Maghreb 2024: New Look

The article analyzes the influence of the foreign policy activities of Algerian and Tunisian leaders on the system ofregional relations in the Maghreb. In the first part of the article, the authors consider the key characteristics of theMaghreb subsystem of international relations. They define it as deeply integrated with other regional subsystems, on theone hand, and as peripheral, on the other. They describe the transformation of this system in the 2010s, the influence ofWestern Sahara and Libyan factors on it, as well as relations between the southern and northern Mediterranean. It isfurther noted that in the early 2020s, key changes at the regional level were associated with the coming to power ofAbdelmadjid Tebboune in Algeria and Kais Saied in Tunisia. The second part of the article characterizes the foreignpolicy innovations of Kais Saied, who, within the framework of the conservative revolution, began to actively use therhetoric of Arab nationalism in the foreign policy discourse. The third part of the article analyzes Algeria's foreign policy.The key principles of this policy are shown, the activities of the APDR in the Sahel, Palestinian and Maghrebiandirections are briefly described. The main conclusion of the article is that the changes in the foreign policy of Tunisia andAlgeria are mainly rhetorical in nature and do not change the essence of the Maghreb system of international relations,although they create a new design for it.

Authors: 

Vasily A. Kuznetsov, State Academic University for the Humanities (GAUGN)
Russian Federation, Moscow
Anastasia Vasilenko, State Academic University for the Humanities (GAUGN)
Russian Federation, Moscow

At the end of 2021, the article “Maghreb 2021: Roadblocks to Domestic Political Advancement and Threats to Regional Subsystem of Relationship” [Кузнецов, Василенко, 2021] was published. At that time our idea was to offer a systemic view of the Maghreb political reality, tracing, on the one hand, some of the general trends in the development of international relations for this subregion, and on the other, the parallelisms in the internal political development of the countries that comprise it. The title of the article was supposed to indicate the specifics of the situation that had developed in the post-pandemic period — it was a situation of numerous roadblocks, both on regional and national levels.

Three years have passed. An armed conflict has begun in Europe, the situation with global food security has deteriorated sharply, the global transport and logistics system has changed, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has escalated, and the Abraham Accords have been put on hold.

Finally, by the end of the year, the fall of the government in Damascus turned out to be the final chord of the process of political transformation of the region that began during the Arab Spring.

In this situation, it makes sense to look at new trends what have emerged in the Maghreb system of international relations, and at the solutions to the roadblocks of domestic political development identified three years ago what have been found in the countries of the region. In Morocco the political process developed quite stably during this period, and in Libya the status quo that had already been established in 2021 was preserved. But in Algeria and Tunisia some changes took place — in this article we will try to identify their impact on the regional situation.

Maghreb Subsystem of International Relations: Quo Vadis

While reviewing the current dynamics of the Maghreb regional development, it is appropriate to single out the common features underlying the subsystem of international relationships prevailing in this segment of the Arab world[Ближний Восток… 2018]. In consideration of the fact that it has already been the focus of research more than a few times before [Zoubir, White, 2015; De Larramendi, 2018; Lounnas, Messari, 2018], we will limit ourselves to outlining some of its basic inherent elements.

The geographic isolation of the Maghreb, with its northern boundary made up of the Mediterranean Sea and the southern — of the Sahara Desert expanse, has predetermined a fairly early formation of a specific identity of the subregion, which was perceived in the Middle Ages by the contemporaries as a certain entire cultural and political space[Видясова, 1987], characterized by a multifaceted identity: primarily, the Arab-Muslim and Mediterranean, and also the African and partially Atlantic.

At the same time, although the Maghreb was fractionally included in all of these regional systems, it held no more than a peripheral status in each of them, as it was only partially exposed to the influence of impulses exuded from the center. This was essentially the reason why, in the second half of the 20th century, not only specific identities were shaped in the Maghreb, but also its own subsystem of international relationships was forged.

