The OSCE, Ukraine, and peace process
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Head of the Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor of MGIMO-University, RIAC Member
I. Introduction
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was involved in the peace process in Ukraine in multiple ways from 2014 through early 2022. In the early phase of the crisis “in and around” Ukraine, the organization was instrumental for preventing further expansion of the conflict. However, it ultimately failed to resolve it. The outbreak of the war in February 2022 left no room for continuing its engagement.
Research on decision-making in international organizations (IO) suggests that the OSCE could hardly be expected to quickly respond to the crisis against the backdrop of the deep pide among the participating states that has handicapped the organization for the past two decades. While the engagement of the OSCE came first as a surprise, its facilitation of the peace process was later on impeded by the pide within the organization.
This article concentrates on discussing the OSCE performance during the crisis. It also addresses broader issues, such as the policies of Russia and Ukraine, but only to the extent necessary to understand the failure of the OSCE. It begins by a brief introduction to the crisis and the international response to it. It continues by discussing the OSCE through the lens of the study of decision-making in international organizations (IO), seeking to explain why, despite the deepening pide, the organization became the primary international institution to facilitate the peace process. In the next section, the article examines the practical involvement of the OSCE in the peace process, its deliverables and limitations. It pays particular attention to the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) in conjunction with the political efforts within the Normandy format and the work of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG). In conclusion, the article assesses the
OSCE performance in the peace process in Ukraine and seeks to answer the question why it has ultimately failed.
II. The crisis “in and around” Ukraine
The crisis grew out of mass protests that began in Ukraine in November 2013. Originally motivated by the decision of the government to postpone the signing of the association with the European Union (EU), the protests quickly escalated into a general political crisis with demands that the president and the government step down. On February 21, 2014, the stalemate seemed resolved after President Viktor Yanukovich and leaders of the opposition signed an agreement brokered by foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland. The deal envisaged the reduction of the powers of the president, the formation of a transitional coalition government, and elections to be held later in 2014. However, the next day the deal collapsed. Yanukovich escaped from Kiev to surface in Russia leaving back a vacuum of political power.
While the transitional government formed by the pro-European opposition sought to handle the political crisis by holding early presidential elections, protests started, now in the south and the east of the country, claiming to represent the Russian-speaking population concerned about the course of the new government. Following a contested referendum in the Crimea in March 2014 and the incorporation of the peninsula into Russia, militias in several cities in Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions from Kharkov through Odessa began seizing government buildings and claiming either independence, or unification with Russia. In most cases, these attempts failed, but they succeeded in Donetsk and Lugansk. The protesters proclaimed the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)
and the Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR)1 which rapidly expanded areas under their control. The government in Kiev responded by launching what it called an antiterrorist operation, thus escalating the armed conflict.2 From April 14, 2014 through December 31, 2021, the conflict has claimed the lives of 14200 to 14400 people, including 4400 Ukrainian forces, 6500 members of armed groups, and at least 3404 civilians. Most of these casualties occurred during the active phases of fighting in the summer of 2014 and in early 2015.3
The involvement of Russia in the crisis remains the most controversial part of the perging narratives. Moscow denied any direct intervention and rejected claims that it had sent regular forces in support of the D/LNR. It asserted that the conflict was purely intra-Ukrainian. Still, it openly sympathized with the D/LNR. Admitting that Russian “volunteers” were fighting on the side of the rebels, it tried to avoid appearing as a party to the conflict. One way or another, the Donbass republics became Russian protectorates.
Ukraine saw the conflict as a direct military engagement with Russia and rejected treating D/LNR as conflict parties. The West generally followed the same understanding and imposed sanctions on Russia but, at the same time, sought a diplomatic solution. The 2014 OSCE Chairperson-in-Office (CiO), the Swiss President and foreign minister Burkhalter actively intervened at the political level, appointed special representatives, and suggested establishing a high-level international contact group and a monitoring mission to Ukraine.4 On March 21, 2014, before the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the Special Monitoring Mission was established by a decision of the OSCE Permanent Council.
On April 17, 2014, a few days after the escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, a ministerial meeting, hosted in Geneva and attended by Russia, the United States, and the EU, agreed on initial steps to de-escalate tensions, including the disarmament of all illegal armed groups and launching a constitutional process in Ukraine based on a broad national dialogue. The SMM was invited to play a leading role in assisting in the implementation of these measures.5 On the eve of the meeting, Russia attempted to ensure the participation of representatives of the breakaway regions as other Ukrainian parties, but failed.
