Moscow and Tehran Are in the Same Boat

Interview for EGHTSAAD24.IR

Interview for EGHTSAAD24.IR

The volume of trade between Russia and the United States in 2024 was USD 3.27 billion, which is the lowest level of trade between the two countries in the last three decades. The volume of trade between Iran and Russia in the same year was USD 1.9 billion. Will Russia jeopardize its trade relations because of Iran? What will Russia do if sanctions against Iran are tightened?

The Russia-US trade reached its peak during the first Obama Administration (USD 45 billion) and later on plummeted due to US sanctions and major US companies leaving Russia. Trade relations between Russia and Iran have never been significant compared to relations that Russia has with China, India or Turkey. There is a significant untapped potential in Russia-Iran economic cooperation, but there are also many obstacles on the way to expand this cooperation. As for Western sanctions, Moscow and Tehran are in the same boat; these sanctions are not likely to be lifted anytime soon, so that constitute yet another incentive for the two nations to work closer with each other.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko recently said that Russia will not provide military assistance to Tehran if the US attacks Iran. On the other hand, Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic agreement in January 2025 with the aim of strengthening military and economic cooperation. Aren't these two approaches contradictory? Can Iran trust the Russians, especially given Russia's abandonment of Bashar al-Assad in Syria? Russia had previously refused to deliver the S-300 missile system to Iran and had previously voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 against Iran.

The bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in January of 2025 does not include any clauses similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In other words, neither side makes a firm commitment to directly support its partner on the battlefield, if the partner is under attack by a third party. However, if the US (or US together Israel) strikes Iran, Tehran can count on Russia’s support including motions within the UN Security Council, additional military and humanitarian assistance and through other means that both sides would consider appropriate. Speaking of “Russia's abandonment of Bashar al-Assad in Syria”, we should not forget that al-Assad was in the first place abandoned by the people of Syria, who decided not to fight for him. Moscow and Tehran had to accept the choice made by Syrians themselves, no matter whether in Russia or in Iran they liked this choice or not. Finally, UN Security Council Resolution 1929 was passed fifteen years ago, in an entirely different global and regional context. Five years later, after JCPOA was signed, the restrictions of 1929 were repealed. I cannot imagine a new UN SC resolution similar to 1929 to be passed in any foreseeable future.

Should Iran be worried about Trump's rapprochement with Russia? Could a deal between Trump and Russia over Iran be possible in exchange for Russia giving concessions on Ukraine? If this deal really exists, what would it be and what consequences would it have for Iran?

We still do not know how far the US-Russian rapprochement may go. The two sides are only starting discussion some of the most politically sensitive and potentially divisive matters. My personal completely uninformed guess is that in Moscow they would love to become an intermediary between Washington and Tehran, but it remains an open question whether Tehran does indeed need such an intermediary. In any case, I do not believe that there is a real prospect for a Russia-US deal “at the expense” of Iran; the US-Iranian relations have their own logic and dynamics that can hardly be significantly affected from the outside.

Why does Russia always play Iran as a playing card in its negotiations with the Americans and European countries?

I would not use the term ‘playing card’ to describe Russia’s policies toward Tehran. Iran is a big and an important country—not only in the region, but also in Eurasia and in the world at large. For Moscow, bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic have its own value, separate from Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe. This is particularly true now, when Moscow’s cooperation with major Western powers has gone down the drain. Still, close partnership with Iran may be regarded by policy-makers in the Kremlin as an asset that could be used to strengthen Russia’s negotiation positions in some future talks to their Western counterparts.

Some believe that Russia has provided a new path for Iran in terms of economy and trade by supporting Iran's membership in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Others believe that Russia has nothing to offer (especially technology) other than providing weapons to help Iran's economy. What is your opinion? If you were to advise the Iranian government on this matter, what would you say?

First of all, BRICS and SCO are not only about Russia. These are truly multilateral groupings of emerging economies that should help its members to mobilize resources needed for large-scale development projects. For instance, the North-South transportation corridor is an initiative that requires participation of many countries. BRICS and SCO are also important in terms of raising their participants’ international profiles, sort of antidotes against international isolation. As for Russia, it is not in a position to meet all possible Iranian demands for modern technologies or for investments. However, it would be wrong to write Russia off—it has some unique pockets of technology beyond the military field, that Iran might find of interest, including atomic energy, space exploration, oil and gas extraction, information and bio-technologies, etc. If I were to advise the Iranian leadership, I would say that the Islamic Republic should count primarily on its in-house capacity, which is very substantial. As they say in Tehran, “the neighbor's chicken is a goose”.

Will Russia benefit from the tightening of oil sanctions against Iran? Some analysts believe that Iran and Russia are both competitors in the field of energy and that their cooperation is only due to their anti-American approach. What is your opinion? Are the foundations of cooperation between the two countries weak?