The inner architecture of this subsystem was defined, as we believe, on the basis of five critical factors: first, the Maghreb member states are not numerous (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Western Sahara), second, there are two states among them, comparable in terms of their strength and power, who have been historically involved in the competition for the mantle of regional supremacy (Algeria and Morocco) [Lefèvre, 2016; Boukhars, 2019]; third, the polity and foreign policy orientation of the regional states are radically different, fourth, the institutionalization of regional relations is very low, while the level of personalization of foreign policies is very high; fifth, the degree of economic connectivity is weak, while the historical and cultural links within the subregion are strong [Labaronne, 2013].

In the 1970-s, a sixth factor was added to the above five — a conflict over the Western Sahara heightenedtensions between Algeria and Morocco. As an impediment to the subregional integration, the conflict became a key element for the entire system of relations in the Maghreb, setting the frames for the earlier existing Algeria vs Moroccorivalry [Володина, 2015].

Over the 1990 – 2000 period, the conflict shifted steadily to the periphery of the global as well as regional agenda, and started, as it seemed, to gradually lose its major role for the regional subsystem of relationships. As the two states were heavily concentrated on the problems of domestic political development throughout the 1990-s, after Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power in Algeria and Mohammed VI became the King of Morocco, they exerted feeble efforts to bring about any rapprochement [Zoubir, 2000], notwithstanding the remaining controversy over the Western Sahara issue. However, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, this positive impulse had been exhausted [DeLarramendi, 2018].

A drastically new trend was imparted to the subregional development in the early 2010-s in conjunction with the Arab Spring events.

First, apart from the Western Sahara conflict that had receded into the background, the conflict in Libya erupted, potentially threatening to exercise a negative influence upon other states. At an early stage, it caused the effect of instability to spread to the Sahel region (primarily, in Mali) and continued to have a negative impact on the national security in Tunisia [Marchal, 2012].

Second, the growing conflict intensity in the Eastern part of the Arab world factored into the strengthening ofties among the Southern and Northern Mediterranean nations. The democratic transition in Tunisia, the designation of Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally of the United States [Lahmar, 2015] and the reinforcement of Morocco — EU cooperation [M. Bourita… 2019] facilitated a certain Europeanization of the both Maghreb member states and their deep involvement in the sphere of Western influence. Moreover, Libya and Algeria, who had been traditionally engaged inpursuing an anti-Western policy, appeared to be temporarily restricted in their foreign policy flexibility. If in the case with Libya, the matter was actually a violent conflict that challenged the very existence of the Libyan statehood, then in the case with Algeria, there was a profound crisis of the political regime in place, when following President A. Bouteflika’sde facto physical incapacitation in 2013, Algeria minimized its foreign policy activities [Daguzan, 2015].

Finally, the third element characterizing the subregional development of that period was a change affecting the Western Sahara situation. The Moroccan diplomacy managed to use the US eagerness to normalize relationships between

Israel and the Arab states to the best advantage to itself. Though the clandestine contacts between Rabat and Tel Avivwere well known to have been maintained long before [Bin-Nun, 2002; Mahmoud, 2018], the Makhzen contrived to have the US Administration acknowledge the Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara in exchange for a normalization of relations with Israel within the framework of the Abraham Accords [Ce qu'il faut savoir… 2021], which is often construedas the de facto defeat of the POLISARIO Front and Algeria, who supported it [Bouchnik-Chen, 2020].

All those new elements pertinent to the subregional development were eventually propelled into the sphere where the Algerian positions were dangerously marginalized, as its foreign policy and also its development model seemed to have been deviating a lot from the general Maghreb trend.

However, after Presidents Abdelmadjid Tebboune in Algeria and Kais Saied in Tunisia came to power in 2019,the situation has changed. In the post-pandemic period, the foreign policy of Algeria began to rapidly intensify, with its political leadership trying to restore the positions lost in recent years by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, while simultaneously demonstrating a “success story” to its own population. At the same time, the Tunisian leadership has attempted to balanceits pro-European foreign policy with a persistent appeal to the idea of strengthening national sovereignty.

‘Uruba of Kais Saied

In the case of Tunisia, the key changes occurred not on the foreign policy track, but on the domestic one.

Already in the 2010s, three weakest elements in the Tunisian political system emerged: the security forces, political parties, and the political elites themselves, which quickly lost public trust.