The Geneva meeting, initially expected to become the high-level contact group suggested by the CiO, did not create the platform for the political process. Having delegated the implementation of the agreed measures to the OSCE, the United States withdrew from active involvement. In May 2014, the Swiss CiO presented a roadmap to support the implementation of the Geneva statement,6 but the ownership of the roadmap remained open.7 Filling the void, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French President François Hollande arranged for a meeting with the newly elected Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and the Russian President Vladimir Putin in June 2014 at the margins of the annual commemoration of the landing of allied forces in Normandy. At that meeting, the establishment of the Trilateral Contact Group was agreed. The TCG included representatives of Ukraine and Russia and was chaired by the special representative of the CiO.8
These developments led to the emergence of a complex international mediation framework. Since the summer of 2014, the quadripartite Normandy group became the main political platform discussing political solutions. Following the initially ad hoc meetings, it was institutionalized by establishing an oversight mechanism in the form of ministerial and senior officials’ meetings.9
The Kiev-based Trilateral Contact Group was formally not an OSCE-funded format. However, being coordinated by a CiO special representative, it was acknowledged as a part of broader OSCE involvement in the peace process. The TCG became the central platform for negotiating specific measures to reduce the conflict with the parties concerned, including representatives of the D/LNR, in a status neutral manner.10 The engagement of Donetsk and Lugansk was further institutionalized in 2015 by convening TCG working groups in Minsk. However, progress within the TCG heavily depended on political impetuses from the Normandy group.
The OSCE was important to provide political backing and support the implementation of concluded agreements. The implementing role of the OSCE was evident after, in July 2014, it followed the appeal of the foreign ministers of the Normandy group to deploy the OSCE observers on the Russian side of the Russia-Ukraine border by establishing the OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk.11
Following the Geneva meeting, the United States maintained relatively low profile, with the exception of a short period in 2017–2019 when its special envoy Kurt Volker actively engaged in the process. Generally, Washington accepted the Franco-German leadership and did not challenge the legitimacy of the Normandy format. At the same time, it supported relevant OSCE activities, such as the SMM, by providing funding and personnel.
Negotiations in this complex framework resulted in a series of agreements, including the Minsk protocol of September 5, 2014 (Minsk-1)12 supplemented by a Memorandum of September 19 (which defined the line of contact between the belligerent parties and the disengagement area)13 and the Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements (Minsk-2), signed in Minsk on February 12, 2015.14 These accords, drafted in the TCG, envisaged a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons from the security zone; disarmament of illegal armed groups and withdrawal of foreign fighters; a constitutional reform based on decentralization; passing a set of Ukrainian laws to define a special status of the “certain areas” of Donbass and the way in which municipal elections were to be held in these areas. These laws were to be agreed with the rebels. Both Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 agreements called on the OSCE to monitor the ceasefire, the withdrawal of weapons, and the overall situation along the part of the Russian-Ukrainian border not controlled by Kiev.
III. The OSCE and the decision-making in international organizations
Research on decision-making in IOs emphasizes the importance of the size (number of members), degree of homogeneity (or heterogeneity), and the decision- making rules (consensus or unanimity versus majority voting). Empirical findings are inconclusive, as they discuss the effects of pooling (the surrender of states’ veto to majority voting), broader delegation of authority to IOs to act on behalf of the member states thus reducing the latter’s control, and the involvement of transnational actors (NGOs) in decision-making. These findings suggest that combinations of these three elements in the design of an IO are likely to increase its ability to act.15
At the same time, the “IOs’ decision-making capacity is adversely affected by large memberships and high preference heterogeneity”, while demanding decision rules (particularly consensus) “aggravates the problem of preference heterogeneity”. The negative effect of a larger number of member states is stronger under a higher level of heterogeneity and a more demanding decision rule.16 In sum, large number of participants, a broad spectrum of preferences, and the requirement of consensus “make it exceedingly difficult to identify a zone of agreement”. At the same time, it is usually expected that the declining ability of member states to identify the possible area of agreement increases the demand for leadership and may lead to the delegation of authority either to the chairmanship of an IO or to alternative leaders to facilitate the generation of compromises.17
The OSCE is a perfect example of an organization handicapped by large membership, growing heterogeneity, and demanding decision-making rules. The operation of its institutions and structures is straitjacketed by participating states’ control and micromanagement.18 The ongoing debate over reforming the organization is very much centered on the extent of autonomy its institutions could be granted, if at all, and on whether the principle of consensus should be tightened or could be softened.19 Since the incorporation of the Crimea into Russia and the escalation of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, tensions within the OSCE increased to an unprecedented level.20 Against this background, one could hardly expect the OSCE to reach consensus, particularly on issues related to the Ukraine crisis. Surprisingly, it did and succeeded to ensure the funding for and staffing the SMM. In contrast to the extremely protracted and frustrating OSCE budgetary process, the funding of the mission that was kept separate from the unified budget was approved in good time despite its increases.21 In 2018, the Austrian Chairmanship succeeded in raising the SMM budget in order to equip the mission with advanced technology, such as remote cameras, satellite imagery, acoustic sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and an information management system for data fusion.
