On September 4, 2024, an independent Indian journalist and writer, Shastri Ramachandaran, presented his new book “Beyond Binaries: The World of India and China (2008-2022)” at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).
The book covers the main phases the two countries’ ties and examines internal and external factors shaping India’s current approach to China. In his book, Shastri Ramachandaran also analyzes the sources of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping’s foreign policies, while paying special attention to the influence the media has on India-China perception of each other.
Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Academic Director, delivered the opening remarks and Shastri Ramachandaran, the author, presented his book.
On September 4, 2024, an independent Indian journalist and writer, Shastri Ramachandaran, presented his new book “Beyond Binaries: The World of India and China (2008–2022)” at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).
The book covers the main phases the two countries’ ties and examines internal and external factors shaping India’s current approach to China. In his book, Shastri Ramachandaran also analyzes the sources of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping’s foreign policies, while paying special attention to the influence the media has on India-China perception of each other.
Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Academic Director, delivered the opening remarks and Shastri Ramachandaran, the author, presented his book.
The discussion featured Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Academic Director, Lydia Kulik, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Indian Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Alexey Kupriyanov, Director of the Center of the Indo-Pacific Region of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) RAS, Gleb Makarevich, Junior Research Fellow at the South Asia and Indian Ocean Group of the IMEMO RAS, Anastasia Pyatachkova, Deputy Head of Asia-Pacific Department of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies of the HSE University, Leyla Turayanova, Junior Research Fellow at the Center for the Indian Ocean Region of the IMEMO RAS, Aleksei Zakharov, Research Fellow at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism of the HSE University, and Julia Melnikova, RIAC Program Manager.
Key Takeaways
Shastri Ramachandaran
Since the early 2000s, India’s foreign policy has become an element of its domestic, electoral, and minority policies, especially in the case of Afghanistan and Bangladesh. In this respect, China and Pakistan are crucial to the Indian national identity.
Today, India’s foreign policy is more assertive and decisive, underpinned by its national identity, which is shaped by Hinduism. At the same time, this identity is based on lifestyle, not religion or ethnicity as such.
Pakistan lacks a single national identity. Rather, there are many smaller heterogenous groups with interests of their own. This, in turn, is one of the dimensions of Pakistan as New Delhi’s significant other. A common misconception in India is that Pakistan is a Chinese satellite state. Meanwhile, Pakistan receives funding and investment from the West and the Persian Gulf.
China also acts as India’s significant other. Emblematic of this is the fact that the media in India is far more focused on China than the media in China is on India. Publications regarding China tend to be negative and fail to reflect reality; fueling anti-Chinese sentiments by presenting subjective opinions as truth. For instance, it is widely assumed in India that it was China that triggered border conflicts in 1962 and 2020. Though the two events exert significant influence on India’s perception of China, the 1962 conflict is all but forgotten in China.
Being developing nations, India and China have many more similarities than differences. New Delhi and Beijing could cooperate to advance the development agenda globally. Instead, they are dealing with the problems formulated by developed countries at G7 meetings, to which they are occasionally invited.
India-China relations have reached a point where it is no longer possible to deliberately stifle opportunities for improved relations and increased economic benefit. Back in 2022–2023, in the absence of the Chinese Ambassador in India, the two countries launched informal talks aimed at resuming dialogue in some form. Most initiatives, which came from business circles, were never implemented.
Following the 2024 elections, India’s foreign policy priority shifted to enhancing its economic performance and trade balance, as well as drawing more foreign investment, including from China. Beijing is already New Delhi’s top import trading partner. A new playbook for the India-China détente is being drafted right now.
The two leaders may convene again in Russia during the BRICS summit in October 2024. Given the Indian media’s attention to Russia and the friendly “troika” of Russia, India, and China, the Russian side may assert itself as a mediator in the Indo-Chinese relationship.
As for “One Belt, One Road”, India is more against the route going through its territory than the initiative in general. It is trying to develop its own transport projects at the same time. The outcome of India’s non-participation in “One Belt, One Road” and other Chinese transport initiatives, such as the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor, is yet to be seen.
Russian experts
Since the late 1990s, the dynamics within the Russia-India-China triangle has changed. The current asymmetry caused by closer ties between China and Russia is damaging to the relationship between India and Russia. The RIC triangle needs more balance, which may be achieved through India and China normalizing their relations.
There is still a risk that the Western countries could interfere in RIC affairs, as Subramanyam Jaishankar, the Indian Foreign Minister, said during his visit to Moscow in December 2023.
India-China relations are full of contradictions that hamper the manifestation of the Asian Century. The current political climate in India discourages unbiased, impartial analysis of its relationship with China.
The Indian academic community lacks quality sinology expertise and competent sinologists in general, even though the China issue has been on the forefront for years. Constant self-comparison with China and other countries is a counterproductive strategy that hinders India’s progress towards genuine strategic autonomy.
India's military circles are a significant influence in shaping the country’s approach towards China, since in case of a conflict between the two nations it is the military that would stand to gain the most from it. Though Indian politicians avoid directly criticizing the PRC, they often condemn the BJP's too lenient stance toward China. This is one of the ways to gain electoral support in major cities.
Improved cooperation with China via multilateral platforms, such as SCO and BRICS, might reduce the existing tensions.
Despite the nature of India’s partnership and close high-level ties with Russia, there are currently no Indian journalists stationed in Russia, and vice versa. This limits the ability of media to produce relevant content about the two countries and thus strengthen informal cooperation between them.
