Russian Perception of the Belt and Road Initiative from 2013 to 2019

In the media field, it is a common view that the mainstream voice in Russian media is positive or neutral with a few security and economic concerns, either written by Russian or Chinese authors. More concretely, first, Kang, Ravitsky, Smirnova, Qin and Xie argue that Russia recognizes the power and plans of China to realize its rejuvenation and enhance international influence, and Russia plays a key role in the BRI.

Second, Kang, Li, Yan, Ravitsky, Yilmaz, Liu, Smirnova and Xie believe that the two governments enjoy the strong trust and firm partnership, especially for the top leaders, and this trust between top leaders has solved the suspicion of Russia for the BRI. Third, Kang, Ravitsky, Smirnova, Li, Yan and Xie argue that the Russian federal and local governments support the BRI and believe that they can benefit from the business and trade opportunities that the BRI may bring. Fourth, Kang, Li, Yan, Smirnova, Qin and Xie affirms that Russians concern its security in Siberia and China’s influence in Central Asia but also want Chinese investment.

Furthermore, the differences in the media-related literature mainly exist to what extent the security issues concern Russia. Smirnova argues that Russian media and experts are strongly concerned about Central Asia and Siberia, although Russia is open to the BRI and can benefit from the BRI economically. More specifically, first, Russians see the BRI as a challenge to the Russian great power status, but are open to cooperating with China on the premise of equality; second, due to the strong media censorship, Russians use metaphor to convey their concerns; and third, Russia tries to propose its own plans to attract Chinese investment in order to serve its own interests. However, Smirnova's view may not represent the whole picture of the Russian media, because some of her samples are from Russian think tanks rather than media.

Overall, it can be concluded that Russian media are positive towards the BRI, due to the following factors: Russian recognition of China’s power, strong trust between the top leaders of two countries, the economic benefits Russia may receive through the BRI, the facilitation of the Crimea Crisis and the same competitor — the United States, the inclusive, politically non-conditional, non-interventional characteristic of the BRI, and the substantial censorship in the Russian media. However, there are security concerns in Russian media in terms of Siberia and Central Asia, but these concerns are not mainstream. Arguably, Russian media have intentionally portrayed the BRI in a positive light.

By comparison, the views of experts in China, Russia and the West are divergent. Chinese scholars realize that the challenges the BRI faces are the linking-up policy between the BRI and the EAEU or the Greater Eurasian Partnership, but they are optimistic towards the solution of these problems. Russian and western experts can be divided into two camps. The first camp argues that the BRI has reflected the domestic and diplomatic necessity in China such as the economic development of western China and the choice of China facing the containment of the U.S. They believe Russia may benefit from the BRI and the advantages of the BRI outweigh its disadvantages.

The second camp shows different levels of strategic concerns regarding the influence of BRI in Central Asia and Siberia and the EAEU-BRI cooperation. Some Russian and western scholars with greater concerns think the increasing influence of China in Central Asia has threatened the leadership of Russia. Furthermore, China has deliberately proposed the BRI after the Crimea Crisis, benefiting China from the Russia-western plummeting relations. With lower concerns and realistic consideration, some Russian scholars have dominated in the decision-making of the Russian government. They argue that Russia does not oppose the BRI, but requests to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia and cooperates with the BRI on the precondition of equality and mutual benefit. Additionally, although the Chinese and Russian governments have endeavored to link up the BRI and EAEU, there are some practical problems the link-up policy needs to solve.

Especially in the West, experts have portrayed the scene of danger lurking on the BRI in Russia. They argue that Sino-Russian relations are temporary rapprochement and will deteriorate if China replaces the leadership of Russia in Central Asia or the ice between Russia and the West starts melting. Furthermore, some of them believe that the BRI projects in Russia is economically unsustainable and the “Yellow Peril” still exists in Russia. Due to the aforementioned censorship in Russia and China, it is crucial to understand the perspectives of scholars around the world.

The Perception of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Russian Media

In the media field, it is a common view that the mainstream voice in Russian media is positive or neutral with a few security and economic concerns, either written by Russian or Chinese authors. More concretely, first, Kang, Ravitsky, Smirnova, Qin and Xie argue that Russia recognizes the power and plans of China to realize its rejuvenation and enhance international influence, and Russia plays a key role in the BRI.

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Second, Kang, Li, Yan, Ravitsky, Yilmaz, Liu, Smirnova and Xie believe that the two governments enjoy the strong trust and firm partnership, especially for the top leaders, and this trust between top leaders has solved the suspicion of Russia for the BRI. Third, Kang, Ravitsky, Smirnova, Li, Yan and Xie argue that the Russian federal and local governments support the BRI and believe that they can benefit from the business and trade opportunities that the BRI may bring. Fourth, Kang, Li, Yan, Smirnova, Qin and Xie affirms that Russians concern its security in Siberia and China’s influence in Central Asia but also want Chinese investment.