At the beginning of the crisis, the OSCE obviously benefitted from the strong Swiss Chairmanship, which significantly contributed to the identification of the possible area of agreement. However, it would be wrong to attribute the organization’s engagement just to the dedicated chairmanship. This explains neither why, against the backdrop of the deep pide within the organization, the participating states accepted the Swiss leadership, nor why it was not sustained by the consecutive, not less dedicated and capable chairmanships. Nor does it explain why the political leadership was already picked up by France and Germany in 2014.
The alternative explanation is that, against the background of the internationalization of the peace process, the OSCE was seen, particularly in Russia, as a lesser evil as compared with the EU, which, in parallel to the OSCE, considered deploying an observer mission to Ukraine.22 Given the principle of consensus, Moscow at least would retain control over the mandate and activities of the OSCE mission. If this explanation is at least partially true, it would imply that the consensus on the deployment of the SMM and on other OSCE activities was fairly fragile.
IV. The OSCE activities
The OSCE’s crisis-related activities in Ukraine can be clustered in two categories: those that did not require prior consensus of all participating states and those that did. The OSCE institutions did take early action within their mandates, as did the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) in order to establish facts,23 without seeking prior consensus. Inpidual participating states made intensive use of the OSCE mechanisms, such as the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).24
However, the high degree of heterogeneity within the OSCE did not allow non-consensual activities to enjoy full support of the participating states, particularly of those reluctant to delegate the authority to the OSCE institutions. The interpretation of evidence collected through such activities was often contested and failed to inform collective decisions. As a result, some participating states decided to redirect resources to support the SMM instead of CSBMs.25
Consensus-based operations, such as the SMM, the deployment of border observers at the Russian checkpoints, or the Kiev-based OSCE Project Coordinator, are more likely to enjoy cooperation of the participating states. However, support for them may be hard to sustain. The mandates of consensus-based operations are difficult to adjust to the changing circumstances and they can be terminated should the consensus on their extension evaporate.
The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was established on March 21, 2014, before the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine. It was an unarmed civilian mission deployed in several regions of the country. Its main tasks were to observe and report on the situation in Ukraine and to facilitate national dialogue among all parties to the crisis, as anticipated by the March 2014 Geneva statement.
Despite dramatic changes in the situation, this mandate remained unchanged until its expiration in 2022. At the same time, the mission was repeatedly tasked by either the Normandy group or by agreements reached in the TCG to monitor the ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons. This led to a significant increase in the personnel strength of the mission, upgrades of its technical equipment, and the concentration of resources in Donbass.
The rapid deployment of the first SMM monitors within less than 24 hours of the decision of the Permanent Council is often referred to as the example of the effectiveness of the OSCE.26 While operating in a hostile environment, the mission was praised for having contributed to de-escalation by regularly providing information on developments on the ground, facilitating dialogues, local ceasefires and disengagement efforts along the contact line, and easing the effects of the conflict on the civilian population, inter alia, by enabling the repairs of civilian infrastructure.27 At the same time, the SMM faced multiple obstacles to its work.28
The mandate of the mission was limited to monitoring and reporting. Its role in the verification of the ceasefire and military disengagement was never defined. As a result, the SMM was neither informed of the areas to which weapons were to be withdrawn, nor allowed access to such areas for verification purposes. It had neither the authority, nor the capacity to prevent or stop ceasefire violations. The freedom of movement of the mission was increasingly restricted by both sides. Monitoring was particularly restricted in the border areas with Russia. The effect of using advanced technological assets was limited because of blanket jamming of long-range UAVs in eastern Ukraine.29 Calls for a more robust and armed SMM fell on death ears in many participating states, as the OSCE does not deploy armed missions and has no peace enforcement mandate.30
The operation of the OSCE Observer mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk was subject to no less controversial debates. In July 2014, 16 observers were mandated to monitor the movements across a small, approximately one km in length, portion of the Russia–Ukraine border that was not controlled by Kiev. However, as a result of the August 2014 offensive, the DNR and LNR expanded their control of the border to more than 400 km, which raised the issue of extending the OSCE monitoring to all checkpoints along that part of the border and to areas between checkpoints.
