How Rational Is President Erdogan’s Policy against Cyprus and Greece: a Case Study

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a sui generis leader: on the one hand, he is recognized as a brilliant strategist; on the other, he manages to intimidate states, infuriate statesmen and stateswomen, and hence alienate himself and Turkey from numerous capitals and international organizations. His recent passionate statements, histrionically performed, are bellicose, offensive, and often contradictory; many of his actions are threatening or expansionist. His critics identify Erdogan’s megalomania and self-aggrandizement as the main causes of such behavior, explicitly implied by his “vision” of “Great Turkey”. If rationality is assumed to be a sine qua non condition of serious decision-making in international relations, and if hyperbolic passion, aggressiveness, and bellicosity contradict “rationality”, it should follow that the Turkish president’s rationality appears problematic. If this is inferred by looking at Erdogan’s policy vis-à-vis Cyprus and Greece — as a paradigm case or case study — the implications will be profound. This essay, theefore, will address primarily his anti-Hellenic behavior, but broader conclusions about his worldview and operational code will emerge via consideration of (1) whether Erdogan is a “rational” leader, given the various denotations of “rationality” in foreign policy analysis; (2) the sources of his hostility against Cyprus and Greece; and (3) what would follow if Erdogan were proven to be irrational” and/or “Machiavellian”.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a sui generis leader: on the one hand, he is recognized as a brilliant strategist; on the other, he manages to intimidate states, infuriate statesmen and stateswomen, and hence alienate himself and Turkey from numerous capitals and international organizations. His recent passionate statements, histrionically performed, are bellicose, offensive, and often contradictory; many of his actions are threatening or expansionist. His critics identify Erdogan’s megalomania and self-aggrandizement as the main causes of such behavior, explicitly implied by his “vision” of “Great Turkey”. If rationality is assumed to be a sine qua non condition of serious decision-making in international relations, and if hyperbolic passion, aggressiveness, and bellicosity contradict “rationality”, it should follow that the Turkish president’s rationality appears problematic. If this is inferred by looking at Erdogan’s policy vis-à-vis Cyprus and Greece — as a paradigm case or case study — the implications will be profound. This essay, theefore, will address primarily his anti-Hellenic behavior, but broader conclusions about his worldview and operational code will emerge via consideration of (1) whether Erdogan is a “rational” leader, given the various denotations of “rationality” in foreign policy analysis; (2) the sources of his hostility against Cyprus and Greece; and (3) what would follow if Erdogan were proven to be irrational” and/or “Machiavellian”.

The Erdogan Regime’s Policies Against Cyprus and Greece

Costas Melakopides:
Cyprus: Fake Truths, Fake Reviews and Moscow’s Expected Role

Having long abandoned Ahmet Davutoglu’s slogan “no problems with our neighbors”, Erdogan is now causing serious issues with mostneighbors. Presently subjected to his sustained hostility, Greeks and Greek Cypriots fear that, after “hybrid warfare”, he might engineer “hot episodes”. They also view his invasion in Syria’s Afrin — codenamed “Operation Olive Branch”! — as ruthless and typical of false pretenses. As for his current collaboration with Moscow and Tehran, many view it as opportunistic and therefore ephemeral.

Observing the fear and pain caused by Erdogan’s policies from the Aegean to the eastern Mediterranean to the Middle East, Greeks and Greek Cypriots feel frustrated and angry, because their friendly discourse and actions towards Turkey and its people, and their commitment to diplomatic and legal solutions for their disputes, have received a toxic response: threats, insults, distortion of arguments and facts, psychological manipulation, and violation of International Law in the Aegean Sea and the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), on top of the ongoing occupation of 37 percent of Cyprus. Given Erdogan’s notorious geopolitical ambitions and Turkey’s mounting militarization, and recalling his multiple international conflicts, the question of Erdogan’s intentions transcends the “academic”. As a recent opinion poll demonstrated, 92.5 percent of the Greeks perceive Turkey as their country’s greatest threat [1].

