The Role of Nuclear Energy for the Achievement of the EU’s and Russia’s Climate Targets

In order to achieve the Russian and European 2030 climate targets, nuclear energy will have to be included in the green transition, since the low-carbon characteristic of nuclear power can satisfy the energy demand without producing the high environmental impact of other fossil fuel alternatives, such as coal, oil, or gas.

The European Union’s strategy for the green transition will most likely depend on what narrative of the dichotomy will prevail on the other. The underlying risk is that, as decarbonization becomes an intransigent principle of the majority of EU member states, the strategies proposed to attain climate neutrality lack a cost-benefit analysis on the feasibility of such changes.

Concerning nuclear power in Russia, there is no doubt that the new Russian taxonomy will allow for greater investment to be made within Rosatom’s competence. Essentially, the underlying issue for the Russian Federation is the overreliance on natural gas. The Russian Federation has a substantive potential for the development of renewable energy resources, especially for wind, biomass, hydro, geothermal and solar, with every region capable of providing at least one form of energy source. According to the Energy Strategy of RF by 2035, renewables should reach approximately 5% of total final energy consumption by 2030. Stepping up the investment in the sector could potentially lead to reach 11.3% of the share according to an IRENA Report of 2017. The reality is that, for the time being, it is unlikely that Russia will bolster a sharp turn to renewables, principally for the unfeasibility of such a sudden change in the current economy.

Therefore, Russia planning to further develop its nuclear power system is still an environmentally viable solution, and it allows the federation to lessen its environmental impact while buying precious time for an increase in investment in the renewable sector.

Ever since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force in 1994, industrialized nations and developing economies have been striving to reduce and limit greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions based on individual targets. The Convention was therefore initially backed by the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and further by the Paris Agreement of 2015, legally binding the 196 participating countries to limit the increase of global temperatures to below 2 degrees Celsius, as compared to pre-industrial levels. The Paris Agreement compelled every signatory to submit plans for climate mitigation by 2020, defined as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which are a set of binding guidelines for sustainable development. The implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, refined in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), provides further reference for the planification of extensive reforms at the national and supranational level.

The most relevant sector for the implementation of effective climate mitigation activities is the energy field, considering that it accounts for more than 70% of global emissions (i.e. energy used for electricity, heat, and transport). All the countries implementing the Paris Agreement have developed national plans to gradually phase-out the use of coal and other hydrocarbons from their own energy mix, advocating for stronger investment on renewable energy sources. But solely focusing the approach to the green transition on the use of renewables can prove quite difficult for socio-economic reasons, therefore the use of implementation of transitional energy sources is required. Nuclear power is considered to be one of those transitional energy.

The purpose of this article is to briefly outline the policy priority of the EU and the Russian Federation regarding the role of nuclear power in the green transition, particularly regarding the achievement of the 2030 climate targets and, eventually, the climate neutrality.

Nuclear Energy

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The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) recently published a report declaring the use of nuclear energy as indispensable for the achievement of the 2030 climate goals, highlighting the importance of nuclear infrastructure in the future global energy portfolio [1]. In fact, many of the energy models programmed and evaluated by international bodies, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), rely on a substantial support of nuclear energy output to meet emissions targets. To clarify this point further, the majority of reports predict that renewables will supply the biggest share of energy consumption, especially wind and solar energy. Nevertheless, the intermittent characteristic of these two types of renewables makes it unfeasible to rely solely on the fluctuating energy output they provide since it would be impossible to dispatch solar or wind energy on demand. Depending on the weather and the time, the output from solar PV and wind turbines could potentially miss the current energy demands. Steady sources of energy are required to ensure security of supply. Examples of steady sources of energy are fossil fuels, such as oil, natural gas, but also low-carbon alternatives such as nuclear power.

For the scope of this essay being the potential role of nuclear energy in the green transition, the policy strategies of the EU and Russia will be briefly discussed, analyzing whether nuclear power is being considered as an effective alternative or not.