Moscow continuously rejected these demands, referring to the impermissibility of singling out one element of the Minsk agreements at the expense of other (political) commitments and suggesting that the agreement should be sought in direct dialogue with the D/LNR de facto authorities. In November 2014, it only agreed to slightly increase the number of observers at the two checkpoints to 22 without extending the area of monitoring.31 The number of observers remained unchanged until September 2021 when the mission was terminated,32 and this modest operation did not alleviate concerns as regards the ineffectiveness of the monitoring along the Russian-Ukrainian border.
While lessons learned from the OSCE operations in Ukraine are important for future missions, the collapse of the peace process can hardly be attributed just to their shortcomings. The political process was stalled after each agreement reached due to perging preferences of the parties concerned. After the 2014 Geneva meeting, Moscow’s expectations that the DNR and LNR would be included in the national constitutional dialogue did not materialize. Having signed the Minsk agreements, Moscow and Kiev insisted that the other side take the first step. Russia wanted Ukraine to offer autonomy to the D/LNR, while Ukraine wanted Russia to cease its support of the self-proclaimed entities and ensure that their forces disarm.33 Kiev delayed passing legislation on local elections and greater self-government for “certain areas” in Donbass until it could reestablish its full control over the border, while Moscow and the D/LNR insisted on the constitutional reform, greater decentralization, and on defining a special status for the “people’s republics” as a prerequisite for stability.34 Moscow and Kiev continuously perged on the engagement of the D/LNR representatives in negotiations.
There was little progress within the Normandy format in overcoming these differences. In the absence of diplomatic progress, “military dynamics filled the vacuum on the ground”.35 The standstill in the political process had a direct impact on the work of the TCG and the SMM.36 Ukraine and the D/LPR failed to implement the September 2016 TCG agreement on establishing first disengagement areas along the contact line, while seasonal ceasefires brokered by the TCG remained short-lived. By 2017, the prevailing understanding within the OSCE was that a political settlement was not in the near reach and the Austrian Chairmanship decided to concentrate on easing the affects of the conflict on the local population. It succeeded in fostering consensus on the need to significantly increase the SMM budget and the number of monitors, and equip the mission with advanced technological assets. However, the main job of the mission was reduced to measuring non-compliance instead of monitoring the ceasefire and verifying disengagement.37
The election of Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine in 2019 seemed to open an opportunity to change these dynamics. In December 2019, for the first time since October 2016, a summit of the Normandy group was held in Paris to agree on a set of measures to stabilize the situation in the conflict area.38 The summit provided a political impetus to the establishment of the first disengagement areas along the line of contact and, in July 2020, the TCG reached an agreement on additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire.39
However, later in 2020, the Minsk process got stalled again, largely over the issue of direct participation of the D/LNR in negotiations. After the roadmaps presented by the D/LNR and Ukraine to the TCG in October and November were rejected, a French- German proposal was circulated within the Normandy group,40 but its discussion degenerated to Russia’s open disagreements with France and Germany. Another attempt to reactivate the Normandy format early in 2022 failed amid the escalation around Ukraine, which in late February led to the war.
