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What Will the Washington—Tehran Psychological Warfare Bring? Jahangir Karami: Iran 2017: Election Race and Outcomes In the first half of 2017 American-Iranian contradictions magnified. President Trump, in the course of his election campaign and after taking office, strongly condemned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for ...
... former partners turned rivals — the United States above all — to acknowledge Russia’s security interests and accept its importance as a power to be reckoned with globally. Moscow’s engagement with the West on issues such as Ukraine, Syria, or Iranian and North Korean nuclear matters is geared to these priorities. With the Minsk II agreement of February 2015, Moscow aims to create an insurmountable constitutional obstacle in Ukraine to Kiev’s accession to NATO and insert a pro-Russian element ...
... continue to exacerbate the already deep-seated, multifaceted struggle for authority between the KRG and the Iraqi central government. The referendum faces strong opposition from the central government in Baghdad as well as the neighboring states of Iran and Turkey who have expressed concerns that independence could inspire separatist claims from their own Kurdish populations. Opposition to Kurdish independence could further exacerbate tensions between these countries, which have been historically ...
... local Sunni tribes from Revolution Commando, supported by American, British, Norwegian and Jordanian special operations forces. At the same time, Washington and Amman will not be promoted to full members of the Astana format and guarantor countries. Iran and Turkey, for their part, will retain their status as guarantor countries in this southern zone, in accordance with the Astana agreements. The newly included territories are not mentioned in the Astana memorandum on de-escalation zones but let ...
... clergy in state affairs and lowering the national economy’s dependence on oil. Prince Mohammad’s liberal views (at least by Saudi Arabian standards) do not stop him from implementing a tough foreign policy. He maintains a firm stance with regard to Iran, the country which Riyadh views as a source of existential threat to Saudi Arabia. In particular, it was Prince Mohammad who made the decision on Saudi Arabia’s direct intervention in the civil war in neighbouring Yemen, an extremely untypical ...
... will respond by asymmetrical means to U.S. Missile Defense deployments and radar systems in Poland and Romania, as well as in Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East. How might the 2013 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear accord with Iran impact U.S. Missile Defense deployments in Europe — particularly given the fact that Iran’s presumed nuclear weapons program and its missile program primarily justified those deployments. Can the U.S., Russia, China and Japan find ways to at ...
Interview with Jahangir Karami, University of Tehran, the Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies On May 20, 2017, Hassan Rouhani won a complete victory as Iran’s president for the second time. Being praised for successful Iranian Nuclear deal implementation and economic recovery during his first term, currently Rouhani has ...
... began their military operation in Syria in the fall of 2015, this is the second attempt to strengthen, qualitatively and quantitatively, the Syrian regular army which has been involved in an armed conflict for many years. Earlier, with Russia’s and Iran’s active support, the Fourth Corps was formed in addition to the earlier established First, Second and Third Corps. The emergence of the new military force has aroused great interest both in Syria and beyond. Observers representing different parties ...
... the other arms of the organization. That is why, at this junction, Qatar’s ties with Hamas did not break the 2014 agreement with the Saudis. Qatar’s ties with Tehran, on the other hand, may prove unacceptable to the Saudis. Despite Hamas’s and Iran’s differences over Syria, Tehran continued to support the military wing of the group, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, while Qatar sponsored its political leadership. Therefore, the situation appeared as though Tehran and Doha were not competing ...
... the UAE and Bahrain, supported by Egypt and Jordan outside the Council, and Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, on the other hand, with Qatar standing somewhat apart from the others with the support of Turkey outside of Council, and recently to a certain extent Iran and Iraq. Oman and Kuwait are being prudent and are loathe to sour relations with either side. It is important to note that Oman opposed the Saudi initiative to unite the GCC armed forces under a joint military command and refused to support Saudi ...
| U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements |
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| U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity |
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| U.S. wants to dissolve Russia |
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| U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China |
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