... the realities that developed without Saakashvili’s participation. And how did Georgian Dream react to this? One of its most prominent members, Mayor of Tbilisi Kakha Kaladze, welcomed Moscow’s willingness to help, but
called for
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a starting point.
Russian troops do not hinder Georgia’s reconciliation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, either at the level of peoples, as Tbilisi claims, or at the level of states, as Moscow suggests. Their presence guarantees ...
... through instruments of power, such as the Eastern Partnership (EaP) which aims to promote European values without taking into account the possibility that a state in the South Caucasus may differ in the way it wishes and should develop.
William Eggerton:
Abkhazia, Georgia and Russia: Future Prospectsa
In the eyes of many EU citizens, the EaP is a means of promoting EU’s identity such as democracy, while non-Europeans would point out such an instrument has been implemented to achieved an economic and/or political superiority ...
... Paper 7 [online]. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press. [Viewed 14 February 2021]. Available From:
https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u35361/2012%20Paper%207.pdf
Kolstø, P., (2019). Biting the hand that feeds them? Abkhazia-Russian client-patron relations.
Post-Soviet Affairs
. [online]. 36(2), pp. 140-158. [Viewed 14 February 2021]. Available from
https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2020.1712987
Lavrelashvili, T & Van Hecke, S., Georgia is ready to apply for membership by ...
... contemporary Chinese diplomacy at the UN, bilateral relations with Moscow (Crimea, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia), Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh), and the West (Kosovo).
The report also bears witness to the upcoming ambivalence of relations with Russia, which wants China to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia (
de jure
independent according to Russia and
de jure
part of Georgia according to the West).
On reading the CIA report, it is clear that Beijing will not vote in favour of diplomatic recognition of any
de facto
states in ...
The decision to recognize Abkhazia underlines growing competition between the West and Russia
Abkhazia is a partially recognized state — Russia (2008), Nicaragua (2008), Venezuela (2009), Nauru (2009), Syria (2018) — of 8,660km2 and 240,000 inhabitants located on the shores of the Black Sea. During the Soviet times, the region was one of the ...
... regional energy security in the Greater Caucasus was held at Savoy Hotel in Moscow. Timur Makhmutov, RIAC Deputy Director of Programs, made welcoming remarks.
The event was organized by RIAC partners: the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, HSE, International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN), and National Energy Security Fund.
The following issues were considered during the expert meeting: the development of the electric power industry in Georgia and Abkhazia, the prospects for oil and gas projects in the Greater Caucasus and in the Caspian Sea area.
The conference also touched upon some issues that had been earlier discussed the
joint RIAC and ICCN conference
.
... negotiations, the situation deteriorates every so often, as was the case in February 2017. Although certain aspects of the conflict do deter the parties from repeating the events of April 2016, the threat still remains. One such aspect is the fact that the Russian-Turkish relationship has acquired a pragmatic nature (the genuine improvement of relations between the two countries is a distant prospect yet).
The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are being transformed, with the main problem there now being internal development, rather than a confrontation with Georgia. After Moscow recognized Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence, it actually became their guarantor ...
... “radicalized” Georgian nationalism; it became more belligerent towards perceived threats from minorities, especially Ossetians and Abkhaz” (Suny 1994, 317-323; Zürcher 2005, 90). For Devdariani (2005) Gamsakhurdia and his movement “perceived Abkhazia and South Ossetia as simply tools for Russian pressure directed against Georgian independence…"[C]oncerns of [their] local elites…[were ignored and]…tensions spiraled into violent clashes…[They failed] to see how...[their] own quest for independence challenged ...
... independence, the former disagreed with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, France, Britain, and China) about the prospects for the work of the UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia) on the territory of Abkhazia. For Russia, Abkhazia was an independent state, while the other permanent members of the UN Security Council considered it to be an integral part of Georgia. On June 15, 2009, Russia vetoed a technical rollover, thereby blocking an extension of the presence of the ...
... create a constructive spirit and search for solutions to many very difficult problems in Russian–Georgian relations. As for Russia’s actions, we do not understand the reasoning behind the decision to sign new integration agreements with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia). The Russian side insists that there is nothing new in these agreements. If this is the case, then it is not clear why they would want to spoil a good start. On the other hand, in reality we can see that these agreements contain much that is new. And this ...
