... threaten the Americans with consequences where they would not be able to use their economic and other advantages.
They would be faced with either an ignominious defeat or nuclear strikes on their allies and their overseas bases.
At first they said that Russia would never use nuclear weapons, so they could continue the war to the last Ukrainian and to the exhaustion of Russia. Then, after receiving signals from Russia, they stopped talking about that and started talking about the need to avoid World War III, the need to stop ...
... weapons in Ukraine, we are talking only about conventional weapons.” Former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu
noted
: “From a military point of view, there is no need to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine to achieve the set goals. The main purpose of Russian nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack.”
Meanwhile, Western reactions to the nuclear debate in Russia grew increasingly harsh. While NATO’s potential response was discussed in rather vague terms, the administration’s officials and experts ...
... against Russian territory and this batch is used beyond the conditions of the Russian nuclear doctrine? Such a strike could be carried out in the expectation that Moscow will not dare to attack targets on the territory of NATO countries, much less use nuclear weapons. However, it would be reckless to hope that the Russian leadership would swallow such an attack, especially if it causes significant damage and casualties.
Indeed, the destruction of targets on the territory of NATO countries is fraught with a direct military clash with the Alliance. However, a nuclear ...
... “nuclear alliances”, up to the phrase “an attack by one means an attack by all.” The mention of strikes using nuclear weapons or other types of WMD against Russian bases or forces outside Russian territory, which could also lead to the use of Russian nuclear weapons, also catches the eye. The previously existing principle of nuclear deterrence continuity up to the use of nuclear weapons has remained intact. What may come after such use is still a matter of question, but it is unlikely to be anything ...
... Union State, approved in 2021, will be harmonized. It allows the Russian “nuclear umbrella” to be fully extended to deter non-nuclear threats to Belarus from, for instance, NATO members. This “umbrella” has been reinforced by the stationing of Russian nuclear arms in Belarus and joint exercises to practice the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons. These changes are clearly warranted, given the situation on the ground (and in the air). At the same time, cooperation within the Union State in non-strategic nuclear weapons is closely linked to the escalation of military confrontation ...
... nuclear weapons, the need for denuclearization and almost a ban on atomic bombs, understands the situation in which Russia finds itself. It also understands the need to strengthen deterrence, even though it professes the doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons.
This means that Russia must qualitatively intensify its work with friendly countries on nuclear policy and convince our partners that lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is aimed at eliminating their use, or at least reducing the risk of such a step....
... linked to the great powers, are painful and destructive, but implicitly motivated by the need to resolve the contradictions impeding the new world order’s formation.
In the fall of 2024, such an understanding is in need of correction.
First,
regarding nuclear weapons. It is not that they have ceased to function as a deterrent. Their possession by Russia, China—and to some extent Israel—does deter those states’ adversaries from actions that they would likely otherwise take to achieve success. But the Ukraine conflict has forced the world to reconsider the limits of nuclear deterrence, i.e....
... prosperity in the understanding of the political establishment and its sponsors. In recent years, we have seen many examples of the US treating its European or Asian allies very harshly. Germany lost its economic privileges during the conflict between Russia and the West. France was reduced to the position of America’s junior partner, although it itself has some nuclear weapons. Similarly, Japan and South Korea find themselves with foreign policy largely determined by Washington, often through direct pressure, leaving them with little opportunity to influence the outcome. None of the listed countries in the world ...
... dictate the rules of the game.
Russian President Vladimir Putin alluded to this fact during his meeting with soldiers’ mothers in December 2022. Responding to a suggestion to renounce the option of a nuclear first strike, he remarked: “Regarding Russia never using nuclear weapons first under any circumstances… If it does not use them first, then it would not be the second to use them either, because in the case of a nuclear strike at our territory, our capabilities will be significantly limited.
[10]
This means ...
....
It is also worth recalling that our good-neighbourly relations with China are based, among other things, on conventional arms control in border areas (Shanghai and Moscow agreements), and the relevant control body recently met again in Astana. The Russian-Chinese mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other also plays a significant role.
Zhao Huasheng, Andrey Kortunov:
Prepare for the Worst and Strive for the Best. Russia’s and China’s Perceptions of Developments in International Security
There is also a Russian-Chinese ...
