There are many countries in Eurasia that still link their future to a world where the rules of the game are determined by the Americans. However, they do so only out of fear or because of the corruption of the elites. In most cases, the driving force is the expectation that obedience will become the source of funds needed to achieve the goals of national development and stability.
Every state’s strategic thinking is determined by its geographical location. This dictates how nations answer the question of what is the most important condition for our survival in a world where cooperation has not yet acquired the character of a common idea? For Russia, located in the centre of the vast continent of Eurasia, the answer lies in its military capabilities, which allow it to exclude the possibility of a fatal defeat in a clash with any enemy. The “island” position of the United States has a similar significance; the country is located at a significant distance from other centres of power and occupies almost the entire northern part of the Americas. This determines the attitude of Americans to any conflict or crisis: no matter how tragic it may be, the consequences will never affect the security of their own Island.
We cannot yet say what specific embodiment the debates will take on the possibility of a formal unification between the United States and such territories as Greenland or Canada. However, if this happens in one form or another, it will strengthen the island rationale of our American opponents. Accordingly, new conditions appear in which Russia has to solve problems related to its development and security. The emergence of a huge island state in North America would be a delightful experiment in the field of practical geopolitics. It provides serious grounds for thinking about the practical consequences of such changes for Russia and Eurasia.
In fact, the idea of Greenland, Canada and another region nearby joining the USA does not seem so bad or illogical. First, because it reflects, in general, one of the principal geopolitical ideas of our time. Its essence is that formal statehood is not sufficient to have the right to it. The second half of the 20th century was an era in which many states emerged: first due to the process of the final disintegration of the European empires and decolonisation, then following the collapse of the USSR, after which a number of countries also emerged, whose future statehood we can now observe with a certain anxiety. We see examples where countries with formal statehood are completely unable to play a corresponding role in world affairs, and easily succumb to pressure or bribery.
They are sometimes completely economically dependent on their large neighbours. There are better examples, but the aforementioned Canada really does receive huge benefits from participating in a Free Trade Zone with the United States, and it may be quite reasonable to ask: why do the Americans value the sovereignty of this country if it creates more risks than benefits? In any event, establishing more direct control would help the United States eliminate any risks associated with the possible penetration of Washington’s opponents into Canada and its economy. China may not like this, but the United States is not obliged to care about Chinese interests. In the case of Greenland, formal control by Denmark can generally be considered an anachronism. After all, Denmark itself is a member of NATO, and its military policy is completely controlled by the United States through this intermediary institution. Neither Canada nor Denmark have full sovereignty anymore, since they are deprived of the opportunity to decide for themselves what poses the greatest danger to them. Their circumstantial control over certain territories can thus be seen as a mere tribute to a tradition established in the past.
Second, the US desire to establish tighter control over neighbouring lands corresponds to an objective tendency to form macro-regions that are more stable amid international competition. Unlike Europe, control over which requires significant logistical efforts, Canada and Greenland are located nearby and can be easily included in the military and economic perimeter of the American geopolitical island. This, as we understand, will not affect the geopolitical basis of US strategic thinking in any way – the island will simply become significantly larger, while preserving all the features that determine its position in the system of international politics. We cannot, therefore, think that the territorial expansion can affect how the US sees itself in the outside world. Moreover, the “ideal idea” of such expansion itself is based on the desire to preserve the uniqueness of America’s geographic location.
This means that Russia, China and other Eurasian countries need to seriously consider what impact such a significant strengthening of their main adversary will have on their plans, assuming it preserves its approach to problems of global and regional significance.
In other words, if the US was to formally unite with Europe and assume real, not mythical, responsibility for the survival of its citizens, this might give Americans more understanding of the importance of the rules of the game and the international order as a whole.
Perhaps such a unification of the West within the framework of some super-state would make it more responsible: after all, the security of citizens is the most important factor determining foreign policy. But this will not happen. Europe will remain an appendage of American military-political power, completely controlled, but not receiving any public benefits from its humiliated position.
For Russia, as the central power of Eurasia, as well as for all our friends and neighbours, this means, at a minimum, several new factors. First, we should not expect US responsibility for what is happening in the world to increase, even slightly. Moreover, with increased internal resources, the Americans will look even more detachedly at everything happening overseas. The US contribution to stability at the level of individual regions may decrease even more. We have already seen that geographic proximity has never been an argument there: the closest neighbours of the United States in Latin America are often stunning examples of failed states. This is largely due to their close proximity to, and interaction with, Washington. However, the responsibility of the United States for security in the global sense may increase. Achieving even greater economic power will increase the price of survival in the physical sense. The Russian military-strategic arguments will not lose their persuasiveness, and may even gain new resonance.
Second, the consolidation of US power capabilities, not only in territorial terms, will make its behaviour in the world more selfish. This, in the end, will benefit Russian interests, since it will inevitably reduce the attractiveness of our main adversaries in the eyes of everyone else. We cannot indulge in the delusion that sympathy and willingness to cooperate can have an intangible basis: powers receive this from others if they themselves are ready to share and help others. A more selfish United States has already scared off part of the world community and created grounds for the rest to think more with their own minds.
If new material grounds emerge to strengthen this trend, one can hope that constructive interaction between countries in other regions will increase. There are many countries in Eurasia that still link their future to a world where the rules of the game are determined by the Americans. However, they do so only out of fear or because of the corruption of the elites. In most cases, the driving force is the expectation that obedience will become the source of funds needed to achieve the goals of national development and stability. The Island America that has grown in all respects will be able to give less, but will become more demanding. This is exactly what Russia or China need, from a strategic perspective.
First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.
