... any steps in its relations with Pyongyang that could even in theory jeopardize legitimate Beijing’s interests in the region and beyond. Still, even working hand in hand with each other, Russia and China are not in a position to impose their will on DPRK—the North Korean nation has paid such a high price for its independence that it will never consider becoming a junior partner of either Moscow or Beijing. This attitude is deeply rooted in the very nature of the North Korean state and it is not likely to ...
... worked hard on the issue in the UN Security Council.
However, multilateral diplomacy, as well as the unilateral policy of containment by the United States and its allies, failed to prevent the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The third factor is the DPRK and Russia’s resistance to sanctions. North Korea has been subject to total trade and financial restrictions by the United States since the 1950s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, American sanctions were eased, although a significant portion of them were not lifted. Washington played up ...
... Koreas was made contingent on severing ties with partners on the other side of the 38th parallel. Thus, inter-Korean relations should be a matter of our concern only if the prospect of their degradation into a direct conflict becomes real. For now, given North Korea’s strong defense capabilities and the security guarantees outlined in the new treaty with Russia, such a prospect seems unlikely.
1
. K.V. Babaev, S.G. Luzyanin. A Pivot to the East. Moscow: ICCA RAS, 2024, p.135
2
. External Policy Office of DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Press Statement //
Rodong Sinmun
, 02.07.2024
Results of Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea: Review of the documents adopted and their impact on the security situation in Northeast Asia
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea, or the DPRK, was an important milestone not only in terms of bilateral relations, but it was also the next step toward transforming the global security architecture. One can speak of a self-fulfilling prophecy: in response to pressure from the collective West,...
On scenarios and conditions for the development of relations between Moscow and Pyongyang
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea, or the DPRK, which has been under discussion since January 2024, could not only be perceived as a reciprocal visit after the North Korean leader’s visit to the Russian Far East in the fall of 2023 but also as an extremely important step in bolstering relations ...
... States or, to a lesser extent, with its southern neighbors. The three U.S.-North Korean summits held in 2018-2019 with Donald Trump apparently failed to convince North Korea’s leadership that the United States does not seek a regime change in the DPRK. Following the three rounds of talks, the North Korean position has evolved toward more rigidity rather than flexibility. And after the November 2020 election victory of Joe Biden, who proclaimed the clash between liberal democracies and illiberal autocracies as the main contradiction of our ...
... recognition of DPRK’s status as a nuclear-weapon state.
Second, Pyongyang’s espousing of the law can now be seen as a response to the “escalation of hostilities” on the part of Washington and Seoul (these are the terms traditionally used in North Korea). If the international environment were relatively favorable to the DPRK, as it was under Donald Trump who regularly exchanged personal friendly letters with Kim Jong-un, while we witnessed a high-level discourse with the U.S. and South Korea coupled with a mutual restraint in the military domain, – such an environment ...
... South Korea. China views the balance of power in Northeast Asia primarily through the prism of its confrontation with the United States. Under these conditions, keeping the DPRK afloat is of strategic value to China. In addition, China does not see the DPRK's nuclear programme as a direct threat to itself. North Korean nuclear weapons are perceived by Beijing primarily as a problem for the United States and its allies. That is why China, on the one hand, suppresses attempts by the North Koreans to gain access to materials and components for the nuclear ...
... current state of severe economic turbulence prefers a dominant, state-controlled, centralized economy, while experiments with market economy are phased out
Over the past two or three years, media outlets all across the globe have been emphasizing North Korea’s growing isolation from the outside world, marking the country’s inevitable economic slump, which may potentially lead to the dissolution of the state.
The economic siege appears to come from two fronts: international sanctions and sanctions ...
The Russia-China proposal for a “double freeze” settlement remains the most feasible solution, although far from ideal
Analytical pieces—typically prepared by self-professed experts—abound as to whether denuclearization of North Korea could be possible or what its parameters would be. Such ruminations became particularly popular by the end of Donald Trump’s presidency when the negotiations eventually found themselves in deadlock. However, I would rather call it a “freeze,...