I agree that Russia and Iran are competitors in hydrocarbons. Yet, this is not the only game in town. There are other major producers of oil and gas around, including Arab Gulf states, the United States, Venezuela and so on. This competition does not exclude cooperation, including joint efforts to manage global oil prices. Still, I also agree with you that the existing foundations of cooperation between the two nations remain weak. This is not only about business links, which are still quite modest, but also about broader social and humanitarian interaction. For instance, we do not have a lot of educational exchanges between Russia and Iran or many joint R&D projects. This situation has to be changed.

The Iranian people have always had a negative view of the Russian government due to historical experiences. Where did this view begin and originate and what is the reason for it?

There is a long track record that explains these negatives attitudes. Some of them go back to XVIII-XIX wars between the Russian and the Persian Empires, others can be traced to the Soviet-British occupation of Iran during the second world war. You’ve mentioned Moscow’s indecisiveness in closing the S-300 deal with the Islamic Republic back in 2010. I am primarily concerned about anti-Russian sentiments within the educated Iranian urban youth, which will define the future of the nation in years to come. There is no silver bullet to solve this problems; the only direction I can think of is more social and human interaction, more open and candid discussions exposing not only common interests, but also diverging ones.

If the agreement between Iran and the United States becomes serious, will Russia feel threatened and obstruct it? In any case, Iran's rapprochement with the West will not be in Russia's interest. What might Russia do in this regard to sabotage it?

I do not believe that Russia can obstruct any Iran-US agreement. Such an agreement would affect relations between Tehran and Moscow. Iran will lessen its dependence on Moscow, as well as its dependence on Beijing and other non-Western partners. An unrestricted flow of the Iranian oil to global markets would also have an impact on Russia’s interests by bringing the export prices on Russia’s hydrocarbons down. At the same time, Russia is absolutely not interested in a large-scale military clash between Iran and the United States, since a clash is likely to have devastating repercussions for the whole world, Russia including. Today, with an ongoing rapprochement between Moscow and Washington, there is even less appetite in Russia to act as a spoiler in a potential Iran-US dialogue. Yet, there is a lot of skepticism in Moscow about the likely outcome of the negotiations between Tehran and Washington: the Trump Administration is likely to have a rather narrow attention span, and the pressure from Israel will prevent it from demonstrating the level of flexibility needed to reach at least a partial agreement on the Iranian nuclear portfolio.

Some believe that an Iran that has approached the West poses a greater threat to Russia than an Iran that has acquired nuclear weapons. Some, however, believe that Russia, as a country that itself possesses nuclear weapons, will not tolerate a neighboring country like Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. What do you think about this?

The Russia’s position has always been that nuclear proliferation should be avoided to the extent possible. If Iran goes nuclear, this might trigger a chain reaction in the region with other countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and even Egypt being tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. The question, however, is whether Moscow can stop Tehran from going nuclear, if such a decision is made by the Iranian leadership. My personal guess is that if there is a major Israeli or US strike against Iran sometime this year or in 2026, the decision-makers in Tehran might opt for going nuclear no matter what Iranian partners might think of such a decision. However, if at least an interim agreement with the United States is reached and at least some of the Western sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic are lifted, Iran may well prefer not to cross the nuclear red line.

Russia has relations with all the countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. Do you think Russia will be able to maintain a balanced relationship with Iran in the long term, along with its relations with the rest of the region? How?

Russia’s strategy is indeed aimed at keeping delicate balances in the region without tilting too much to one side. That includes Israelis and Palestinians, Sunnis and Shia, Arabs and Iranians, Turks and Kurds, and so on. So far, Moscow has been mostly successful in these attempts, at least, more successful than many other non-regional actors. Speaking specifically about Iran, the Russian position has always been that it is counterproductive and even impossible to exclude the Islamic Republic from the region and no security arrangement in the Middle East would be stable and lasting unless Iran is a part of it. This is why Russia has decisively opposed the idea of an “Arab NATO” that could deter and contain Iran. Of course, these days it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain this calibrated balance, but I think that Moscow’s strategy in the region has not moved away from this overall approach.

Is Russia's relationship with Israel more important or its relationship with Iran, and why? Some analysts say that Russia showed Israel the location of Iranian military and advisory forces in Syria, and the points where Israel attacked them. To what extent do you think this speculation is correct?