The EU Approach to Nuclear Energy

Energy accounts for 75% of the total GHG emissions of the EU, implying that the energy sector holds a particularly crucial position in the green transition. In the European Commission programme for 2021, the initiatives of climate mitigation that follow the guidelines of the European Green Deal and the 2030 Climate Target [2] are featured in the Fit for 55 Package [3]. The package is essentially a set of legislative proposals meant to redefine the objectives and the strategy of the EU energy and environment framework. Most of the proposals deal with the revision of the Emission Trading System (ETS), the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and the research investment on energy efficiency. Fundamentally, the Fit for 55 Package does not comprehend or even discuss matters related to nuclear energy. Nevertheless, nuclear power is being actively disputed at the pan-European level.

According to the recently discussed Complementary Climate Delegated Act, nuclear energy represents a low-carbon energy source and, if subject to strict safety and environmental conditions that respect the “do no significant harm” principle, it can play a role in the green transition towards climate neutrality. A series of technical assessments and reports by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the Scientific Committee on Health, Environmental and Emerging Risks (SCHEER) confirm that, if the long-term disposal of nuclear waste is processed correctly and does not represent a threat for the environment, nuclear energy is to be included in the EU Taxonomy. This legal step basically permits capital to be more easily invested in nuclear R&D and infrastructures, but it does not label nuclear as a “green energy source”. To be more precise, the Taxonomy Regulation outlines three types of activity: a) low-carbon, b) transitional, and c) enabling. In the Complementary Climate Delegated Act, the European Commission defines certain types of nuclear power and natural gas in the second category, i.e. transitional. This category encloses the activities that “cannot yet be replaced by technologically and economically feasible low-carbon alternatives but do contribute to climate change mitigation and with the potential to play a major role in the transition to a climate-neutral economy”. But nuclear energy has not yet being accepted by the EU member states and the proposal is still in discussion.

In the Final Report of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance of March 2020, it was mentioned that “nuclear energy generation has near to zero green-house gas emissions in the energy generation phase”, and that “evidence on the potential substantial contribution of nuclear energy to climate change mitigation objectives was extensive and clear”.

From the data provided, it would seem, at a first glance, that the EU is becoming increasingly more adamant on the crucial role of nuclear power in the green transition. Nevertheless, at the national level, a dichotomy of approaches seems to be forming between Germany and France. Two different strategies for the achievement of the green transition, which are highly in contrast with one another.

The German “Energiewende” with its anti-nuclear feature

Germany is adamant on the phasing out of nuclear power from the national energy mix, with a strategy that puts the focus mainly in research and improvement of the renewable energy sector. In 2002, the “Act on the structured phase-out of the utilization of nuclear energy for the commercial generation of electricity” prevented the possibility of issuing new licenses for the construction of nuclear facilities and called for a gradual decommission of all nuclear power plants by 2021. Recently three of the last six nuclear plants were shut down, and soon enough the role of nuclear in the German energy transition will most likely be null. The anti-nuclear narrative of the government is further reinforced by the Green Party, which has been against the use of nuclear energy since its creation, due principally to the fear caused by the disasters of Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new German government, Annalena Baerbock, co-leader of the Green Party, repeatedly expressed her stance against the “French proposal to label nuclear as green”, while Robert Habeck, Economy and Climate Protection Minister, suggested that the policy resembles “greenwashing”.

The abandonment of nuclear power entails consequences such as the need for more natural gas, since intermittent renewables cannot satisfy the volatility of energy demand. The German “Energiewende” has increased the dependence of the country to natural gas, to the point that 95% of gas consumption is supplied by imports. In fact, Germany’s strategy for the green transition puts a strong relevance on the use of natural gas to achieve the commitments of the 2030 climate targets. This priority is supported by the bilateral agreements stipulated with the Russian Federation in the last decade, strategy that allowed for the establishment of the gas pipeline Nord Stream 1 and even Nord Stream 2. A stronger energy interdependence between Germany and Russia is of utmost necessity for the effectiveness of Germany’s energy mix, but achieving it is proving more difficult than planned.

Several mutually reinforcing factors are stopping Germany from increasing natural gas supply with Russia by officially inaugurating the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. To begin with, relations between the EU and Russia have become increasingly more politicized in the last decade, consequences of the Ukraine crisis and the failed attempts to strengthen cooperation in mutual areas of interest. The gas pipeline became essentially part of a security dilemma: notwithstanding the energy interdependence between the two actors, the EU considers as dangerous to further increase the Union’s dependence on Russian supply, while Russia’s priority is to ensure that economic revenues from the European markets remain stable and, possibly, even increase [4] (EYL-MAZZEGA). Germany, under the government of Angela Merkel, was inclined to finish the project and increase the quantity of natural gas supply, doubling the current capacity provided by the Nord Stream 1. The rest of the EU has been so far strongly against the German stance.