Under Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the two most important elements of the political system were the powerful security forces, primarily the Interior Ministry apparatus, and the ruling party, whose members included about a quarter of the country's population. However, the dissolution of the party in 2011 and the sharp weakening of the special services, which were unable to restore their lost positions in twelve years, in the absence of strong political parties led to a weakening of the state's position, a decrease in governance and public trust in the state[Кузнецов, 2018].

The problem of political transformation was that in the period 2011–2021, attempts to establish an effective regime of representative democracy continued in the country. However, the recipes of political transitology, which the Tunisians relied on at that time, were no longer effective, and the revolution in information technologies that had already taken place sharply reduced the effectiveness of democratic political systems, the principles of which had been established almost two centuries ago. As a result, internal development problems in Tunisia coincided with the negative global situation.

The reaction to this was an attempt to implement a conservative revolution, combining an orientation toward a neoliberal economic course and an appeal to conservative values within the state. This path was taken by the Ennahdaparty, whose leadership largely governed the country in 2012–2019: it fully implemented the World Bank's suggestions and tried to strengthen religious elements in governing the country, but in both directions, it encountered resistance from civil society.

Kais Saied, who came to power in 2019, went further than Ennahda in implementing the conservative revolution, implementing into the constitution the provision on Tunisia’s belonging to the Muslim ummah and on the fact that only the state works to achieve the goals of Islam in the country (Article 5).

Although the latter provision was interpreted by supporters of Kais Saied as a ban on religious propaganda not regulated by the state, opponents of the new leader understood it as an affirmation of the religious nature of Tunisianstatehood. Ultimately, according to Tunisian experts1, the ideological identity promoted by Kais Said can be described as conservative nationalism based on religious values. In this context, it is entirely logical for the country’s president to turn to conservative rhetoric, playing up the themes of sovereignty, ‘Uruba (Arabness), the Palestinian problem, and anti-Westernism.

The foreign policy manifestations of all these principles are rather rhetorical. It is clear that Tunisia, as a small state, does not have serious opportunities either to somehow change the regional subsystem of relations, or even to really choose a foreign policy course: the republic's dependence on the EU and the US is predetermined politically, economically and even geographically.

In these circumstances, various high-profile actions such as a series of arrests in 2023–2024 of representatives ofthe expert community and journalists for cooperation with foreign diplomats or loud statements in support of Palestineplay role of compensating mechanisms. This mechanism balances the real weakness of the sovereignty producing an illusion of a power.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune's Tiers-mondisme

In the case of Algeria, however, the changes are more significant.

Despite five years in power and a successful entry into its second term, the administration of Abdelmadjid Tebboune, as far as one can judge, still feels somewhat unsure of itself.

The president's victory in the 2019 elections was ensured primarily not by his personal popularity, but by the lack of real alternatives, the organization of a large-scale information campaign in his support, and the general disappointment of society in the possibilities of the electoral process, while the fear of a return to the political violence of the 1990s persisted [Василенко, 2019]. However, even with all these factors, turnout in 2019, according to unofficial data, was barely 35%, and in some regions of Kabylia, polling stations did not open at all. In the 2021 parliamentary elections, the turnout was only 23%.

Over the following years, the government's activities developed in a favorable global environment: first, the COVID-19 pandemic allowed the authorities to put an end to the Hirak protest movement, then the conflict in Ukraine and the decline of Russia's presence in European energy markets increased Algeria's importance in the global economy. This situation created conditions for a partial solution to three of the most important tasks of that period: the redistribution of financial flows after the removal from power of key figures from the A. Bouteflika clan, a reduction in protest activity, and an increase in public trust in the government. This, in turn, allowed him to successfully pass through the twists and turns of the next electoral cycle. In 2024 A. Tebboune gained 84.3% of the votes with an official turnout of 46.1% and15% of spoiled ballots [Résultats définitifs… 2024]. Despite the fact that, according to unofficial data, the actual turn out was even lower than in 2019 and barely exceeded 25% [En Algérie… 2024], the victory of the incumbent president did not cause any serious protests in the country.

However, the noticeable discontent in society, which is evident even from the official election results (asevidenced by the huge number of spoiled ballots), is forcing the government to take some steps aimed at increasing popularity.