Furthermore, the differences in the media-related literature mainly exist to what extent the security issues concern Russia. Smirnova argues that Russian media and experts are strongly concerned about Central Asia and Siberia, although Russia is open to the BRI and can benefit from the BRI economically. More specifically, first, Russians see the BRI as a challenge to the Russian great power status, but are open to cooperating with China on the premise of equality; second, due to the strong media censorship, Russians use metaphor to convey their concerns; and third, Russia tries to propose its own plans to attract Chinese investment in order to serve its own interests. However, Smirnova's view may not represent the whole picture of the Russian media, because some of her samples are from Russian think tanks rather than media.

By comparison, Chinese authors are more optimistic about the concerns in the Russian media and argue that they will be solved as both sides facilitate communication. Michael Ravitsky, a representative researcher at the Hudson Institute, has similar views with Chinese authors and believes that the Russian media seem to justify why Russia should be part of the BRI. More concretely, first, Russian media regards the BRI as a practical economic-driven project and downplay the geopolitical intentions behind the BRI; second, China is more a competitor to the U.S. economically and politically than China is the rival of Russia. Thus, China is more preferred by Russia as an alternative rather than the U.S., and a stronger China is relatively good for Russia; and third, China-led economic projects are more inclusive, politically non-conditional, non-interventional and more equal than the U.S.-led ones.

In addition, there are two consensuses Chinese scholars have reached, but Russian authors have not mentioned in the media-concerned research. First, Xie, Xikui Li, Yan, Jianxin Li, Xingwie Li and Qin contend that due to the limitation of different traditions and culture, ordinary Russian people know little about the BRI and the BRI is limited to governmental and business cooperation in Russia. Second, they analyze that the Crimea Crisis promoted Sino-Russian cooperation as an important factor. Based on the above two views, selected reporting of Russian media shows that the media tries to maintain good Sino-Russian relations, and not to portray the relations as a forced option of Russia, in order to maintain Russian self-esteem and good relations between the two countries. Essentially, these two consensuses, to some extent, align with the perspective of Ravitsky: Russian media seem to justify why Russia should be part of the BRI.

It is noteworthy that there is a comprehensive work written by Jiaxin Qin as his thesis of master’s degree. Qin argues that the BRI in the Russian media is positive by summarizing and analyzing around 4000 articles in the Russian media from September 2013 to December 2017. Qin details that BRI is China’s coping strategy for promoting regional economic integration under the U.S. strategic containment, but in fact, the BRI has exacerbated the Sino-American trade war. In addition, Qin, Jianxin Li and Xingwei Li argues that on the grounds that the media are controlled by the Russian government, Russian national media dominate the media market in Russia. Furthermore, Qin affirms that the Russian government shapes Russian media rather than vice versa, but the selecting report of Russian media also influence Russian decision-making, although the influence is limited.

The Perception of the Belt and Road Initiative in Russia Among Global Experts

On this topic, despite some potential challenges, many scholars believe the benefits of Russia being a member of the BRI outweigh the possible disputes. The controversy mainly focuses on the increasing Chinese influence in Central Asia due to the massive economic imbalances between China and Russia, even though the two sides have decided the “linking-up” policy between the BRI and the Russia-led EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) or the greater Eurasian Partnership.

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First, they argue that there is huge development space and convergence of interests between the two countries in the BRI, especially in the infrastructure constructions, which deepen the links of Eurasian countries and promotes the economic development of the Far East and southern Siberia of Russia. Second, they believe that the BRI is mainly to satisfy the need of Chinese economic development to solve the current economic regional imbalance between western and eastern China, and adjust China's diplomatic strategy to respond to the American TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy rather than aiming at weakening Russia.

Third, there are other contributing factors to facilitate the Sino-Russian cooperation, such as the identical strategic threat from the U.S., the Ukraine Crisis, personal ties of top leaders, and formalized institutional framework. Similarly, there is some summarized literature concerning the evaluation of Russian experts, Qin, and Xiujiao Li contend that the opportunities and challenges coexist for Russia in light of the BRI, but overall, the advantages surpass the disadvantages and the reasons are akin to the above as well.

Additionally, some literature shows strong suspicion regarding the BRI in Russia and beyond. Alexeeva, Lasserre, Bennett, Buranelli, Peyrouse, the Economist, Qin, and Xiujiao Li believe that Russia shows strategic anxiety in terms of the incremental influence of BRI in Central Asia, where the BRI constitutes threats to the leadership of Russia. Lukyanov and Kazantsev argue that the timing of BRI is at a time when the Ukrainian crisis has reached a climax, which is very symbolic and has made China the biggest beneficiary. More concretely, China has kept a distance from all its competitors and proposed a plan, the BRI, to absorb everyone, which will have far-reaching effects on the Russian sphere of influence, Central Asia. Furthermore, Kazantsev and the Economist believes that the BRI is considered to be an alternative to the Russia-led EAEU in Central Asia, thus diminishing the Russian influence there.