The new coalition led by Olaf Scholz risks to face more internal challenges than the previous administration. Annalena Baerbock is against the Nord Stream 2 both for political and environmental reasons, since the establishment of the new pipeline could grant Russia the power to “blackmail” the European clients. Lastly, considering the escalation of tensions in Ukraine in the last few weeks, and consequently the worsening of the relations between the EU and Russia, Nord Stream 2 came back at the center of attention. The future of the gas pipeline has never been more at stake, and it is likely that the official inauguration will be postponed until the tensions have eased.

France nuclear-centered model of energy self-sufficiency

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France’s approach to the green transition is essentially the opposite of the German one. France has always been advocating for a stronger relevance of nuclear power in the EU energy framework, considering the security of electricity supply obtained by the nuclear-centered energy system of the country. Naturally, France is also EU’s leader in nuclear know-how and research, which could turn out to be politically powerful in the circumstances of an EU-wide green transition assisted by nuclear power. Nuclear energy accounts for approximately 70% of the electricity production in France and, in the first half of 2021, France was Europe’s biggest electricity exporter.

The Programmation pluriannuelle de l’energie (PPE) 2019-2028 states that the energy demand will decline by 14 percent from 2019 to 2028, consumption of coal cut by 80%, oil by 35%, natural gas by 20%. This will be obtained not only by incentivizing the improvement of the nuclear energy output, but also by promoting the development of biomass and biogas, in addition to the more classical renewables such as solar, wind and hydrogen power.

In these circumstances, there is still the political will of the French government to partially replace nuclear and, naturally, fossil fuels with renewables, as signaled by several policy priorities. First of all, the Loi de transition énergétique pour la croissance verte (LTECV) states that the share of nuclear energy in electricity production has to be lowered from 70% to 50% by 2035, in order to guarantee stronger investment in renewables and other low-carbon fuels. Second, already in 2019, the Macron administration halted spending on the research of its fourth-generation nuclear reactors, indicating the intention to switch the focus of investments from nuclear research to hydrogen, solar, and wind infrastructure.

Overall, the French government promises that the green transition will lead to higher economic growth and more jobs, but the reality is that the projects will require expensive public investments. The French strategy of establishing a highly self-sufficient energy grid based on nuclear power has also political consequences. Advocating for an energy-independent European Union is powerful and tempting at the same time, but risks overlooking the importance of maintaining stable and functioning relations with fuel-exporting rich countries.

Nuclear Power as a Reliable Energy Source for the Russian Climate Targets

Currently, Russia’s economy is highly dependent on the oil and gas industry, which accounts for “a quarter of the country’s GDP, a third of investments, more than half of exports and 40% of the federal budget revenue” [5] . For the near future, it is unlikely that the RF will pursue a fast-paced transition to an energy mix mainly dependent on renewables, as the one advocated by the European Union. Such an immediate phase-out of fossil fuels would not be sustainable for the Russian economy, potentially causing irreparable socio-economic damage. It is worth mentioning that natural gas will play a fundamental role for the EU for the next decades, as the consumption of oil and coal will be gradually diminished. The Russian leadership will surely invest enough resources in securing a steady profit from such energy supply, thus suggesting that natural gas export is expected to increase in the near term. The IEA’s Net-Zero Emissions (NZE) Scenario suggests that the use of unabated natural gas for electricity production will peak in the mid-2030s, but then plummet to 90% lower by 2040 (compared to 2020).

Rutland states that Russia will likely continue making as much money as it can with the export of oil, coal, and natural gas, until the last possible moment [6]. This perspective is also supported by examples such as the Vostok Oil project, Rosneft-led plan for the development of infrastructures and increase of production of oil and gas fields of the Krasnoyarsk Oblast’. Concerns over the environmental damage of Vostok Oil were raised by several countries, with Rosneft claiming that sustainability will still be a priority and that wind power and natural gas will be used to power the extraction fields. Nevertheless, such example suggest that the RF is actively delaying a full-fledged transition to renewables, in order to pursue higher economic growth. On the same note, Tynkkynen states that Russia has all the requirements to transform into a “green superpower”, but that the “current economic and political system is blocking policies moving the country in that direction” [7]. In such a challenging situation, the role of nuclear for an effective climate mitigation is gaining more and more relevance.

