... context of the armed conflict in Ukraine. In 2024, this debate centered on amendments to Russia’s official Military Doctrine on nuclear deterrence, which were promulgated in November of that year. The issue gained even greater urgency following the victory ... ... election in November. These developments will have a tangible impact on the prospects for nuclear arms control, the arms race, strategic stability and the likelihood of nuclear war.
Nuclear weapons in Russia’s Military Doctrine
The Stabilizing “Basic ...
... noteworthy that the new version drops the phrase “compliance with international arms control obligations” as one of the nuclear deterrence principles.
Pyotr Topychkanov, Head of Section for New Challenges in South and Southeast Asia at the Primakov ... ... the role of nuclear weapons in meeting these challenges. It is hardly possible to assess the doctrine's impact on the state of strategic stability in its regional and global dimensions in isolation from developments in the situation. For example, the test ...
... can be inflicted through the ‘
application of calibrated damage
’. By placing an increased emphasis on ‘
strategic non-nuclear deterrence
’ since 2014, Russia has raised the threshold for nuclear use. That being said, while some of the Russian ... ... of recurrent bilateral interactions. Although Russia has rejected the recent U.S. proposal to
resum
e systematic dialogue on strategic stability and arms control, both states should continue to seek other opportunities—whether as a track-1.5 format ...
... rely on independent expertise. It attributes more than 1,900 TNWs to Russia [SIPRI Yearbook 2022: 355-368]. However, until recently, tactical nuclear weapons did not feature in Russia’s official documents and declarations.
There is another paradox of nuclear deterrence associated with the phenomenon of limited nuclear war. The enhancement of strategic stability [
37
] through the START treaties and some weapons programs of Russia and the United States since the early 1990s has made a first nuclear strike at the strategic level impossible, as both sides have lost the ability to launch a disarming ...
... public domain, and it was obvious that this would attract a lot of attention in certain circles.
The first goal was probably to emphasize once again Russia’s interest in this area in the context of an "unhealthy" situation in the field of strategic stability, as well as with the extension of the START.
One of the positive aspects of the document itself is a clear classification of both military risks and threats to be neutralized by the implementation of nuclear deterrence: deployment by states "which consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary" of missile defense systems and means, deployment of nuclear weapons, build-up of the general purpose forces groupings in the territories ...