There are three main tools used for this. The first one is the persecution of major businessmen and officials incorruption case: such emblematic figures as Ali Haddad, Issad Rebrab, Ahmed Ouyahia, Abdelmalek Sellal were arrestedat the beginning of Tebboune's rule, but at a lower level corruption cases are still being brought up constantly. The second tool is moderate economic liberalization (Law No. 22-18 Relating to Investment 2022; Finance Law 2023) and the formation of a new national development strategy (Government Action Plan for the Implementation of the Program of the President of the Republic). And finally, the third is the increase in foreign policy activity, thanks to which Algeria has once again begun to demonstrate its desire to take its place as one of the leaders of the Global South.

The very idea of forming a new world order, within which the role of the Global South should become significantly higher than it is today, is proving to be in high demand by the Algerian establishment. Being not only the largest country in Africa and the Arab world, but also one of the historical leaders of the anti-colonialist movement, Algeria, according to this logic, has grounds to lay claim to one of the leading places in the new global configuration of forces. At the same time, the lack of sufficient economic power is not considered by Algerian experts2 as an insurmountable obstacle: it is compensated by the country's geopolitical position and its ability to play a significant role in the formation of international security systems.

Based on this approach, three basic principles of foreign policy are put forward: solidarity, globality and indivisibility.

The first one is understood, on the one hand, as solidarity of all actors in confronting global threats (primarily related to ecology), and, on the other hand, as solidarity with the countries of the Global South and with the oppressed peoples of Palestine and Western Sahara. Globality is conceived as a global vision of the future and the corresponding role in the new world order of Algeria. The third one, implies the unwillingness to divide problems into global and regional ones and, accordingly, rejection of the possibility of building regional security frameworks without solving global problems.

It remains unclear to what extent such an interpretation of world politics reflects the ideological views of the Algerian elite, and to what extent it remains merely a tool for demonstrating (primarily to its own population) the country's increased claims on the international arena. Nevertheless, it is actively voiced by the ruling circles to both domestic and foreign audiences, and generally corresponds to the historically established political identity of the Algerian People’s Democratic Republic (APDR).

The areas of implementation of this foreign policy doctrine that are important to President Tebboune are Palestine, the Sahel and the Maghreb itself3. In the first two areas, however, things are not going very well for the Algeria.

The attempt to play a key role in uniting Palestinian political forces in 2022 [Conférence des factionspalestiniennes… 2022] was successful only on paper, and the outbreak of a full-scale war in Gaza in 2023 completely sidelined Algeria with its irreconcilable position towards Israel.

In the Sahel, Algeria has sought to play the role of a mediator in conflict resolution and a serious donor of development aid in recent years. The Algerian Agency for International Cooperation for Solidarity and Development(l'Agence algérienne de coopération internationale pour la solidarité et le développement) was even created specifically for this purpose. However, a series of coups and the formation of the subregional bloc of the Alliance of Sahel Statesmade the mediation efforts of the Algeria unclaimed by local partners.

Under these conditions, the idea of Maghreb unity sparkled with new colors for the administration of Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

Western approaches to the Maghreb are causing increasing dissatisfaction in Algeria. From the standpoint of Algerian experts, Europe has never learned to perceive Africa in general and the Maghreb in particular as its economic and political neighbor. While maintaining its colonial vision, it simultaneously sees its southern neighbors as a source of threats and increasingly securitizes its policy. The U.S. generally does not view the Maghreb as a specific region, building relations with each of the states located there separately. Even Russia, which signed the Declaration of In-depth Strategic Partnership with Algeria, does not show sufficient interest in the Maghreb, perceiving Maghreb policy only as aderivative of other regional ones: Middle Eastern, Mediterranean or African.

This general disinterest in the Maghreb creates opportunities for Algeria to realize its own leadershippotential.

On April 22, 2024 a consultative meeting of three leaders was held in Tunisia [La Réunion consultative… 2024]:Algerian President Abdelmajid Tebboune, Tunisian President Kais Saied and Libyan President Muhammad Al-Manfi, Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya. They discussed prospects for the deepening of cooperation in the economic sphere, including the development of border regions, energy, food security and the removal of obstacles to trade.