Over the years, the OSCE was increasingly becoming a target for critic from both Russia and Ukraine for being biased and not putting sufficient pressure on the other side. This critique went as far as accusing SMM personnel of espionage either for Kiev, or for D/LNR and Moscow.41 The erosion of the support for consensus-based OSCE activities ultimately resulted in the termination of mandates of all its crisis-related operations after Moscow decided not to extend them further. The Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk was discontinued as of October 1, 2021.42 The SMM monitors were evacuated from eastern Ukraine in early March 2022, while the mandate of the mission expired on March 31, 2022.43 In May 2022, Moscow notified the OSCE that it saw “no chances for the mission of the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine to continue its work after the expiration of its mandate at the end of June”.44
V. Conclusion
At the beginning of the crisis, the OSCE acted surprisingly fast for an organization with extremely heterogeneous membership and the requirement of consensus. The deployment of the SMM contributed to the stabilization of the situation, raising the threshold for the resumption of hostilities. The Normandy group became the main platform for generating political solutions. The TCG, engaging representatives of the D/LNR in a status neutral manner, worked on transforming these solutions into practical measures. These activities fueled expectations of consolidation of the peace process, despite the obstacles faced by the OSCE missions, such as a limited mandate, restrictions to the freedom of movement, and inability to verify the withdrawal of weapons and enforce a ceasefire.
Nevertheless, the ultimate failure of the peace process can hardly be attributed to the shortcomings of the OSCE operations. Persisting and increasing pergence of the Russian and Ukrainian preferences on the sequence of steps to implement agreed measures and on the engagement of the D/LNR in direct negotiations impeded political process, adversely affected the work of the TCG and the SMM, and contributed to erosion of the fragile consensus. Despite the temporary reactivation of the political process in 2019 and 2020, the escalation of the situation around Ukraine in 2021 – early 2022 resulted in Moscow’s formal recognition of the DNR and LNR, a direct Russian military intervention, and the termination of all consensus-based OSCE operations in Ukraine.
Despite the initial revival of the OSCE, the disruption of the peace process facilitated by this organization confirms the findings of the research on the decision- making in IOs. This research suggests that a broad heterogeneity of preferences, pursued by members of an organization and combined with demanding decision-making rules, impedes its effectiveness as an institution. At the same time, the relatively low effectiveness of the engagement of the OSCE institutions and mechanisms (that did not require prior consensus) in the early phase of the crisis suggests that abandoning the principle of consensus would not necessarily solve the problem.
Endnotes
1 “DNR” and “LNR” are abbreviations from “Donetskaya narodnaya respublika” and “Luganskaya narodnaya
respublika”, respectively.
2 Rebels without a Cause: Russia’s Proxies in Eastern Ukraine. International Crisis Group Europe Report no. 254. – Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2019. P. 1–5.
3 Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 27 January 2022. P. 3. URL: https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Conflict-related%20 civilian%20casualties%20as%20of%2031%20December%202021%20%28rev%2027%20January%202022%29% 20corr%20EN_0.pdf (accessed 17.07.2022).
4 Grau H. The 2014 Swiss Chairmanship: between “routine” and “crisis” // The OSCE Yearbook 2014. – Baden- Baden: Nomos, 2015. P. 26–30; Tanner F. The OSCE and the crisis in and around Ukraine: first lessons for crisis management // The OSCE Yearbook 2015. – Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016. P. 244.
5 Text of the Geneva Statement on Ukraine Released by the US, EU, Ukraine and Russia. 18 April 2014. URL: https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/04/18/text-of-the-geneva-statement-on-ukraine-released-by-the-us- eu-ukraine-and-russia (accessed 17.07.2022).
6 Grau H. Op. cit. P. 29; A Roadmap for Concrete Steps Forward: The OSCE as an Inclusive Platform and Impartial Actor for Stability in Ukraine. Bern–Brussels, 12 May 2014. Speech by the President of the Swiss Confederation, Didier Burkhalter, at the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/1/118509.pdf (accessed 17.07.2022).
7 Tanner F. Op. cit. P. 244.
8 Grau H. Op. cit. P. 30.
9 Zagorski A. The OSCE and the Ukraine crisis // Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security. IMEMO Supplement to the Russian Edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2014. Eds. A.Arbatov and S.Oznobishchev. – Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2015. P. 50.
10 Grau H. Op. cit. P. 30.
11 Ibid. P. 31.
12 Protocol on the Results of Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, 5 September 2014. URL: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_140905_MinskCeasfire_en.pdf (accessed 17.07.2022).
13 Memorandum of 19 September 2014 Outlining the Parameters for the Implementation of Commitments of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014. URL: https://www.osce.org/home/123806 (accessed 17.07.2022).
14 Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements. URL: https://peacemaker.un.org/ sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf (accessed 17.07.2022).
