conflict in Sudan. What is clear, however, is that the role of the military, regardless of who prevails in the current struggle, will remain decisive in Sudan, at least in the medium term.