Ankara’s relations with Nicosia and Athens have been problematic and frequently conflicted, given the occupation of Cyprus and Ankara’s attempts to revise the Aegean status quo by explicit military threats and unending violations of the Athens FIR and Greek airspace since the 1970s. However, Greek-Turkish relations have also been marked by periods of détente and bilateral collaboration in many fields, because Athens banked on appeasement and Turkey’s “Europeanization”. Regarding Cyprus, Turkey has posed as eager to see the Island’s problem resolved through “bi-communal negotiations”. But, as my two recent RIAC analyses have shown, Erdogan’s methods –i.e. demanding a “solution” tailor-made for Turkey — are totally offensive, and this explains the Greek Cypriot majority’s renewed expectations from Moscow [2].

To be sure, Ankara’s insulting rhetoric and arrogant actions have long upset and confused many European states and officials – from Germany to the Netherlands to Austria and Denmark. However, when Erdogan started asserting his “vision” of a “New Turkey”, a popular London website wrote that “Turkey’s President Erdogan wants Mosul and Greek islands for his own” [3].

Today, Erdogan’s avalanche of anti-Hellenic declarations and actions demand or imply radical revisions of established treaties and agreements; threaten explicitly to use military force unless Ankara’s demands are met; and expand Turkey’s geopolitical challenges that violate fundamental international legal and ethical principles and norms, by deploying, sometimes literally, gunboat diplomacy.

Erdogan’s paradigmatic statements insulting and threatening Greece and Cyprus include his insistence that Turkey’s “present borders” do not coincide with “the borders of his heart,” which include Cyprus and Greek territories; his declaration in Athens last December that the 1923 multilateral Lausanne Treaty — which fixed the two countries’ borders — should be “updated”; naked threats against numerous Greek Aegean islands; and ad nauseam repetition by Erdogan and Ankara that they “will not tolerate unilateral actions” by the legitimate Cyprus government regarding the Cypriot EEZ. Simultaneously, Erdogan made the following macabre declaration:

“Certainly we will build a great and dynamic future for Turkey, and for this we will sacrifice our life and will take the life of others when needed.” [4]

Meanwhile, his close advisor, Yigit Bulut, stated his “certainty” that Washington plans to make Greece attack Turkey, but since Greece “is no match for Turkey’s might”, it would be “like a fly picking a fight with a giant” [5]. Moreover, regarding the Greek Imia islets whose “Greekness” Turkey disputes, Bulut professed last January [6]:

“We will break the arms and legs of any officers, of the Prime Minister, or of any minister, who dares to step onto Imia in the Aegean.”

Similarly, when a few fascists burned a Turkish flag in Athens last March, Mustafa Deztiji, president of the extreme-right BBP — Erdogan’s expected ally in Turkey’s 2019 presidential elections – proclaimed, “the Turkish flag one day will fly again in Athens” [7]. Characteristic hostile actions include the never-ending violation of the Aegean status quo (Greek airspace and FIR) by armed Turkish military jets, demonstrating Ankara’s expansionist revisionism and risking serious “accidents” in the process; the endless flights by Turkish military jets over Greek islands, often a few hundred meters over the terrified inhabitantsthe constant issue of illegal NAVTEX within the Republic of Cyprus’s EEZ, aiming to disrupt Nicosia’s hydrocarbons program; the Turkish Navy’s actual “abortion” of gas drilling by drillship SAIPEM 12000 in Bloc 3 of the EEZ in March 2018, violating Nicosia’s contract with Italian ENI; the February 2018 brutal crash of a Turkish coast guard vessel into a Greek patrol boat off Imia, deliberately threatening Greek sailors’ lives; and the theatrical arrest in early March 2018 of two Greek military personnel who inadvertently crossed the Greek-Turkish border in miserable weather conditions [8].

Various hypotheses will now be considered in attempt to identify Erdogan’s intended goals, before assessing their rationality.

Hypotheses on Erdogan’s perceived goals

Kerim Has:
Turkey vs. the EU: Still arguing? Russians Are Coming…

A prominent first hypothesis focuses on Erdogan’s anxiety to mobilize Turkey’s masses to ensure victory in next June’s presidential elections. Indeed, he is firing up chauvinistic emotions, flirting openly with Turkey’s extreme political formations, resorting to passionate rhetoric, and even adopting alien signs, such as the salute of the (fascist) Grey Wolves and the “rabia” of the Moslem Brotherhood. The same campaign goal is served by using grandiose declarations about “New Turkey” and “Turkey as a world power” – the latter echoing Ahmet Davutoglu’s central thesis in his famous Strategic Depth [9] — and by targeting Cyprus and Greece with hate speech. But Greek analysts also note Erdogan’s extreme nervousness and progressive insecurity: first, because of his determination to surpass Mustafa Kemal (Attaturk) as modern Turkey’s undisputed leading personality; second, because of his “existential” fears in case he loses the forthcoming election; and third, because in April 2018, his electoral prospects hover below 50 percent (allegedly by 5 percent). This hypothesis is shared by Le Monde Diplomatique, which observed in a current title, Erdogan tries to fix his election [10]:

