Russia’s current policy in Greater Eurasia is a product of the interaction of two processes that are important for its national economy and international position. First, it is part of a large-scale “pivot to the East” – Moscow’s foreign policy and foreign economic strategy, adopted in the early 2010s. The main objective of the “pivot” has been to expand the system of trade and economic ties, primarily with Asian countries, in a context where the West, primarily the European Union, occupied a dominant position among Russia’s external partners. The political riskiness of this state of affairs became obvious to Moscow during the contradictions with the EU that preceded the “pivot”, related to its expansion to the East, as well as pressure from Brussels during negotiations on Russia’s accession to the WTO.
However, another thing was no less important – by the end of the 2000s the Asian countries had begun to show convincing signs that they were coping with the coming global economic upheavals better than Europe. Amid the global economic crisis of 2008-2011, most Asian countries demonstrated a confident position and, moreover, growing demand for goods that served as the bulk of Russian exports. Consumption and the middle class were growing in Asia, which meant that Russia could view previously secondary markets as important in the long term. Recognition of this at the level of state policy was an important achievement, since it fundamentally altered the nature of Russia’s foreign relations. Moreover, it served as confirmation of Moscow’s ability to make unconventional decisions – a turn to the East, which no one in Europe could seriously expect from Russia.
Eurasia is inextricably linked with the main processes affecting the globe. BRICS, in turn, is a platform for developing strategies to achieve a new, more just world order. It is precisely this order, where the possibility of forceful dominance of a narrow group of states is minimised, that seems most suitable for the arrangement of Eurasia, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
Russia’s current policy in Greater Eurasia is a product of the interaction of two processes that are important for its national economy and international position. First, it is part of a large-scale “pivot to the East” – Moscow’s foreign policy and foreign economic strategy, adopted in the early 2010s. The main objective of the “pivot” has been to expand the system of trade and economic ties, primarily with Asian countries, in a context where the West, primarily the European Union, occupied a dominant position among Russia’s external partners. The political riskiness of this state of affairs became obvious to Moscow during the contradictions with the EU that preceded the “pivot”, related to its expansion to the East, as well as pressure from Brussels during negotiations on Russia’s accession to the WTO.
However, another thing was no less important – by the end of the 2000s the Asian countries had begun to show convincing signs that they were coping with the coming global economic upheavals better than Europe. Amid the global economic crisis of 2008-2011, most Asian countries demonstrated a confident position and, moreover, growing demand for goods that served as the bulk of Russian exports. Consumption and the middle class were growing in Asia, which meant that Russia could view previously secondary markets as important in the long term. Recognition of this at the level of state policy was an important achievement, since it fundamentally altered the nature of Russia’s foreign relations. Moreover, it served as confirmation of Moscow’s ability to make unconventional decisions – a turn to the East, which no one in Europe could seriously expect from Russia.
The gradual expansion of ties with China made the development of the Far East an important task. Now the investments made there are paying off due to the scale of trade going through Pacific Russia in the context of the economic war being waged by the United States and the European Union. In other words, the “pivot to the East” was Russia’s natural reaction to new opportunities, not an “escape from Europe”: Russian policy in Asia proved to be advantageous. Thus, Russia’s aspirations to integrate with the Greater Eurasian space were directly related to its security considerations, which were subject to the most serious challenge from the West, but were not conditioned by them.
Second, Russia’s policy towards Greater Eurasia inevitably reflects the state of the conflict in relations between Russia and the West, which after February 2022 turned into a hybrid military confrontation.
The entire Eurasian space with the exception of Europe is a zone where Russia is surrounded by friendly states that do not make fighting against it a goal of their foreign policy.
Even in the Far East, Japan and South Korea are obviously burdened by the task of confronting Moscow that the United States persistently imposes on them. In Asia, only two states – Japan and Singapore – initiated sanctions against Russia after the start of the armed confrontation in Ukraine. All other countries in the region pursue either a friendly or benevolently neutral policy towards it, which is limited only by the ability of the United States to harm them as punishment for their ties with Russia.
The Central Asian space has begun to play a significant role in ensuring Russia’s foreign economic ties in conditions where some traditional partners in the West have been cut off. At the same time, the impact of the conflict in Eastern Europe on Russian policy in Greater Eurasia is twofold. On the one hand, it strengthens Russia’s desire to develop a space that is friendly to it. This is manifested, in particular, in more intensive contacts with its Eurasian neighbours, even in comparison with what was achieved in the previous decade. In other words, against the backdrop of the conflict with the West, the construction of Greater Eurasia has not only come to reflect general political intentions, but is also practical, reflecting real material interests.
However, on the other hand, the military and political confrontation around Ukraine has created some uncertainty among Russia’s partners in Eurasia and a desire to slow down the political processes of rapprochement until the balance of power in relations between Moscow and the West becomes more definite. Moreover, as we understand, almost all countries of Greater Eurasia are states of the World Majority and link their future with the development resources that the modern form of globalisation offers them. Russia’s immediate neighbours in Central Asia and its partners in Southeast Asia are also under pressure from the rivalry of the great world powers: Russia and the West, as well as China and the United States. This creates a fair degree of uncertainty about the future, which can hardly be compensated for by the benefits of their current neutral position. They certainly fear negative consequences in the unlikely event of Russia’s weakening, but they are no less conceptually unprepared for the United States to weaken its presence as an external balancer for Moscow and, especially, Beijing. There are also concerns in both parts of Greater Eurasia that the intensification of Sino-American contradictions will provoke the West to engage in subversive activities and foment internal conflicts. This is especially true for the countries of Central Asia, where the emergence of civil unrest could become a serious security challenge for Russia and China.
Against this backdrop, Russia in 2024 focused on strengthening ties with individual states in Greater Eurasia and the global dimension of its foreign policy through the BRICS group. Meanwhile, initiatives with regional Eurasian importance were put on the backburner and were seen in these two contexts. Rapprochement with China and India, which are now considered the two most formidable Eurasian powers, along with Russia itself, also continued. All these foreign policy initiatives combined integration motives – strengthening trade and economic ties, but also dealt with the issues of security, since it is cooperation and mutual benefit that are in this case the most reliable guarantees of stable political relations. Particular attention was paid, as we have seen, to relations with the Central Asian states, which are linked to Russia geographically, economically and through human contacts. State visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan confirmed a fairly high level of bilateral relations with these countries, now reinforced by the growth of trade and Russian investment in the region.
The second dimension of Russia’s Eurasian policy in 2024 is BRICS and the opportunities provided by Moscow’s presidency in the group during the year. It is not at all surprising that the October BRICS summit in Kazan became an important event in strengthening the Eurasian agenda: due to its geographical position in the world, Eurasia is inextricably linked with the main processes affecting the globe. BRICS, in turn, is a platform for developing strategies to achieve a new, more just world order. It is precisely this order, where the possibility of forceful dominance of a narrow group of states is minimised, that seems most suitable for the arrangement of Eurasia. Thus, Russia’s global policy in 2024 also worked towards the construction of Greater Eurasia.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
