The biggest obstacle to looking more closely to the East, towards Asia, in our case was that this geographic region has never posed a fundamental threat. In this regard, Asia is inferior not only to the West, but also to the South in Russian geopolitics – the latter region is in any case closely connected with the internal structure of the country as a multinational and multi-confessional society. There have been no military invasions of Russia's territory from Asia since the mid-13th century; there are no powers there for whom fighting Russia would be the main thrust of their foreign policy. There are no states in Asia that would bear deep grievances against Russia, like the countries of Europe - from Poland, which we conquered in the 18th century, to France and Germany, which we defeated in the 19th and 20th centuries. In recent times, this has been compounded by the absence of military-political alliances in Asia whose internal cohesion would be based on the task of confronting Russia or preparing for aggression against it. Such alliances do not exist there and cannot arise, due to regional geopolitics and the peculiarities of historical development.
Since Russia has never had grounds to take threats to its eastern territories seriously, their development was considered secondary, due to the interests of national security. This, we recall, is a necessary condition for attention on the part of the Russian state, whose most important task has historically been the defence of the land and the people inhabiting it. In other words, the true concentration of forces in Asia was hindered by the objective geopolitical considerations of the state, which had always been very prudent in distributing its limited resources over the colossal territory of northern Eurasia. The eastern part of Russia received the greatest theoretical attention during the late imperial period, when at the turn of the century the outstanding Russian scientist Vladimir Semenov Tian-Shansky compared our state to a thinning sword, the main part of which was located in the West, and the weak point was turned to Asia. However, at that time, the basis for concern and the argument in favour of the need to expand its presence in Asia was the growing threat emanating from the Japanese Empire, which was dynamically developing and had inflicted a humiliating defeat on Russia in the war of 1904-1905. However, by the middle of the last century, the Japanese problem had been solved: partly through the efforts of Russia (the USSR) itself, and first and foremost through the decisive actions of the United States, which still exercises control over Japanese sovereignty and will not ever allow the country to gain its own strength. Just as they do with Russia's neighbour in the West - Germany, which shared a similar historical fate. With the disappearance of Japan's great power status, even a hypothetical threat from the East disappeared. With it disappeared reasons for taking a serious look at Asia. China, during the revolutionary stage of its foreign policy, was perceived in Moscow as a threat. This forced Russia to take certain actions aimed at Asia. On its territory, it began strengthening the transport and logistics system linking the European and Asian parts of the state. In foreign policy, cooperation with China's regional counterweights, primarily Vietnam, was increased, as well as a direct military presence in the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia. These measures became, until the last decade, the most large-scale manifestations of Russian attention towards Asia – which, as we have seen, has no fundamental geopolitical basis.
It is natural for any state to prioritize those geographic regions from which the main threat to its basic interests and values originates. Russia is no exception, and for more than 500 years, the West and relations with it have occupied a central place in Russian foreign policy. Moreover, the main administrative and industrial centres of Russia are located in close proximity to Europe – the historical West, writes Timofei Bordachev for the 15th Asian Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Therefore, the biggest obstacle to looking more closely to the East, towards Asia, in our case was that this geographic region has never posed a fundamental threat. In this regard, Asia is inferior not only to the West, but also to the South in Russian geopolitics – the latter region is in any case closely connected with the internal structure of the country as a multinational and multi-confessional society. There have been no military invasions of Russia's territory from Asia since the mid-13th century; there are no powers there for whom fighting Russia would be the main thrust of their foreign policy. There are no states in Asia that would bear deep grievances against Russia, like the countries of Europe - from Poland, which we conquered in the 18th century, to France and Germany, which we defeated in the 19th and 20th centuries. In recent times, this has been compounded by the absence of military-political alliances in Asia whose internal cohesion would be based on the task of confronting Russia or preparing for aggression against it. Such alliances do not exist there and cannot arise, due to regional geopolitics and the peculiarities of historical development.