“Turkey’s president has made an alliance with the ultranationalist far-right MHP, ahead of the next elections. He can still count on his AKP supporters but other voters are slipping away.”

Secondly, Greek analysts emphasize the manifest Erdoganian ambition to achieve Turkish regional hegemony –religious, geopolitical, and economic. Erdogan’s protracted Syrian adventure, culminating in the Afrin invasion and its threatened extension into northern Iraq, belongs here. Cyprus and Greece have emerged as parallel targets of intimidation, conceivably linked to Erdogan’s desire for their “Finlandization”. But his renewed clashes with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu are also relevant. After the short-lived post-Mavi Marmara rapprochement, on April 2, 2018 Erdogan called Netanyahu a “terrorist”.

Netanyahu responded: “Anyone who occupies northern Cyprus, invades Kurds, and massacres civilians in Afrin shouldn’t lecture us on morality and values.” [11]

The third hypothesis suspects that Greece’s recent economic difficulties stimulated Erdogan’s superficial impression that it could be easy prey for Turkish militarism. Ankara, however, failed to predict that the length, strength and banality of its attacks have caused a pan-Hellenic awakening from Athens’ appeasement slumber, strengthening further Greek Deterrence [12].

Fourthly, Cyprus’s resorting primarily to legal and diplomatic measures titillates Turkey’s expansionist proclivity. Therefore, the long-standing victim of Turkey’s 1974 military invasion and ongoing illegal occupation [13] seems irresistible to Erdogan’s designs, following the recent confirmation of impressive hydrocarbon deposits in its EEZ. Demonstrating arrogance, Turkey does not hesitate to violate the norms of the 1982 Law of the Sea [14]. Distorting established historical, political, and legal facts to pose as “the protector of Turkish Cypriot rights”, Ankara, lacking domestic energy resources, hopes to impose itself in the region, in conflict with Cyprus, Israel and Egypt.

Fifthly, a grand vicious circle is generated by Erdogan’s chauvinist extremism: the closure and/or Erdoganization of Turkish Mass Media and the massive imprisonment of journalists and academics prevent the Turkish people from knowing the truth and cause nationalist hysteria, which is then fed back to the pro-Erdogan Media. Simultaneously, Erdogan’s rhetoric and actions have pushed the Kemalist CHP and the extreme-right MHP to compete with the AKP in anti-Hellenic vehemence.

The sixth hypothesis is related to Erdogan’s “Machiavellian” game of playing Moscow and Washington against each other while attempting to milk both. To be sure, Greek analysts, drawing also on historical Russian-Turkish antagonism, keep doubting that Moscow will long tolerate Erdogan’s cynical improvisations, arguing that his “problematic rationality” entails unreliability.

The seventh explanatory vehicle expands the Machiavellian hypothesis to cover the EU, which is concurrently being blackmailed by Ankara. Greek and Greek Cypriot analysts, columnists and academics emphasize that Erdogan keeps threatening to “open the gates” and flood Europe (via the Greek Islands) with millions of migrants and refugees.

Eighth, analysts and commentators lament Erdogan’s exploitation of Hellenic appeasement, entrenched as Athens’ and Nicosia’s traditional policy against Turkish hostility. Their proven naivety, then, has encouraged Turkey’s bellicosity, mistaking diplomatic civility for weakness and stupidity.

