... relations with Moscow are unfriendly or, at best, uncertain. It is no coincidence that serious
discussions
have recently
unfolded
in Germany, Japan and South Korea, as well as in Taiwan and Ukraine, about the costs and benefits of acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
Regardless of the progress of the peace process in the Ukrainian conflict, resuming the U.S.–Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue will be a daunting challenge. In any case, the U.S. will likely make China’s involvement in arms limitation efforts a mandatory condition. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility of Washington leaving the New START before its extended expiration date in February 2026 under the pretext of alleged Russian “violation” ...
... linked to the great powers, are painful and destructive, but implicitly motivated by the need to resolve the contradictions impeding the new world order’s formation.
In the fall of 2024, such an understanding is in need of correction.
First,
regarding nuclear weapons. It is not that they have ceased to function as a deterrent. Their possession by Russia, China—and to some extent Israel—does deter those states’ adversaries from actions that they would likely otherwise take to achieve success. But the Ukraine conflict has forced the world to reconsider the limits of nuclear deterrence, i.e., to define ...
... conflict between Russia and the West. France was reduced to the position of America’s junior partner, although it itself has some nuclear weapons. Similarly, Japan and South Korea find themselves with foreign policy largely determined by Washington, often ... ... radical movements in Syria receive support from abroad, which has little effect on Russia’s relations with their sponsors. China at one time actively used radical Marxist movements in the countries of Southeast Asia and provided them with various assistance....
... relations with China are based, among other things, on conventional arms control in border areas (Shanghai and Moscow agreements), and the relevant control body recently met again in Astana. The Russian-Chinese mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other also plays a significant role.
Zhao Huasheng, Andrey Kortunov:
Prepare for the Worst and Strive for the Best. Russia’s and China’s Perceptions of Developments in International Security
There is also a Russian-Chinese agreement on notifications of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. It is possible to use such mechanisms in the future to reduce regional ...
... continuation of this practice. China, for its part, intends to build up its nuclear arsenal rather than reduce it, probably with a view to achieving parity with the US and Russia in the long term. The Americans, who have officially identified Russia and China as the main threats to their security, are considering how to balance the combined nuclear potential of Moscow and Beijing. So there is no hope here.
The main problem, however, is not the quantity of nuclear weapons or even their presence per se, but the quality of relations between states. The world order is experiencing an acute systemic crisis. In the past, such crises inevitably led to wars. Now nuclear deterrence is working, albeit with some ...
... 24 hours, and 121 carriers or 1,139 charges within 30 days. Of particular significance are the U.S. plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons, including medium-range missiles, which further increases their strike potential. In this context, the development ... ... defense system in the Asia Pacific calls global strategic stability into question, because it could be used against Russia and China. In 2018, the head of Russian diplomacy insistently
urged
Japan to enter into a dialogue about the U.S. plans to create ...
... polycentrism. The bipolar system of the Cold War period was based on mutual deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction. The split between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China in the late 1950s logically led to the emergence of China’s own nuclear weapons. The claims of Great Britain and France to the status of great powers in the post-WWII world also found its expression in their nuclear programs. India’s rise as a great power also has a nuclear dimension. With the exception of the two ...
... powers to resurrect the JCPOA agreement with Iran or to keep the North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic ambitions at bay. The US-China last year mini-détente remains very fragile and might turn into another cycle of escalating tensions. The global economy ... ... ongoing Russia-Ukraine armed conflict millions of soldiers have been fighting for two years, using almost all heavy weapons except nuclear weapons such as airplanes, tanks, artillery, warships, missiles, etc., and the U.S. and the NATO countries are already ...
... members, or signatories, to the Treaty, including all major space-faring nations.
The document not only bans the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space, but also prohibits the establishment of military bases, testing ... ... military space forces, or the placement of conventional weapons in space. Since 1967 many countries, including the US, Russia, China and India have conducted a variety of unhindered tests of anti-satellite weapons prototypes. So far, the most visible impact ...
... building nuclear ties with both Moscow and Washington.
Islamabad’s nuclear program is traditionally alleged to be backed by China. Pakistan has been set to overcome New Delhi’s demographic superiority by “eating grass” to create its A-bomb [
iv
... .... In other words, one can witness a particular asymmetry within the subregion: Pakistan has obtained low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons to
balance
out New Delhi’s larger conventional army.
Even more dangerous is that nuclear clashes may take place ...