Likewise, some scholars, mainly in the West, downplay the role Russia plays and put more emphasis on China and Sino-Central Asian cooperation due to the rise of China and the relative decline of Russia. They portray the Sino-Russian relations are temporary “friends with benefits,” and the current good Sino-Russian relations are the result that Russia does not have an alternative after the Crimea Crisis. Alexeeva and Lasserre argue that the BRI projects in Russia heavily rely on the bilateral mechanism of the two countries, which proves ineffectual. They further that these projects can only be economically profitable in the long run on the prerequisite that several conditions can be met, alluding the unsustainability of the BRI projects in Russia. Bennett believes that the “Yellow Peril” still exists in Russia, and argues that the huge difference of population may lead to Chinese people to take over the Far East. Peyrouse argues that any ease between Russia and the West may destruct the Sino-Russian relations, and the EAEU-BRI cooperation.

By comparison, there are some Russian scholars with lower concerns or practical considerations, which, to some extent, reflects the attitude of the Russian government. As a representative realist, Professor Alexander Lukin is a prestigious expert in this field and his advice has been adopted by the Russian government, according to my observation and life experience in Russia. This opinion can be supported by the fact that in 2009, President Hu Jintao awarded him a medal for his outstanding contribution to Sino-Russian Relations. Lukin believes that Russia regards Central Asia as the core interest of Russian foreign policy. Russia has no objection to the BRI, but Russia prefers the Russia-led "Eurasian integration" and hopes to retain traditional Russian influence in Central Asia and carry out political and economic cooperation with China "on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.”

Furthermore, it is noteworthy to mention the work written by Gabuev, who argues the China and Russia have built numerous “intellectual and bureaucratic frameworks to accommodate mutual interests in Central Asia, including ideas of 'linking up' OBOR with the EAEU.” However, by in-depth interviews, Gabuev believes that there are many problems that prevent the EAEU-BRI linking-up such as the vague description of the BRI, the different perspectives of top-down decision-making in the two countries, low engagement of local businessmen in the linking-up, and China’s priority to cooperate with Central Asian countries on a bilateral basis rather than through EAEU. Thus, Gabuev considers there might be some tensions between the two countries if Beijing and Moscow cannot solve these problems.

Summary

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Overall, it can be concluded that Russian media are positive towards the BRI, due to the following factors: Russian recognition of China’s power, strong trust between the top leaders of two countries, the economic benefits Russia may receive through the BRI, the facilitation of the Crimea Crisis and the same competitor — the United States, the inclusive, politically non-conditional, non-interventional characteristic of the BRI, and the substantial censorship in the Russian media. However, there are security concerns in Russian media in terms of Siberia and Central Asia, but these concerns are not mainstream. Arguably, Russian media have intentionally portrayed the BRI in a positive light.

By comparison, the views of experts in China, Russia and the West are divergent. Chinese scholars realize that the challenges the BRI faces are the linking-up policy between the BRI and the EAEU or the Greater Eurasian Partnership, but they are optimistic towards the solution of these problems. Russian and western experts can be divided into two camps. The first camp argues that the BRI has reflected the domestic and diplomatic necessity in China such as the economic development of western China and the choice of China facing the containment of the U.S. They believe Russia may benefit from the BRI and the advantages of the BRI outweigh its disadvantages.

The second camp shows different levels of strategic concerns regarding the influence of BRI in Central Asia and Siberia and the EAEU-BRI cooperation. Some Russian and western scholars with greater concerns think the increasing influence of China in Central Asia has threatened the leadership of Russia. Furthermore, China has deliberately proposed the BRI after the Crimea Crisis, benefiting China from the Russia-western plummeting relations. With lower concerns and realistic consideration, some Russian scholars have dominated in the decision-making of the Russian government. They argue that Russia does not oppose the BRI, but requests to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia and cooperates with the BRI on the precondition of equality and mutual benefit. Additionally, although the Chinese and Russian governments have endeavored to link up the BRI and EAEU, there are some practical problems the link-up policy needs to solve.

Especially in the West, experts have portrayed the scene of danger lurking on the BRI in Russia. They argue that Sino-Russian relations are temporary rapprochement and will deteriorate if China replaces the leadership of Russia in Central Asia or the ice between Russia and the West starts melting. Furthermore, some of them believe that the BRI projects in Russia is economically unsustainable and the “Yellow Peril” still exists in Russia. Due to the aforementioned censorship in Russia and China, it is crucial to understand the perspectives of scholars around the world.