As a ninth hypothesis I suggest an explanation of the protracted international “toleration” of Erdogan’s trouble-making, besides bullying and blackmail. This is Erdogan’s and Ankara’s permanent use of “strepsodikia”- Greek for chicanery or pettifoggery – that is, the tendency to twist and distort historical, legal, political, and geopolitical arguments and facts to serve populist and chauvinistic goals. For instance, Turkey has deepened international confusion on the real nature of the Cyprus problem. Erdogan and his ministers resort to conceptual distortion and legalistic manipulation, presenting Turkey’s illegal and immoral policies as paradigms of morality and legality and claiming to represent “the equal rights” of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, instead of admitting its illegal status. In fact, this occupied territory is, according to the European Council of Human Rights, a “puppet state” and illegal appendix to Turkey, and it was condemned by UN Security Council Resolutions 541(1983) and 550 (1984). Hence it remains unrecognized by the entire world, except for Turkey! [15]

Serious questions, therefore, arise about President Erdogan’s “rationality”. For if his expansionist “vision” borders megalomania; if his chosen means can be violent and even ruthless; if, domestically, his regime keeps violating elementary democratic principles and the rule of law; and if, externally, the use of threats and military force threaten Turkeywith isolation, traumatizing its international prestige; then it is arguable that Erdogan and the AKP elite have lost touch with reality. Hence Greek and Greek Cypriot commentators resort to “psychological” explanations that include Erdogan’s “megalomania”, “paranoia”, “arrogance”, and “psychopathology”.

Some necessary definitions

Timur Akhmetov:
Turkey and the Containment of Iran in the Middle East

Resisting a primarily psychological assessment, I propose to define and use the concepts “Rational” and “Machiavellian”. “Rational” is widely employed both in academic IR Theory and in ordinary/everyday language. In the second context, rational persons are generally considered to think and act in measured and dignified ways, using clear ideas, setting clear goals, and using noble and civil means towards carefully chosen and attainable ends. By contrast, persons are regarded as “irrational” if they fail to meet the rational persons’ characteristics, being highly emotional and unpredictable and opting for goals and means that “do not make sense”, as though they have lost contact with objectively perceived reality. In ordinary discourse, the term “irrational” is justifiably applied to problematic behavior that is illegal and/or immoral as a result of evil intentions, lack of control in both goals and methods, and immature actions that disregard probable consequences and costs. In that sense, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s supposed rationality appears deeply problematic.

In IR theory and foreign policy analysis, the denotation and connotation of the terms “rational” and “Machiavellian” rests on prior theoretical and methodological perspectives, such as “political realist”, “idealist” or “pragmatic idealist” [16]. The “realist” conception defines rationality primarily in instrumental ways, whereas the “idealist” and “pragmatic idealist” approaches consider necessary the legal and ethical dimensions. Thus, the “rational actor” model refers to a policy-maker who carefully identifies problematic issues, defines the desired goals, assesses the probable costs and benefits, and then pursues the most appropriate means to achieve these ends. In a “Realist” model, this decision-making process is supposed to be “clinical”, clear-headed and even cold-hearted. Thus, it is divorced from the normative or axiological considerations contained in International Ethics and International Law. Accordingly, President Erdogan’s rhetoric and actions will appear “rational” if they meet the declared goals and are accepted, or tolerated, by the international community. This judgement, however, can only be temporary and provisional, until international reactions are accumulated and his policies’ consequences are fully assessed.

By contrast, the competing non-realist (“idealist”) perspectives link “rationality” to questions of justice and injustice, good and evil, honesty and hypocrisy, and human and inhuman implications of actions. In sum, their “rationality” is akin to “reasonableness” and “prudence” regarding both goals and means. Clearly, for “idealists”, the notions that “might is right” and “the end justifies the means” – trademarks of political realism — are deeply cynical and can be inhuman, and should, therefore, be rejected, since the means deployed by “might”, and all envisaged “ends”, cannot escape ethical and legal criteria. It follows that they cannot be “right” if they fail the axiological or normative tests. Therefore, since President Erdogan pursues megalomaniacal goals through violent and aggressive means criticized by international public opinion, international mass media, individual European leaders, and the last European Council, his rationality is being severely questioned.

