... without it.
Georgy Toloraya:
A Rift Between the Koreas: Implications for Russian Policy
Furthermore, a complete rejection of Pyongyang as a full-fledged member of the “nuclear club” does not necessarily mean a similar refusal to negotiate with North Korea as a
de-facto
nuclear power. The goal of turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone does not need to be taken off the agenda; however, one should take it as a long-term objective, and it could take several decades to come to a solution. It is also important to understand that even very modest ...
... 2016–2017.
But, in keeping with the pattern of inter-Korean relations, 2018 brought yet another declaration of “the start of a new era.” Following the summits, Moon Jae In and Kim Jong Un solemnly
declared
that there would be no more war on the Korean Peninsula and that the two Koreas would strive for complete denuclearization. Specific measures were taken to reduce military confrontation, and in September 2018, the defense ministers of South Korea and North Korea adopted the Comprehensive Military Agreement, which included
provisions
for establishing buffer zones between the two states. But all these good intentions did not outlive the liberal administration for long and were scrapped with the coming ...
... the country has an irrational fear of North Korea, but has not developed an official position on the issue, and in any case does not have the military might to change the situation on its own.
Thus, a calm, albeit somewhat forced, has fallen on the Korean peninsula – there has been a distinct lack of dramatic twists and turns in the North Korean nuclear programme, which has effectively been frozen against the background of the sluggish negotiations and the fact that neither side has taken any provocative actions of late. And this will suit all parties involved to one degree or other ...
... of the United States, significantly strengthens American military power in the Pacific, doing so to a much greater extent than Japan, still fettered by Article 9 of its Constitution.
Nuclear Issue
In the 1990s, the tangle of security problems on the Korean peninsula was supplemented by the North Korea nuclear crisis. North Korea, in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, announced the development of a nuclear missile program. Pyongyang remembered the calls of the American General Douglas MacArthur, who led ...
... the round table by the staff of the Office of Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, MFA of the Republic of Korea, as well as representatives of the Embassy of South Korea in Moscow.
The discussion touched upon such issues as the state of the US-North Korea dialog, the importance of multilateral mechanisms in achieving the goal of turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, possible economic development projects on the peninsula, and prospects for bilateral cooperation between Russia and the Republic of Korea in the area of security in the Northeast Asia. The roundtable was ...
... cooperation between the North and the South is terminated
Since the beginning of 2019, the solution to the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the issues of providing security assurances for the DPRK have made no progress. Despite several important ... ... regard, but also the United States, counting on the resumption of negotiations and so far refraining from harsh reaction.
So far, North Korea has not been actively implementing its nuclear program. The Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Committee ...
... accordingly, there is no more need for the United Nations Command in Korea. As for the U.S. forces in Korea, their presence should be regulated solely by intergovernmental agreements between South Korea and the U.S.
Peace treaty
The peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula should be signed by the two independent sovereign states, North Korea and South Korea, possibly with guarantees provided by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: Russia, China, the U.S., the UK, and France.
In connection with the inter-Korean summits of 2019, the question arose several times ...
... and the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Korea took part in the discussion.
The round table was moderated by Woo Yun Keun, Ambassador of South Korea. The discussion focused on various dimensions of the issues of eliminating nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, including the state and prospects of the U.S.-North Korean negotiations, the role of multilateral formats, and the positions of Russia, China, and South Korea on security issues in North-East Asia. Additionlally, the discussion touched upon the issues of the development of an expert-analytical dialog ...
... some realities do emerge, which will indicate that it is beginning of a great gamble by both sides. This issue had crossed the limit of being a bilateral one and it impacts other stakeholders as well, hence this may not be the last call on peace of Korean Peninsula. In real terms North Korea continues to be saddled with continued economic sanctions and US continues to be suspicious of implementation of the complete, irreversible, verifiable denuclearization, hence will lift sanctions only ‘when nukes are no longer an issue’....
... implementation
. Markets for arms transfers remain open to the North in Asia, Africa and Latin America; the interdiction of illicit cargo remains weak in practice. This regime will continue to be significant even if peace prevails. If a final settlement allows North Korea to retain its nuclear capabilities, then it is imperative that the international community continues to monitor and interdict proliferation streams. Otherwise, the Korean peninsula might become the nexus for global nuclear proliferation.
In hindsight, the truce of 1914 was not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning. Likewise, the truce of 2018 is only the first stage in a prolonged, multi-part process....