15 Sommerer T., Squatrito T., Tallberg J., Lundgren M. Decision-making in international organizations: institutional design and performance // The Review of International Organizations. 2021. October 17 [Online First]. URL: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11558-021-09445-x.pdf (accessed 17.07.2022).
16 Sommerer T., Tallberg J. Decision-Making in International Organizations: Actors, Preferences, and Institutions. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16–19, 2016. P. 1, 14. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302907044_Decision- Making_in_International_Organizations_Actors_Preferences_and_Institutions/link/57330b3508ae9ace84072e a3/download (accessed 23.04.2022).
17 Tallberg J. The power of the chair: formal leadership in international cooperation // International Studies Quarterly. 2010. V. 54. No. 1. P. 243–246, 255.
18 Greminger T. Making the OSCE more effective: practical recommendations from a Former Secretary General
// OSCE Insights 2021: Identifying Common Ground. – Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2022. P. 13–25.
19 Zagorski A. Russia and the OSCE // OSCE Insights 2021: Identifying Common Ground. – Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020. P. 77–84.
20 Grau H. Op. cit. P. 29.
21 Greminger T. Op. cit. P. 19.
22 Härtel A., Pisarenko A., Umland A. The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: the SMM’s work in the
Donbas and its Ukrainian critique in 2014–2019 // Security and Human Rights. 2020. No. 31. P. 121–154.
23 Zagorski A. The OSCE and the Ukraine crisis. P. 53–54.
24 Anthony I. The application of European confidence-building measures and confidence- and security-building measures in Ukraine // SIPRI Yearbook 2015. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. – Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 68–74.
25 Zagorski A. The OSCE and the Ukraine crisis. P. 52–53.
26 Härtel A., Pisarenko A., Umland A. Op. cit. P. 9.
27 Ibid. P. 4.
28 Hug A. Die OSZE Beobachtermission in der Ukraine // Lehren aus dem Ukrainekonflikt: Krisen vorbeugen, Gewalt verhindern. Eds. A.Heinemann-Grüder, C.Crawford, T.B.Peters. – Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2022. P. 89–114.
29 Restrictions to the SMM’S Freedom of Movement and Other Impediments to the Fulfillment of Its Mandate. OSCE SMM Thematic Report. – Kyiv: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2021. URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/b/508991.pdf (accessed 17.07.2022).
30 Tanner F. The OSCE and peacekeeping: track record and outlook // OSCE Insights 2021: Identifying Common Ground. – Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020. P. 51–60.
31 Zagorski A. The OSCE and the Ukraine crisis. P. 59–60.
32 Annual Report 2021. Ed. M.Albon. – Vienna: OSCE, 2022. P. 37. URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/ documents/a/4/520912.pdf (accessed 17.07.2022).
33 Rebels without a Cause. P. ii.
34 Kemp W. Civilians in a war zone: the OSCE in Eastern Ukraine // The OSCE Yearbook 2017. – Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018. P. 115.
35 Ibid. P. 113–116.
36 Hug A. Op. cit. P. 106.
37 Kemp W. Op. cit. P. 113, 115–117.
38 Paris “Normandie” summit // Élisée. 09.12.2019. URL: https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/ 09/paris-normandie-summit.en (accessed 17.07.2022).
39 Press Statement of Special Representative Grau after the Regular Meeting of Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020. URL: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/457885 (accessed 17.07.2022).
40 Соловьев В. Переговоры по Донбассу ушли в декрет о мире // Коммерсантъ. 23 марта 2021 [Solovyov V. Negotiations on Donbas have left on a peace leave // Kommersant. 23 March 2021].
41 Härtel A., Pisarenko A., Umland A. Op. cit. P. 18–20; ФСБ: спецслужбы Украины незаконно используют миссию ОБСЕ для диверсий в ЛНР // РИА-Новости [FSB: the special services of Ukraine illegally use the OSCE mission for sabotage in the LNR // RIA Novosti]. 18.07.2016. URL: https://ria.ru/20160718/ 1469881944.html?in=t (accessed 17.07.2022).
42 Annual Report 2021. P. 37.
43 OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Secretary General Announce Upcoming Closure of Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. OSCE Press Release. 28 April 2022. URL: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/516933 (accessed 17.07.2022).
44 Russia for curtailing mission of OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine – deputy envoy // TASS. 26.05.2022. URL: https://tass.com/politics/1456531 (accessed 17.07.2022).
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Source: IMEMO
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