... the same time, the Russian leadership does not want to get too much involved into Arab-Iranian disputes, since such an involvement would inevitably limit Moscow’s freedom of action in the region. Besides, the nature of Russia’s relations with the GCC group is very different from its relations with Iran: in case of the Islamic Republic the drivers of cooperation are common security concerns and a degree of complementarity of their respective defense sectors, in case of GCC states cooperation
is based
more on economic, educational, and other “soft ...
... Nuclear Deal. The resumption of the JCPOA as a whole is in the interests of all Gulf countries, including Iran. This is also important for Russia since it considers ensuring security in the Gulf a key regional goal. By expanding the dialogue between Iran and the GCC countries Moscow would be seen as an active participant in strengthening the region’s security; hence why Russia is actively promoting its proposals for the creation of a new collective security system in the Gulf”.
First published in
ISPI
.
... coalition, it would be premature to argue that the integrity of the GCC has been successfully restored [
12
]. It is still more difficult to agree on a ‘legitimate’ role for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although some scholars entertain the idea of a GCC+2 (adding Iran and Iraq to the existing GCC group [
13
]), it is clear that such a geographical enlargement of the GCC, even if doable, is not likely to make the Council more efficient.
If we take a broader geographical perspective, we cannot exclude from the list ...
... has poor quality military equipment that would be effective for defensive purposes or as a deterrent, but is not geared towards an offensive assault on another country. Iran seems to have a manpower advantage, but this is not a decisive factor. The GCC has outspent Iran in terms of military equipment, and the UAE’s military arsenal is of far superior quality and sophistication. The U.S. has various security agreements and numerous military bases in the UAE and other GCC countries. The UAE’s close cooperation ...
... session.
For instance—what we are seeing from the UAE in the region would arguably look very different if the U.S.-Saudi Arabia-Iran triangle of engagement took a new turn.
Likewise and although its roots are not the same, what we are seeing vis-a-vis Qatar ... ... considerations. And I would add here that I think it was a huge mistake to enact the blockade of Qatar and threaten a fellow GCC state in such a way, it also exacerbated problems in the sub-region. An unintended bi-product by the way is that it actually ...
... hostility between Washington and Tehran — could be a "EU3 +3" grouping (excluding US, but adding India).
Such a format could be instrumental to work on the basis of the Iranian HOPE project on the one hand and a counterproposal coming from the GCC on the other hand. If both Iran and Saudi Arabia were to join the endeavour launched by this potential EU3+3, a new animal could appear progressively (no love at first sight is to be expected) which could be labelled "P4+4" (China, France, Russia, UK plus India, Iran,...
... is diversity in security policy in Europe and the Gulf. The EU has a specific relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), they have been working on a free trade agreement for some 18 years and it is still not complete. But relations to the EU ... ... stopping and challenging radicalized militias.
Also, over the past 6–7 years, Qatar has started to work very closely with Iran, while Saudi Arabia and Iran have hostile relationships. Iran is responsible for creating great levels of instability in ...
... something. Iran, without whose support countries like Russia and Turkey cannot imagine a successful future for the region, has certainly found itself excluded from such formats.
Another proposal calls for the creation of a format that would bring together the GCC, Iran and Iraq (so-called GCC+2) [
48
]. In the initial phase, this new format might require the participation of external actors, such as the U.S. and Russia. Under its auspices, direct dialogue between the Gulf states could reduce the level of mutual ...
... studying further the issue of creating a security architecture in the region.
Yulia Sveshnikova:
Iran’s Presence in Syria: Is It There for the Long Haul?
Moscow, Beijing and Washington could suggest setting up a security system in the Persian Gulf in the GCC+2 format (adding Iraq and Iran). In addition, Russia traditionally maintains working contacts with Saudi Arabia [
32
] and Iran [
33
]. Moreover, China is a key trading partner for these countries [
34
].
Efforts to reduce tensions between Riyadh and Tehran and strengthen trust ...
... instance, Oman has been actively reinforcing its ties with Iran. Since 2011, it has conducted
joint naval training
with the Iranian fleet. Moreover, Muscat refused to back Saudi Arabia’s campaign against Saleh and the Houthis in Yemen, instead deciding ... ... neutral stance in the conflict, a decision that Riyadh was inclined to view as pro-Houthi.
Another country to have broken from the GCC’s ranks and challenge the Saudis’ leading role was Kuwait. It also refrained from any military involvement in Yemen, trying ...