The absence of representatives from Rabat among the participants, which is particularly striking given the ever-growing Algerian-Moroccan tensions, has led commentators to speculate [Algeria and Tunisia Pursue… 2024] that the meeting was an attempt to create a structure alternative to the AMU with an anti-Moroccan orientation. While quite logical at first glance, these speculations are hardly based on serious grounds — after all, neither Libya, immersed in the difficulties of the endless transition period, nor Tunisia, limited in its foreign policy capabilities, have any motivation to participate in such an alliance. The anti-Moroccan nature of the meeting was also rejected by Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf, who stated [La Réunion consultative… 2024], that the meeting was “not directed against any party” and “the door [of the alliance] is not closed to either Morocco or Mauritania.”

If we put aside the antagonistic logic of rapprochement between the countries, there remain two main explanations for the revival of the idea of Maghreb unity.

The first one is image building. For Mohammed al-Manfi, participation in the meeting was an opportunity to demonstrate the regional identity of Libya, which in recent years has been more often perceived not as an independent participant in international relations, but as an object of external claims. For Kais Saied, this is a matter of putting into life his ambitions related, on the one hand, to the strengthening of the Arab foreign policy vector and, on the other hand, to the preservation of Tunisia’s special mediatory function in the region, which was shaped back in the days of Habib Bourguiba. Finally, for President Tebboune, participation in the meeting was another occasion to demonstrate the leading regional political role of Algeria.

The second explanation is related to the aspiration, shared by both Algeria and Tunisia: looking for a regional solution to regional problems without the involvement of any external actors.

Although it was stated during that first meeting that the leaders intended to meet quarterly, we were unable to find any information about new summits of the Maghreb leaders. However, the very expediency of such frequent consultations at the highest level also raises some doubts. Overall, it seems that the April initiative was largely an image initiative and did not lead to any significant results.

It is also interesting that the sharp intensification of the Algerian foreign policy does not significantly affect thekey areas for the country: the Mediterranean, Libya, Morocco and Western Sahara. Relations with France have experienced several rounds of warming and cooling in recent years, but have not changed significantly. Relations with Morocco reached the extreme point of crisis in 2021, when all official contacts with the kingdom were severed, and have not changed since then. On the issues of Western Sahara and the settlement in Libya, Algerian diplomacy continues to make loud statements about the right of peoples to self-determination (in the first case) and support for the legitimate government in Tripoli (in the second). However, things do not go beyond statements.

Thus, it can be concluded that the sharp activation of Algeria's foreign policy is rather rhetorical. It does not affect the system of foreign economic relations of the republic, nor its approaches to the problems of regional security or global governance.

Conclusions

As can be seen, in the last three years all the basic characteristics of the Maghreb subsystem of international relations have remained the same, while the dynamics of the internal political development of Tunisia and Algeria have led to some changes in its design.

In both cases, the revival of the foreign policy agenda became one of the instruments for expanding the social base of the ruling regimes and consolidating society. Despite the fact that, judging by the election statistics, this goal was not fully achieved, there was still no collapse of the regimes.

At the same time, active foreign policy rhetoric — whether it plays on the theme of sovereignty and Arab unity, as in Tunisia, or pedals the ideas of Tiers-mondism, anti-colonialism and multipolarity, as in Algeria — has not yetresulted in any real changes in approaches to foreign policy, nor in more system transformation. It seems that in the age of

mass media, the Algerian and Tunisian political leaderships are making a strange attempt to replace real adjustments to each country's foreign policy with impressive rhetoric.

The problem is that both countries have accumulated a lot of real problems, and it is still not very clear how to solve them. It is enough to mention such general Maghreb problems as trans-Saharan crime, the activities of terrorist groups, drug trafficking, illegal migration, desertification and shortage of water and food resources. In the case of Tunisia, there is a deep economic crisis and the country's colossal dependence on donor countries, and in the case of Algeria, the lack of diversification of the economy and foreign economic relations.

One day, all these problems will have to be solved. And, unfortunately, talks about multipolarity or Arab unitywill no longer be enough.

Remarks:

1. Interview with Tunisian experts, April 6, 2023.

1. This part of the article is based on a series of expert interviews conducted by the authors in Algeria in January 2024.

1. See more details: [Василенко, Кузнецов, 2024].

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Source: Oriental Courier