We see that in the case of potential international cooperation in Greater Eurasia, none of the political factors mentioned in the previous section function. For those states that Russia calls upon to create some new international reality, there is no unifying external threat. Their political elites are not in the position of a besieged fortress, as was the case with the European colonial powers or the pided Germany in the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, it is precisely openness to the outside world that is now a generally recognised condition for success in achieving the most urgent tasks of national development. The states of Greater Eurasia should not deal with an external force – a state or a union of states, whose goal is to destroy their political systems or physically absorb them.
There can be no unifying role for one leader here either. Due to its size, Greater Eurasia includes such states as Russia, India and China, and none of them will ever be able to agree on who else will play the role of regional leader. Even at the sub-regional level in Eurasia, we see that the countries of its geographic core – Central Asia – are faced with the problem of competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for who is more suitable for the role of leader of this small group of countries. We cannot imagine at all that Moscow, Beijing or New Delhi will be so powerful that they will take responsibility for becoming the “core” of cooperation in such a huge space. Even in the case of China, whose economic opportunities are the most significant, the idea of a “community of shared destiny” has nothing in common with the concept of a collective West organised around the will of its unconditional leader – the United States. Although even if China had such ambitions, they would still be based on only theoretical interest simply due to the presence of Russia and India.
If the states of Greater Eurasia do not have classical factors of international cooperation at their disposal, then it is very likely that they can be replaced by those common goals that not only meet their current interests, but are also the most historically rooted, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev. The basis for the gradual formation of a community of states of Greater Eurasia will be the opportunity to obtain within it what the countries of this region most strive for – resources for solving national development tasks as the basis for stability and survival of the state. This is the second part of the author’s reflections on the possible foundations of international cooperation in Greater Eurasia..
We see that in the case of potential international cooperation in Greater Eurasia, none of the political factors mentioned in the previous section function. For those states that Russia calls upon to create some new international reality, there is no unifying external threat. Their political elites are not in the position of a besieged fortress, as was the case with the European colonial powers or the pided Germany in the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, it is precisely openness to the outside world that is now a generally recognised condition for success in achieving the most urgent tasks of national development. The states of Greater Eurasia should not deal with an external force – a state or a union of states, whose goal is to destroy their political systems or physically absorb them.
There can be no unifying role for one leader here either. Due to its size, Greater Eurasia includes such states as Russia, India and China, and none of them will ever be able to agree on who else will play the role of regional leader. Even at the sub-regional level in Eurasia, we see that the countries of its geographic core – Central Asia – are faced with the problem of competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for who is more suitable for the role of leader of this small group of countries. We cannot imagine at all that Moscow, Beijing or New Delhi will be so powerful that they will take responsibility for becoming the “core” of cooperation in such a huge space. Even in the case of China, whose economic opportunities are the most significant, the idea of a “community of shared destiny” has nothing in common with the concept of a collective West organised around the will of its unconditional leader – the United States. Although even if China had such ambitions, they would still be based on only theoretical interest simply due to the presence of Russia and India.
However, simple geopolitics does not particularly support the idea of truly deep interstate cooperation in Eurasia: the dependence of the foreign policy behaviour of states on their geographic location. First of all, because the countries of Greater Eurasia are at a significant geographical distance from each other. There is no doubt that modern communication and transport technologies no longer make a geographic space as a dramatic factor in its influence as it was 300-500 years ago.
However, geographic location is in any case the most important in shaping foreign policy priorities. For example, for Russia the top priority, whether we like it or not, remains the West, which in our case represents the greatest threat. China’s geographic priorities are in the East and the Pacific Ocean, where the location is most important for the existence of the most populated areas of the PRC. Even if we imagine colossal economic and demographic growth in the North-West regions of China, which is unlikely, they still will not be able to compete even theoretically with its own coastal provinces. India’s geographic priorities are directed to the West and South-West: Africa, the Arab world and, finally, Europe, with which this country is most historically connected. Therefore, for Russia, Europe is, first of all, an enemy that has been trying to limit its sovereignty for centuries. For China, our immediate western neighbours pose no threat. India, of course, regards Europe with some apprehension, but its scale is in no way comparable to the concerns that New Delhi has about the rise of China.
Finally, the geopolitical scale of the region really does play a vital role in making its countries feel drawn to systematic cooperation. It is no accident that the tradition of military alliances, so deeply rooted in Europe, has never been present in Asia or the eastern part of Eurasia. As noted above, the development of communications and transport now somewhat reduces the significance of distances. But let us not forget that the foundations of foreign policy culture were formed over a period much longer than the existence of aviation or even long-haul rail transit. Due to their geographical location, the states of Greater Eurasia are much less accustomed to systematic cooperation than their historical opponents and oppressors in the West.
However, we are now quite confidently and actively saying that the strategic priority of the states located in this colossal geographical space can serve as the foundation of an international order in which relations between its participants will be closer and more trusting than with external partners. These discussions are not the product of one of the powers’ desire to build Greater Eurasia “for itself”: as we have seen, this is even theoretically impossible. Therefore, there is reason to believe that we are dealing here with other prerequisites for broad international cooperation than those that the historical experience of the West, considered above, allows us to systematise. The current task of the researcher, therefore, is to study these prerequisites and, on their basis, make assumptions about what the Eurasian international order might look like in the future.
In other words, if Edward H. Carr, analysing the state of affairs in Europe on the eve of World War II, wrote that “our task is to explore the ruins of our international order and discover on what fresh foundations we may hope to rebuild it,” then in Greater Eurasia it is not the conventional “ruins” that deserve understanding, but the shoots of something that is not a product of a general military conflict.
Greater Eurasia, unlike Europe, really does not know the experience of a large-scale war in which its peoples would fight against each other.
Even the great empires that existed here – the Russian and Chinese –never were military opponents on the scale of Britain and France or France and Germany. Other Eurasian states did not have to choose sides in military alliances that were irreconcilably fighting each other. In this sense, Greater Eurasia has always remained on the periphery of international politics, if we understand it as a process of a military nature.
At the same time, Greater Eurasia has its own experience of direct or indirect interaction between the most perse cultures and civilisations, whose geographical remoteness has limited direct military-political interaction. Here, therefore, the experience of wars is replaced by the experience of cultural and economic exchange. The last great conquest in Greater Eurasia was the campaigns of Genghis Khan and his successors, which resulted in the creation of a huge and short-lived empire. For more than 700 years, Greater Eurasia has not known military conflicts that would affect the majority of its peoples and states. The task is, as one might assume, to understand the significance of this unique experience for the ability of states to cooperate. We should do this not only at the declarative level, but also conceptually, convincingly for the decision-making politicians.
The vast political space of Greater Eurasia remains, at the same time, subject to a common challenge for all – these are the threats to political systems and internal stability that are associated with the pressure of the modern world economy. The imbalances that exist in it inevitably lead to an increase in poverty, the consequences of which can be dangerous for domestic political stability and the very survival of states. Religious radicalism offers the simplest answers to questions related to the problem of injustice rooted in the market economy. It would be completely imprudent to underestimate its danger for the states of Greater Eurasia.
Perhaps, moving towards solving this and a number of other problems could really help place development tasks in the centre of attention, rather than traditional security. If we agree that the states of Greater Eurasia do not have classical factors of international cooperation at their disposal, then it is very likely that they can be replaced by those common goals that not only meet their current interests, but are also the most historically rooted. Then the basis for the gradual formation of a community of states of Greater Eurasia will be the opportunity to obtain within it what the countries of this region most strive for – resources for solving national development tasks as the basis for stability and survival of the state.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
