Here’s why there won’t be a world war over the Middle East

The elaborate assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran will inevitably lead to another round of acute international tension in the Middle East. We do not yet know the exact nature of the retaliatory strike that the Iranian leadership has promised Israel. But it is likely to follow in the near future. This has many observers genuinely worried about the wider implications for the region and the world.

For almost a year now, we have witnessed a serious deterioration in relations between Israel and its neighbors. Iran, in whose capital the terrorist attack took place, has traditionally been at the forefront of the struggle against the Israelis and their Western allies. At the same time, we must take into account two peculiarities of what is happening. First, there are no objective reasons for a truly large-scale interstate war in the region. Secondly, a conflict would have a limited effect on world affairs as a whole.

There is no doubt that dreams of a relatively peaceful equilibrium in the Middle East will have to be abandoned, if not forever, then for a very long time. The reduction in America’s ability to intervene in Middle Eastern politics gave rise to the idea that countries in the region would be able to find ways of living together on their own, without Washington holding their hand. But now those expectations seem very premature. 

The elaborate assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran will inevitably lead to another round of acute international tension in the Middle East. We do not yet know the exact nature of the retaliatory strike that the Iranian leadership has promised Israel. But it is likely to follow in the near future. This has many observers genuinely worried about the wider implications for the region and the world.

For almost a year now, we have witnessed a serious deterioration in relations between Israel and its neighbors. Iran, in whose capital the terrorist attack took place, has traditionally been at the forefront of the struggle against the Israelis and their Western allies. At the same time, we must take into account two peculiarities of what is happening. First, there are no objective reasons for a truly large-scale interstate war in the region. Secondly, a conflict would have a limited effect on world affairs as a whole.

There is no doubt that dreams of a relatively peaceful equilibrium in the Middle East will have to be abandoned, if not forever, then for a very long time. The reduction in America’s ability to intervene in Middle Eastern politics gave rise to the idea that countries in the region would be able to find ways of living together on their own, without Washington holding their hand. But now those expectations seem very premature. 

Israel’s domestic problems have created the conditions for its government to choose the traditional path of conflict rather than cooperation with its neighbors. Other states have reacted according to their capabilities.

However, it is too early to think that we could see a major regional war as a result. In any case, there are no obvious prerequisites for one. This, of course, compares with all the previous large-scale conflicts around Israel in the second half of the twentieth century. What seems more likely at the moment is that its neighbors and adversaries will show restraint.

First, because none of them is currently pursuing a revolutionary foreign policy. Until the mid-1970s, most Arab countries in the region were gripped by radical nationalism, the cause of most wars. Israel, for its part, was also on the rise, and major confrontations with its neighbors were a continuation of its internal dynamics.

The situation today is somewhat different. All of Israel’s neighbors are either established states or facing serious internal difficulties. Even Iran, which looks the most determined, is no longer the revolutionary entity it was for the first 10-15 years after the fall of the Shah’s regime and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. In other words, Israel’s neighbors have no reason to take the risks that a major war would entail. And it still takes two to tango. In particular, none of Israel’s neighbors capable of waging a major war have their own territorial disputes with it. And there don’t seem to be domestic political reasons for locking horns, at present.

Thus, a relatively serious armed conflict is only possible in the event of a massive Israeli attack on one of its neighbors. Such a prospect is not yet in sight.

But even if we accept the theoretical possibility of a major war, the potential for its impact on world politics and economies is far from obvious. It is highly likely that these effects would be limited to domestic issues. In other words, the war would affect the balance between the major powers, presenting them with additional advantages or problems. But it would not change their position to such an extent as to force them into existential problems.

The unique position of nuclear superpowers is that only peers can pose a real danger to them. Only direct action aimed at each other’s security could lead the US or Russia to conclude that a threat is worth such a monstrous risk as an appeal to their unique military capabilities.

Possession of nuclear weapons places an enormous responsibility on the leaders of those two great powers. And that responsibility is only to their own citizens and their own state. It therefore seems extremely unlikely that a regional conflict would lead them to engage in direct confrontation – even if they are indirectly involved.

We remember from history that during the Cold War, the USSR and US openly supported their main adversaries in the Middle East. Moscow, as we know, even sent a significant number of advisers, along with weapons, to Arab countries. Washington, for its part, supported Israel with all its might. But this did not create a situation in USSR-US relations similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when we really were on the brink of world war. Simply because at that moment the threat was mutual and aimed at the territory of the USSR and the US. The other regional conflicts, even Korea in 1950-1953, where Soviet pilots fought, did not create crises of this magnitude.

Of course, we could be wrong, especially if the political elites of the West do not display good strategic thinking. But it is axiomatic that relations between the nuclear superpowers take place on a different plane than the rest of international politics. And all regional conflicts, even the most violent ones, are in the realm of conventional politics and thus do not pose a direct and immediate threat to the survival of these powers.

Therefore, they retain the ability to remain detached from any changes in the balance of power caused by conflicts between their allies.

And purely theoretically, the likelihood that even a major – God forbid – war in the Middle East would threaten the survival of all humanity is minimal.

And not only there: a likely clash between the US and China over Taiwan would also have a good chance of remaining at the level of an ordinary major conflict. This may be one of the reasons why the Chinese leadership has reacted with restraint and equanimity to all the hostile antics of the Americans.

The situation in the Middle East will unfortunately always be a source of disturbing and very sad news. We will have to get used to the fact that as long as Israel exists, its interactions with its neighbors will remain complex and, in some cases, bloody. But even if the Jewish state should eventually disappear, it’s not certain that other sources of regional tension will follow suit. Don’t forget that Iran also has territorial disputes with its Gulf neighbors.

The weight of civilian casualties and flagrant violations of international law should elicit condemnation and diplomatic action from Russia and all countries committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. But the eventual reduction of tensions in the region will, of course, remain a matter for the states concerned themselves.