... administration clearly shows, when the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty and actually refused to negotiate extending START-3. Apparently, he believes that the United States is in a position to outspend and to outperform any military adversary, Russia including. In addition, any new full-fledged format of strategic arms control could no longer be bilateral, but has to become multilateral, taking into account the nuclear missile arsenals of third countries. It is crystal-clear that Trump is much more concerned about the fast-growing military capacities of China rather ...
... Impacts
Andrey Kortunov:
Does the Non-Proliferation Regime Have Any Future?
Official nuclear powers are threatening not only each other but also to
middle powers and small states
. At least three out of the five NWSs (nuclear weapon states)—China, Russia and the US—have direct stakes in the region. However, the crippled arms control system has not been trilateralized as China has refused to be included in the configuration, nodding to its incomparably smaller nuclear arsenal. Notwithstanding the discovery of numerous silos in the PRC described further, Moscow and Washington’s ...
... the Moscow SORT Treaty (2002), and the New START (2010).
51
. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.
President of Russia
21.02.2023.
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565
(accessed 01.07.2023).
52
. Statement by the Head of the Russian Delegation during the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control, A. Yu. Mazur at the plenary session of the Joint Consultative Group on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Vienna, March 10, 2015.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
.
https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/at/1505429/
...
... for the post-START period, separating strategic arms control from the broader scope of problematic issues in relations.
Fashion for the 1980s
Alexander Yermakov:
The Nuclear Triad: Alternatives from the Days Gone By and Possible Futures
Although some Russian speakers have criticized Sullivan’s references to the times of the Cold War, when the two countries were engaged in arms control despite their confrontation, we see in fact a situation that closely resembles the fate of the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2). The agreement, which has no legal basis for political reasons, continues to ...
... potential of nuclear deterrence [
1
], which meant
that additional
steps
needed to be taken to bypass an adversary’s missile defence systems. All this made sure that missile defence has inevitably made a comeback as one of the most pressing issues in arms control.
Igor Ivanov:
Quo Vadis ?
However, Russia’s official rhetoric accompanying the demolition of the ABM Treaty was surprisingly restrained. In his December 2001 statement on the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty, the Republican President George W. Bush
emphasized
, “Today’s Russia is ...
... of weapons to what the UN Security Council has designated a terrorist organization.
This is not the first time that Washington has violated a UN Security Council Resolution. For example,
a statement
by Sergei Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, suggests that the United States released four Taliban members from Guantanamo in 2014, all of whom were on the Security Council sanctions list, to send them to the Middle East.
Ivan Timofeev:
Afghanistan in the Grip of Sanctions
This ...
... instituted. The broad agenda was divided into three negotiating tracks, and the USSR ultimately agreed to consider them separately, which resulted in the signing of the INF Treaty and New START. Today, Moscow is far more open when it comes to verification in arms control. Russia’s conceptual approach to talks with the U.S., the so-called “strategic equation,” does indeed entail determining the interrelation between all the factors affecting strategic stability; however, this approach does not require—as far as ...
... nothing of China). Due to a long break in the talks (2010-2021), Russia is going back to the Soviet traditions, when some information provided to the sarcastically termed “potential partners” under the New START terms is kept secret even from the Russian public.
Naturally, arms control should not be idealized; it is not free of its own contradictions. This process is regularly thrown off course by political conflicts between superpowers (around Afghanistan in 1979, Yugoslavia in 1999, and Crimea and Donbass in 2014) and ...
... Geneva can jump-start a dialogue, at least at the ad hoc level.
An important background factor for the summit is the growing confrontation between the United States and China. Washington views Beijing as a more dangerous and difficult adversary than Russia. In arms control negotiations, China’s growing military capabilities are becoming an important variable. The Trump administration has tried to persuade Moscow to engage in a trilateral arms control discussion involving Beijing. The idea was rejected by ...
... increasingly focus on deterrence and risk management in their relations with Russia.
It was noted that following a series of unsuccessful outreaches to Russia by NATO members, the Allies do not feel they should be the
demandeurs
in terms of the reset with Russia or for arms control initiatives. A UK participant observed that recent efforts by Western European states to reach out to Russia, including President Emmanuel Macron’s initiative and the visit to Moscow by EU High Representative Josep Borrell, bore no fruit ...