It is not easy to compare Iran and Israel as Russia’s foreign policy priorities. Iran is much bigger than Israel, the history of Russian-Iranian relations goes deep into Middle Ages, and political leaders in Moscow and in Tehran have many common views on regional and global matters, as well as on the desirable new world order. Israel, in its turn, has a large Russian and Russian-speaking community, it is an important economic partner for Russia (one should mention that Israel has never subscribed to US or EU sanctions against Moscow). As I said, it is not easy to preserve the right balance between Iran and Israel, but Russia is trying hard not to lose any of the two partners. As for Syria, I am not a military expert, but I do believe that Israelis indeed needed any guidance from Russia to target Iranian military and advisors in Syria: the Israeli intelligence failed miserably on October 7, 2023, but later on they demonstrated impressive professionalism—both in Lebanon and in Syria.

Can President Trump drive Iran and Russia apart? How? What impact will the tariffs imposed by President Trump have on Iran-Russia relations?

So far, Russia has not been directly affected by the new US trade tariffs that the Trump Administration announced in early April. The United States still buys from Russia some fertilizers and platinum, but these purchases are not critically important for the US economy and they do not directly challenge US local producers. One could add that Cuba, Belarus and North Korea were also excluded from the new tariff lists, and the Islamic Republic of Iran got the lowest tariff increase of 10%—only a half of the tariffs hike imposed by Trump on the European Union. None of the above-mentioned established adversaries of the US has a lot of economic ties to America, all of them are long-term victims of US unilateral sanctions, and they are now in an arguably comfortable position watching the incipient US launched trade war from back benches.

However, there are reasons for these countries to be concerned about more remote implications of the recent US tariffs decisions. The precise impact of Trump’s decisions on the global economy is still hard to predict, but in the worst-case scenario we could record a rise of global inflation, a significant slowdown in economic growth worldwide and even a new global recession followed by a higher unemployment and a decline of real incomes across the world. Responding to the demonstrative US unilateralism, major economic actors might be forced to focus on regional rather than on global trade chains or to shift their attention to expanding their domestic rather than foreign markets. If such a scenario becomes reality, it will affect everybody, Russia and Iran including. The global demand on Russia’s and Iran’s commodities will decline, its energy and raw materials exports will start shrinking and domestic economic growth will eventually go down due to growing trade deficits, depreciation of national currency and higher inflation. So, if in Moscow and in Tehran can count on short-term geopolitical gains caused by the emerging transatlantic rift, it also has to consider potential mid and long-term economic losses linked to numerous disruptions within the global economic system.

How strong do you think the partnership between Iran, China, North Korea, and Russia is in the long term? Will it have internal conflicts of interest? Can it really be a serious threat to US interests?

It is hard for me to look at all these quite diverse countries as a single group. Still, there are features that unite them. All of them value a lot their independence and sovereignty, are sensitive to any interference into their domestic affairs, reject universal value of Western liberal norms, fight for what they believe to be a more representative and inclusive world order. It does not mean that those four nations agree on everything—for example, Russia and China do not look eye to eye on India or even on Ukraine. North Korea does not accept Russia’s and China’s positions on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Russia does not agree with Iran on Israel. However, there are many overlapping interests within this group. On a number of issues they challenge the West at large and the United States in particular. Though the initial foreign policy performance of the Trump Administration shows that the US interests can be redefined in a rather radical way. Just look at the recent UN General Assembly vote on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: the United States together with North Korea and Russia voted against the resolution draft presented by Ukraine and a number of European states, while China abstained from voting.

It seems that Türkiye has gained the upper hand in the Caucasus. Russia left Armenia alone in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, and Baku was able to win the war with the help of Ankara and Israel. Russia also has no objection to the Zangezur corridor, which Iran sees as a threat to itself. Is Russia withdrawing from the Caucasus in favor of Turkey due to its focus on the war in Ukraine? What will the new situation mean for Iran?

First of all, Armenia itself never recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state and never announced its annexation. The international community never questioned the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Therefore, from the legal viewpoint, in 2020 there was no state-to-state war between Armenia and Azerbaijan; the military conflict was a clash between the central authorities in Baku and a break-away region of the country. The Zangezur corridor is something different—it is supposed to cross the territory of Armenia, which means that Yerevan should exercise administrative control over this route. Russia supports the plans to open new communication lines in South Caucasus and it fully understands the importance of linking the two separate pieces of Azerbaijan, but, to my best knowledge, it has never questioned the territorial integrity of Armenia. Hopefully, Yerevan and Baku could resolve this issue while negotiating a bilateral peace agreement.

I do not think that Russia is withdrawing from the Caucasus and that Turkey will dominate the region. The Russian proposal is to discuss important matters of regional security and development within the “3+3” format involving the three regional states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and the three neighboring powers (Iran, Russia and Turkey). Such a format would allow to take into consideration various interests and fears of local players as well as priorities and concerns of their immediate neighbors. Such a format is not easy to put together, but no likely alternative that excludes at least one of the six states is likely to provide for a lasting peace and prosperity in the region.

First published in the EGHTESAAD24.IR