As the Russian Federation has implemented the Paris Agreement in 2015, an initial NDC was announced, targeting to reduce the 70% of GHG emissions (relative to the 1990 level) by 2030.

In September 2021, during the COP26, Russia’s new green taxonomy was officially adopted, which is expected to boost the investment for the development of green initiatives, businesses, and projects. The document was developed following the guidelines of international best practices and the EU taxonomy, in order to guarantee an optimal compatibility for the achievement of global climate targets. Most importantly, the Russian taxonomy includes nuclear as a “green” energy, therefore cementing the role of nuclear energy in the Russian green transition.

In the Energy Strategy of the RF by 2035, it is mentioned that the percentage of nuclear energy in the total energy portfolio of the RF is expected to grow from 13% in 2018, to 26% by 2024, and to 40% by 2035 [8]. While, in one of the latest Federal Target Programme, the implementation of new Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) is expected to guarantee a 25–30% nuclear share in electricity supply by 2030, 45–50% by 2050, and 70–80% by the end of the century.

Therefore, the potential of nuclear energy is of utmost importance for Russia both domestically and internationally. On the national level, Rosatom is currently the largest electric generating company in the country, accounting for more than 20% of Russia’s total generation of electricity [9]. On the global level, Russia is considered a leader in nuclear R&D, and in the export of nuclear know-how and NPP. In fact, Rosatom’s scientists are involved in high-ranking international nuclear research centres, e.g. the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) or the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR), and the Russian Federation has stipulated several bilateral agreements on the construction of nuclear plants in several countries, such as Turkey and Finland, thus even beyond the traditional Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) clients. In 2020, Rosatom’s revenues from foreign orders of NPP amounted at 138 billion USD, highlighting the economic potential of a switch of energy relations from fossil fuels to nuclear power.

Currently Rosatom’s strategy for the long run is explicated in the Proryv project, with the research and establishment of “closed nuclear fuel cycle (CNFC) based on fast reactors that will lead to development of a large-scale nuclear power industry”. As stated in the Proryv project itself, the CNFC is potentially the best option in eliminating the environmental impact of nuclear waste. Even Vladimir Gorn, Deputy Director of Rosatom Eastern Europe, has stated that “nuclear energy plays a key role in solving the economy decarbonization issues”, referring also to the “beginning of a new “green” transport era”.

With the information provided, the green transition advocated by the Russian Federation will likely be focused on the use of nuclear energy for the achievement of short- and long-term climate targets. Nuclear energy will gradually lessen the environmental impact of the Russian energy system, with natural gas remaining a stable source of energy for the near future.

Conclusions

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In order to achieve the Russian and European 2030 climate targets, nuclear energy will have to be included in the green transition, since the low-carbon characteristic of nuclear power can satisfy the energy demand without producing the high environmental impact of other fossil fuel alternatives, such as coal, oil, or gas.

The European Union’s strategy for the green transition will most likely depend on what narrative of the dichotomy will prevail on the other. The underlying risk is that, as decarbonization becomes an intransigent principle of the majority of EU member states, the strategies proposed to attain climate neutrality lack a cost-benefit analysis on the feasibility of such changes.

Germany’s energy mix is currently the most polluting one in the entire Union. In 2020, Germany emitted 604.8 million metric tons of CO₂, more than twice as much than the next most polluting members, namely Italy (287.1 MtCO₂), Poland (279.5 MtCO₂), and France (250.9 MtCO₂). Germany is still heavily reliant on coal use for electricity generation, with lignite currently accounting for circa 30% of electricity production. Neglecting the use of nuclear power to ease the environmental impact is proving rather counterintuitive.

The global energy mix of developed countries will surely consist of mainly renewable energy in the long run, thus the scope of the 2030 climate targets is to keep nations on track in achieving climate neutrality by 2050, for the EU, and by 2060, for Russia. Nevertheless, relying solely on investment in renewables, without considering the support that the nuclear option can provide during the transitional phase, can prove rather deleterious for the environment, forcing the regression to fossil fuels or low-carbon alternatives to satisfy the energy demand.

