The recent assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh proved not only embarrassing for Tehran but also greatly concerning; it revealed the capability of outside forces to reach deep into the most secure Iranian facilities and successfully strike an adversary in its homeland. While some experts are clamoring that the death of Haniyeh has been a setback for negotiations and the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, it can also be argued that Haniyeh was in fact a major roadblock to the negotiations succeeding. The Hamas leader has never sought a peaceful coexistence with Israel, and he milked every ounce of antisemitism and hatred toward Israel from the UN, the Hague, university campuses, and even politicians. In many ways, Haniyeh’s death consequently clipped Iranian’s puppet strings.
Iran has now vowed to avenge the assassination of the Hamas leader. On several occasions, the Iranian leadership has promised to take action and is now effectively committed to a meaningful attack on the Jewish state and perhaps other targets in the West. It is still unclear when Iran will launch its threatening assault against Israel, or what form those strikes would take.
While Iran’s recent April 13 attack on Israel marked a significant escalation for the two nations—over 300 drones and a combination of cruise and ballistic missiles were launched—almost all incoming drones and missiles were intercepted with little to no damage. The lack of a damaging response to the assassination may be seen as a failure not only for Iranian clerics—who are actively calling for revenge—but also a sign of weakness to Iran’s proxies.
This is the quandary Iran faces as they find themselves in the corner of a shrinking sandbox: Does Iran retreat from its blustering rhetoric with another choregraphed attack to settle the score or do they attack with a simultaneous wave from Iran, Hezbollah, and its other proxies in the region? The former has the Iranian military appear weak while the latter green lights Israel to finally make good on their commitment to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.
The recent assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh proved not only embarrassing for Tehran but also greatly concerning; it revealed the capability of outside forces to reach deep into the most secure Iranian facilities and successfully strike an adversary in its homeland. While some experts are clamoring that the death of Haniyeh has been a setback for negotiations and the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, it can also be argued that Haniyeh was in fact a major roadblock to the negotiations succeeding. The Hamas leader has never sought a peaceful coexistence with Israel, and he milked every ounce of antisemitism and hatred toward Israel from the UN, the Hague, university campuses, and even politicians. In many ways, Haniyeh’s death consequently clipped Iranian’s puppet strings.
Iran has now vowed to avenge the assassination of the Hamas leader. On several occasions, the Iranian leadership has promised to take action and is now effectively committed to a meaningful attack on the Jewish state and perhaps other targets in the West. It is still unclear when Iran will launch its threatening assault against Israel, or what form those strikes would take.
While Iran’s recent April 13 attack on Israel marked a significant escalation for the two nations—over 300 drones and a combination of cruise and ballistic missiles were launched—almost all incoming drones and missiles were intercepted with little to no damage. The lack of a damaging response to the assassination may be seen as a failure not only for Iranian clerics—who are actively calling for revenge—but also a sign of weakness to Iran’s proxies, who often sacrifice their lives for their “big brother” Iran.
This is the quandary Iran faces as they find themselves in the corner of a shrinking sandbox: Does Iran retreat from its blustering rhetoric with another choregraphed attack to settle the score or do they attack with a simultaneous wave from Iran, Hezbollah, and its other proxies in the region? The former has the Iranian military appear weak while the latter green lights Israel to finally make good on their commitment to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.
How confident is Iran in defending its prized nuclear aspirations? Following Iran’s missile blitz, Israel launched a limited revenge strike that targeted Iranian air defence radar systems in the province of Isfahan, where the Natanz nuclear facility and military industrial complex—including drone and ballistic missile factories—are located. The IDF has thus sent a message: Iran is vulnerable. Israel’s military superiority—specifically, its air force—will play a pivotal role in Iran’s strategy. Is Iran willing to gamble and lose what they spent years and billions of dollars on building a nuclear weapons program? It would not be so far fetched to surmise what Iran’s Arab neighbours are discreetly rooting for.
Can Iran defend itself against 310 of the world’s best combat and ground attack aircraft, whose technological advantage in surveillance, precision strikes, and rapid response far outweighs an Iran’s struggling air force that is composed of outdated US aircraft and a few Russian acquisitions? Moreover, does Iran’s air defense system comprising of Russian-made S-300s provide a serious deterrent to counter aerial threats? The short answer is no. Iran must also consider the arrival and committed support of a US naval strike force that harbors an aircraft carrier and a supporting cast of destroyers and cruisers.
Most have been predicting a quick response from Iran; however, Iran may need to buy more time if it is planning to make a substantial attack on the Jewish state. First, it will take some time to set up a defensive ring around strategic infrastructure, refineries, and military and naval installations. A meaningful Iranian assault may take weeks or months to plan out with its proxies, and this may see Israel’s allies reduce their presence, leaving the Israeli population on edge. Thus, Iran must decide its course of action prior to the US presidential elections.
Additionally, there may also be a more sinister Iranian plot that is not being considered. This might involve a major terrorist attack with a weapon capable of causing unfathomable destruction and suffering. Such an attack could take place anywhere in the world. Israel may consider launching a pre-emptive strike to deter Iran if it uncovered evidence that Tehran was preparing to strike Israeli or US interests.
Following the creation of the Jewish state, Israel and its people have always seemed to manage maintaining an upper hand in defending itself and its interests. This narrative goes far beyond the military superiority of the IDF and its cunning ingenuity, discipline, and will to survive in a hostile region. Israeli adversaries—whether the Amalekites or Philistines, the 6-Day War, Entebbe, and the recent rescue of hostages being held in Gaza—never seem to catch up to Israel’s next move. Perhaps because of this, numerous Arab states have—through the Abraham Accords—come to the conclusion that it is better to be a friend of Israel than an enemy.