Since Russia has never had grounds to take threats to its eastern territories seriously, their development was considered secondary, due to the interests of national security. This, we recall, is a necessary condition for attention on the part of the Russian state, whose most important task has historically been the defence of the land and the people inhabiting it. In other words, the true concentration of forces in Asia was hindered by the objective geopolitical considerations of the state, which had always been very prudent in distributing its limited resources over the colossal territory of northern Eurasia. The eastern part of Russia received the greatest theoretical attention during the late imperial period, when at the turn of the century the outstanding Russian scientist Vladimir Semenov Tian-Shansky compared our state to a thinning sword, the main part of which was located in the West, and the weak point was turned to Asia. However, at that time, the basis for concern and the argument in favour of the need to expand its presence in Asia was the growing threat emanating from the Japanese Empire, which was dynamically developing and had inflicted a humiliating defeat on Russia in the war of 1904-1905. However, by the middle of the last century, the Japanese problem had been solved: partly through the efforts of Russia (the USSR) itself, and first and foremost through the decisive actions of the United States, which still exercises control over Japanese sovereignty and will not ever allow the country to gain its own strength. Just as they do with Russia's neighbour in the West - Germany, which shared a similar historical fate. With the disappearance of Japan's great power status, even a hypothetical threat from the East disappeared. With it disappeared reasons for taking a serious look at Asia. China, during the revolutionary stage of its foreign policy, was perceived in Moscow as a threat. This forced Russia to take certain actions aimed at Asia. On its territory, it began strengthening the transport and logistics system linking the European and Asian parts of the state. In foreign policy, cooperation with China's regional counterweights, primarily Vietnam, was increased, as well as a direct military presence in the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia. These measures became, until the last decade, the most large-scale manifestations of Russian attention towards Asia – which, as we have seen, has no fundamental geopolitical basis.
However, the nature of Russian policy in Asia is currently changing, as are the motives that form it. For more than 15 years, the main driving factor has been the economic growth of Asian countries and their ability to act for Russia not only as trading partners, but also as sources of necessary technologies and other resources, which are limited in Russia. Asia is gradually and increasingly being viewed as a replacement for Europe, a traditional partner in matters of modernisation and increasing competitiveness at the global level.
Moreover, the events of recent years have confirmed that Asian countries have the ability to act as buyers of Russian export products. First of all, traditional energy, where Russia has competitive advantages and the largest world reserves of a number of fossil resources. The new Russian policy of "turn to the East" was never conceived in the context of increasing military and political influence. In this sense, it fully reflects the absence of a threat from this region and, accordingly, the need for large-scale preparatory measures. Nevertheless, up until recent years, this factor continued to play a negative role in the process of the “turn”: it is very difficult to make an almost completely unthreatened direction a priority for Russia’s foreign policy.
At the same time, Russia has consistently worked towards the main thing – to be perceived in Asia as part of the region, albeit less integrated into the system of its international economic ties. This means it participates in a number of regional platforms and forums, and is constantly increasing the level and quality of its formal contacts with Asian states. But the main role was played by something else: now Russian policy in Asia is the most important component of its general and broader global policy. Europe, no matter what threat it represents, is fading into the background of world affairs, and it is Asia that the centre of life is shifting to, in which Russia is obliged to play a role simply by virtue of its size and military potential.
The rise of China, as the late Henry Kissinger rightly noted, became a phenomenon which was much more significant than the end of the Cold War in Europe or the collapse of the USSR. Together with the process of globalisation, China pulled other Asian countries up with it. Now Russia, which remains a global power, is increasing its presence in Asia not as such, but as the centre of its global politics and economics. Moreover, Asian countries themselves are increasingly involved in the discussion of the global agenda. They often play an active role here and look at Russia as a power whose opinion matters for the success or failure of their global initiatives. Countries such as, for example, Malaysia, understand perfectly well that their final exit from the shadow of the colonial past will be impossible without involvement in solving global issues. They look at the BRICS group, where Russia plays an important role, as a potential "engine" of their own integration into the major league of world politics.
Simple economic achievements, no matter how bright they are, are not enough here: in the 1970s and 1980s, the whole world witnessed the rise and collapse of Japan's ambitions, whose fantastic successes in the economy turned out to be meaningless in the face of its foreign policy insignificance. None of the major Asian countries intend to repeat this experience. This means that in addition to new incentives for Russia itself in its presence in Asia, the new world politics and economics create interest in Russia’s inclusion in the affairs of the region on the part of its inhabitants.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