For instance, Italy is currently considering starting once more drilling and excavating natural gas in the Adriatic Sea, while Poland announced the construction of five new-generation gas power plants, which are effectively going to slow down the country’s climate mitigation efforts. Nuclear power could provide the base-load electricity needed to sustain the economic investment in the renewable sector, essentially acting as a less-polluting alternative to natural gas for the achievement of the 2030 climate targets.

France is adamant on the need to bolster nuclear energy output throughout the Union. The support of nuclear energy could also temporarily ease the security dilemma of the gas relations with Russia, providing a new field of mutual exchange with the federation, i.e. nuclear know-how. The example of the cooperation between French and Russian nuclear companies on the use of additive technologies leaves a window of hope for future energy relations. The energy interdependence between the EU and Russia is fundamentally going to change and comprehending the role that Russia will hold in the future EU energy system is a crucial point.

Overall, Germany most likely will keep nuclear power out of its energy mix. This means that France could attempt to over-produce nuclear energy with the sole intention of becoming the lead-exporter of energy inside the EU. As suggested by Noreng, it is likely that in the future European energy market, France will become the major provider of base-load electricity, while Germany will become the major provider of flexible electricity, due to the reliability on imported nuclear gas that can be dispatched faster on demand [10].

Concerning nuclear power in Russia, there is no doubt that the new Russian taxonomy will allow for greater investment to be made within Rosatom’s competence. Essentially, the underlying issue for the Russian Federation is the overreliance on natural gas. The Russian Federation has a substantive potential for the development of renewable energy resources, especially for wind, biomass, hydro, geothermal and solar, with every region capable of providing at least one form of energy source. According to the Energy Strategy of RF by 2035, renewables should reach approximately 5% of total final energy consumption by 2030 [11]. Stepping up the investment in the sector could potentially lead to reach 11.3% of the share according to an IRENA Report of 2017 [12]. The reality is that, for the time being, it is unlikely that Russia will bolster a sharp turn to renewables, principally for the unfeasibility of such a sudden change in the current economy. Therefore, Russia planning to further develop its nuclear power system is still an environmentally viable solution, and it allows the federation to lessen its environmental impact while buying precious time for an increase in investment in the renewable sector.

1. UNECE (2021). “Application of the United Nations Framework Classification for Resources and the United Nations Resource Management System: Use of Nuclear Fuel Resources for Sustainable Development – Entry Pathways”, report prepared by the Expert Group on Resource Management Nuclear Fuel Resources Working Group, Geneva.

2. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (2020). “Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition – Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our people”, COM (2020) 562 final, Brussels.

3. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (2021). “Fit for 55: Delivering the EU’s 2030 Climate Target on the way to Climate Neutrality”, COM (2021) 550 final, Brussels.

4. Eyl-Mazzega, Marc-Antoine & Mathieu, Carole (2021). “The Energy Price Crises: A Reality Check for Europe’s Green Deal”, Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI).

5. Pravitel’stvo Rossijskoj Federacii (2020). “Energeticheskaja Strategija Rossijskoj Federacii na period do 2035 goda” (Энергетическая Стратегия Российской Федерации на период 2035 года), N. 1523-p, Moscow.

7. Rutland, Peter (2021). “Energy and Russian Great Power Post-Crimea”, in Russian Energy Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Australia, published by ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, ch.4, pp. 85-103.

8. Tynkkynen, Veli-Pekka (2019). Book: “The Energy of Russia – Hydrocarbon Culture and Climate Change”, London, Edward Elgar, ch.6.

8. Energeticheskaja Strategija Rossijskoj Federacii na period do 2035 goda, ibid. 24.

9. IAEA, Ibid. 34.

10. Noreng, Øystein (2019). “EU Energy Union”, The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol.44, no.1/2, pp. 197-236, published by International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development (ICEED).

11. Energeticheskaja Strategija Rossijskoj Federacii na period do 2035 goda, ibid. 24.

12. IRENA (2017). “REmap 2030 – Renewable Energy Prospects for the Russian Federation”, ISBN 978-92-9260-022-8, available both in English and Russian.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Russian Council (RIAC) or its members.