The problem common to the Russian and US (Western) approaches is that they describe the past and may prove of little use for describing the present and the future
The current debate on the world order’s future mostly boils down to two opposite points of view. The first one presupposes that after the Cold War the world has finally transitioned to a liberal world order. Its supporters describe it as a ‘rules-based order’, implying that ...
... that the U.S. believes the Kremlin and Russian hackers to be one of the key threats. Western politicians’ fears are to a certain extent based on the fact that, after the takeover of Crimea, Russia is viewed as a country that undermines the liberal world order and attempts to promote its own alternative.
It’s easy to understand this thinking if we recall European leaders’ reaction to a statement made by the Russian president in a June 2019 interview with The Financial Times, when he said that ...
... viewpoint, the death of INF is very risky because it might lead us into a world without any arms control whatsoever, not just a world with no bilateral US-Russia arms control agreements.
GT: How would relations among China, the US, and Russia affect world order?
Kortunov:
They would have a very important impact because these countries define the rules of the game. For example, if Russia and the US do not want to disarm, nobody will be ready to disarm. If China and the US cannot agree on free trade,...
... global politics, which will combine liberal functions with other features
In 1984, Robert Keohane acknowledged the possibility of one of the world’s superpowers achieving global hegemony [
1
], and the concept of establishing a unipolar liberal world order led by the United States has dominated scientific and political circles since the collapse of the USSR.
However, in the second decade of the 21
st
century, the mood of publications by Western (primarily American) political scientists has slipped ...
... international security and strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific.
The organizers of the Forum are traditionally Tsinghua University and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. The main theme of the Forum this year was “Stabilizing the World Order: Common Responsibilities, Joint Management, and Shared Benefits”. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) has been participating in the event since 2012, since the Forum was launched. Igor Ivanov, RIAC President, made a report at the ...
... violation of the fundamental norms of international law. Everyone saw it, everyone knew it, but either kept silent or simply could not do anything about it. As a result, three decades’ worth of irreparable damage was caused to the foundations of the world order on which international security had been built since the end of the Second World War.
And then Donald Trump stepped onto the global political scene. Many see him as a revolutionary, a destroyer of the foundations of the familiar world order....
... ‘Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region’ (01 June 2019): "The Indo-Pacific is the [U.S.] Department of Defense’s priority theater...Inter-state strategic competition, defined by geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary concern for U.S. national security...The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy articulate our vision to compete, deter, and win in this environment. Achieving this vision requires combining a ...
... outstripped theory, taking Fukuyama’s ideas to their logical conclusion. While Fukuyama wrote about global democratization, for politicians in Washington at the turn of the century, democratization was reduced to global Americanization, and the ideal world order consisted not in searching for mathematically calibrated balance of interests of “stable democracies,” but in perpetuating the notorious “unipolar moment” that emerged in the world following the self-destruction of the Soviet Union....
... the unlocked doors, open windows, cracked walls, and crumbling ceilings.
Can this chaos put everything back in order? Apparently not just by itself. However, it is clear to me that it would be extremely unwise for both Russia and China to cling to a world order that will soon be gone forever.
There is this opinion that Russia and China are the two largest revisionist powers of the contemporary world. In fact, if we look past the hackneyed political stereotypes, Moscow and Beijing have always tried ...
... pro-active in engaging the US, China and others, as well as through forums like the G20, to ensure that protectionist policies do not win the day.
What kind of global governance could we expect in 10–15 years? What powers will determine the future world order in your opinion? And what place should Russia take?
I would like to think that we will see continued strong international cooperation and properly functioning global governance on key concerns.
Despite the current deterioration in relations ...