Turning now to “Machiavellian(ism)”, it implies decisions, policies or actions that contradict all “idealist” or “normative” commitments. As Professor Steven Forde observes, “Machiavelli develops the realist argument in its purest form, arguing that the nature of international politics absolves states of any moral duties whatsoever. He endorses imperialism, the unprovoked subjugation of weaker nations by stronger, without reservation and without limit….Machiavelli’s political writings are manuals on how to thrive in a completely chaotic and immoral world.” [17]

Erdogan’s words and actions can be perceived via this framework.. He consciously and consistently opts for political behavior that openly resists or disregards universally endorsed legal and ethical principles, values, and norms, since the deployment of “might” seems to him necessary and sufficient for achieving his ends. Therefore, the Turkish president must have decided to “thrive in a completely chaotic and immoral world”. It follows that, from a “sophisticated IR viewpoint”, President Erdogan’s “rationality” is either seriously problematic or constitutes what I propose to call “Machiavellian rationality”, which clearly amounts to irrationality from any “non-realist” perspective.

The EU’s Belated Reaction

Kerim Has:
Turkey–USA Relations in a Tailspin: To Be Continued

Erdogan’s aggressive statements and actions had long been tolerated by the EU because of indecision, confusion, Erdogan’s ongoing blackmail, and effective strepsodikia. Concluding, however, that Ankara continues violating legal and ethical values and norms while remaining an accession candidate forced the EU to respond. The March 22-23 European Council issued an unequivocal and powerful condemnation of Turkey for its behavior in the Aegean Sea and the Cypriot EEZ [18]:

12. The European Council strongly condemns Turkey’s illegal actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean and underlines its full solidarity with Cyprus and Greece.

13. Recalling its Conclusions of October 2014 and the Declaration of 21 September 2005, the European Council urgently calls on Turkey to cease these actions and respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus to explore and exploit its natural resources in accordance with EU and International law.

14. In this context, it recalls Turkey’s obligation to respect International Law and good neighbourly relations, and normalize relations with all EU Member States including the Republic of Cyprus.

The next paragraph condemned Turkey for another sensitive (and widely disturbing) issue:

15. The European Council expresses its grave concern over the continued detention of EU citizens in Turkey, including two Greek soldiers, and calls for the swift and positive resolution of these issues in a dialogue with Member States.

Erdogan’s “rationality” received thereby a serious blow from the EU’s “strong condemnation”. The EU thereby disproved his apparent assumption that intimidation and blackmail, coupled with material benefits flowing from EU-Turkey relations, could allow Ankara to “get away” with offensive and violent decisions.

Conclusions

The explicit condemnation of Turkey’s illegal policies and actions against Cyprus and Greece seriously endangers Erdogan’s EU prospects. This development, however, contradicts Ankara’s historic dream to be “accepted” by another major Western organization, a dream reiterated by Erdogan himself just before the March 26 Varna Conference: “accession remains our strategic goal.”

The European Council, moreover, issued a blanket condemnation of Erdogan’s rejection of International Law principles and European Union norms. Therefore, according to the “rational actor” criteria, the EU has proven Erdogan’s favorite policies counter-productive, ineffective or problematic in terms of rationality.

In addition, Erdogan’s intimidating utterances and insulting rhetoric manifest emotional extremism. In ordinary language, used by journalists, columnists and other opinion-makers, these excesses qualify as irrational. With regards to Erdogan’s actions, we noted the pursuit of blackmail, “hybrid war”, dirty war (in Afrin), and the ruthless persecution of real or imagined enemies and adversaries. Therefore, even without recourse to the Just War theory regarding the ongoing North Syria invasion, it transpires that the Turkish president’s means qualify as “Machiavellian”, or immoral and illegal, and, for any “idealist” reading, “irrational”.

Using the criteria of territorial expansionism (or “imperialism”) and the “unprovoked subjugation of weaker nations by stronger ones”, Erdogan’s policies against Cyprus and the Syrian Kurds are paradigms of “Machiavellianism”. Thus, Erdogan and his regime risk alienation from states, peoples and organizations that resent an aggressive and conflictual political culture. Considering both Turkey’s political culture and Erdogan’s emerging operational code, it was inevitable that Erdogan would keep attracting characterizations such as “untrustworthy”, “unpredictable” and “unreliable” [19]. Many analysts would equate these epithets to “irrational”.

In view of this alarming picture, Cyprus and Greece are re-awakened to the necessity to mobilize the EU far more effectively. Inter alia, they should demand the application of serious sanctions on Turkey, like the EU insists on applying to Moscow. Simultaneously, they must keep reinforcing their Deterrence and strengthen their regional bonds with Israel and Egypt, probably adding Lebanon and Jordan as well. Cyprus, finally, should avoid at present a re-start of (pathological) “inter-communal negotiations” and wait for a more “rational” regional context.

Finally, as my RIAC essays demonstrate, despite the current warming of Russia-Turkey collaboration, Greek Cypriots seem committed to counting Moscow as a “Gigantic Counterweight”. Indeed, their deep affection and respect for Russia was re-asserted in the November 2017 opinion research for the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. The crucial question on the “Role of International Actors in the Resolution of the Cyprus Problem”, received these revealing replies: Greece attracted 64% positive responses and 10% negative; Russia was second with 41% positive and 15% negative; after the EU and the UN, the US was fifth with only 15% positive and 39% negative responses, while at bottom (as expected) stood the UK with 10% positive and 55% negative attitudes [20].

The next few months will make clear whether Moscow remains prepared to pursue the “cohabitation” of its “material embrace” with Turkey and its time-honored “special relationship” with Cyprus, as my RIAC essays have predicted.

1. Kappa Research, shown by Alpha TV, Athens, 21 March 2018.

2. See Costas Melakopides, “On the ‘Special’ Nature of the Russia-Cyprus Relationship”, and “Cyprus: Fake Truths, Fake Reviews and Moscow’s Expected Role”, RIAC Analytics, 20.6.2017 and 20.12. 2017 respectively.

3. Patrick Christys in www.express.co.uk/news/world/725722/Turkey-President-Recep-Tayyip-Erdogan-Mosul..., 27 October 2016.

4. P. Karvounopoulos, “We will take the life of others for the great Turkey”, 24 March 2018, www.militaire.gr

5. “Erdogan advisor says Greece ‘like a fly picking a fight with a giant’, ekathimerini.com, 14 February 2018.

6. Ibid.

7. “’Delirium’ by Deztiji: The Turkish flag will fly back in Athens”, onalert.gr/paralhrhma-destidzi-tourkikh-shmaia-kymatisei-3ana-a8hna/63715

8. Such incidents, frequent at the Evros river border, have customarily been resolved at the lowest military level, as against the recent banal and humiliating Turkish “show”.

9. Ahmet Davutoglu, Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position, Piotita Publications, Athens, 2010 (in Greek). Paradoxically, this “megalomaniacal” book has resisted translation in major languages.

10. Akram Belkaid, Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2018.

11. “Erdogan Hits Back: Netanyahu Is a ‘Terrorist’ and Israel Is a ‘Terror State’”, www.haaretz.com/israel-news/erdogan-hits-back-netanyahu-is-a-terrorist-israel-a-terror-stat..., HAARETZ, 3 April 2018.

12. Selcuk Gultasli, a Turkish journalist whose Zaman newspaper was closed by Erdogan’s decree in July 2016, recently warned the Europeans: “Appeasement will not work with Erdogan”. See euobserver.com, 26 March 2018.

13. My earlier RIAC essays provide elaborate information and bibliography on Turkey’s 1974 invasion and ongoing illegal occupation of 37 percent of Cyprus.

14. Turkey is among a handful of states refusing to sign the UNCLOS. This, however, has no real significance in International Law terms, since the norms of UNCLOS have become part of Customary International Law, being also part of the acquis communautaire of the EU which Turkey aspires to join.

15. My two RIAC Analytics essays provide sufficient information on these UNSC Resolutions.

16. “Pragmatic Idealism” in IR was introduced in my 1998 book, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995 (McGill-Queen’s University Press) and was employed again in my Russia-Cyprus Relations: A Pragmatic Idealist Perspective (London, Palgrave, 2016).

17. Steven Forde, “Classical Realism”, in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.64.

18. Council of the EU, European Council conclusions on the Western Balkans and actions by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, 22 March 2018, Press Release 164/18.

19. See my Russia-Cyprus Relations, pp.129-134, for a discussion of Turkish political culture, which is shown to exhibit a rare combination of blatant contradictions.

20. See “Presidential Elections 2018, 25^th Pan-Cyprian Research on Political Culture and Electoral Behavior”, CYMAR Market Research, Nicosia November 2017 (in Greek).

Views expressed in the article do not necessarily represent those of RIAC.